UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
KHEPRA KESUANU ANU,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 26-2250 (JEB)
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Khepra Anu has brought this pro se action under the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
contending that multiple banks and consumer-reporting agencies (CRAs) have neglected to
correct inaccurate information on his credit report. While some Defendants have settled and
others have filed answers, Truist Bank now moves to dismiss. As it correctly points out that the
Amended Complaint never alleges that its reporting of an outstanding balance was factually
inaccurate, the Court will grant the Motion.
I. Background
According to the Amended Complaint, which must be presumed true at this stage, the
seven named Defendants — three CRAs and four banks — “fail[ed] to maintain accurate
consumer credit information and to conduct reasonable reinvestigations of Plaintiff’s timely
written disputes.” ECF No. 19 (Am. Compl.), ¶ 1. Although Anu “submitted written dispute
notices on July 22, 2025[,] and September 20, 2025[,] . . . the consumer reporting agency
Defendants continued to report the disputed derogatory information, and the furnisher
Defendants verified and continued that reporting rather than correcting or deleting it, in violation
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of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.” Id., ¶ 2. More specifically, one CRA, Experian Information
Solutions, Inc., “reports a Truist Bank credit card account . . . with a credit limit of $500, an
account status of charge-off, $700 written off, and $700 past due, reflecting a payment history of
30-, 60-, 90-, and 120-day late payments prior to charge-off.” Id., ¶ 33. Although Anu disputed
this account, Truist, “[u]pon receiving notice of the dispute from the consumer reporting
agencies,” “failed to conduct a reasonable investigation and failed to correct, update, or delete its
furnishing of the account.” Id., ¶ 34.
While the Amended Complaint contains four counts, only the third — for violation of the
FCRA — names Truist. Id., ¶¶ 50–57. The bank now moves to dismiss. See ECF No. 24-1
(MTD).
II. Legal Standard
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a claim for relief
when the complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” In evaluating a
motion to dismiss, the court must treat “well-pleaded factual allegations as true” and draw “all
reasonable inferences” in the plaintiff’s favor. Animal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Vilsack, 111 F.4th
1219, 1223 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citation omitted); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009). The court must also consider factual allegations in an opposition to a motion to dismiss
where the plaintiff is pro se. Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146, 152 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). A court need not accept as true, however, “a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation,” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in the complaint. Trudeau v.
FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although “detailed factual allegations” are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), “a complaint must contain sufficient
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factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Though a plaintiff may survive a Rule
12(b)(6) motion even if “recovery is very remote and unlikely,” the facts alleged in the complaint
“must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555–56 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).
III. Analysis
Anu entitles his third count against Truist (and the other three banks) “Violation of 15
U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) — Furnisher Liability.” Am. Compl. at ECF p. 12. The Fair Credit
Reporting Act, located in that part of the U.S. Code, was enacted “to ensure fair and accurate
credit reporting, promote efficiency in the banking system, and protect consumer privacy.”
Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007). “As an important means to this end, the
Act sought to make ‘consumer reporting agencies exercise their grave responsibilities [in
assembling and evaluating consumers’ credit, and disseminating information about consumers’
credit] with fairness, impartiality, and a respect for the consumer’s right to privacy.’” Gorman v.
Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 584 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a)(4)). “Section 1681s-2 sets forth ‘[r]esponsibilities of furnishers of information to
consumer reporting agencies.’” Id. at 1154. Here, neither party disputes that Truist is a
“furnisher” of information for FCRA purposes. Cf. Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595
F.3d 26, 35 (1st Cir. 2010) (quoting H.R. Rep. 108-263, at 24 (2003)) (listing common types of
furnishers).
The Act imposes certain obligations on furnishers. Relevant here, “a furnisher incurs
[additional duties] under § 1681s-2(b) if a consumer disputes the accuracy of information that the
furnisher reports.” Himmelstein v. Comcast of the Dist., LLC, 931 F. Supp. 2d 48, 52 (D.D.C.
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2013) (citation omitted). “If a consumer notifies the CRA that he disputes the accuracy of an
item in his file, [the] FCRA requires the CRA to notify the furnisher of the dispute.” Id. (citing
§ 1681i(a)(2)). Once notified, a furnisher must:
(a) conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed
information;
(b) review all relevant information provided by the [CRA]
pursuant to section 1681i(a)(2) of this title;
(c) report the results of the investigation to the [CRA]; [and]
(d) if the investigation finds that the information is incomplete
or inaccurate, report those results to all other consumer reporting
agencies to which the person furnished the information and that
compile and maintain files on consumers on a nationwide
basis . . . .
§ 1681s-2(b)(1). Put another way, “a private citizen wishing to bring an action against a
furnisher must first file a dispute with the consumer reporting agency, which then must notify the
furnisher of information that a dispute exists. Only after this notification can the furnisher face
any liability to a private individual.” SimmsParris v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 652 F.3d 355, 359
(3d Cir. 2011); see also Gibbs v. SLM Corp., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D. Mass. 2004) (“While
there is not unanimity on the issue, ‘[t]he majority of courts that have considered the issue’ have
concluded that there is a private cause of action under § 1681s-2(b) . . . .’”) (citations omitted).
Although the D.C. Circuit has yet to weigh in, other courts have listed the elements
required to successfully plead an FCRA claim in these circumstances. The Eleventh Circuit, for
instance, has held that “[f]irst, a plaintiff cannot recover on a § 1681s-2(b) claim without
identifying inaccurate or incomplete information that the furnisher provided to the reporting
agency[,] . . . [a]nd second, to prove an investigation was unreasonable, a plaintiff must point out
‘some facts the furnisher could have uncovered that establish that the reported information was,
in fact, inaccurate or incomplete.’” Milgram v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 72 F.4th 1212, 1218
(11th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted); see also Hughes v. IQ Data Int’l, Inc., 2016 WL 7406993
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(N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2016) (“A plaintiff is required to plead and prove four elements to prevail on
an FCRA claim against a credit furnisher: ‘(1) a credit reporting inaccuracy existed on plaintiff's
credit report; (2) plaintiff notified the consumer reporting agency that plaintiff disputed the
reporting as inaccurate; (3) the consumer reporting agency notified the furnisher of the alleged
inaccurate information of the dispute; and (4) the furnisher failed to investigate the inaccuracies
or further failed to comply with the requirements in 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(b)(1)(A)–(E).’”) (citation
omitted).
In this case, Truist does not deny that Anu notified the CRAs about the Truist charge, that
the CRA informed it, or that it had an obligation to conduct an investigation. Instead, it
maintains that Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled the inadequacy of such investigation or that the
information passed on to the CRAs was in fact false. See MTD at 1, 4–6. The Court need only
consider the latter point.
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that Experian “reports a Truist Bank credit card
account . . . with a credit limit of $500, an account status of charge-off, $700 written off, and
$700 past due, reflecting a payment history of 30-, 60-, 90-, and 120-day late payments prior to
charge-off.” Am. Compl., ¶ 33. While Anu states that he “disputed this account in his July 22,
2025[,] and September 20, 2025[,] written disputes,” id., ¶ 34, he never alleges that these sums
were not past due or that there was any other inaccuracy. In other words, he may well have
owed $700 and not made prompt payments on the debt. If Truist is not responsible for any
actual inaccuracy on his credit report, he has not made out a claim against the bank.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Truist’s Motion to Dismiss. An Order so
stating will issue this day.
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/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
Chief Judge
Date: September 22, 2026
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