IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2025-KA-00515-COA
STEPHANIE FORD APPELLANT
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI APPELLEE
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 02/12/2025
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JAMES D. BELL
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: HINDS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
BY: AMBER LAUREN STEWART
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: ABBIE EASON KOONCE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY: JODY EDWARD OWENS II
NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY
DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/22/2026
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., WESTBROOKS AND McCARTY, JJ.
WESTBROOKS, J., FOR THE COURT:
¶1. A jury convicted Stephanie Ford of shooting into an occupied dwelling in violation
of Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-37-29 (Rev. 2020). The circuit court sentenced
Ford to serve ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. Ford
now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction defining reasonable
doubt and that the trial court erred in admitting video surveillance evidence that was not
properly authenticated. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
FACTS
¶2. On May 8, 2023, police responded to a report of a shooting at a quadruplex on Skyview Drive in Jackson. Resident Rasheka Harris reported that a woman she recognized
(but knew only by her nickname “Black”) came to Harris’ door and beat on it with a hammer
before retrieving a gun from her car and firing shots at Harris’ apartment. Based on the
subsequent investigation, Ford was identified as the suspect and arrested. Harris identified
Ford in a lineup. Ford was charged with shooting into an occupied dwelling.
¶3. At trial, Harris testified that she knew Ford because Ford used to date Harris’ uncle.
On the day of the shooting, Harris was sitting on the stairs outside her second-story apartment
door having a phone conversation when she saw Ford climbing up the stairs toward her. Ford
was wielding a hammer, yelling Harris’ name and profanity. Harris rushed inside and closed
her door. Harris testified that Ford then “started hitting on the door with the hammer, saying,
‘Open up the door. Open up the door’ . . . and was kicking on it and pulling on the
doorknob.” Harris said that the hammer looked like a “f[l]atheaded hammer; not like a
nailing hammer.” Harris was worried that Ford would break in and start hitting her with the
hammer, so Harris went to the kitchen window to show Ford that she was calling the police.
¶4. However, Ford had gone back downstairs. Harris opened the door and observed Ford
retrieving a gun from a gray Honda. Ford fired shots up at the apartment as Harris ran back
inside, taking shelter in the back of the apartment. After Ford left, Harris observed bullet hole
damage to the outside walls of the building, her kitchen window, and the door of her
apartment. The door was also damaged with hammer marks. She testified that the dents in
the door were not there before the incident. Harris later heard that Ford had taken issue with
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a Facebook post by Harris that Ford had taken to be directed at her. Harris testified that she
does not own a gun and did not have a gun in the apartment. Body-camera footage and
photographs were introduced showing the damage to the door and holes in the kitchen
window.
¶5. No other witnesses testified to directly seeing the incident. The manager of the
apartment complex sent the police a disc of the video surveillance capturing the parking lot
during the relevant time span of the incident. The video shows a woman retrieve a gun from
a gray Honda and then shoot repeatedly up at Harris’ apartment from ground level before
getting in the car and driving off quickly.1 At trial, the State introduced the video surveillance
through the investigating officer, who testified that he received it from the apartment
complex and that the video shown at trial was the same video he received. The video is
slightly blurry, and the investigator acknowledged that he could only describe the woman as
a dark-skinned female with long hair, and he could not tell her identity from the video alone.
The video was admitted over Ford’s undue prejudice objection.
¶6. Chrishawna Paige was the only witness for the defense. She testified that Ford is like
a sister to her and that she calls her “sister.” Paige further testified that she was visiting a
friend at the apartments, and that while she was at her car to retrieve some items, she heard
gunfire. She claimed that when she looked up, she saw Harris shooting a gun from her
balcony. Paige did not see who she was shooting toward. She testified that she did not
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Another person, who is not visible in the video, was driving the car.
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observe Ford to be present.
¶7. After the close of testimony, during the jury instruction conference, the trial court
refused the defense’s proposed Jury Instructions D-3 and D-4. D-3 stated:
The phrase “beyond a reasonable doubt” means that you must have a strong
and abiding conviction that the State has shown the guilty [sic] of Stephanie
Ford. You must be persuaded as you would want to be persuaded about the
most important concerns of your lives. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must
be proof of such a convincing character that you would not hesitate to rely and
act upon it in the most important concerns of your own personal affairs. If your
view of the evidence, or lack of evidence, makes you doubt Stephanie Ford is
guilty because you have not been persuaded that the State has shown the guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, then it is your duty to acquit [Stephanie Ford].
D-4 stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that Stephanie Ford is entitled to a verdict of all
12 jurors, of whom on the whole of the evidence, and after free consultation
with their fellow jurors, must be free from any reasonable doubt in their minds.
Each juror should be allowed to have their own conception of what a
reasonable doubt is to them. Each member of the jury is under no legal
compulsion to give or to be able to formulate and state the reason which may
raise a reasonable doubt in their mind and conscience. It any one of you, in
fact, have a reasonable doubt, then Stephanie Ford is entitled to your
individual vote of “Not Guilty” on the verdict.
The State objected to the proposed instructions as an attempt to define reasonable doubt. The
record reflects the following exchange:
COURT: There have been some very recent Supreme Court
opinions that discourage attempts to define reasonable
doubt. This looks like an instruction that has been
approved in the past. I’m going to pass[].
ATTORNEY: You’re going to what?
COURT: Pass on it until I see all the instructions.
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¶8. The State proposed Jury Instruction S-2, which stated:
The Court instructs the jury that you are bound, in deliberating upon this case,
to give the defendant the benefit of any reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt that arises out of the evidence or want of evidence in this case. There is
always reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilty [sic] when the evidence
simply makes it probable that the defendant is guilty. Mere probability of guilt
will never warrant you to convict the defendant. It is only when, after
examining the evidence on the whole, you are able to say on your oaths,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is guilty, that the law will permit
you to find her guilty; and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that she is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find the
defendant “Not Guilty.”
The following exchange occurred:
DEFENSE: I object to S-2.
STATE: S-2 is what – the problem that I had with D-4. It basically
says what D-4 says but in the proper way.
DEFENSE: It says there’s always reasonable doubt to a defendant’s
guilt.
COURT: S-2 will be granted. That brings me back to D-4, which
is duplicitous and refused for that reason. I don’t want
too many instructions.
Two other given instructions referenced reasonable doubt. The jury was instructed that the
State “must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty”
and that the “presumption of innocence attends the Defendant throughout the trial and
prevails at the trial’s close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the Jury of their
guilty [sic] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Additionally, the elements instruction stated that the
jury must find each of the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
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¶9. The jury found Ford guilty, and she now appeals.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10. “Jury instructions are generally within the discretion of the trial court, and the settled
standard of review is abuse of discretion.” Butler v. State, 424 So. 3d 429, 433 (¶11) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2025) (quoting Johnson v. State, 252 So. 3d 597, 599 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2017)).
“When reviewing a trial court’s admission of evidence, this Court applies an
abuse-of-discretion standard of review.” Crutcher v. State, 68 So. 3d 724, 733 (¶16) (Miss.
Ct. App. 2011).
DISCUSSION
I. Whether the trial court erred in giving a jury instruction that
attempted to define “reasonable doubt.”
¶11. On appeal, Ford argues that the trial court erred in giving Jury Instruction S-2 because
the instruction was an attempt to define reasonable doubt. Our supreme court has
“consistently asserted that ‘[r]easonable doubt defines itself.’” Lett v. State, 902 So. 2d 630,
638 (¶27) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (¶12) (Miss.
2003)). Such an instruction is improper because it “in effect tells jurors that they should be
able to state a reason why they have a doubt. Such an instruction is erroneous because, in our
jurisprudence, jurors are never required to articulate any explanation of their decision.” Id.
at (¶28) (quoting Isaacks v. State, 337 So. 2d 928, 930 (Miss. 1976)); see also Boutwell v.
State, 165 Miss. 16, 143 So. 479 (1932).
¶12. Consistent with this long line of precedent, this Court has affirmed the refusal of
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instructions similar to the instruction given in this case. In Williams v. State, 94 So. 3d 324,
332-33 (¶29) (Miss. Ct. App. 2011), we affirmed the denial of a request for a defense
instruction that stated:
The Court instructs the Jury that that [sic] you are bound, in deliberating upon
this case, to give . . . Williams, [sic] the benefit of any reasonable doubt that
arises out of the evidence or lack of evidence in this case. There is always
reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt when the evidence simply makes it
probable that . . . Williams is guilty. Mere probability of guilt will never call
for you to convict . . . Williams. It is only when, after examining the evidence
on the whole, you are able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that . . . Williams is guilty that the law will permit you to find him guilty. You
might be able to say that you believe beyond a reasonable doubt, that he is
guilty, and yet, if you are not able to say on your oaths, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that . . . Williams is guilty, it is your sworn duty to find . . . Williams,
“Not Guilty.”
In affirming the denial, we noted the “long-standing rule that defining ‘reasonable doubt’ for
the jury is improper.” Id. (quoting Colburn v. State, 990 So. 2d 206, 217 (¶35) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2008)). We further reiterated that “jurors are never required to articulate any
explanation of their decision.” Id. (quoting Lett, 902 So. 2d at 638 (¶28)).
¶13. While such an instruction is improper, here we must determine whether giving it
constituted an abuse of discretion warranting reversal of the conviction. On the particular
circumstances of this case, we find that it does not. When the jury instructions “taken as a
whole fairly—although not perfectly—announce the applicable primary rules of law[,] no
reversible error will be found.” Moody v. State, 202 So. 3d 1235, 1237 (¶7) (Miss. 2016)
(quoting Boyd v. State, 47 So. 3d 121, 124 (¶11) (Miss. 2010)). Our Supreme Court has
previously found that the giving of an instruction defining reasonable doubt, while improper,
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was not prejudicial when looking to the other instructions and the facts of the particular case.
Johnson v. City of Crystal Springs, 218 Miss. 453, 67 So. 2d 465, 466 (1953). In Johnson,
the Court stated that “we again withhold our approval of this particular instruction” yet found
no reversible error where the defendant was granted multiple instructions that “adequately
set forth the extent to which the jurors must be convinced of guilt before finding a verdict of
guilty.” Id. Similarly, in Sykes v. City of Crystal Springs, 216 Miss. 18, 61 So. 2d 387, 389
(1952), “other instructions granted appellant as well as the state, when taken together, cure[d]
any possibly misleading aspect of this instruction.”
¶14. Here, Ford has not demonstrated how giving the instruction, while erroneous,
constitutes an error requiring reversal of her conviction. Under the circumstances of this
particular case, the error was harmless. See Johnson, 67 So. 2d at 466. Significantly,
additional proper instructions were given on reasonable doubt that “adequately set forth the
extent to which the jurors must be convinced of guilt before finding a verdict of guilty.” Id.
II. Whether the trial court erred in admitting video surveillance that
was not properly authenticated.
¶15. Ford argues that the trial court erred in admitting the apartment complex video
surveillance as evidence because the video was not properly authenticated. Because Ford did
not object at trial to the admission of the video on the ground that it had not been properly
authenticated, on appeal she asks us to review the issue for plain error. To determine “if plain
error has occurred, [this Court] must determine if the trial court has deviated from a legal
rule, whether that error is plain, clear[,] or obvious, and whether the error has prejudiced the
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outcome of the trial.” Neal v. State, 15 So. 3d 388, 403 (¶32) (Miss. 2009) (quoting McGee
v. State, 953 So. 2d 211, 215 (¶8) (Miss. 2007)).
¶16. Mississippi Rule of Evidence 901(a) provides:
To satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence,
the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
item is what the proponent claims it is.
Rule 901(b)(1) further provides that evidence that satisfies the requirement includes
“[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed to be.” MRE 901(b)(1). “A party need only
make a prima facie showing of authenticity, not a full argument on admissibility.” Wilson v.
State, 267 So. 3d 264, 270 (¶24) (Miss. 2019). “Once a prima facie case is made, the
evidence goes to the jury and it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of
the evidence, not the court.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶17. “The same standards used in determining admissibility of photographs are applicable
to videotapes.” Conway v. State, 915 So. 2d 521, 526 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). “When
a videotape is admitted into evidence through a witness, it must be authenticated by someone
who can testify that the events on the tape accurately depict the transaction as it occurred on
the day in question.” Id. at (¶19) (citing Seals v. State, 869 So. 2d 429, 433 (¶13) (Miss. Ct.
App. 2004)). In McCammon, for example, this Court found that video recordings of the
defendant’s police interviews were properly authenticated when one of the officers present
for the interviews testified at trial how the recordings were made by being burned to discs
and that they were “fair and accurate recordings of the interviews.” McCammon v. State, 299
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So. 3d 873, 891 (¶66) (Miss. Ct. App. 2020). Similarly, in Bunch v. State, 123 So. 3d 484,
490-94 (¶¶13-14) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013), this Court found that surveillance videos from a
hospital parking lot and a Walmart were properly authenticated when the employees who
acted as custodians of the surveillance-video equipment (an IT director and assistant
manager, respectively) provided the original videos to law enforcement and testified at trial
that the videos submitted into evidence accurately depicted the original footage.
¶18. Ford points to contrasting cases in which videos were found to not be properly
authenticated. In Conway, a violent altercation resulting in a shooting death occurred at a
carwash business. Conway, 915 So. 2d at 524 (¶9). The business provided the responding
officer unedited surveillance footage from 24 hours before the incident, which was admitted
through the officer’s testimony at trial without objection from the defense. Id. at 525 (¶16).
The original video was “unviewable” and “unclear,” so a detective took the original tape
from the evidence room and transported it to a technician who copied and enhanced the
relevant portions of the video to make it more viewable and to slow it down. Id. at (¶17).
Over the defense’s objection, the State admitted the edited video through the testimony of
the detective. Id. at 526 (¶17). On appeal, the defense argued that the second video should
not have been admitted because the detective “was not the person who actually made or
produced the second tape.” Id. This Court agreed, noting that the detective “was not at the
accident scene and never indicated that he watched the first video tape. In addition, he was
not the technician who made the edited tape.” Id. at (¶19). Therefore, the “State failed to
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prove that [the detective] had sufficient knowledge of the crime scene to be able to testify
that the edited videotape accurately depicted the events on the day in question.” Id.
¶19. In Terry, the State introduced video surveillance from a Kroger parking lot showing
an altercation unfold between five adults during a child custody exchange. Terry v. State, 386
So. 3d 744, 749 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2024). Following the altercation the individuals left
the premises in two cars. Several blocks away, one car chased the other, and the defendant
shot and killed a person in the other car. Id. at 747 (¶5). Both a passenger and a bystander
testified at trial to witnessing the shooting. Id. at 747-48 (¶6). The surveillance footage was
introduced at trial through a detective who had obtained it from Kroger and watched it prior
to trial. Id. at 748 (¶10). However, the detective “did not testify that the video was an
accurate representation of the Kroger parking lot, that the video accurately depicted the
meeting itself, or that the video offered at trial was an exact, unedited copy of the original
video on Kroger’s surveillance system.” Id.
¶20. This Court determined that the video was not properly authenticated. Id. at 750 (¶16).
The detective could not testify that she watched the original recording prior to receiving a
copy from Kroger, whether the surveillance system was functioning properly at the time, or
whether the video accurately depicted the location or events depicted in the video. Id.
Further, the State did not try to authenticate the events in the video through the testimony of
the witness who was present at the altercation. Id.
¶21. Here, we agree with Ford’s argument that the video surveillance footage was not
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properly authenticated. Similar to Conway and Terry, “the sponsoring witness lacked
sufficient personal knowledge to authenticate the surveillance video.” Terry, 386 So. 3d at
750 (¶16). The video was admitted through a police officer who was not at the scene and did
not view the original video. He was not able to testify that it was an exact copy of the original
video or that the video accurately depicted the location or events that happened.
¶22. Because the video surveillance was not properly authenticated, we find that it was
error for the trial court to admit it. However, we do not find that the error warrants reversal
of Ford’s conviction. “No trial is free of error; however, to require reversal the error must be
of such magnitude as to leave no doubt that the appellant was unduly prejudiced.” Conway,
915 So. 2d at 526 (¶20) (quoting Busick v. St. John, 856 So. 2d 304, 308 (¶9) (Miss. 2003)).
“When the weight of the evidence against the defendant is overwhelming, such error is
harmless.” Id. In both Conway and Terry, this Court affirmed the convictions despite the
admission of improperly authenticated surveillance videos. In Conway, multiple eyewitnesses
testified that they saw the shooting in the business parking lot, and the defendant argued selfdefense. Id. at 524 (¶¶9-10). In Terry, eyewitnesses to the shooting that occurred at a second
location testified to the surveillance video in question. Terry, 386 So. 3d at 750 (¶18).
¶23. Similarly here, the State’s case against Ford relied primarily on eyewitness testimony.
The victim, Harris, testified that Ford beat on her door with a hammer, retrieved a gun, and
shot at her apartment. The State did not rely on the blurry video to establish Ford’s identity.
The jury further saw and heard evidence of the damage done to Harris’ door and the outside
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of the apartment walls. On plain error review, Ford has not demonstrated that the admission
of the improperly authenticated video resulted in prejudice warranting reversal of her
conviction.
CONCLUSION
¶24. Giving Jury Instruction S-2 did not constitute reversible error. While the trial court
erred in admitting video surveillance that was not properly authenticated, this error did not
result in prejudice to Ford warranting reversal of the conviction. We therefore affirm Ford’s
conviction and sentence for shooting into an occupied dwelling.
¶25. AFFIRMED.
BARNES, C.J., CARLTON, P.J., McDONALD, LAWRENCE, McCARTY,
WEDDLE AND LASSITTER ST. PÉ, JJ., CONCUR. WILSON, P.J., AND
EMFINGER, J., CONCUR IN PART AND IN THE RESULT WITHOUT SEPARATE
WRITTEN OPINION.
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