Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-26-00095-CV
BLACKROCK MINERAL PARTNERS, LLC and Dynasty Land & Minerals, LLC,
Appellants
v.
JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Trustee of the Red Crest Trust,
Appellee
From the 81st Judicial District Court, La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23-05-00048-CVL
Honorable Jennifer Dillingham, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Lori Massey Brissette, Justice
Delivered and Filed: September 16, 2026
AFFIRMED
Appellants Blackrock Mineral Partners, LLC and Dynasty Land & Minerals, LLC
(collectively “Blackrock”) own a nonparticipating royalty interest (“NPRI”) in real property
commonly known as the Burks Ranch. Appellee JP Morgan Chase, N.A., Trustee of the Red Crest
Trust, (the “Red Crest Trust”) owns the mineral interest that is burdened by Blackrock’s NPRI.
Blackrock and the Red Crest Trust disagree on the meaning of the deed conveying Blackrock’s
NPRI. The trial court denied Blackrock’s motion for summary judgment, and it rendered a final
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judgment in the Red Crest Trust’s favor. Blackrock raises what we construe as three issues on
appeal. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The deed conveying the NPRI from the Red Crest Trust’s predecessor-in-interest to
Blackrock’s predecessor-in-interest provides:
That I, [the Red Crest Trust’s predecessor-in-interest] . . . grant . . . to [Blackrock’s
predecessor-in-interest] . . . One-Sixty Fourth of one eighth of the landowner’s one
eighth royalty interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under
and that may be produced from the following described lands situated in La Salle
County, Texas, to-wit:
[description of 3,200 acres in the Burks Ranch]
together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining,
drilling, and exploring said lands for oil, gas and other minerals, and removing the
same therefrom.
The interest hereby conveyed is a royalty interest included in and with the royalty
under any lease now on said lands or any subsequent lease given thereon, executed
by predecessors in title empowered to execute the same . . . .
Witness my hand this 10th day of September, A.D. 1929.
(Emphasis added). Nowadays, XTO Energy, Inc. operates oil and gas wells that extract resources
owned by the Red Crests Trust on the Burks Ranch. The Red Crest Trust has, however, not signed
any oil and gas lease with XTO Energy.
The parties’ dispute largely hinges on the term “lease” in the deed. Blackrock contends
that the deed conveyed a 1/512th royalty interest on any oil and gas lease. In the event the Red
Crest Trust fails to execute a lease, as is the case here, then Blackrock should be treated as a cotenant with the Red Crest Trust. In such circumstances, Blackrock is entitled to a 1/512th royalty
of production after accounting for XTO Energy’s production costs. The Red Crest Trust contends
that Blackrock seeks to impermissibly convert a floating NPRI, which limits the interest holder to
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its designated faction of the leased amount, into a fixed NPRI, which allows for the payout of an
absolute faction, regardless of any lease.
Blackrock sued the Red Crest Trust and XTO Energy on claims of trespass to try title, quiet
title, monies had and received, and a request for declaratory relief. All of Blackrock’s claims are
premised on its interpretation of the deed and its effective status as a co-tenant. As the suit
progressed, Blackrock settled with XTO Energy. Blackrock then sought summary judgment
against the Red Crest Trust, praying that the trial court rule Blackrock owns a nonparticipating
royalty interest equal to 1/512 of production occurring on the Burks Ranch, less the cost of drilling.
In an “Order and Final Judgment” that claims to “grant” Blackrock’s motion for summary
judgment, the trial court declared that the deed:
conveyed a floating non-participating royalty interest in the lands described therein
which is equal to one-sixty fourth of one-eighth — or one five hundred and twelfth
(1/512) — of the landowners’ one-eighth royalty interest in and to all of the oil,
gas, and other minerals in and under and that may be produced . . . .
The judgment states that it “disposes with prejudice of all claims between and among” Blackrock
and the Red Crest Trust. The final judgment effectively denies Blackrock of all the relief it sought
in its live petition and motion for traditional summary judgment. 1 Blackrock timely appeals.
1
Blackrock’s opening brief makes no complaint that the trial court granted summary judgment in the Red Crest Trust’s favor without the Red Crest Trust having filed a cross motion for summary judgment. Blackrock’s opening brief prays that we render judgment in its favor. The Red Crest Trust’s brief complains that Blackrock’s opening brief raises new arguments. But see, Greene v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 446 S.W.3d 761, 764 n.4 (Tex. 2014) (“We do not consider issues that were not raised in the courts below, but parties are free to construct new arguments in support of issues properly before the Court.”). It nevertheless contends that Blackrock’s new arguments fail on the merits, and it presents responsive arguments. In Blackrock’s reply brief, it complains for the first time that the trial court improperly rendered a final summary judgment in the Red Crest Trust’s favor without it first filing a cross motion for summary judgment. Blackrock concludes its reply brief by praying for a reversal and remand based on this “obvious[] . . . procedural error.”
We respectfully decline to consider Blackrock’s new issue and appellate remedy. See Lopez v. Montemayor, 131 S.W.3d 54, 61 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, pet. denied) (“A reply brief is not intended to allow an appellant to raise new issues.”); see also Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Hunt Petroleum Corp., 439 S.W.2d 853, 862 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 455 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. 1970) (“This being the case, we hold that when on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment the undisputed facts show that the plaintiffs have no case, the court has power to grant
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II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW
The movant for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of demonstrating that (1)
no genuine issue of material fact exists, and (2) it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX.
R. CIV. P. 166a(a)(1); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex.
2003); KPMG Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.
1999).
We review a trial court’s construction of a deed de novo. See Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff,
596 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex. 2020). “As with any deed or contract, our task is to determine and
enforce the parties’ intent as expressed within the four corners of the written agreement.” Id.
(citing Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Cap. Partners, Ltd., 546 S.W.3d 110, 117–18 (Tex. 2018)).
“Intent must be determined by a careful and detailed examination of the document in its entirety,
rather than by application of mechanical rules of construction that offer certainty at the expense of
effectuating intent.” Hysaw v. Dawkins, 483 S.W.3d 1, 16 (Tex. 2016). We utilize a holistic
approach in ascertaining intent from the language of the deed. U.S. Shale Energy II, LLC v.
Laborde Properties, L.P., 551 S.W.3d 148, 151 (Tex. 2018); see Clifton v. Johnson, 733 S.W.3d
16, 21 (Tex. 2026) (“We look to all the language in such deeds to deduce intent.”).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Floating & Fixed NPRIs
In Blackrock’s first issue, it references our opinion in Prize Energy Resources, L.P. v. Cliff
Hoskins, Inc., 345 S.W.3d 537, 561–62 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.), abrogated on
other grounds by Nath v. Texas Children’s Hospital, 576 S.W.3d 707 (Tex. 2019), for the
proposition that a floating NPRI burdening unleased minerals becomes part of the mineral estate,
a defendant a summary judgment even though the defendant made no cross motion for summary judgment.”). Instead, we will address each of the issues Blackrock raises in its opening brief.
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entitling the floating NPRI holder to royalty payments. Blackrock emphasizes (1) a passage in the
trial court’s judgment in Prize Energy finding that “BP’s royalty does not burden any interests held
by the Defendants . . . ;” (2) an operator’s contention that because it operated wells on leased
minerals, it had no obligation to pay NPRI owners burdening unleased minerals; and (3) our
application of Section 91.402 of the Texas Natural Resources Code that “payees,” defined as
“persons legally entitled to payment from the proceeds derived from the sale of oil or gas,” includes
royalty interest owners. Id. at 561 (citation omitted).
The Red Crest Trust argues that Prize Energy is distinguishable for three reasons. First, it
emphasizes that we addressed a claim under Section 91.402 of the Texas Natural Resources Code,
and that Blackrock asserted such a claim against only XTO Energy, not the Red Crest Trust.
Second, the instrument at issue in Prize Energy was a joint operating agreement that provided:
If it develops that any interest owned and contributed by a party hereto is an
unleased interest in the oil and gas rights, then such unleased interest shall be treated
for all purposes of this agreement as if it were an oil and gas lease covering such
unleased interest on a form providing for the usual and customary one-eighth
royalty . . . .
Id. at 546, n.2. The instrument at issue here is the deed, which contains no comparable provisions.
Third, in Prize Energy, we did not decide the question Blackrock presents: whether a floating
NPRI that is expressly tied to “the royalty under any lease” generates an entitlement to production
in the absence of a lease.
We find our opinion in Prize Energy distinguishable from the instant case for the three
reasons the Red Crest Trust articulates. As such, Blackrock fails to provide us with any authority
supporting its contention that its floating NPRI should be treated as a fixed NPRI because the Red
Crest Trust has failed to execute a lease.
We overrule Blackrock’s first issue.
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B. Co-Tenancy
In Blackrock’s second issue, it argues that “when a mineral owner does not sign an oil and
gas lease, the common law of co-tenancy applies.” Blackrock further argues that “[b]ecause there
is no lease, the unleased mineral owner’s right to receive royalties is not subject to the royalty
reserved by the lease.” Other than general authority regarding the law of co-tenancy, Blackrock
references no authority for its two contentions. The Red Crest Trust argues that, as an NPRI owner,
Blackrock cannot enjoy the benefits of a co-tenant.
In Pickens v. Hope, 764 S.W.2d 256, 264 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, writ denied), we
held that:
A “non-participating royalty” does not entitle the owner to produce the minerals
himself, or permit him to join in a lease of the mineral estate to which the royalty
is appurtenant, or entitle him to share in bonus or delay rentals that may be paid for
the lease, but merely entitles him to a share of production under the lease free of
exploration and production expenses.
Id. (emphasis added). Blackrock fails to reference any on-point authority in support of its cotenancy contention. Moreover, Pickens, militates against Blackrock’s co-tenancy contention
because it draws our attention back to the lease. In this case, there is no lease.
We overrule Blackrock’s second issue.
C. Duty of Utmost Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Blackrock’s third issue, it argues that the Red Crest Trust breached its duty of utmost
good faith and fair dealing to it by not signing a lease. The Red Crest Trust highlights that
Blackrock never pleaded a cause of action related to the duty of utmost good faith and fair dealing.
Even if Blackrock did so, it, according to the Red Crest Trust, fails to reference any evidence that
the Red Crest Trust “unfairly diminished” any value to Blackrock’s interest.
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Blackrock fails to tether its appellate argument regarding the Red Crest Trust’s duty of
utmost good faith and fair dealing to any claim pleaded in its live petition or to any issue raised in
its motion for summary judgment. In Morriss v. Enron Oil & Gas Company, 948 S.W.2d 858,
871 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, no writ), we observed:
Since, according to Morriss, contractual claims have never been a part of the case,
any complaint on appeal with regard to contractual breaches is inappropriate.
Morriss’s failure to urge contractual breaches at the trial court level presents
nothing for review by this court. Whatever claims of contractual breach may have
existed have been waived.
Id. Accordingly, Blackrock has waived any claim relating to the duty of utmost good faith and
fair dealing.
We overrule Blackrock’s third issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
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