J-A30039-25
2026 PA Super 211
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
CARL JAMES, :
:
Appellant : No. 2753 EDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 21, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0008759-2023
BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., PANELLA, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.
OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 22, 2026
Carl James (“James”) appeals from the judgment of sentence following
his convictions for possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance
(“PWID”), possession of a controlled substance, criminal conspiracy, and
evading arrest.1 Because we conclude the trial court properly admitted a
police officer’s lay testimony that, based on his observations and experience,
he believed James engaged in a drug transaction, we affirm.
We glean the facts and procedural history from the record of James’s
bench trial. Philadelphia Police Narcotics Strike Force Officer Brian
Outterbridge (“Officer Outterbridge”) testified that on July 28, 2023, at
approximately 10:45 a.m., he and Officer Robertson2 established an
undercover narcotics surveillance in the area of 3100 G Street. See N.T.,
1 See 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (a)(30), 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903(c), 5104.2(a).
2 The certified record does not contain Officer Robertson’s first name. J-A30039-25
3/26/24, at 11-12. Officer Outterbridge testified he was in constant radio
contact with three other two-man teams that were part of the surveillance
team and were stationed nearby. See id. at 12. Officer Outterbridge
personally observed an individual, later identified as Mekhi Smith (“Smith”),
engage in a brief conversation with James. See id. Officer Outterbridge then
observed Smith engage in a brief conversation with an unidentified man, 3 who
handed Smith an unknown amount of United States currency, which Smith
accepted. See id. In exchange, Smith handed the man small objects. See
id.
A man later identified as Callaghan4 approached Smith and gave him
money. See id. at 14. Smith then placed an object on the trunk of a nearby
car, which Callaghan retrieved immediately before leaving the area. See id.
Backup officers stopped Callaghan and recovered one clear Ziploc packet with
a blue glassine insert stamped “Drive-Thru” in red ink, containing alleged
heroin. See id. Moments later, a man later identified as Jose Martinez
(“Martinez”) approached James and gave him money in exchange for small
objects. See id. Police stopped Martinez as he walked away and recovered
six clear Ziploc packets with blue glassine inserts stamped “Drive-Thru” in red
ink, containing alleged heroin. See id. at 14-15. James then engaged in a
brief conversation with a man later identified as Eliezer Castillo (“Castillo”),
3 Police did not apprehend the man.
4 Callaghan’s first name does not appear in the certified record.
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who gave James money in exchange for small objects. See id. at 15. Backup
officers stopped Castillo and recovered two clear Ziploc packets with blue
glassine inserts stamped “Drive-Thru” in red ink, containing alleged heroin. 5
See id. At approximately 11:15 a.m., an unknown man approached Smith
and James and spoke with them briefly. See id. at 16. Smith drove away in
a car; James began walking south on G Street. See id.
Officer Raymond Zukauskas (“Officer Zukauskas”) moved toward James
to arrest him. See id. at 33-34. Upon seeing Officer Zukauskas, James
turned and fled. See id. at 34. In the course of his pursuit, Officer Zukauskas
saw James reach into his front waistband and drop something onto the
sidewalk on Potter Street. See id. Officer Zukauskas lost sight of James
shortly thereafter. See id. Officer Jamarr Leary (“Officer Leary”) gave chase
and detained James after James leapt a fence and attempted to hide. See id.
at 16.
Officer Leary recovered from James’s person one clear Ziploc packet
with a blue glassine insert stamped “EZ Pass,” containing heroin and $122.
See id. at 45. Officer Miguel Santiago (“Officer Santiago”) went to the 3100
block of Potter Street where Officer Zukauskas had seen James discard
something as he ran, and recovered from the sidewalk eighty clear Ziploc
packets containing alleged heroin and a blue glassine insert stamped in red
5 Police also recovered three clear Ziploc packets with blue, glassine, unstamped inserts containing heroin. See N.T., 3/26/24, at 15.
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ink. See id. at 49-50. The alleged heroin was packaged together in five
bundles of sixteen packets each and wrapped in white paper. See id. at 50-51. The alleged heroin was later revealed to be a mix of fentanyl and xylazine.
See id. at 31, 40, 46, 50 (entering property receipts into evidence).
At James’s non-jury trial, Officer Outterbridge testified that the
Narcotics Strike Force (“NSF”), to which he had been assigned for
approximately five years, conducts all outdoor narcotics surveillances in
Philadelphia. He further testified that he previously conducted well over one
hundred narcotics surveillances (including twenty-five on G Street alone) in
which he had personally observed over one hundred interactions of the type
James conducted. See id. at 18-20. Officer Outterbridge testified that the
packets later recovered from the people with whom James interacted all
contained an off-white powder and were stamped “Drive Thru.” See id. at
14-15.
When Officer Outterbridge was asked, based on his direct observations
and experience, what he thought James was doing, James’s counsel objected
that the officer was being asked to give “improper lay witness opinion”
testimony. Id. at 22-23. The trial court overruled the objection. See id. at
23. Officer Outterbridge then testified he believed, from his observations of
James’s short conversations with multiple people and exchanges of small
objects for money, that he witnessed James conducting drug transactions.
See id. at 22-24.
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The trial court, sitting as factfinder, found James guilty of the abovelisted offenses. In May 2024, the court sentenced James to an aggregate term
of eleven-and-one-half to twenty-three months of incarceration followed by
two years of reporting probation. James filed motions in arrest of judgment
and for reconsideration of sentence, which were denied by operation of law.
James filed a timely appeal, and he and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P.
1925. This appeal followed.
James raises the following issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by repeatedly permitting a
police officer to testify, over defense objections, as to his improper
lay opinion that[] James was conducting narcotics transactions on
the date in question?
James’s Brief at 2.
James challenges the trial court’s admission of Officer Outterbridge’s
testimony that he believed, in light of his experience and observations, James
conducted narcotics transactions, which James asserts was improper lay
opinion. James further asserts that, even if Officer Outterbridge had been
qualified as an expert witness, his testimony would have been inadmissible
because the “court did not require assistance from a police witness claiming
special knowledge about narcotics transactions.” Id. at 14.6
Our standard of review for evidentiary issues is as follows:
The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial
6 James finally argues the admission of Officer Outterbridge’s lay opinion testimony was not harmless error. See James’s Brief at 19-25.
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court clearly abused its discretion. Accordingly, a ruling admitting
evidence will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling reflects
manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill, or such lack of support to be clearly erroneous.
Commonwealth v. Berry, 172 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
citations, quotations, and brackets omitted).
Initially, based on our review of the record, we note the following
uncontested facts:
1. The trial at issue was conducted as a non-jury trial with the trial court
sitting as factfinder. See N.T., 3/26/24, at 7-8 (James waiving his
right to a jury trial).
2. Officer Outterbridge personally observed the transactions to which
he testified. See id. at 11-16 (Officer Outterbridge stating he came
into contact with James on the date in question and observed the
transactions).
3. Officer Outterbridge is a veteran member of the NSF, with over five
years of experience in the NSF. See id. at 18-19 (Officer
Outterbridge testifying he is assigned to the NSF and has been with
them for approximately five years).
4. The Commonwealth did not offer Officer Outterbridge as an expert,
nor did they attempt to qualify him as an expert. See id. at 23
(James’s counsel objecting to Officer Outterbridge’s testimony on the
basis that he has not been offered as an expert in narcotics).
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Relevant to James’s objection alleging Officer Outterbridge’s improper
lay opinion, Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 701 addresses the admission of
opinion testimony by lay witnesses and provides:
If a witness is not testifying as an expert, testimony in the
form of an opinion is limited to one that is:
(a) rationally based on the witness’s perception;
(b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony
or to determining a fact in issue; and
(c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.
Pa.R.E. 701. Lay witnesses are generally permitted to offer opinions related
to their observations based on their personal experiences; subject to Rule
104(a), the trial court uses its discretion to determine whether the lay opinion
is helpful to the factfinder. See Berry, 172 A.3d at 3-4. An officer’s testimony
is admissible lay opinion when limited to what the officer observed or to other
facts derived from a particular investigation. See Commonwealth v.
Huggins, 68 A.3d 962, 969 (Pa. Super. 2013).
However, officers who personally witness drug transactions and testify
to their observations are not then permitted to offer expert testimony at a
jury trial regarding the transactions observed. See Commonwealth v.
Carter, 589 A.2d 1133 (Pa. Super. 1991). In Carter, the officers first testified
as lay witnesses to their investigatory observations. Then, the Commonwealth
offered the officers as, and they were accepted as, experts “on the street value
of drugs, the habits of users, the quantity that would be purchased or
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possessed at one time . . . and whether the pattern of activity observed by
the police officers was consistent with the usual pattern of narcotics
transactions.” Id. at 1134. We found the admission of expert opinion by the
officers who witnessed the transactions was highly prejudicial because it
invited the jurors to shift their focus from assessing the credibility of the
officers’ testimony and permitted them to defer to the officer’s expertise as
narcotics detectives. See id. We further underscored that expert testimony
is proper only where the subject requires knowledge, information, or skill
beyond that possessed by the ordinary juror. See id. We concluded the
admission of expert testimony, including expert opinion that a drug
transaction took place, was prejudicial error at Carter’s jury trial. See id. at
1135.
Of relevance to this case, Carter did not address whether officers may
give lay opinion testimony about drug sales they personally observe. James
asks us to extend Carter and declare that during a non-jury trial an
experienced officer who, based on his observations and experience, witnesses
what he/she believes to be a drug transaction, cannot offer lay opinion
testimony to that effect.
To address James’s claim, we look to relevant authority addressing the
admission of lay opinion testimony. In Berry, we held an officer’s testimony,
based on his personal knowledge and experience, that droplets he observed
were blood, fell within the scope of lay opinion. See Berry, 172 A.3d at 4.
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There, Corporal David Donkochik (“Corporal Donkochik”) and Officer Matthew
Dillman (“Officer Dillman”) responded to a reported assault and observed
droplets, which resembled blood, on the floor of Berry’s residence. See id. at
2. The trial court denied Berry’s motion in limine to exclude any reference to
the observed substance as blood. See id. On appeal, Berry argued the trial
court erred in admitting Corporal Donkochik’s and Officer Dillman’s testimony
that the substance was blood. See id. at 3.
The Berry Court held the officers “gave permissible lay opinion
testimony regarding their observations of the blood droplets while inside
[Berry’s] home . . . .” Id. at 4. Importantly, the trial court allowed Corporal
Donkochik to testify regarding his twenty years of experience as a police
officer and relevant crime scene training. See id. We also noted that the
jury, as the finder of fact, was aware of “its obligation to determine whether
the droplets were blood, the victim’s blood, or some other substance as part
of its fact-finding duty.” Id. at 5. We concluded that “[w]hether or not the
droplets were the victim's blood, or blood at all, were matters relating to the
weight and credibility of that evidence properly reserved for the jury as
factfinder.” Id. In other words, the officers’ lay testimony was a matter of
weight, not admissibility. Thus, Berry shows an officer may properly offer lay
opinion testimony based on his experience, training, and observations where
his opinion is helpful to determining a fact in issue. See Pa.R.E. 701(b).
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Another analogous line of cases permitting lay opinion of police officers
that combines testimony involving personal observations with training and
experience involves charges for driving under the influence of alcohol or
controlled substances (“DUI”). An officer can testify generally as a lay witness
as to whether an individual is under the influence of alcohol or a controlled
substance to a degree that renders them incapable of safe driving based on
observations that are informed by the officer’s training and experience. These
opinions, while informed by the officer’s training and experience, do not
inherently exceed the knowledge of the average layperson. See
Commonwealth v. Nestor, 314 A.3d 863, 871-72 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(internal citation omitted) (explaining officer trained to identify signs of
impairment could testify as a lay witness that the appellant was “under the
influence of a drug or combination of drugs” relying on his personal
observations); see also Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 310 (Pa.
Super. 2023) (conducting a sufficiency review, where no expert testimony was
presented, and noting the officer credibly testified, based on his training,
experience, and observations, that the appellant was driving under the
influence of marijuana based on his observations of appellant’s driving and
the odor of marijuana); Commonwealth v. David, No. 1557 EDA 2025, 2026
WL 381409 at *1, 4 (Pa. Super. Jan. 23, 2026) (non-precedential
memorandum) (conducting a sufficiency review, where no expert testimony
was presented, and noting the officer, who based on his training and
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experience could recognize when an individual was impaired by alcohol or
narcotics, credibly testified the appellant drove erratically and his physical
signs were consistent with narcotics impairment). Cf. Commonwealth v.
Greene, 340 A.3d 324, 330-31 (Pa. Super. 2025) (holding trial court abused
its discretion in admitting officer lay opinion that the defendant was under the
specific influence of PCP because it “was beyond the knowledge of an average
layperson”).7 It is permissible lay opinion because it combines direct
observation with training and experience, which allows for reliability. One
cannot expect a lay witness to get in the witness box and forget the relevant
training they have received or their prior life experiences. As Nestor states,
personal observations made in a given scenario are informed by the training
and experience of the law enforcement officers. See Nestor, 314 A.3d at
873.
Similarly here, Officer Outterbridge, a veteran officer in the NSF, who
has experience and training in the area of narcotics, testified to his experience
in conjunction with what he actually observed that day. Similar to the DUI
scenarios discussed supra, Officer Outterbridge’s experience and training
informed what he observed that day.
Furthermore, the rules of evidence regarding opinion testimony are not
limited to Rules 701 and 702. Rule 704 clearly states that “[a]n opinion is not
7See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (non-precedential memoranda decision of Superior Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for persuasive value).
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objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue.” Pa.R.E. 704.
Furthermore, “[u]nder Rule 704, a lay or expert opinion otherwise admissible
under Rules 701 or 702 is not barred merely because it embraces an ultimate
issue.” EDWARD D. OHLBAUM, OHLBAUM ON THE PENNSYLVANIA RULES OF EVIDENCE
§ 704.05 (2026 ed.); see, e.g., In re Paul S., 552 A.2d 288, 291 (Pa. Super.
1988) (superseded by statute on other grounds) (explaining “[o]ur courts
have held that a witness, whether lay or expert, will be permitted to testify
concerning the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact, provided that
admission of the opinion testimony will not cause confusion or prejudice);
Huggins, 68 A.3d at 967 (explaining Rule 704 “clearly permits both expert
and lay opinion testimony on issues that ultimately must be decided by the
trier of fact”).
We discern no abuse of discretion in admitting Officer Outterbridge’s lay
opinion testimony. As noted, the holding in Carter is narrow, and it bars the
admission of expert opinion testimony before a jury that a drug transaction
occurred where the expert witnesses had testified as fact witnesses as well.
The case at bar is distinguishable from Carter in that it involves a non-jury
trial and lay opinion testimony. As we recently stated in Commonwealth v.
Arroyo, No. 1332 EDA 2024, 2025 WL 1833870 (Pa. Super. July 3, 2025)
(non-precedential memorandum), Carter does not address the admissibility
of lay opinion testimony based on personal experience, training and
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observations. See Arroyo, 2025 WL 1833870 at *5 n.58; Carter, 589 A.2d
at 1135.9 Additionally, pursuant to Berry, an officer’s testimony, when based
on his personal knowledge and experience, is admissible lay opinion
testimony. See Berry, 172 A.3d at 4. Under Rule 701, a lay witness may
offer an opinion “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or
to determining a fact in issue[]” where the opinion testimony is “not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702.” Pa.R.E. 701(b), (c). That is the type of testimony the officer gave in
Berry; it did not constitute scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
beyond that possessed by the average layperson[,]” as would constitute
expert opinion pursuant to Pa.R.E. 702(a).
Here, as in Berry, Officer Outterbridge gave lay opinion testimony
based on his personal observations informed by his training and experience.
Those observations included James’s multiple short conversations and
exchanges of money for small objects between James and other individuals.
Officer Outterbridge’s testimony was helpful to determining a fact in issue,
and although his testimony was based on his experience as an NSF officer, it
8 Arroyo is a non-precedential memorandum and its somewhat broad reading
and application of Carter is not binding on this Court. In any event, Arroyo is distinguishable in that, there, the trial court conceded error. Here, the trial court did not concede error.
9 James’s assertion Officer Outterbridge could not have given expert testimony
under Carter is irrelevant; he offered lay opinion, not expert opinion.
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was not based on specialized knowledge that would fall outside the scope of
lay opinion under Pa.R.E. 701, and within the scope of an expert opinion under
Pa.R.E. 702, because it was not based on “scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge . . . beyond that possessed by the average
layperson[.]” See Commonwealth v. Baker, 313 A.3d 1112, 1122-23 (Pa.
Super. 2024) (affirming the admission of a Children and Youth worker’s lay
opinion, based on matters within her personal knowledge and experience, that
it was dangerous for Baker to be around the victim); Nestor, 314 A.3d at
872-73 (affirming the admission of officer’s lay witness testimony, where
officer testified, based on his personal observations and his experience and
training, that a driver was under the influence of a controlled substance). 10
Stated differently, Officer Outterbridge’s testimony, while informed by his
observations, experience, and training, did not exceed the scope of knowledge
of an average layperson who witnesses a drug transaction. Accordingly, it
was admissible lay testimony. See Pa.R.E. 701; Berry, 172 A.3d at 5.11
10 We note, in Arroyo, we focused on the portion of Carter that condemned
the qualification of officers to give expert testimony an observed transaction was a drug transaction and did not emphasize that Carter declared it “absurd[]” to allow expert testimony where an officer has already testified from his personal observation he saw a drug transaction.
11 Assuming arguendo the trial court erred in overruling James’s objection, the
error would in any event be harmless: we note that here, unlike Berry and Carter, the judge sat as factfinder, and “trial judges are presumed to ignore inadmissible evidence.” Commonwealth v. Goldman, 252 A.3d 668, 680 (Pa. Super. 2021). Additionally, a judge sitting as factfinder possesses “the expertise necessary to perceive and discount improper opinion evidence from a police expert[.]” Commonwealth v. Brown, 596 A.2d 840, 844 (Pa.
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Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Officer
Outterbridge’s lay opinion based on his observations and experiences, James
is due no relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Date: 9/22/2026
Super. 1991); see also Commonwealth v. Neal, 713 A.2d 657, 662 (Pa. Super. 1998) (stating a court as factfinder is “presumptively is capable of disregarding inadmissible evidence and considering only relevant and competent evidence.”).
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