COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Record No. 1241-25-4
JOHN R. HAMILTON, INDIVIDUALLY, ET AL.
v.
SUSAN G. KORNIDES, AS TRUSTEE OF THE REVOCABLE TRUST OF JAMES R.
HAMILTON, ET AL.
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges AtLee and Callins
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
Opinion Issued September 22, 2026
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Christie A. Leary, Judge
Matthew Yanovitch (Spotts Fain PC, on briefs), for appellants.
Justin B. Berger (Kimberley A. Murphy, Hale Ball Murphy, PLC, on brief), for appellees.
PUBLISHED OPINION BY
CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER
John R. Hamilton, in his individual and representative capacity, appeals the trial court’s
order granting the motion to strike made by Trustee Susan G. Kornides and dismissing his
complaint against her. He argues that Kornides breached her duty as trustee to inform and
report. We agree that the reports she issued do not provide sufficient transparency as to the trust.
The reporting statute requires that a trustee disclose the facts necessary to allow the beneficiaries
to protect their interests, but the documents provided by Kornides do not satisfy this requirement.
The judgment is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court for action
consistent with this opinion. We deny Kornides’s request for an award of costs and attorney fees
incurred on appeal.
BACKGROUND
Both parties are the children of James R. Hamilton (the father). The father created a
revocable trust, the funds of which were to be disbursed at his direction or for his benefit. The
father was a trustee, and he appointed Kornides as a co-trustee and granted her power of
attorney. The father also made her a joint account holder on certain bank accounts.
In August 2021, the father died. His will designated that his estate passed to his trust.
The trust provided that upon the father’s death, the assets would be distributed in three equal
shares: one to Hamilton, one to Kornides, and one to his grandchildren. After the father’s death,
Hamilton learned that Kornides had transferred the money remaining in the joint accounts to
herself.
Hamilton, individually and in his capacity as ad hoc representative of the estate of the
father, sued Kornides, individually, as trustee, and as an agent for the father. Hamilton brought
claims for conversion, breach of a trustee’s duty to inform and report, breach of fiduciary duty,
breach of trust, and undue influence. He alleged that Kornides improperly took possession of
$676,462.29 of the trust money.
Kornides filed a plea in bar and a demurrer. The trial court sustained the demurrer to the
conversion count and overruled it as to the remaining counts.
On the day of trial, Hamilton asked for a continuance because of a missing witness
expected to testify as a custodian of certain financial records. Kornides opposed the continuance,
and the trial court denied the motion.
At trial, Hamilton testified that he helped his father with his finances until 2017.
According to Hamilton, the father was displeased with his decision to move, and at that time,
Kornides “took over assisting” their father with his finances. Hamilton claimed that Kornides
moved money from trust accounts to the joint accounts she shared with the father. He alleged
-2-that she then moved the money to her personal bank account in a series of transactions.
Hamilton testified that Kornides refused to disclose information about the trust, and he submitted
into evidence three documents that she gave him reporting on the trust. At no point did Kornides
dispute that the documents accurately represented those she provided to Hamilton.1
After Hamilton presented his evidence, Kornides made a motion to strike the remaining
claims. The court granted the motion. In striking the claim for breach of a trustee’s duty to
inform and report, the court held that Kornides satisfied her statutory duty. In striking the other
claims, the trial court found that Hamilton failed to present evidence “as to the origination of the
funds in the account,” as to “how those transactions came about,” or what assets “comprised” the
“corpus of the trust.”
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Assignments of Error
As a preliminary matter, we address Kornides’s suggestion that Hamilton’s arguments are
procedurally barred due to insufficient assignments of error. Rule 5A:20(c)(2) provides that
“[a]n assignment of error . . . is not sufficient” if it “does not address the findings, rulings, or
failures to rule on issues in the trial court . . . from which an appeal is taken, or which merely
states that the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the evidence.”
Hamilton lists five assignments of error. In them, he suggests that “[t]he [trial] court
erred in granting [Kornides]’s motion to strike [his] evidence of” four different causes of action:
“breach of the duty to inform and report (Counts 1 and 2),” “breach of fiduciary duty (Count 3),”
“breach of trust (Counts 4 and 5)”, and “undue influence (Count 7).” In the remaining
1
Hamilton attached one of the documents to his complaint. In her answer, Kornides provided that the report “speaks for itself.”
-3-assignment of error, Hamilton alleges that “[t]he [trial] court erred in denying [his] motion for a
continuance of trial.”
These assignments of error identify specific rulings of the trial court that Hamilton
challenges. See Commonwealth v. Herring, 288 Va. 59, 67-68 (2014) (upholding as sufficient an
assignment of error providing that the trial court erred by denying the defendant’s motion to
strike because the evidence was insufficient to support the three specified convictions). As a
result, the assignments of error are sufficient under Rule 5A:20.
II. Motion to Strike
Hamilton contests the trial court’s decision to grant the motion to strike. A trial court
should grant a motion to strike the plaintiff’s evidence “only when ‘it is conclusively apparent
that [the] plaintiff has proven no cause of action against [the] defendant[]’ or when ‘it plainly
appears that the trial court would be compelled to set aside any verdict found for the plaintiff as
being without evidence to support it.’” Chantilly Constr. Corp. v. Dep’t of Highways & Transp.,
6 Va. App. 282, 291 (1988) (quoting Williams v. Vaughan, 214 Va. 307, 309 (1973)). In making
this decision, “the trial court should resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the
evidence in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” Id. at 290-91 (quoting Williams, 214 Va. at 309).
When reviewing the grant of a motion to strike, an appellate court “consider[s] the
evidence and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the
appellant, resolving any doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in favor of” that party.
Condo. Servs. v. First Owners’ Ass’n of Forty Six Hundred Condo., Inc., 281 Va. 561, 571
(2011) (quoting McGowan v. Lewis, 233 Va. 386, 387 (1987)); see Gelber v. Glock, 293 Va. 497,
525 (2017). At the same time, any issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo.
Minor v. Heishman, 78 Va. App. 690, 705 (2023). When interpreting a statute, courts look to its
language. If the statutory language “is unambiguous,” the reviewing court is “bound by the plain
-4-meaning of that language.” Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 300 Va. 153, 161
(2021) (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 295 Va. 256, 263 (2018)).
Of the issues raised pertaining to the motion to strike, we start with Hamilton’s argument
about a trustee’s statutory duty to inform and report. This is the logical beginning because our
decision on this point impacts Hamilton’s other assignments of error. Hamilton contends that the
trial court erred in holding that Kornides did not breach her duty to inform. He asserts that the
information Kornides provided was “woefully” insufficient and did not meet her obligation
under the statute.
Virginia law imposes a fundamental duty on trustees to provide beneficiaries with
specified information. The law requires that “[a] trustee shall keep the qualified beneficiaries of
the trust reasonably informed about the administration of the trust and of the material facts
necessary for them to protect their interests.” Code § 64.2-775(A); see Material, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024) (defining “material” in part as “significant” or “essential”). A
violation of this duty is a breach of trust. See Code § 64.2-792(A).
The obligation applies “at least annually and at the termination of the trust.” Code
§ 64.2-775(C). The information must be provided to “distributees or permissible distributes”
unless they waive the obligation. Code § 64.2-775(C)-(D). Other beneficiaries are entitled to the
report on request. Code § 64.2-775(C). And beneficiaries may waive the obligation.2 Code
§ 64.2-775(D).
2
A trustee may assert waiver as an affirmative defense. See generally Code § 64.2-775 (listing the elements of a claim for a breach of duty to inform and report); Tidwell v. Goldsmith, 85 Va. App. 152, 168 (2025) (explaining the general principles of affirmative defenses). Kornides did not do so here, and there is no dispute that Kornides owed Hamilton the duty to inform and report when their father died and the trust ended. In addition, a trustee who breaches the duty to inform but does so under a good-faith belief that disclosure would be unreasonable is protected from sanctions. Code § 64.2-775(A). But such a good-faith belief does not justify non-disclosure. Id.
-5-A report should inform the recipients “of the trust property, liabilities, receipts, and
disbursements, including the source and amount of the trustee’s compensation, a listing of the
trust assets and, if feasible, their respective market values.” See Code § 64.2-775(C). “The key
factor is . . . whether the report provides the beneficiaries with the information necessary to
protect their interests.” Unif. Tr. Code § 813 cmt. (Unif. L. Comm’n 2023).3 See generally Alan
Newman, George Gleason Bogert, & George Taylor Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees
§ 963 n.27-28 (3d ed. 2010) (discussing the information required). The obligation “may include
a duty to communicate to a qualified beneficiary information about the administration of the trust
that is reasonably necessary to enable th[at party] to enforce the beneficiary’s rights and to
prevent or redress a breach of trust.” Unif. Tr. Code § 813 cmt. And “the beneficiary is always
entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to enable him to enforce his rights under
the trust or to prevent or redress a breach of trust.” Fletcher v. Fletcher, 253 Va. 30, 36 (1997)
(quoting Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. c (A.L.I. 1959)).
It is clear that the information does not have to be provided in any particular format. See
Code § 64.2-775. The statute’s use of “the term ‘report’ instead of ‘accounting’ . . . negate[s]
any inference that the report must be prepared in any particular format or with a high degree of
formality.” Unif. Tr. Code § 813 cmt. The adequacy of a report is determined on a case-by-case
basis. Although a trustee does not have to provide a formal accounting, a trustee providing an
3
“Virginia adopted the Uniform Trust Code in 2005, joining the majority of [s]tates that have implemented it.” Fulks v. Fulks, 87 Va. App. 685, 691 (2026). The intent in promulgating the act was to consolidate “the law of trusts in a single source.” Id. at 699 (quoting Galiotos v. Galiotos, 83 Va. App. 206, 231 n.7 (2024)). “The common law of trusts and principles of equity supplement [the Virginia Uniform Trust Code], except to the extent modified by [it] or another statute of the Commonwealth.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Code § 64.2-704). “In applying and construing this uniform act, consideration shall be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.” Galiotos, 83 Va. App. at 231 n.7 (quoting Code § 64.2-805).
-6-informal report bears the risk that the information provided is inadequate under Code
§ 64.2-775.4
Kornides provided trust reports to Hamilton in 2022, 2023, and 2024. Each of the three
reports included essentially the same information, listing the assets of the trust as well as total
disbursements and expenses. The documents reflected that the trust assets (generically labeled as
“House,” “TD Ameritrade,” and “Interest earned”) were initially valued at more than one million
dollars. The reports listed four categories of expenses, which totaled just over $34,000: fees
from the house sale, “Legal,” “Other,” and “Taxes on interest earned.” The documents also
showed two disbursements from the trust for a combined amount of around $750,000. One
disbursement was labeled “House-partial,” and the other was labeled “TD Ameritrade
liquidated.” But no further details were included.5 The trial court, with no specific guidance
4
The adequacy of the information provided by a trustee depends on whether it contains the necessary components in light of the trust itself. “The reporting requirement might even be satisfied by providing the beneficiaries with copies of the trust’s income tax returns and monthly brokerage account statements if the information on those returns and statements is complete and sufficiently clear.” Unif. Tr. Code § 813 cmt. (referring readers to Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting Guide (2d ed. 1998), “[f]or model account forms, together with practical advice on how to prepare reports”). In fact, under the proper circumstances, “[i]n a simple situation adequate descriptive notations in the checkbook kept by the fiduciary may be sufficient,” as long as a record is made of deposits and expenditures. David M. English & Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting and Trust Administration Guide § 1.1 (2d ed. 2002).
5
Images of the documents are as follows:
-7-from the language in the applicable section of the Code or Virginia case law, was left to
determine whether these reports met the basic requirements of the statute. It held that these
documents were sufficient to meet the statutory duty to inform based on the statute’s lack of a
“specific requirement as to the form and the nature of information with specificity that needs to
be included.”
We conclude that an examination of the reports does not support the trial court’s
conclusion about the adequacy of the documents. Although the statute does not compel
compliance with a specific format, it logically requires more than generic descriptions and
barebones reporting. See Code § 64.2-775.
The plain language of the statute broadly requires trustees to “reasonably inform[]”
beneficiaries “about the administration of the trust and of the material facts necessary for them to
protect their interests.” Code § 64.2-775(A). This disclosure obligation necessarily includes
information identifying trust assets and specifying on what the trust funds were spent. See Code
§ 64.2-775(A); see, e.g., David M. English & Robert Whitman, Fiduciary Accounting and Trust
Administration Guide app. B (2d ed. 2002) (providing examples of first and final trustee’s
accountings). The statute specifically directs trustees to disclose “the source and amount of the
trustee’s compensation,” which Kornides did not do. Code § 64.2-775(C). The reports here
contain information too general to facilitate the safeguarding of the beneficiaries’ interest in the
trust. Because Kornides failed to include material facts in her report, the trial court erred as a
matter of law by concluding that the documents were sufficient to meet the requirements of Code
§ 64.2-775.
As a result, the judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with
directions to instruct Kornides to prepare a report that includes material facts that are sufficient
to comply with Code § 64.2-775. See Code § 64.2-792(B)(1), (4) (providing that, to remedy a
-8-breach of trust, a court may “[c]ompel the trustee to perform the trustee’s duties” or “[o]rder a
trustee to account”).6 The trial court has the discretion to determine specifics such as what
timeline should be followed. At a minimum, the report must provide information on the trust
assets and disbursements “as is reasonably necessary” for Hamilton and the other beneficiaries
“to enforce [their] rights under the trust.” See Fletcher, 253 Va. at 36 (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 173 cmt. c).
In light of this decision, we do not reach the merits of Hamilton’s remaining claims. See
generally Commonwealth v. Moncrea, ___ Va. ___, ___ n.1 (Apr. 2, 2026) (deciding the case
“on the best and narrowest grounds”); Lee v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Third Dist., ___ Va. ___, ___
n.1 (Mar. 19, 2026) (“Virginia courts strive to resolve legal contests on the ‘best and narrowest
ground available’ for decision.” (quoting Rebh v. Cnty. Bd., 303 Va. 379, 382 (2024) (per
curiam))). His assignments of error relating to undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and
breach of trust rest on the premise that the money deposited in the joint accounts and
subsequently transferred to Kornides was money that belonged to the trust. The trial court ruled
that these claims failed because Hamilton did not meet his burden of proof. On remand, once
Kornides fulfills her duty to provide Hamilton with a more detailed trust report in accordance
with Code § 64.2-775, Hamilton will have the option to amend his complaint and proceed in
order for the trial court to revisit any issues raised in light of any new evidence presented. See
generally Code § 64.2-792(B)(10) (authorizing courts to “[o]rder any . . . appropriate relief” to
remedy a breach of trust). Hamilton also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a continuance. Given the remand, we similarly do not reach Hamilton’s argument concerning
6
Code § 64.2-775 is silent on a particular penalty for a trustee’s failure to meet the obligation to inform and report, leaving this Court to apply Code § 64.2-792, which provides a list of possible remedies for breach of trust.
-9-this assignment of error. See generally Moncrea, ___ Va. at ___ n.1 (citing the principle for
“best and narrowest grounds”).
III. Costs and Attorney Fees
Kornides asks for an award under Rule 5A:30 ordering Hamilton to pay her costs and
attorney fees incurred on appeal. If a judgment is affirmed, costs are generally assessed against
the appellant. Rule 5A:30(a). In specified cases in which attorney fees are recoverable under the
Code of Virginia, the Court of Appeals may award some or all of the fees requested or “remand
the issue” to the trial court “for determination as directed in the mandate.” Rule 5A:30(b)(2); see
Code § 64.2-795 (authorizing an award of reasonable attorney fees “[i]n a judicial proceeding
involving the administration of a trust . . . to be paid by another party or from the trust”).
The decision of whether to award attorney fees on appeal is within the discretion of this
Court. E.g., Dixon v. Dixon, 71 Va. App. 709, 722 (2020). In making this determination, the
Court may consider factors including which party prevailed as well as the equities of the case.
See Code § 64.2-795 (authorizing an award “as justice and equity may require”); Friedman v.
Smith, 68 Va. App. 529, 546 (2018) (noting other possible relevant factors, such as “whether the
appeal was frivolous” and “whether either party generated unnecessary expense or delay”). The
appeal here has merit as to the deficient report, and the circumstances of this case do not weigh
in favor of granting Kornides’s request for attorney fees. For these reasons, we exercise our
discretion to deny the request. See, e.g., Wright v. Wright, 61 Va. App. 432, 470 (2013).
CONCLUSION
The reports that Kornides provided as trustee did not provide sufficient information to
permit Hamilton to safeguard his interest as a beneficiary. As a result, the judgment is reversed,
and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to direct Kornides to provide a report
of the material facts relating to the trust as required by Code § 64.2-775. If Hamilton chooses to
- 10 -move forward after Kornides fulfills this statutory obligation, the trial court should proceed
accordingly on the complaint to include a retrial if appropriate. Last, Kornides’s request for
costs and attorney fees incurred on appeal is denied.
Reversed and remanded.
- 11 -