SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
Case No. 6D2024-0447
Lower Tribunal No. 24-DR-030308
KATHIE BERNSTEN,
Appellant,
v.
JEFFREY P. SANTOPIETRO,
Appellee.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Lee County.
John S. Carlin, Judge.
September 18, 2026
BROWNLEE, J.
Kathie Bernsten appeals a stalking injunction issued against her in favor of
her neighbor, Jeffrey Santopietro. Though we disapprove of Bernsten’s behavior, we
agree the evidence presented did not meet the legal standard for issuance of a
stalking injunction and therefore reverse.
I. Background
Bernsten lives two doors down and one floor up from Santopietro in a
condominium complex. The two got along well when Santopietro first moved in, but their relationship eventually became so fraught that Santopietro petitioned for an
injunction for protection against stalking under section 784.0485, Florida Statutes
(2023).
At the hearing on the petition, Santopietro testified about Bernsten’s “nasty”
behavior toward him: she made insulting comments “about [his] weight, . . . [his]
handicap, . . . you name it,” and spread rumors about him, including a false story
that he lost control of his bowels in the community pool. Santopietro said Bernsten
made these kinds of comments daily as she sat outside on the lawn in front of their
building, staring towards his unit. He also believed Bernsten took photos of his lanai,
which were sent to the condo association. And he was concerned that Bernsten had
recently begun walking around the neighborhood at night with a flashlight.
Santopietro felt he could no longer sit on his lanai in peace because of Bernsten’s
behavior towards him, which he described as “really becoming comical.”
In addition to Santopietro’s testimony, one fellow condo resident confirmed
that Bernsten made “very rude” and “cruel” comments about Santopietro, calling
him names like “fat man” and “pizza boy,” while sitting in her chair outside their
building. Another resident confirmed Bernsten’s “bullying” of Santopietro, but also
detailed his own issues with her, telling the court that Bernsten had “smear[ed] dog
poop on [his] front doorstep” and had told his teenage daughter she was not allowed
to run around the complex.
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For her part, Bernsten testified she had lived in the neighborhood for many
years and liked to sit outside talking with her friends. She admitted she had called
Santopietro “pizza man,” since she thought it was funny that he ordered food so
often. The court found Bernsten’s behavior “unbelievable” and told her that he
believed Santopietro and not her. The court then remarked that he could not imagine
having to put up with her as a neighbor and granted the injunction, which included
a prohibition on Bernsten sitting outside her residence.
II. Standard of Review
We review an order imposing a permanent stalking injunction for an abuse of
discretion, but we review the sufficiency of the evidence for such an injunction de
novo. See Klein v. Manville, 363 So. 3d 1163, 1167 (Fla. 6th DCA 2023) (citing
Pickett v. Copeland, 236 So. 3d 1142, 1143–44 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)); see also
Hoover v. Peak o/b/o C.P., 392 So. 3d 261, 263 (Fla. 1st DCA 2024).
III. Analysis
Bernsten now argues the evidence of her conduct towards Santopietro was
insufficient to constitute stalking and asks us to reverse. We agree the evidence of
Bernsten’s behavior was insufficient to cause substantial emotional distress as
required for issuance of a permanent injunction.
Section 784.0485, Florida Statutes, creates a civil cause of action for
injunctive relief for a victim of stalking. It provides that, “[u]pon notice and hearing,
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when it appears to the court that the petitioner is the victim of stalking, the court may
grant such relief as the court deems proper, including an injunction[.]” §
784.0485(6)(a), Fla. Stat. (2023). “Stalking” occurs when “[a] person [] willfully,
maliciously, and repeatedly follows, harasses, or cyberstalks another person.” §
784.048(2), Fla. Stat. (2023). And ‘“[h]arass’ means to engage in a course of conduct
directed at a specific person which causes substantial emotional distress to that
person and serves no legitimate purpose.” § 784.048(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (emphasis
added).
In determining whether harassment causes substantial emotional distress, we
apply an objective standard, considering whether the conduct at issue would cause
substantial emotional distress in a reasonable person in the victim’s position. See
Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 237–38 (Fla. 1995) (explaining that the statutory
definition of “harasses” under the stalking statute creates an objective standard);
Klein, 363 So. 3d at 1168 (“We apply a reasonable person standard, rather than a
subjective standard, to determine whether harassment or cyberstalking causes
substantial emotional distress.”); Hoover, 392 So. 3d at 263 (“[C]ompetent,
substantial evidence must be present in the record to support a finding that a
‘reasonable person’ suffered from emotional distress due to the stalking.”).
Importantly, “substantial emotional distress” is more than ordinary distress,
annoyance, or offense. See, e.g., Hasan v. Rivera, 332 So. 3d 1023, 1025 (Fla. 4th
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DCA 2022) (“[M]ere irritation, annoyance, embarrassment, exasperation,
aggravation, and frustration, without more, does not equate to ‘substantial emotional
distress.’” (citation omitted)); Kaye v. Wilson, 363 So. 3d 1155, 1159 (Fla. 2d DCA
2023) (“Substantial emotional distress is greater than ordinary distress, and under
Florida law, a reasonable person does not suffer substantial emotional distress
easily.” (citation modified)). Indeed, “the act of ‘stalking,’ upon which a petition for
injunction may be based, is abhorrent and criminal conduct, a first-degree
misdemeanor under section 784.084(2), Florida Statutes.” Brennan v. Syfrett, 369
So. 3d 320, 323 (Fla. 1st DCA 2023).
While conduct between neighbors may certainly warrant the imposition of a
stalking injunction, “the stalking statutes authorizing protective injunctions are not
designed to ‘keep the peace’ between neighbors ‘who for whatever reason, are
unable to get along and behave civilly toward each other.’” Id. (quoting Paulson v.
Rankart, 251 So. 3d 986, 990 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018)). A protective injunction requires
more.
Upon review of the evidence in this case, we find it falls short of the applicable
standard. Santopietro testified that Bernsten spread untruthful and crude rumors,
called him cruel names, sent photos of his lanai to the condo association, and stared
in his direction while sitting outside their shared building. While that behavior may
have been “unbelievable,” as the trial court found, it is not sufficient to cause
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substantial emotional distress to a reasonable person in Santopietro’s position, as
required for injunctive relief under the stalking statute. See, e.g., Brennan, 369 So.
3d at 325 (reversing stalking injunction where the “[u]neighborly conduct” by
appellants—riding four-wheelers on their own property at night while shining lights
in appellees’ direction, spreading manure near the fence line, staring, and calling
state agencies about appellees, would not cause substantial emotional distress to a
reasonable person); Heule v. Humphrey, 426 So. 3d 572, 575–76 (Fla. 1st DCA
2025) (reversing stalking injunction where a married couple placed numerous
handmade signs in their windows with messages making fun of their neighbor’s
mental health, dressed a skeleton on their front door in outfits corresponding to
events in the neighbor’s life, and installed a solar device, because the evidence was
insufficient to establish substantial emotional distress); Caterino v. Torello, 276 So.
3d 88, 89 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) (reversing injunction where appellant yelled
obscenities at neighbor and entered the neighbor’s property to remove a permit
attached to the garage door, because the conduct would not cause a reasonable
person to suffer the requisite distress). Indeed, there was no evidence that
Santopietro suffered emotional distress at all.
While dealing with this sort of rude conduct is no doubt unpleasant, we cannot
find that it is sufficient to cause substantial emotional distress as required by section
784.048(1)(a). Accordingly, we reverse the order granting the injunction in this case.
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REVERSED.
WHITE and GANNAM, JJ., concur.
Kara B. Rogers and Robson D.C. Powers, of Powers & Rogers, PLLC, Cape Coral, for Appellant.
No Appearance for Appellee.
NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING
AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED
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