LAW.coLAW.co

Ugrenyuk v. Rubio

2026-09-22

Authorities cited

Opinion

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

)

KAROLINA UGRENYUK, et al., )

)

Plaintiffs, )

)

v. ) Case No. 26-cv-03181 (APM)

)

MARCO RUBIO, )

in his official capacity as Secretary of State, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

_________________________________________ )

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiffs Karolina Ugrenyuk and Vincent Knight are diversity visas selectees for

the 2026 fiscal year. Compl., ECF No. 1, at 2. They request an emergency order compelling

Defendants to act on their visa applications before the statutory deadline of September 30, 2026,

after the State Department scheduled but then cancelled their interviews. See Pls.’ Emergency

Mot. for a Temp. Restraining Order and Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 2, at 2. Plaintiffs have now received

their interviews but, because their applications remain in administrative processing, they still seek

to compel their final adjudication. See Pls.’ Notice, ECF No. 10, at 1–3.

On September 17, 2026, the court issued an order to show cause why this case should not

be dismissed because Plaintiffs are members of the certified class in Medani v. Trump, 26-cv-6332

(EJD) (N.D. Cal.), and under the first-to-file rule. Minute Order, Sept. 17, 2026. In Medani, the

court granted class-wide relief to 2026 diversity visa selectees who, like Plaintiffs, were subject to

an unlawful pause in the processing of their applications. See Medani v. Trump, 26-cv-6332 (EJD),

2026 WL 2547287, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2026). Plaintiffs acknowledge that they are

members of a certified subclass in Medani, Compl. ¶ 28, yet insist that equitable considerations counsel against applying the first-to-file rule, see Pls.’ Resp. to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 9

[hereinafter Pls.’ Resp.], at 2 ¶ 4; see UtahAmerican Energy, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., 685 F.3d 1118,

1124 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“The usual rule in this circuit has been that where two cases between the

same parties on the same cause of action are commenced in two different Federal courts, the one

which is commenced first is to be allowed to proceed to its conclusion first,” unless “equitable

considerations . . . weigh against applying it in particular cases.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted). The court is unpersuaded.

Plaintiffs assert that, as mere class members in Medani, they have “no ability to seek relief

tailored to their individual circumstances” and thus cannot secure the emergency relief they seek

here through that action. Pls.’ Resp. at 2 ¶ 5. But as another judge in this District recently

explained in a nearly identical case, “that aggravates rather than cures the comity problem.”

Gadasi v. Rubio, No. 26-cv-2549 (CRC), 2026 WL 2754355, at *4 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2026). “A

district court abuses its discretion when it grants equitable relief that expands or supplants relief

already being administered in a class action involving the same parties and issues.” Id. Further,

“Rule 23(b)(2),” under which the Medani class was certified, “exists so that parties and courts . . .

can avoid piecemeal litigation when common claims arise from systemic harms that demand

injunctive relief.” D.L. v. District of Columbia, 860 F.3d 713, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2017). If the court

were to grant the relief Plaintiffs seek—compelling final adjudication of their applications—it

would move them ahead of other Medani class members. Such an outcome is at odds with the

purpose of class-wide relief.

The court very much sympathizes with Plaintiffs’ plight. Indeed, this court granted

comparable class-wide relief when the State Department arbitrarily and capriciously halted the

processing and adjudication of 2020 and 2021 diversity selectees’ applications. See Gomez v.

2

Trump, 485 F. Supp. 3d 145, 204–205 (D.D.C. 2020); Filazapovich v. Dep’t of State, 560 F. Supp.

3d 203, 245–246 (D.D.C. 2021), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Goodluck v. Biden, 104 F.4th 920

(D.C. Cir. 2024). But binding legal principles prevent the court from granting the individualized

relief sought here. Accordingly, the court denies Plaintiffs’ Emergency Motion for a Temporary

Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, ECF No. 2, as well as Plaintiffs’ Renewed Motion

for Expedited Relief, ECF No. 11, and sua sponte dismisses this action without prejudice.

A separate final, appealable order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.

Dated: September 22, 2026 Amit P. Mehta

United States District Judge

3