Taliani v. Anderson

2026 IL App (3d) 250427

Opinion filed September 22, 2026

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2026

STEVEN A. TALIANI, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court

) of the 13th Judicial Circuit,

Petitioner, ) Bureau County, Illinois,

)

v. ) Appeal No. 3-25-0427

) Circuit No. 24-MR-34

DANIEL ANDERSON, in His Official )

Capacity as State’s Attorney of the County of )

Bureau, ) The Honorable

) Michael C. Jansz,

Respondent. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion

Justices Brennan and Bertani concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Petitioner, Steven A. Taliani, appeals following the Bureau County circuit court’s dismissal

of his complaint for mandamus relief. Petitioner argues the court erred because respondent, State’s

Attorney Daniel Anderson, had a duty to seek a reduction of petitioner’s prison sentence as

required under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 Petitioner is an inmate at Hill Correctional Center serving an aggregate 100-year sentence

for first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 1994)) and aggravated battery with a firearm (id.

§ 12-4.2). On February 10, 2025, petitioner filed an amended complaint for mandamus relief

wherein he argued his sentence no longer advanced the interest of justice, and respondent had a

duty under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct of 2010 (Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2010) R. 3.8(d)

(eff. Jan. 1, 2016)) to motion the court for resentencing. Specifically, Rule 3.8(d) pertains to special

responsibilities of a prosecutor, which includes that a prosecutor shall “in connection with

sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information

known to the prosecutor.” Id. Petitioner attached various documents to his complaint to

demonstrate that he had a low risk of recidivism, which was based on a correctional counselor

determining he had low aggression and had completed various courses while imprisoned.

¶4 On March 24, 2025, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant

to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Civil Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2024)),

arguing petitioner was not entitled to mandamus relief because a state’s attorney has the discretion

as to whether to file a motion for resentencing under section 122-9(b) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (Criminal Code) (725 ILCS 5/122-9(b) (West 2024)). Further, respondent

argued Rule 3.8 had no relevance under these circumstances.

¶5 On August 26, 2025, the court held a hearing and dismissed the complaint. The court found

that, under the statutory authority provided, state’s attorneys had the discretion as to whether to

file a motion for resentencing, and thus, it was not a proper basis for mandamus relief. Moreover,

it found that Rule 3.8(d) did not create a continuing duty for a state’s attorney to investigate

mitigating information that may warrant resentencing. Petitioner appeals.

¶6 II. ANALYSIS

¶7 On appeal, petitioner argues the court erred as a matter of law when it granted respondent’s

motion to dismiss his complaint for mandamus relief. A section 2-615 motion to dismiss attacks

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the legal sufficiency of the complaint. In re Estate of Powell, 2014 IL 115997, ¶ 12. A complaint

should be dismissed under this section where “it is clearly apparent from the pleadings that no set

of facts can be proven that would entitle the plaintiff to recover.” Id. The court must accept all

pleaded facts as true in the light most favorable to the petitioner. Fillmore v. Taylor, 2019 IL

122626, ¶ 35. We review de novo a circuit court’s dismissal of a mandamus complaint pursuant to

section 2-615 of the Civil Code. Nyhammer v. Basta, 2022 IL 128354, ¶ 29.

¶8 “Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy to enforce, as a matter of right, the performance of

official duties by a public officer where no exercise of discretion on his part is involved.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) People ex rel. Smith v. Tobin, 2025 IL 131213, ¶ 25. Mandamus cannot

be used to direct a public official to perform a discretionary duty—it is only appropriate when it is

used to compel compliance with mandatory legal standards. McFatridge v. Madigan, 2013 IL

113676, ¶ 17. Mandamus relief will only be issued by the court when the petitioner has

demonstrated all of the following: (1) a clear right to the requested relief, (2) a clear duty of the

public officer to act, and (3) clear authority of the public officer to comply with the order. Id.

¶9 Petitioner argues that he demonstrated his entitlement to mandamus relief because Rule

3.8(d) is mandatory and supersedes the discretion provided to state’s attorneys under section 122-9(b) of the Criminal Code (725 ILCS 5/122-9(b) (West 2024)). We first analyze the language of

section 122-9(b) of the Criminal Code. When interpreting a statute, our primary objective is to

ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000).

The best indicator of this intent is the language of the statute. Id. When the language of a statute is

clear and unambiguous, it should be applied without resorting to additional aids of statutory

construction. People v. Marshall, 242 Ill. 2d 285, 292 (2011). A court may not depart from a

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statute’s plain language by reading into exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did

not express. In re Hernandez, 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18.

¶ 10 Section 122-9(b) of the Criminal Code provides, as follows:

“At any time upon the recommendation of the State’s Attorney of the county in

which the defendant was sentenced, the State’s Attorney may petition the

sentencing court or the sentencing court’s successor to resentence the offender if

the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice. The sentencing

court or the sentencing court’s successor may resentence the offender if it finds that

the original sentence no longer advances the interests of justice.” (Emphasis added.)

725 ILCS 5/122-9(b) (West 2024).

¶ 11 The legislature’s use of “may” connotes discretion, as it gives one the ability to decide

whether to take action. See Fritz v. Staley Ferry, 2025 IL App (3d) 240489, ¶ 55; Canel v. Topinka,

212 Ill. 2d 311, 326 (2004) (“Except in very unusual circumstances affecting the public interest,

the legislature’s use of the word ‘may’ indicates that the statute is permissive as opposed to

mandatory.”). The language also makes clear that it is the state’s attorney who is given the

discretion, as it provides, “the State’s Attorney may petition the sentencing court.” 725 ILCS

5/122-9(b) (West 2024). Based on the foregoing, this statute provides a state’s attorney with the

discretion as to whether they petition the sentencing court to resentence an offender. Accordingly,

petitioner in this case is not entitled to mandamus relief because a writ of mandamus cannot be

used to direct respondent to use his discretion in a particular manner. See, e.g., Crump v. Illinois

Prisoner Review Board, 181 Ill. App. 3d 58, 61-62 (1989) (finding the defendants’ decision to

deny the plaintiff parole was a discretionary decision and not a proper subject for mandamus

relief).

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¶ 12 Nonetheless, petitioner argues this statutory discretion is superseded by the mandatory

language in Rule 3.8(d), which states that the prosecutor in a criminal case shall:

“(d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information

known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates

the offense, and, in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the

tribunal all unprivileged mitigating information known to the prosecutor, except

when the prosecutor is relieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the

tribunal[.]” Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2010) R. 3.8(d) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016).

¶ 13 Petitioner argues respondent failed to comply with the mandatory duty in Rule 3.8(d)

because respondent did not disclose reports of petitioner’s conduct since incarceration, which

contained mitigating information demonstrating his rehabilitation. However, petitioner fails to

acknowledge that he has already been sentenced, and Rule 3.8(d) does not contemplate

postsentencing matters. In fact, Rule 3.8 contains two other paragraphs pertaining to ongoing

duties of a prosecutor postsentencing that apply: “(g) [w]hen a prosecutor knows of new, credible

and material evidence creating a reasonable likelihood that a convicted defendant did not commit

an offense of which the defendant was convicted” and “(h) [w]hen a prosecutor knows of clear

and convincing evidence establishing that a defendant in the prosecutor’s jurisdiction was

convicted of an offense that the defendant did not commit.” Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2010) R. 3.8(g),

(h) (eff. Jan. 1, 2016). Neither of these paragraphs discuss disclosure of new mitigating factors for

resentencing. Further, the supreme court’s use of language in paragraph (d) and wholly different

language in paragraphs (g) and (h) demonstrates different results were intended. See In re K.C.,

186 Ill. 2d 542, 549-50 (1999). We cannot read into the rule language that the supreme court did

not express. See Hernandez, 2020 IL 124661, ¶ 18.

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¶ 14 Moreover, petitioner has failed to demonstrate that an alleged violation of a rule of

professional conduct is the proper subject matter for a mandamus action. See Ill. R. Pro. Conduct

(2010), Preamble (eff. Jan. 1, 2010) (“Violation of a Rule should not *** create any presumption

in such a case that a legal duty has been breached.”); see also, e.g., Prospect Funding Holdings,

LLC v. Saulter, 2018 IL App (1st) 171277, ¶ 36 (stating that a violation of the professional conduct

rules does not establish a separate duty or cause of action). An alleged violation of the professional

conduct rules is brought before the Attorney and Registration Disciplinary Commission, which

decides whether an attorney acted ethically and if disciplinary action is required. As stated in the

preamble to the rules of professional conduct, “The fact that a Rule is a just basis for a lawyer’s

self-assessment, or for sanctioning a lawyer under the administration of a disciplinary authority,

does not imply that an antagonist in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing to seek

enforcement of the Rule.” Ill. R. Pro. Conduct (2010), Preamble (eff. Jan. 1, 2010).

¶ 15 For these reasons, petitioner failed to demonstrate he was entitled to mandamus relief, and

the court did not err as a matter of law when it dismissed his complaint.

¶ 16 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court of Bureau County is affirmed.

¶ 18 Affirmed.

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Taliani v. Anderson, 2026 IL App (3d) 250427

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Bureau County, No. 24-MR34; the Hon. Michael C. Jansz, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Steven A. Taliani, of Galesburg, appellant pro se.

for

Appellant:

Attorneys Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, for Solicitor General, and Emily A. Vernon, Assistant Attorney Appellee: General, of counsel), for appellee.

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