[Cite as State v. Daniels, 2026-Ohio-3728.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
STATE OF OHIO Case No. 2025-CA-00142
Opinion And Judgment Entry
Plaintiff-Appellee
Appeal from the Canton Municipal Court,
Case No. 2025 CRB 01127
DE-SHAWNAY DANIELS Judgment: Affirmed
Date of Judgment Entry:
Defendant-Appellant September 23, 2026
BEFORE: Craig R. Baldwin, Kevin W. Popham, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Jason Reese, Kate Lukosavich, Beau Wenger, for Plaintiff-Appellee; Catherine R. Meehan, for Defendant-Appellant
OPINION
Popham, J.,
{¶1} Appellant De-Shawnay Daniels ("Daniels") appeals her convictions for two
counts of Endangering Children following a jury trial in the Canton Municipal Court, Stark
County, Ohio. Daniels argues that insufficient evidence supports her convictions and that her
convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence. For the reasons that follow, we
disagree and affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
{¶2} B.C. is an eight-year-old girl who suffers from cerebral palsy and is unable to
walk, talk, eat, or move independently. B.C.’s mother (“Mother”) has provided for B.C.'s
around-the-clock care throughout B.C.’s life.
{¶3} Mother experienced an emergency involving her older daughter, which
required a stay in the intensive care unit of a local hospital. Because B.C. required respite care
during this time, arrangements were made through the Stark County Board of Developmental
Disabilities ("the Agency"). After confirming that Daniels had the required certifications to
provide care for B.C., the Agency referred the family to Daniels for respite care.
{¶4} Julie Willis, a Service Support Administrator with the Agency, testified that she
assisted in selecting Daniels, who owns For Betty's Angels, to provide B.C.'s respite care.
{¶5} When Mother dropped B.C. off at Daniels's residence, Mother provided
Daniels with B.C.'s medications, medical equipment, and car seat. Mother testified that B.C.
was suffering from no injuries before entering Daniels's care. B.C. remained in Daniels's care
from June 21 through June 24, 2024.
{¶6} During B.C.'s respite stay, she experienced a problem with her feeding tube that
required Daniels to take B.C. to Mercy Cleveland Clinic (“Mercy”), which was unable to
address the problem and referred Daniels to Akron Children's Hospital. Because Mercy could
not transport B.C. to Akron Children's Hospital, Daniels transported B.C. in Daniels’s
vehicle.
{¶7} Willis testified that, following B.C.'s release from Akron Children's Hospital,
Daniels informed her that a MUI (Major Unusual Incident) report needed to be filed
concerning B.C.'s hospital visit and a bruise that B.C. sustained from the safety locks inside
her car seat while leaving the hospital.
{¶8} When B.C. returned to Mother’s care, B.C. was crying. Mother testified that
B.C. returned at approximately 3:45 p.m. (June 24, 2024), but she did not check B.C.'s diaper
until after 8:00 p.m., at which time she noticed a bruise on the side of B.C.'s body that appeared similar to a diaper rash. Mother immediately contacted the social worker and was
instructed to take B.C. to the emergency room. Mother also noticed that B.C.'s leg was
"wobbly" when she attempted to pick B.C. up.
{¶9} B.C. was subsequently diagnosed with extensive bruising and a fractured leg.
The Investigation
{¶10} Detective Dennis Betz of the Stark County Sheriff's Office investigated the
matter following a referral from the Agency. Detective Betz testified that, on June 27, 2024,
he received a call from the Canton Police Department regarding an individual who had
sustained injuries believed to have resulted from abuse or neglect.
{¶11} Detective Betz interviewed Daniels regarding B.C.'s injuries. Daniels told
Detective Betz that, following the visit to Akron Children's Hospital, hospital staff placed B.C.
back in the vehicle.
{¶12} Daniels believed the injury to B.C.'s buttock resulted from the seat belt because
the car seat harness was too small to fit around B.C. Regarding the fractured tibia, Daniels
stated that she did not know how the injury occurred. Daniels explained to Detective Betz
that she transported B.C. between the vehicle and the hospital in a wagon.
{¶13} Detective Betz testified that Daniels was cooperative during the investigation
and provided her daily care logs, which documented B.C.'s feedings, diaper checks and
changes, and sleep schedule.
Expert Testimony
{¶14} Both sides presented expert testimony.
{¶15} The State called Dr. Paul McPherson, chief of the Child Abuse Clinic at Akron
Children's Hospital, as an expert in general pediatrics and child-abuse pediatrics. B.C.'s case was referred to Dr. McPherson, for unusual skin findings, possible burns or bruising, and skin
breakdown, when she was brought to Akron Children's Hospital on June 24, 2024. Dr.
McPherson reviewed the matter for possible abuse or neglect.
{¶16} Dr. McPherson testified that B.C.'s primary injuries consisted of injuries to her
left buttock, swelling in her vaginal area, and a fracture of the lower right leg near the knee.
Photographs of the injuries were admitted into evidence.
{¶17} Dr. McPherson concluded that B.C.'s skin injuries resulted from poor hygiene.
He also testified that B.C.'s underlying medical conditions made her susceptible to fractures.
According to Dr. McPherson, the fracture was likely caused by B.C. being maneuvered while
in respite care. He noted that B.C. had no prior history of fractures and testified that there had
been no apparent issues before she entered respite care.
{¶18} Dr. McPherson further testified that he ruled out Akron Children's Hospital as
the location where the fracture occurred because B.C. was already experiencing pain when
she arrived at the hospital. He reviewed Daniels's daily care logs and testified that B.C.'s skin
injuries would have been visible to anyone appropriately checking on her. Dr. McPherson
concluded that B.C.'s injuries resulted from a lack of proper care while she was in Daniels's
care.
{¶19} The defense called Dr. Steven Roderick Guertin as an expert in child abuse.
Dr. Guertin reviewed the records related to B.C.'s case and concluded that the injury
identified as a bruise was actually a burn. He opined that the injury was likely caused by a
seat belt, which he described as a well-known and well-documented form of injury during the
summer.
{¶20} Dr. Guertin testified that he concluded the injury was not a bruise because
bruises do not peel. He observed a well-defined pattern on one of B.C.'s thighs that
corresponded to a similar pattern on her buttock. Dr. Guertin opined that the "sharp
demarcations like that ... indicated that it is a contact burn." 2 Tr. at 43-44.
{¶21} Dr. Guertin further testified that his review of B.C.'s medical records showed
that she had been evaluated by burn specialists while hospitalized and that those specialists
agreed the injury was a burn.
Verdict and Sentence
{¶22} A jury convicted Daniels of both counts charged in the complaint - Count 1:
Child Endangerment by creating a substantial risk to the health or safety of B.C. by violating
a duty of care pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(A) and Count 2: Child Endangerment by abusing the
child pursuant to R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
{¶23} On September 30, 2025, the trial court sentenced Daniels to sixty days in jail
on each count, with the sentence to begin on January 5, 2026. The sentences were ordered to
be served concurrently. On November 4, 2025, the trial court granted Daniels's motion to stay
execution of her sentence pending appeal.
Assignments of Error
{¶24} Daniels raises two assignments of error for our consideration,
{¶25} “I. APPELLANT'S CONVICTIONS WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.”
{¶26} “II. APPELLANT’S CONVICTIONS WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.”
I.
{¶27} In her first assignment of error, Daniels contends that the State failed to
establish with sufficient evidence she acted recklessly in her care of B.C. We disagree.
Standard of Review— Sufficiency of the Evidence
{¶28} A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence presents a question of law that
we review de novo. State v. Walker, 2016-Ohio-8295, ¶ 30. The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v.
Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶29} A conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence only when reasonable
minds “could not reach the conclusion reached by the trier-of-fact.” State v. Ketterer, 2006-Ohio-5283, ¶ 94.
Applicable Law
{¶30} Daniels was convicted of Endangering Children under R.C. 2919.22(A) – [duty
of care], which provides:
(A) No person, who is the parent, guardian, custodian, person having
custody or control, or person in loco parentis of a child under eighteen years of
age or a child with a mental or physical disability under twenty-one years of
age, shall create a substantial risk to the health or safety of the child, by violating
a duty of care, protection, or support.
{¶31} Daniels was also convicted of Endangering Children under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1)
– [abuse], which provides:
(B) No person shall do any of the following to a child under eighteen
years of age or a child with a mental or physical disability under twenty-one
years of age:
(1) Abuse the child.
{¶32} Recklessness is the required mental state for a violation of R.C. 2919.22. State
v. McGee, 79 Ohio St.3d 193 (1997); State v. Adams, 62 Ohio St.2d 151 (1980); State v. O'Brien,
30 Ohio St.3d 122 (1987); R.C. 2901.21(B). Therefore, we apply a recklessness mens rea to
both charges in the case.
{¶33} R.C. 2901.22(C) provides:
A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the
consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain
nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless
indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
{¶34} "Substantial risk" means "a strong possibility, as contrasted with a remote or
significant possibility, that a certain result may occur or that certain circumstances may exist."
R.C. 2901.01(A)(8). "Abuse" means any act that causes physical or mental injury that harms
or threatens to harm the child's health or welfare. R.C. 2151.031(E).
{¶35} The Eighth District has explained that the legislature intentionally based the
definition of recklessness on the likelihood, rather than the probability, of a particular result.
State v. Hardman, 2016-Ohio-498, ¶ 38 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Young, 2005-Ohio-3584 (8th
Dist.). "Something is 'probable' when there is more reason for expectation or belief than not, whereas something is 'likely' when there is merely good reason for expectation or belief." Id.;
State v. Sheppard, 2025-Ohio-2747, ¶ 31 (5th Dist.).
{¶36} Thus, the defendant's awareness of the likelihood of the result is central to the
recklessness inquiry. "'If the result is probable, the person acts "knowingly;" if it is not
probable, but only possible, the person acts "recklessly" if he chooses to ignore the risk.'" In re
Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Emrich, 75 Ohio St.3d 1517, 1519 (1996), quoting State v.
Edwards, 83 Ohio App.3d 357, 361 (10th Dist. 1992); State v. Clay, 2008-Ohio-6325, ¶ 32
(Lanzinger, J., concurring); Sheppard at ¶ 31; State v. Ashcraft, 2023-Ohio-2378, ¶ 23 (5th Dist.).
In other words, a person acts recklessly when the person is aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the proscribed result will occur and nevertheless disregards that risk.
{¶37} Criminal intent is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and may be inferred
from facts and circumstances reasonably tending to manifest a defendant's mental state.
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274 (1952); State v. Wallen, 21 Ohio App.2d 27, 35
(5th Dist. 1969). The intent with which an act is committed may likewise be inferred from the
act itself and the surrounding circumstances, including a defendant's acts and statements. State
v. Garner, 74 Ohio St.3d 49, 60 (1995); Wallen, 21 Ohio App.2d at 34.
Analysis
{¶38} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
sufficient evidence supports each of Daniels's convictions. Although both counts arise from
the care Daniels provided to B.C., the two counts require proof of different conduct. We
therefore address each conviction separately.
R.C. 2919.22(A) – Violation of a Duty of Care
{¶39} Daniels was convicted under R.C. 2919.22(A) for recklessly creating a
substantial risk to B.C.'s health or safety by violating a duty of care, protection, or support.
{¶40} The evidence was sufficient to establish each element of this offense. First,
Daniels had custody and control of B.C. during the four-day respite-care period. B.C. is an
eight-year-old child with cerebral palsy who is unable to walk, talk, eat, or move
independently and requires around-the-clock care. Daniels was selected by the Stark County
Board of Developmental Disabilities to provide that care. Thus, Daniels assumed a duty to
provide appropriate care, protection, and support to B.C. while B.C. was in her custody.
{¶41} Second, the State presented evidence that Daniels violated that duty of care.
B.C.'s mother testified that B.C. had no injuries when she entered Daniels's care; however,
when B.C. returned to her mother's care approximately four days later, she was crying and
had sustained extensive injuries, including bruising and a fractured leg. Dr. McPherson
testified that B.C.'s skin injuries were caused by poor hygiene and that the injuries would have
been visible to anyone appropriately checking on B.C. He further testified that B.C.'s fracture
was likely caused by the way she was maneuvered while in respite care.
{¶42} This evidence, if believed, permitted the jury to conclude that Daniels breached
her duty of care owed to B.C. in order to meet B.C.'s significant medical needs.
{¶43} Finally, the evidence was sufficient to establish the required mental state (mens
rea). Recklessness does not require proof that Daniels intended to injure B.C. Rather, the
State was required to establish that Daniels acted with heedless indifference to the
consequences and disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk that her conduct would
create a substantial risk to B.C.'s health or safety. R.C. 2901.22(C).
{¶44} Here, the jury could reasonably infer Daniels's awareness of that risk from the
circumstances surrounding B.C.'s care. Daniels was responsible for B.C.'s feeding, diapering,
hygiene, transportation, and physical care. Dr. McPherson testified that B.C.'s skin injuries
would have been apparent to anyone appropriately checking her. The jury could reasonable
find that either Daniels did not notice B.C.’s injuries or chose to ignore the same. Dr.
McPherson also testified that the fracture was likely caused by maneuvering B.C. while she
was in Daniels's care. From this evidence, the jury could find that Daniels was aware of the
risks associated with failing to properly care for a medically fragile child who could not
independently meet her own basic needs yet disregarded those risks.
{¶45} Accordingly, viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, a rational trier
of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniels, while having custody or control of
B.C., violated her duty of care and, thereby, created a substantial risk to B.C.'s health or safety
in violation of R.C. 2919.22(A).
R.C. 2919.22(B)(1) - Abuse
{¶46} Daniels was also convicted under R.C. 2919.22(B)(1), which prohibits a person
from abusing a child. The evidence was likewise sufficient to support this conviction.
{¶47} R.C. 2151.031(E) defines "abuse" to include "any act that causes physical or
mental injury that harms or threatens to harm the child's health or welfare." Thus, the State
was required to establish that Daniels's conduct caused physical or mental injury to B.C. and
that Daniels acted recklessly in causing that injury.
{¶48} The State presented evidence of multiple physical injuries. B.C. had no injuries
when she entered Daniels's care. When B.C. returned approximately four days later, she had
extensive bruising and a fractured leg. Dr. McPherson identified injuries to B.C.'s left buttock, swelling in her vaginal area, and a fracture of her right lower leg near the knee. He testified
that the skin injuries resulted from poor hygiene and that the fracture was likely caused by
B.C. being maneuvered while in respite care.
{¶49} The evidence also permitted the jury to find that Daniels's conduct, rather than
an accidental or unforeseeable event unrelated to her care, caused or contributed to B.C.'s
injuries. Dr. McPherson testified that B.C. was already experiencing pain when she arrived
at Akron Children's Hospital, allowing him to rule out the hospital as the location where the
fracture occurred. He further testified that B.C. had no prior history of fractures and that her
injuries would have been apparent to someone appropriately checking on her.
{¶50} The defense presented contrary evidence. However, at the sufficiency stage, we
must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. Whether Dr.
McPherson or Dr. Guertin provided the more credible explanation for B.C.'s injuries is a
matter for the jury.
{¶51} Considering the State's evidence in that light, a rational trier of fact could find
that Daniels's failure to properly care for and maneuver B.C. was abuse, which caused
physical injuries that harmed B.C.'s health and welfare. The jury could further infer
recklessness from the circumstances, including Daniels's responsibility for B.C.'s care, B.C.'s
significant physical limitations, the absence of injuries before B.C. entered Daniels's care, the
presence of significant injuries when she returned home, and Dr. McPherson's testimony
regarding the cause and visibility of those injuries.
{¶52} Accordingly, the State presented sufficient evidence from which a rational trier
of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Daniels recklessly caused physical injury to
B.C. and thereby abused her in violation of R.C. 2919.22(B)(1).
Conclusion
{¶53} The State was required to prove different conduct for each conviction. With
respect to R.C. 2919.22(A), the evidence permitted the jury to find that Daniels, having
custody and control of B.C., violated her duty of care by failing to provide appropriate care
and, thereby, created a substantial risk to B.C.'s health or safety. With respect to R.C.
2919.22(B)(1), the evidence permitted the jury to find that Daniels's reckless conduct caused
physical injuries that harmed B.C.'s health or welfare and, therefore, constituted child abuse.
{¶54} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that
a rational trier of fact could find all the essential elements of both offenses proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
{¶55} Daniels's first assignment of error is overruled.
II.
{¶56} In her second assignment of error, Daniels contends that her convictions are
against the manifest weight of the evidence. We disagree.
Standard of Review— Manifest Weight of the Evidence
{¶57} A manifest-weight challenge concerns the persuasive force of the evidence.
Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 19. In conducting this review, an appellate court acts
as a "thirteenth juror," independently reviewing the record, weighing the evidence and
reasonable inferences, considering witness credibility, and determining whether the jury
clearly lost its way and created a manifest miscarriage of justice. State v. Jordan, 2023-Ohio3800, ¶ 17; State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997). Reversal on manifest-weight
grounds is reserved for the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
conviction. Thompkins at 387.
{¶58} Because the jury personally observes the witnesses, substantial deference is
afforded to its credibility determinations. Eastley at ¶ 21; Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio
St.3d 77, 80 (1984). “An appellate court sits as the thirteenth juror only when evidence
contradicts a fact-finder's findings, see State v. Martin, 170 Ohio St. 3d 181, 2022-Ohio-4175, ¶
26, 209 N.E.3d 688, or when a witness's testimony is so inconsistent as to material facts, so
impeached, or so fantastical as to make it patently unbelievable.” State v. Reillo, 2026-Ohio2701, ¶ 3. Without conflicting testimony or evidence that completely discredits a witness’s
testimony the appellate court has nothing to weigh. Id.
{¶59} A conviction is not against the manifest weight of the evidence merely because
the jury chose to believe the State's evidence over the defense's evidence. Where the evidence
presents competing but reasonable interpretations, we defer to the jury's resolution of those
conflicts unless the record demonstrates that the jury clearly lost its way. See State v. Martin,
2022-Ohio-4175, ¶ 26.
{¶60} In addition, the Ohio Constitution requires the unanimous concurrence of all
three appellate judges before a conviction may be reversed as against the manifest weight of
the evidence. Ohio Const., Art. IV, § 3(B)(3); Bryan-Wollman v. Domonko, 2007-Ohio-4918, ¶¶
2-4.
Analysis
{¶61} Daniels's manifest-weight challenge principally concerns the cause of B.C.'s
injuries and whether those injuries resulted from Daniels's reckless conduct. Unlike a
sufficiency challenge, we may consider the competing evidence and assess the credibility and
weight of the testimony. Having done so, however, we cannot conclude that the jury clearly
lost its way.
{¶62} The evidence established that B.C. entered Daniels's care on June 21, 2024,
without any apparent injuries. B.C. is an eight-year-old child with cerebral palsy who is unable
to walk, talk, eat, or move independently and requires around-the-clock care. Daniels
assumed responsibility for providing that care for approximately three days. When B.C.
returned to her mother on June 24, she was crying, and her mother observed a new injury to
her body and noticed that B.C.'s leg appeared abnormal when she attempted to pick her up.
B.C. was subsequently found to have extensive injuries, including injuries to her buttocks and
lower body and a fractured leg.
{¶63} The State presented expert testimony connecting B.C.’s injuries to the care she
received while in Daniels's custody. Dr. McPherson testified that B.C.'s skin injuries resulted
from poor hygiene and that the injuries would have been visible to someone appropriately
checking on B.C. He further testified that B.C.'s fracture was likely caused by maneuvering
her while she was in respite care. Dr. McPherson noted that B.C. had no prior history of
fractures and testified that B.C. was already experiencing pain when she arrived at Akron
Children's Hospital, allowing him to rule out the hospital as the location where the fracture
occurred.
{¶64} The defense presented a competing explanation for the injuries. Dr. Guertin
testified that the injury identified by Dr. McPherson as a bruise was actually a burn. He opined
that the injury was likely caused by a seat belt and testified that its sharply demarcated pattern
was consistent with a contact burn. Dr. Guertin also testified that burn specialists had
evaluated the injury while B.C. was hospitalized and agreed that it was a burn.
{¶65} Dr. McPherson testified that B.C.’s broken leg was not initially noticed by the
hospital staff. He opined that the injury could have occurred in the hospital during the examination of B.C. or during routine care, as B.C.’s bones are hollow, and susceptible to
breaking.
{¶66} The competing expert testimony does not render the State's evidence
insufficient or demonstrate that the jury clearly lost its way. The jury heard both experts,
considered their opinions along with the photographs and medical records, and was entitled
to determine which opinion was more persuasive. The existence of an alternative explanation
for the injuries does not require the jury to reject the State's evidence concerning the cause of
the injuries.
{¶67} The evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding B.C.'s care further
supported the State's case. Daniels had responsibility for B.C.'s daily care during the relevant
period. That responsibility was significant because B.C. could not independently walk, eat,
move, or attend to her own hygiene. Daniels was responsible for feeding, diapering,
monitoring, and physically handling B.C. The jury could reasonably consider the nature of
B.C.'s medical needs, the short period during which Daniels had custody, the absence of
injuries when B.C. entered her care, and the presence of significant injuries when she returned
home.
{¶68} Daniels's own statements also provided evidence for the jury to consider.
Daniels acknowledged that B.C. sustained an injury during transportation from Akron
Children's Hospital and attributed that injury to the car-seat restraints. As to the fractured
tibia, however, Daniels stated that she did not know how it occurred. The jury was entitled
to consider these statements, together with the other evidence, in determining whether
Daniels exercised appropriate care.
{¶69} Daniels essentially asks this Court to accept Dr. Guertin's explanation of the
disputed injury over Dr. McPherson's testimony. But our role is not to substitute our judgment
for that of the jury simply because the record contains conflicting evidence. The jury was
entitled to credit Dr. McPherson's testimony, reject Dr. Guertin's alternative explanation, or
accept portions of each expert's testimony. “The choice between credible witnesses and their
conflicting testimony rests solely with the finder of fact and an appellate court may not
substitute its own judgment for that of the finder of fact.” State v. Awan, 22 Ohio St.3d 120,
123 (1986) citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St. 3d 77 (1984); Henkle v. Salem Mfg.
Co., 39 Ohio St. 547 (1883).
Conclusion
{¶70} After reviewing the entire record, weighing the evidence and reasonable
inferences, and considering the credibility of the witnesses, we cannot conclude that this is
the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the convictions.
{¶71} The jury heard the competing evidence and resolved the conflicts in favor of
the State. Nothing in the record demonstrates that its resolution of those conflicts was
unreasonable or that the jury clearly lost its way.
{¶72} Accordingly, Daniels's convictions are not against the manifest weight of the
evidence.
{¶73} Daniels's second assignment of error is overruled.
{¶74} For the reasons stated in our Opinion, the judgment of the Canton Municipal
Court, Stark County, Ohio is affirmed.
{¶75} Costs are to be paid by Appellant De-Shawnay Daniels.
By: Popham, J.
Baldwin, P.J. and
Gormley, J., concur