Inza v. Apple Inc.

majority opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

RICHARD INZA, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v. Civil Action No. 25-1970 (RDM)

APPLE INC., et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This is one of four related cases pending before the Court involving overlapping parties

and claims. All four cases allege that Apple Inc., Alphabet Inc., Google LLC, and Samsung

Electronics America Inc. (“the Platform Defendants”) and Verizon Wireless, AT&T, and TMobile (“the Carrier Defendants”) have conspired to create a market in which smartphone users

must pay supracompetitive prices for Wi-Fi calling, a wireless voice service that relies on Wi-Fi

to route calls over broadband internet networks instead of through cell towers. Each of the

Carrier Defendants offers Wi-Fi calling for “free” or at “no additional charge” with the purchase

of certain cellular plans, and each of the Platform Defendants sells smartphones that employ

operating systems that support wireless voice services offered by the Carrier Defendants and

others. In the first of the four cases (24-cv-3051), the corporate plaintiff, VoIP-Pal.com, Inc.

(“VoIP-Pal”), asserts various antitrust claims against the Carrier Defendants. In the second case

(24-cv-3054), Richard Inza (“R. Inza”), Michael Inza (“M. Inza”), and Ray Leon (collectively,

“the Individual Plaintiffs”), along with VoIP-Pal, assert similar antitrust and other claims both

individually and on half of a putative class against the Carrier Defendants. And, in the third case (25-cv-1843), VoIP-Pal asserts various antitrust and other claims against the Platform

Defendants.

In the present case, the fourth case, the Individual Plaintiffs and VoIP-Pal (collectively,

“Plaintiffs”) assert similar claims, both individually and on behalf of a putative class, against the

Platform Defendants. Although Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint is not the picture of clarity, it

alleges that the Platform and Carrier Defendants “have combined and conspired to monopolize

or [to] attempt to monopolize native telephony calling (including Wi-Fi Calling) and have

foreclosed independent competition in the market.” Dkt. 7 at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). Plaintiffs

allege, among other things, that the Platform Defendants have designed their operating systems

and firmware to permit only the Carrier Defendants and their affiliates to offer wireless voice

services integrated with the “native telephony” features of their devices. Id. at 2 (Am. Compl.

¶ 2). Those “native telephony” features are the “default phone” features of a smartphone, which

include the phone app, contact list, voicemail, emergency services, and default notifications. Id.

at 3, 5–6 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12–13). Plaintiffs further allege that the Platform Defendants’

operating systems will unlock these features of the smartphone only when presented with a SIM

card or eSIM that presents carrier credentials. Id. at 5 (Am. Compl. ¶ 12). As a result, the

Carrier Defendants may directly access the default phone features, but others providing wireless

voice services must do so through third-party apps that offer a “degraded” experience because

“incoming calls . . . are not recognized as native incoming calls, do not wake the [p]hone app,

appear in the call log, or allow access to emergency functions.” Id. at 6, 38, 43 (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 14, 95, 108). Although the Carrier Defendants are not parties to this suit, they are—on

Plaintiffs’ telling—central to the alleged conspiracy and, among other things, provide the

“SIM/eSIM entitlements” and other inputs required to unlock the default phone features of Apple

and Android devices. Id. at 2, 8 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 19).

The bottom line, according to Plaintiffs, is that Platform and Carrier Defendants have

conspired to create a market in which smartphone users must either “pay supracompetitive

bundle prices” to use the default calling functions of their phones or use third-party apps that

offer a subpar experience. Id. at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). Plaintiffs allege that but for this

allegedly unlawful conspiracy, a competitor could offer a standalone Wi-Fi calling service that

uses the native telephony features of Apple and Android devices “at far lower prices” than the

bundled cellular plans offered by the Carrier Defendants. Id.

In this action, Plaintiffs assert four claims against the Platform Defendants. Counts One

and Two allege that they have violated the Sherman Act by preventing non-carrier wireless

service providers “from accessing native telephony [features] on virtually all smartphones in the

United States,” id. at 66 (Am. Compl. ¶ 166), and by requiring consumers to buy bundled

cellular plans to “unlock native calling (including Wi-Fi calling)” on their devices, id. at 67 (Am.

Compl. ¶ 168). Counts Five and Six allege violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (“RICO”). More specifically, they allege the existence of an association in

fact—consisting of either the Platform Defendants or the Platform Defendants and the Carrier

Defendants—created to “mislead consumers and to obtain and maintain monopoly power in the

market for Wi-Fi calling.”1 Id. at 74, 77 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 200–01, 211).

The Platform Defendants have filed a joint motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Dkt. 29. In addition, as relevant here, Samsung

Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint originally included eight counts, but Plaintiffs stipulated to the dismissal with prejudice of Counts Three, Four, Seven, and Eight. Dkt. 40 at 1.

has separately moved to compel arbitration and to stay any non-arbitrable claims against it

pending arbitration. See Dkt. 30. Samsung asks the Court to resolve its motion to dismiss for

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and, if necessary, its motion to compel arbitration before

addressing any of its Rule 12(b)(6) grounds for dismissal. See Dkt. 29-1 at 15 n.5. In support of

its motion to compel, Samsung first argues that the Individual Plaintiffs must arbitrate the claims

at issue in this case based on their subscriber agreements with Verizon Wireless and T-Mobile,

which contain arbitration clauses, and on “well-established principles of equitable estoppel,”

which render those agreements enforceable in cases brought against other defendants alleging

interdependent and concerted misconduct by the signatory and non-signatory defendants. Dkt.

30-1 at 10, 28. Because Plaintiffs allege that (1) the Platform Defendants conspired to allow the

Carrier Defendants to charge supracompetitive prices for Wi-Fi calling; (2) the Platform

Defendants and Carrier Defendants are unlawfully tying native telephony features and “carrier

bundles;” and (3) the Platform Defendants have violated RICO based on statements made by the

Carrier Defendants about the price of Wi-Fi calling, and seek damages for being charged too

much under their subscriber agreements, their claims all arise out of, relate to, and concern their

subscriber agreements with T-Mobile and Verizon. See Dkt. 7 at 9–11, 74–76 (Am. Compl. ¶¶

22–26, 199–209); Dkt. 30-1 at 55–56. But, if equitable estoppel does not apply, Samsung asks

the Court to enforce R. Inza’s and Leon’s agreements to arbitrate their claims against Samsung.

Id. at 40.

Finally, the Platform Defendants ask the Court to dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims in this action

on the ground that they are “essentially identical” to the claim that VoIP-Pal asserts against them

in the earlier-filed case (25-cv-1843). Dkt. 29-1 at 11, 41–42. As they point out, the rule against

claim splitting bars a party from maintaining two actions involving the same parties and same

subject matter in the same court at the same time. See id. at 41–42.

Because the Court will grant Samsung’s motion to compel arbitration on equitable

estoppel grounds, it need not address the enforceability of Samsung’s arbitration agreements

with R. Inza and Leon. The Court will also grant Apple Inc., Alphabet Inc., and Google LLC’s

motion to dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims in this action on the grounds of improper claims splitting

and, for similar reasons, will sua sponte dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims against Samsung.

I. BACKGROUND

In support of its motion to compel arbitration, Samsung offers sworn declarations and

other exhibits showing that each Individual Plaintiff entered into a subscriber agreement

containing an arbitration clause with either T-Mobile or Verizon. See Dkt. 30 (Exs. 2, 5–61).

Plaintiffs have neither disputed any of Defendants’ factual allegations nor proffered any

controverting evidence of their own. See Dkt. 35 at 9–10. The Court, accordingly, relies on the

following undisputed facts for purposes of resolving the pending motion. Moreover, because the

Court concludes that Samsung is entitled to compel arbitration based on the Individual Plaintiffs’

agreements to arbitrate their parallel claims against the Carrier Defendants and on principles of

equitable estoppel, the Court focuses on those agreements, rather than the separate arbitration

agreements that some of the Individual Defendants entered into with Samsung itself.

A. T-Mobile

With respect to T-Mobile’s arbitration clause, Samsung relies on a declaration executed

by Judy Sanchez, whose job responsibilities at T-Mobile include “review, analysis, and research

of litigation and arbitration matters, and acting as a custodian of T-Mobile’s records.” Dkt. 30-34 at 2 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 2). Sanchez attests that Plaintiff Michael Inza has had a T-Mobile

account since April 30, 2016. Id. at 3 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 4). When he activated his account, M.

Inza agreed to T-Mobile’s Terms and Conditions, which contained a mandatory arbitration

provision and a class action waiver. Id. at 3 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 5); see Dkt. 30-35 at 4, 10–11.

Since 2016, M. Inza “has repeatedly been presented with and agreed to T-Mobile’s [Terms &

Conditions] by using and paying for T-Mobile services and/or devices.” Dkt. 30-34 at 3

(Sanchez Decl. ¶¶ 6, 16–28).

Most recently, M. Inza “was presented with and accepted the May 15, 2023 [Terms &

Conditions] when he received a new phone pursuant to an equipment installment plan [] dated

September 18, 2023.” Id. at 5 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 19). When the new phone was delivered, it

would have come in a box with a sticker informing him that “[b]y purchasing or opening this

package, activating, using or paying for service, you agree to the applicable Terms &

Conditions (“T&Cs”) (including mandatory arbitration provisions)” and directing him to TMobile’s website where the T&Cs were available. Id. at 5 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 19). He “would

have needed to break or remove [the sticker] to open the box.” Id.

The first page of the May 15, 2023, Terms and Conditions clearly notifies the customer

that the agreement “contain[s] important information about your relationship with us, including

individual mandatory binding arbitration of disputes between us, instead of class actions or jury

trials.” Dkt. 30-43 at 3. In a subsection titled “Dispute Resolution” beginning on page 5, the

following paragraph appears:

YOU AND WE EACH AGREE THAT, EXCEPT AS PROVIDED

BELOW, ANY AND ALL CLAIMS OR DISPUTES, OF ANY NATURE,

INCLUDING TORT AND STATUTORY CLAIMS, IN ANY WAY

RELATED TO OR CONCERING THE AGREEMENT, OUR PRIVACY

NOTICE, PRIVACY OR DATA SECURITY PRACTICES, OUR

SERVICES, DEVICES OR PRODUCTS, INCLUDING ANY BILLING

DISPUTES, WILL BE RESOLVED BY INDIVIDUAL BINDING

ARBITRATION OR IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT. THERE IS NO

JUDGE OR JURY IN ARBITRATION, AND COURT REVIEW OF AN

ARBITRATION AWARD IS LIMITED.

Id. at 7. Three paragraphs later, the Terms and Conditions provide:

YOU MAY CHOOSE TO PURSUE YOUR CLAIM IN COURT AND NOT

BY ARBITRATION IF YOU OPT OUT OF THESE ARBITRATION

PROCEDURES WITHIN 30 DAYS FROM THE EARLIER OF THE

DATE YOU PURCHASED A PRODUCT OR DEVICE FROM US OR

THE DATE YOU ACTIVATED A NEW LINE OF SERVICE . . . .

Id. The Terms and Conditions also contain the following class action waiver:

YOU AND WE EACH AGREE THAT ANY PROCEEDINGS,

WHETHER IN ARBITRATION OR COURT, WILL BE CONDUCTED

ONLY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS AND NOT AS A CLASS,

REPRESENTATIVE, MASS, OR CONSOLIDATED ACTION. If you

opt out of the arbitration provision as specified above, this Class Action

Waiver provision will not apply to you.

Id. at 9. There is no indication that T-Mobile ever received an opt-out notice from M. Inza. Dkt.

30-34 at 6 (Sanchez Decl. ¶ 29).

B. Verizon Wireless

With respect to Verizon Wireless’s arbitration agreement, Samsung relies on the

declaration of Joseph Ninete, a “Senior Analyst” who “assist[s] with the handling of consumer

disputes for Verizon Wireless.” Dkt. 30-51 at 2 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 1). Ninete attests that “Plaintiff

Richard Inza has been a customer of Verizon Wireless since in or around September 2016.” Id.

at 4 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 8). On October 2, 2016, Verizon sent R. Inza “a letter confirming his service

activation which included a copy of the then-operative customer agreement.” Id. at 10 (Ninete

Decl. ¶ 9). The agreement set out the ways that a subscriber could accept the agreement, one of

which is by “[a]ctivating your Service.” Dkt. 30-56 at 5.

In August 2018, R. Inza “purchased a Samsung Galaxy S9 and executed . . . a Device

Payment Agreement.” Dkt. 30-51 at 4 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 10). The agreement required him to

“AGREE TO AND MAINTAIN SERVICE WITH VERIZON WIRELESS UNDER YOUR

CUSTOMER AGREEMENT,” which the agreement incorporated by reference. Dkt. 30-57 at 4.

Concerning dispute resolution, in particular, the agreement provides:

ADDITIONALLY, ANY DISPUTES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT

(INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, ANY DISPUTES AGAINST THE

SELLER AND/OR VERIZON WIRELESS) SHALL BE RESOLVED IN

ACCORDANCE WITH THE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROVISIONS IN

YOUR CUSTOMER AGREEMENT UNDER THE HEADING: HOW DO I

RESOLVE DISPUTES WITH VERIZON WIRELESS, WHICH TERMS ARE

INCOPRORATED BY REFERENCE. SPECIFICALLY, YOU AND

VERIZON WIRELESS (AND/OR THE SELLER) AGREE TO RESOLVE

ALL DISPUTES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT ONLY BY ARBITRATION

OR SMALL CLAIMS COURT AND YOU WAIVE ANY RIGHT TO A

JUDGE OR JURY IN ANY ARBITRATION

Id. at 4. In 2021 and 2023, R. Inza “purchased new devices and executed additional Device

Payment Agreements,” which also incorporate by reference the customer agreement and contain

materially identical descriptions of the arbitration requirement. Dkt. 30-51 at 5 (Ninete Decl.

¶ 11); Dkt. 30-58 at 4; Dkt. 30-59 at 4.

Plaintiff Leon is also a Verizon Wireless subscriber. Dkt. 30-51 at 3 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 5).

On April 4, 2025, he “purchased a new iPhone 16 and activated Verizon’s Unlimited Plus

Service.” Id. “In connection with this purchase, Leon electronically signed a receipt stating that

he had read and agreed to the Verizon Customer Agreement, including the settlement of dispute

by arbitration instead of jury trial.” Id.; see Dkt. 30-53 at 5. The agreement included a link to

the full Customer Agreement. Dkt. 30-53 at 5.

The currently operative customer agreement went into effect on February 5, 2025. Dkt.

30-51 at 5 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 4). R. Inza was “notified of the update in the billing statement for his

account for the period between January 29 and February 28, 2025.” Id. at 5 (Ninete Decl. ¶ 14).

Both R. Inza and Leon have used their Verizon Wireless services since the operative customer

agreement went into effect on February 5, 2025. Id. at 3, 5 (Ninete Decl. ¶¶ 5, 13).

The first paragraph of the agreement highlights that it contains “important information”

about subscribers’ wireless service, including “how any disputes between us must be resolved

in arbitration or small claims court.” Dkt. 30-52 at 2. The full text of the arbitration clause

has a grey background distinct from the majority of the agreement. Id. at 6. It provides: “YOU

AND VERIZON BOTH AGREE TO RESOLVE DISPUTES ONLY BY ARBITRATION OR

IN SMALL CLAIMS COURT AS DISCUSSED BELOW. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT BY

THIS AGREEMENT YOU ARE GIVING UP THE RIGHT TO BRING A CLAIM IN COURT

OR IN FRONT OF A JURY.” Id. As to scope, it provides that the arbitration agreement covers

“ANY DISPUTE THAT IN ANY WAY RELATES TO OR ARISES OUT OF THIS

AGREEMENT.” Id. at 7.

The third paragraph of the arbitration provision states that “THIS AGREEMENT

DOESN’T ALLOW CLASS OR COLLECTIVE ARBITRATIONS.” Id. The last paragraph

of the agreement further provides that “IF FOR ANY REASON A CLAIM PROCEEDS IN

COURT RATHER THAN THROUGH ARBITRATION . . . NO ACTION WILL BE

BROUGHT ON A CLASS OR COLLECTIVE BASIS.” Id. at 9.

* * *

Each of the Carriers’ subscriber agreements specified that the agreement and the

arbitration clause contained therein would be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act and the

law of the state encompassing the billing address associated with each subscriber’s Verizon

account. Dkt. 30-43 at 9 (T-Mobile); Dkt. 30-52 at 8, 10 (Verizon Wireless). The billing

address associated with each Individual Plaintiffs’ account is in Florida. Dkt. 30-34 at 6

(Sanchez Decl. ¶ 30) (M. Inza); Dkt. 30-51 at 3–4 (Ninete Decl. ¶¶ 5, 8) (R. Inza and Leon).

Plaintiffs oppose Samsung’s motion to compel arbitration, but they do not dispute or

otherwise controvert any of these facts. See Dkt. 35 at 9–10.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) “places arbitration agreements on equal footing

with other contracts, and requires courts to enforce them according to their terms.” Rent-A-Ctr.,

W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (internal citation omitted). “Section 2 of the [FAA]

makes agreements to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as

exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.’” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,

563 U.S. 333, 336 (2011) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). The FAA “reflec[s] both a liberal federal

policy favoring arbitration, and the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of

contract.” Id. at 339 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “A motion to compel

arbitration is decided on a summary judgment standard.” Dist. No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine

Eng’rs’ Ben. Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Mar. Corp., 998 F.3d 449, 456 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

“Because the party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement bears the burden of

proving that the other party agreed to arbitrate, . . . the party seeking to compel arbitration must

first present evidence sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable agreement to arbitrate.” Osvatics

v. Lyft, Inc., 535 F. Supp. 3d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2021) (internal citations, brackets, and quotation marks

omitted). “The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to raise a genuine issue of material

fact as to the making of the agreement, using evidence comparable to that identified in Rule

56.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The court must grant summary

judgment with respect to the formation of an arbitration agreement if the pleadings and evidence

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But if the

Court concludes that a “genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the making of the arbitration

agreement, including whether the parties assented to the agreement,” the case must “proceed

summarily to trial solely on the issue of arbitrability.” Jin v. Parsons Corp., 966 F.3d 821, 827

(D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotations omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Article III Standing

The Platform Defendants’ motion to dismiss challenges the Court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction on the grounds that Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. See Dkt. 29-1 at 15–17.

Because standing is a threshold jurisdictional issue, the Court begins by assuring itself it has

jurisdiction. To establish standing, a plaintiff must show that they suffered an (1) “injury in fact”

that was (2) “caused by the defendant” and (3) “would likely be redressed by judicial relief.”

TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). In the complaint, Plaintiffs allege that

they are “device owner[s] who [] paid supracompetitive bundle charges to unlock native calling

on their own phone.” Dkt. 7 at 30 (Am. Compl. ¶ 80). Defendants do not dispute that the

payment of supracompetitive prices for bundled cellular service and Wi-Fi calling would qualify

as an Article III injury; indeed, “monetary harms” are a quintessential Article III injury.

TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 425; see Marion Diagnostic Ctr., LLC v. Becton Dickinson & Co.,

29 F.4th 337, 345 (7th Cir. 2022) (“paying inflated prices due to an anticompetitive scheme will

satisfy injury-in-fact”). Instead, they argue only that Plaintiffs “allege no facts to establish . . .

that they purchased such a bundle.” Dkt. 29-1 at 16.

That contention is based on the premise that “Plaintiffs allege no facts to establish either

that they purchased” bundled cellular services that were priced at a supracompetitive level, facts

indicating “from which Defendant, if any, they purchased such a bundle,” or facts indicating

“that they would have purchased standalone Wi-Fi calling but from the bundle.” Id. But

Plaintiffs allege that they “purchased and own smartphones,” Dkt. 7 at 18 (Am. Compl. ¶ 48),

and that they “paid supracompetitive bundle changes to unlock native calling on their phone[s]”

and/or “suffered functional degradation when declining the [alleged] tie,” id. at 30 (Am. Compl.

¶ 80). They further allege, moreover, that this economic loss is “fairly traceable to” the Platform

and Carrier Defendants’ conspiracy “to deny native functionality” to competing service

providers. Id. They allege, for example, that “[a] stand-alone Wi-Fi Calling option could cost as

little at $6.50 per month for an individual or $20 for a family of four,” as compared to the costs

of $90 to $110 per month that “families must routinely pay” for voice, text, and mobile data

services.” Id. at 11 (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). Finally, they allege that these supracompetitive costs

would be avoided were the Court to order the Platform Defendants to permit “parity access via

neutral certification” and not to re-impose a “lock” in the future. Id. at 31 (Am. Compl. ¶ 82).

The combination of Plaintiffs’ allegations and the uncontroverted evidence before the

Court is sufficient to establish the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. See also Oxbow Carbon &

Mins. LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 81 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2015) (plaintiffs sufficiently

alleged injury in fact for Sherman Act, Section 1 claim by alleging that “each plaintiff paid ‘fuel

charges . . . that they would not have paid in the absence of the conspiracy” even though they did

not state “to whom plaintiffs . . . paid those surcharges”). This is neither the time nor (at least as

to Samsung) the forum to determine whether these allegations have any factual or legal merit.

Plaintiffs have adequately alleged, however, that they have suffered economic loss due to the

alleged conspiracy and the extraction of supercompetitive prices for Wi-Fi calling services.

The Court, accordingly, concludes that it has Article III standing to consider the parties’

respective arguments.

B. Forfeiture or Waiver

The Court begins with Plaintiffs’ argument that Samsung has waived its right to arbitrate

their claims. “Under the FAA a litigant is entitled to a stay pending arbitration so long as the suit

in which he is a party is ‘referable to arbitration’ under a valid agreement and he ‘is not in

default in proceeding with such arbitration.’” Zuckerman Spaeder, LLP v. Auffenberg, 646 F.3d

919, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). Plaintiffs cite National Foundation for Cancer

Research v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1987), for the proposition that

“[a] party may waive its right to arbitration by acting ‘inconsistently with the arbitration right.’”

Dkt. 35 at 32. “By simultaneously seeking dismissal with prejudice and compelling arbitration,”

Plaintiffs argue, “Samsung has invoked the judicial merits process in a manner inconsistent with

a genuine commitment to arbitration.” Id.

Although Plaintiffs accurately state the standard for waiver set out in National

Foundation for Cancer Research, the D.C. Circuit has since clarified that “forfeiture, not waiver,

is the appropriate standard for evaluating a late-filed motion under Section 3 of the FAA.”

Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d at 922; accord Kelleher v. Dream Catcher, L.L.C., 729 F. App’x

4, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Morgan v. Sundance, Inc., 596 U.S. 411, 416–17 (2022)

(declining to decide whether waiver or forfeiture is the appropriate procedural framework under

the FAA); Harris v. Med. Transp. Mgmt., Inc., No. 17-CV-1371, 2019 WL 11320367, at *1–*2

(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2019) (applying only the standard for forfeiture to question of default under

FAA § 3). “Forfeiture is the ‘failure to make a timely assertion of a right’ and, unlike waiver,

entails no element of intent.” Zuckerman Spaeder, 646 F.3d at 922 (quoting United States v.

Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)).

A party presumptively forfeits its right to arbitrate if it fails to “invoke[] the right to

arbitrate on the record at the first available opportunity, typically in filing his first responsive

pleading or motion to dismiss.” Id. In Zuckerman Spaeder, the D.C. Circuit held that the

defendant had “failed to make a timely assertion of his right to arbitrate” because he “failed to

invoke arbitration in (or before filing) his original answer,” and the record did not support his

assertion that he “told Zuckerman early and often of his intention to arbitrate.” Id. at 923. This

case presents the opposite scenario. Samsung has consistently signaled its intention to seek to

compel arbitration to the Court, Dkts. 17, 24 (seeking extensions of time to file a motion to

dismiss or a motion to stay pending arbitration), and it filed its motion to compel arbitration at

the earliest possible opportunity, see Dkt. 30-1. Under Zuckerman Spaeder, Samsung preserved

its right to arbitrate by moving to compel arbitration at the “first available opportunity.” 646

F.3d at 922.

Furthermore, to the extent that Zuckerman Spaeder leaves any role for the “inherently

fact-bound” waiver analysis when a defendant concurrently files a motion to stay and a motion to

dismiss with prejudice, id. at 922, the Court further concludes that Samsung has not acted

inconsistently with an intent to arbitrate. In the D.C. Circuit precedent describing default in

terms of waiver, the court described “active participation in a lawsuit” as an example of conduct

inconsistent with an intent to arbitration. Khan v. Parsons Glob. Servs., Ltd., 521 F.3d 421, 425

(D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation modified); Nat’l Found., 821 F.2d at 775. More generally, the court of

appeals has focused on litigation efforts that signify “a conscious decision” to leave substance

claims and defenses (even if otherwise arbitrable) before the court for decision. Khan, 521 F.3d

at 427 (citation modified); Nat’l Found., 821 F.2d at 776; see also Winston & Strawn, LLP v.

Doley, 654 F. Supp. 2d 17, 21 (D.D.C. 2009). To give litigants “a second bite at the very

questions presented to the court for disposition squarely confronts the policy that arbitration may

not be used as a strategy to manipulate the legal process.” Nat’l Found., 821 F.2d at 776.

Samsung’s concurrent filings do not evince an intent to have the Court decide the

substance of Plaintiffs’ claims or an attempt to take a forbidden second bite at legal issues

already decided by the Court. Both the Platform Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Samsung’s

motion to compel arbitration stress that the Court should decide Samsung’s motion to compel

arbitration before reaching any of its arguments under Rule 12(b)(6). Dkt. 30-1 at 11; Dkt. 29-1

at 15 n.5. That request reflects Samsung’s intent to submit all of the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims

against it to arbitration and to address only the merits of non-arbitrable claims before this Court.

So, unlike in prior cases in which the D.C. Circuit has found waiver of the right to arbitrate,

Samsung has not “made a conscious decision to exploit the benefits of pretrial discovery and

motion practice” and have the substance of Plaintiffs’ claims decided by the Court. Nat’l

Found., 821 F.2d at 776 (defendant waived right to arbitrate by answering complaint, instigating

extensive discovery, moving for partial summary judgment, engaging in settlement negotiations,

and setting case for trial); Khan, 521 F.3d at 428 (defendant waiver the right to arbitrate by filing

motion for summary judgment based on materials outside the pleadings); see also Forby v. One

Techs., L.P., 909 F.3d 780 (5th Cir. 2018) (finding waiver but distinguishing cases holding “that

the party seeking arbitration did not invoke the judicial process because its motion to dismiss

was filed concurrently with a motion to seek arbitration”).

Finally, although Plaintiffs do not press the point, the Court notes that the Platform

Defendants’ request that the Court dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims in this action does not constitute a

waiver or forfeiture of Samsung’s request to arbitrate. To start, Samsung never argues that those

claims are subject to arbitration, and it does not ask the Court to compel VoIP-Pal to arbitrate its

claims against Samsung. But beyond that difficulty, Samsung merely asks that the Court stay

VoIP-Pal’s claims against it pending arbitration, and it is clear that it is not asking the Court to

adjudicate the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ claims before deciding whether to compel arbitration.

Dkt. 29-1 at 15 n.5. As discussed further below, the Court has concluded sua sponte that VoIPPal’s claims against Samsung in this action should be dismissed on grounds of claim splitting—

rather than merely stayed pending arbitration. But that sua sponte action cannot possibly

constitute a waiver or forfeiture by Samsung. The Court merely concluded that there is no

reason to maintain VoIP-Pal’s duplicative claims in this action—and thus unnecessarily to clutter

the Court’s docket—even while the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims against Samsung are in

arbitration.

C. Arbitration

Although Samsung entered into arbitration agreements with R. Inza and Leon, it asks the

Court to compel all of the Individual Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims against it based on their

separate arbitration agreements with T-Mobile and Verizon. Dkt. 30-1 at 10. It relies on

Florida’s doctrine of equitable estoppel, which is an exception to the ordinary rule that “a party

cannot compel arbitration under an arbitration agreement to which it was not a party.” Beck Auto

Sales, Inc. v. Asbury Jax Ford, LLC, 249 So. 3d 765, 767 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018); see also

Marcus v. Fla. Bagels, LLC, 112 So. 3d 631, 633–34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013). Equitable

estoppel allows a non-signatory to compel arbitration against a signatory under limited

circumstances. See Bergeron Env’t & Recycling, LLC v. LGL Recycling, LLC, 398 So. 3d 988,

995 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024). The Supreme Court has recognized that “the FAA permits a

nonsignatory to rely on state-law equitable estoppel doctrines to enforce an arbitration

agreement.” GE Energy Power Conversion France SAS, Corp. v. Outokumpu Stainless USA,

LLC, 590 U.S. 432, 438 (2020); accord Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 631–32

(2009).

The Individual Plaintiffs do not dispute that they each entered into an arbitration

agreement with either T-Mobile or Verizon, nor do they challenge the enforceability of those

agreements (as opposed to the separate Samsung agreements). They object to arbitration

pursuant to their subscriber agreements on two grounds. First, they argue that equitable estoppel

does not require them to arbitrate their claims against Samsung because those claims “do not

depend on rights or obligations created by [their subscriber] contracts” with T-Mobile and

Verizon. Dkt. 35 at 17. On their telling, Florida law requires “that the claim against the nonsignatory actually depend on the contract containing the arbitration clause.” Id. Second, they

argue in a perfunctory fashion that the carrier subscriber agreements do not cover their claims

because they “govern billing relationships between carriers and consumers, not the design of

Samsung firmware embedded in smartphones before any carrier relationship exists.” Id.

1. Equitable Estoppel

Plaintiffs’ objection to the application of equitable estoppel relies on a misunderstanding

of Florida contract law. Florida courts have recognized “two situations” in which equitable

estoppel principles may compel a signatory to arbitrate his claims against a non-signatory. Fla.

Roads Trucking, LLC v. Zion Jacksonville, LLC, 384 So. 3d 817, 819 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2024).

The first of those situations is the one identified by Plaintiffs: “when the claims relate directly to

the contract and the signatory is relying on the contract to assert its claims against the nonsignatory.” Fla. Roads Trucking, 384 So. 3d at 820 (citation modified). But Samsung does not

argue in its motion to compel that Plaintiffs’ claims against Samsung rely on their subscriber

agreements with T-Mobile and Verizon. Rather, it invokes the second situation that Florida

courts have held justify the application of equitable estoppel: when “a signatory to a contract

containing the arbitration clause raises allegations of substantially interdependent and concerted

misconduct by both a non-signatory and one or more of the signatories to the agreement.”

Kratos Invs. LLC v. ABS Healthcare Servs., LLC, 319 So. 3d 97, 101 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021);

accord Fla. Roads Trucking, 384 So. 3d at 820.

Florida courts do not require a non-signatory to show both concerted misconduct and that

the claims against them rely on the contract containing the arbitration agreement. Nonsignatories can invoke either or both theories of equitable estoppel as fits the facts of their case.

See, e.g., Integrated Health Servs. at Cent. Fla., Inc. v. Est. of DeSantis by & through DeSantis,

407 So. 3d 547, 552–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025) (addressing “both [equitable estoppel]

exceptions” independently and finding equitable estoppel warranted because “both

claims . . . necessarily entail concerted misconduct between Compass Point and signatory Laurel

Point”); Fla. Roads Trucking, 384 So. 3d at 820 (“The Trucking Companies argue that Zion’s

claims fit both paradigms” of equitable estoppel); Lash & Goldberg LLP v. Clarke, 88 So. 3d

426, 428 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (addressing only concerted misconduct prong and finding

equitable estoppel warranted because plaintiff “alleged concerted misconduct by nonsignatories . . . and signatories”); Kolsky v. Jackson Square, LLC, 28 So. 3d 965, 970 (Fla. Dist.

Ct. App. 2010) (addressing only concerted misconduct prong and finding equitable estoppel

warranted because “claims against the non-signatory appellants ar[ose] out of the same

allegations of concerted conduct among the non-signatory appellants and [a signatory], are based

on the same facts, and are inherently inseparable”); Armas v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 842 So. 2d

210, 212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing each theory of equitable estoppel separately and

finding equitable estoppel warranted because claims against non-signatory “ar[ose] out of the

same factual allegations of concerted conduct by both the non-signatory . . . and the

signatories”).

Accordingly, Samsung need not show that Plaintiffs’ claims rely on their T-Mobile or

Verizon subscriber contracts for equitable estoppel to apply. The question, instead, is whether

the signatory’s claims allege “substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” by

Samsung and T-Mobile or Verizon. Fla. Roads Trucking, 384 So. 3d at 819. In addition,

because equitable estoppel “does not expand the scope of disputes subject to arbitration,” Florida

courts will not apply equitable estoppel to an arbitration clause that limits its application to

disputes between the parties of the arbitration agreement. Beck Auto Sales, 249 So. 3d at 768

(citation modified) (declining to apply equitable estoppel to “arbitration provision [that]

generally limited its applicability to disputes ‘between the parties’ to the arbitration agreement”);

Kroma Makeup EU, LLC v. Boldface Licensing + Branding, Inc., 845 F.3d 1351, 1354–55 (11th

Cir. 2017) (similar). On the other hand, “arbitration provisions containing the language, ‘arising

out of or related to,’ in certain instances can be construed to include non-signatories.” Armas,

842 So. 2d at 211; see Kratos Invs., 319 So. 3d at 101–02 (applying equitable estoppel to

arbitration provision covering “any dispute arising out of or related in any way to” the

agreement).

Applying these principles here, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs must arbitrate their

claims against Samsung. Both T-Mobile’s and Verizon’s arbitration agreements, which cover all

three Individual Plaintiffs, contain the kind of broad language sufficient to evince an intent to

arbitrate claims with nonsignatories. Under T-Mobile’s arbitration agreement, subscribers agree

to arbitrate “any and all claims or disputes, of any nature, including tort and statutory claims, in

any way related to or concerning the agreement.” Dkt. 30-43 at 7. Verizon’s arbitration

agreement contains similar language, requiring subscribers to arbitrate “any dispute that in any

way relates to or arises out of this agreement.” Dkt. 30-52 at 8. These agreements use broad

language intended to cover the widest possible array of claims and do not “expressly restrict[]

arbitration to the signing parties,” Koechli, 870 So. 2d at 945, and are therefore amenable to

enforcement by non-signatories. See also Mid-Am. Apartment Communities, Inc. v. Gonzalez,

406 So. 3d 362, 364 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2025) (“On the other hand, the phrase ‘arising out of or

relating to’ the contract has been interpreted broadly to encompass virtually all disputes between

the contracting parties, including related tort claims.”).

Beyond this broad language, requiring the Individual Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims

against Samsung is appropriate here because the service at the center of Plaintiffs’ antitrust and

RICO claims in this case—Wi-Fi calling—is offered by the Carrier Defendants on the terms set

out in their subscriber agreements. Indeed, taking Plaintiffs’ claims on their own terms, the

allegedly unlawful conduct at issue in this case, as in Plaintiffs’ other cases, involves a

conspiracy between the Platform and Carrier Defendants to permit the Carrier Defendants to

extract supercompetitive prices from their customers—that is, from those who entered into the

subscriber agreements with T-Mobile and Verizon (and AT&T). Dkt. 7 at 69 (Am. Compl. ¶

178). Plaintiffs’ alleged injury, for example, is the payment of “supracompetitive bundle prices”

to the Carrier Defendants for cellular plans that include Wi-Fi calling. Dkt. 7 at 10 (Am. Compl.

¶ 26); see id. at 67 (Am. Compl. ¶ 168) (“As a direct and proximate result of the

Agreement/Conspiracy . . . Plaintiffs . . . suffered antitrust injury, including . . . paying for

bundle premiums to unlock native calling (including Wi-Fi calling) . . . .”). The Platform

Defendants’ principal role in the alleged conspiracy is to design their operating systems in a

manner that enables Carrier Defendants to sell the bundled cellular service and Wi-Fi calling

plans at a premium. See, e.g., id. at 46 (Am. Compl. ¶ 114) (“The Carrier Co-Conspirators drive

a business model to force tying and the Platform Provider Defendants (Apple, Google, Samsung)

enable the tie at the device level.”); Dkt. 7-2 at 2 (alleging that the Platforms have “creat[ed] a

two-tier system that protects the carriers’ traditional business models”). Similarly, the tying

arrangement alleged in this case consists of “native Wi-Fi calling”—which is itself a

Frankenstein combination of the Platforms’ operating systems and the Carriers’ cellular plans—

and “carrier bundles,” which are sold only by the Carrier Defendants. Dkt. 7 at 24, 73 (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 24, 194). If that were not enough, the racketeering activity forming the basis of

Plaintiffs’ RICO claims is mail and wire fraud based on statements made exclusively by the

Carrier Defendants about the price of Wi-Fi calling. See id. at 52, 80 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 129, 229);

Dkt. 7-4 (depicting the allegedly misleading statements).

In short, Plaintiffs rely on the Carrier Defendants’ offering of bundled cellular service

and Wi-Fi calling plans to establish their antitrust injury, the existence of the conspiracy, the

occurrence of anticompetitive conduct, the racketeering activity underlying their RICO claims,

and their damages. It would create precisely the kind of unfair circumstances addressed by the

equitable estoppel doctrine to allow Plaintiffs to invoke their subscriber agreements with the

Carrier Defendants to establish the Platform Defendants’ liability while avoiding arbitration

under those same agreements. See Koechli, 870 So. 2d at 945.

With the breadth of T-Mobile’s and Verizon’s arbitration agreements established, the

Court easily concludes that the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims rely on allegations of the type of

“substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct” that justify application of principles of

equitable estoppel. Fla. Roads Trucking, 384 So. 3d at 819 (citation modified). The first

paragraph of the amended complaint alleges that the Platform Defendants and their “Carrier Co21

Conspirators . . . have combined and conspired to monopolize or attempt to monopolize native

telephony calling (including Wi-Fi calling).” Dkt. 7 at 2 (Am. Compl. ¶ 1). The amended

complaint is littered with allegations that the Platform and Carriers Defendants engaged in a

conspiracy or an association-in-fact with the purpose of dominating the market for Wi-Fi calling.

See id. at 3 (Am. Compl. ¶ 4) (“The Platform Provider Defendants and the Carrier CoConspirators engage the Lock-and Key system . . . so that native Wi-Fi calling is functionally

conditioned on purchase/retention of carrier voice/text bundles . . . .”); id. at 7 (Am. Compl. ¶ 18)

(“Together the Platform Provider Defendants and the Carrier Co-Conspirators ensure that only

bundled carrier lines are treated as native.”); id. at 10 (Am. Compl. ¶ 24) (“The Platform

Provider Defendants (and the Carrier Co-Conspirators) act as one enterprise maintain monopoly

power of Wi-Fi Calling in violation of Sherman Act § 2.”); id. at 51 (Am. Compl. ¶ 126)

(“Apple, Google, Samsung (the “Platform Provider Defendants”), together with AT&T, Verizon,

and T-Mobile (the “Carrier Defendants”), form an association-in-fact enterprise under 18 U.S.C.

§ 1961(4).”); id. at 52 (Am. Compl. ¶ 129) (“The Platform Provider Defendants and Carrier CoParticipants engaged in a pattern of racketeering consisting of fraudulent messaging and

transmitted uniform ‘Wi-Fi Calling is included at no additional charge’ messages . . . .”). The

Amended Complaint refers to the Carrier Defendants as co-conspirators or co-participants no

fewer than 45 times. See, e.g., id. at 2, 10, 28 47, 50–53 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 24, 75, 125, 128–

32).

Plaintiffs do not dispute that they have alleged “substantially interdependent and

concerted misconduct.” See, e.g., Dkt. 35 at 22 (arguing that “[c]oncerted misconduct” among

platform providers and carriers is coordinated market behavior” and does not “arise[] from rights

or obligations created by consumer subscriber agreements”). Nor could they. Their response to

the motion to compel acknowledges that their claims against Samsung “arise[] from coordinated

platform- and carrier-level architecture operating across six defendants and two industry tiers.”

Dkt. 35 at 8. It resists arbitration precisely because Plaintiffs’ “claims arise from interdependent

conduct across multiple defendants and proceedings,” arguing that “compelling arbitration of a

single defendant’s role would fragment adjudication of the same structural restraint and

undermine the Court’s coordinate management of related cases.” Id.; see also Dkt. 5 at 1 (notice

that Platform case is related to Carrier case because it “involves common issues of fact” and

“grows out of the same event or transaction”). But that flips the governing doctrine on its head;

because Plaintiffs’ claims against the Platform Defendants allege that they acted in concert with

the Carrier Defendants as a “unified enterprise” to commit the antitrust and RICO violations

alleged in the complaint, Dkt. 7 at 13 (Am. Compl. ¶ 35), equitable estoppel is warranted.2

Finally, Plaintiffs fail to identify any law holding that equitable estoppel presents an all or

nothing proposition and that it is unavailable if any claims against any defendant might avoid

arbitration.3

See, e.g., Kratos Investments, 319 So. 3d at 101 (applying equitable estoppel where signatory “specifically allege[d] the appellants conspired with its agents in a scheme to steal ICD’s business by interfering with and causing the agents to breach”); Greene v. Johnson, 276 So. 3d 527, 531 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019) (applying equitable estoppel where plaintiff’s claims against non-signatory defendants were “based on the same set of operative facts that Greene alleges against signatory Johnson, that is, a conspiracy by the defendants”); Lash & Goldberg LLP v. Clarke, 88 So. 3d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) (applying equitable estoppel where complaint alleged that defendants “intentionally ‘engaged in a pattern of fraud and deceit” and “conspired to prevent” plaintiff from discovering information); Citi Cars, Inc. v. Cox Enters., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-22190-KMM, 2018 WL 1521770 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 22, 2018) (equitable estoppel warranted where “Plaintiff essentially alleges that Defendants have acted in concert by entering into a conspiracy to restrain trade and force Plaintiff into bankruptcy”); Gunson v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1396, 1402–03 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (equitable estoppel warranted where plaintiff alleged that defendants conspired to engage in illegal lending activities). 3

It is premature, moreover, to decide whether the arbitrability of certain claims against certain defendants would, as a matter of judicial efficiency, justify staying Plaintiffs’ claims against the

2. Applicability of the Arbitration Agreements

With the availability of equitable estoppel established, the Court turns to Plaintiffs’

contention that the T-Mobile and Verizon agreements do not cover their claims in this action. As

Samsung observes, those agreements use broad language, and Plaintiffs’ claims against the

Platform Defendants are tied to their purchases of cellular plans on the terms set out in the

subscriber agreements. But the question of whether the agreements are sufficiently capacious to

cover the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims in this case is not properly before the Court, because both

agreements include delegation clauses that give the arbitrator—as opposed to the Court—

authority to decide gateway issues of arbitrability. See Dkt. 30-43 at 8–9; Dkt. 30-52 at 8. One

of those gateway issues is “whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a certain

type of controversy.” Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452 (2003). The FAA

requires courts to enforce delegation provisions and to leave “any challenge to the validity of the

Agreement as a whole for the arbitrator” unless the party opposing arbitration “challenge[s] the

delegation provision specifically.” Rent-A-Ctr., 561 U.S. at 72; accord Henry Schein, Inc. v.

Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. 63, 65 (2019). Because Plaintiffs never mention or

challenge the delegation provisions of their subscriber agreements, they must raise their

challenges to the enforceability of the Verizon and T-Mobile agreements in arbitration.

In sum, then, Plaintiffs do not dispute that they entered into enforceable arbitration

agreements with T-Mobile and Verizon Wireless and that those agreements include delegation

clauses that delegate arbitrability questions to the arbitrator. They also do not dispute that they

remaining defendants pending resolution of the arbitration, since the Court is not yet persuaded that Plaintiffs’ remaining claims can survive a threshold motion to dismiss.

have alleged that the Platform Defendants engaged in concerted misconduct with T-Mobile and

Verizon Wireless. Those concessions resolve Samsung’s motion to compel arbitration.

D. Claim Splitting

Finally, the Court turns to the question of claim splitting. In their motion dismiss, the

Platform Defendants urge the Court to dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims in this action on the grounds of

claim splitting. Dkt. 29-1 at 41-42. As they note, VoIP-Pal filed an earlier action in which it

asserts essentially the same claims against the same defendants. See Complaint, VoIP-Pal.com,

Inc. v. Apple Inc., Dkt. 1, 25-cv-01843 (D.D.C. June 11, 2025); Amended Complaint, Dkt. 9, 25-cv-01843 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2025). The rule against claim splitting “obligates a plaintiff to

‘assert all . . . causes of action arising from a common set of facts in one lawsuit.’” Steele v.

United States, 144 F.4th 316, 324 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). The rule “‘shield[s] parties

from vexatious concurrent or duplicative litigation.’” Id. at 325 (quoting Katz v. Gerardi, 655

F.3d 1212, 1217 (10th Cir. 2011)). A plaintiff impermissibly splits its claim when “the plaintiff

seeks ‘to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant

at the same time.’” Clayton v. District of Columbia, 36 F. Supp. 3d 91, 94 (D.D.C. 2014)

(quoting same). Claim splitting “is a proper basis for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).” Steele,

144 F.4th at 325.

In response, VoIP-Pal acknowledges that the factual allegations in the two cases overlap

but argues that dismissal is not warranted because “they involve different parties, different

injuries, and different remedies.” Dkt. 34 at 46. On VoIP-Pal’s telling, the cases involve

different parties because the second case adds the Individual Plaintiffs and class claims and

because VoIP Pal appears in the second case “only as a co-plaintiff seeking structural injunctive

relief aligned with the consumer class relief.” Id. at 47. The cases involve different claims: the

first case focuses on barring VoIP-Pal from entering the market, while this case focuses on the

related injury to consumers. Id. And, finally, the cases involve different remedies because the

first case seeks “lost licensing revenue and restoration of market entry opportunities,” and this

case seeks class damages and declaratory relief. Id. at 48.

None of these contentions is responsive to the Platform Defendants’ charge of claim

splitting. Most notably, VoIP-Pal does not dispute, nor could it dispute, that it is a plaintiff in

both cases, that the Platform Defendants are the defendants in both cases, and that both cases

turn on the same underlying factual allegations and antitrust and RICO theories of relief. Indeed,

Plaintiffs themselves filed a notice of related case in this action, asserting that this case and the

earlier-filed case “involve[] common issues of fact” and “grow[] out of the same event or

transaction.” Dkt. 3. The fact that counsel made the decision to include additional plaintiffs in

this case, along with VoIP-Pal, does not negate the fact that VoIP-Pal previously brought an

action in this Court against the same defendants based on “the same ‘nucleus of facts.’” Steele,

144 F.4th at 324 (citation omitted) (cleaned up). Nor does the fact that VoIP-Pal made the

decision to focus on different injuries or to seek different relief in the two cases matter. What

matters is that in both cases, VoIP-Pal asks the Court to adjudicate its antirust and RICO claims

against the Platform Defendants based on their alleged agreement with the Carrier Defendants

and alleged “locking” of their operating systems to prevent competitors from entering the

market, and there is no reason—and certainly no reason that VoIP-Pal has identified—why it

could not have brought its claims against the Carrier Defendants in a single action. In short, the

Platform Defendants have carried their burden of showing that that the litigation is duplicative,

and VoIP-Pal has offered no justification for bringing multiple suits in the same court against the

same defendants based on the same nucleus of operative facts and, indeed, same theories of

relief. That conclusion resolves VoIP-Pal’s claims in this action against all of the defendants,

with the possible exception of Samsung.

As noted above, Samsung (unlike the other Platform Defendants) has not sought

dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) and, instead, merely asks that the Court stay VoIP-Pal’s claims

against it in this action pending resolution of the earlier-filed case. Although perhaps overly

cautious, Samsung presumably declines to seek dismissal out of fear that, were it do so, the

Court might conclude that it has waived or forfeited its right to seek to arbitrate the Individual

Plaintiffs’ claims against it. But because the cases turn on the same alleged facts, because the

final resolution of the earlier-filed action will inevitably control the resolution of VoIP-Pal’s

claims against Samsung in this case based on principles of collateral estoppel or res judicata, and

because the rule against claim splitting serves the judicial interest in “discouraging duplicative

proceedings,” Steele, 144 F.4th at 327, and is premised, at least in part, on the Court’s authority

to manage its docket, the Court will sua sponte dismiss VoIP-Pal’s duplicative claims in this

action against Samsung. As explained above, because the Court has done so on its own initiative

as a matter of judicial efficiency and docket management, dismissal has no bearing on

Samsung’s motion to compel the Individual Plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims.

E. Defendants’ Remaining 12(b)(6) Arguments

At this point, the Court has concluded that the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims against

Samsung are arbitrable and that, accordingly, their claims against Samsung in this action should

be stayed pending arbitration. The Court has also concluded that VoIP-Pal’s claims in this case

against all of the Platform Defendants should be dismissed on grounds of claim splitting.

Finally, the Court has rejected the Platform Defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of standing.

That leaves the remaining Platform Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the Individual

Plaintiffs’ claims. The Court has scheduled oral argument on that motion and, accordingly, will

defer ruling on that portion of Defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) motion until the Court can hear from

the parties.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Samsung’s motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings,

Dkt. 30, is hereby GRANTED and the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims against Samsung are hereby

STAYED pending further order of the Court; Apple Inc., Alphabet Inc., and Google LLC’s

motion to dismiss VoIP-Pal’s claims on grounds of claim splitting is hereby GRANTED and

those claims are hereby DISMISSED; and VoIP-Pal’s claims against Samsung are hereby

DISMISSED sua sponte. The Court will DEFER ruling on the Platform Defendants’ Rule

12(b)(6) arguments relating to the Individual Plaintiffs’ claims against Apple Inc., Alphabet Inc.,

and Google LLC, pending oral argument.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss

RANDOLPH D. MOSS

United States District Judge

Date: September 23, 2026

Inza v. Apple Inc.

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain