Slip Op. 26-
UNITED STATES COURT OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
CHINA CORNICI CO., LTD. and RAOPING
HONGRONG HANDICRAFTS CO., LTD.,
Plaintiffs, Before: Jane A. Restani, Judge
v. Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217
UNITED STATES, Public Version
Defendant.
OPINION
Dated: September 23, 2026
[Sustaining Commerce’s final results of redetermination pursuant to court remand.]
Mark Rett Ludwikowski, Clark Hill PLC, of Washington, DC, for plaintiffs China Cornici Co., Ltd. and RaoPing HongRong Handicrafts Co., Ltd. Also on the brief were Kelsey Christensen of Washington, DC and Robert Kevin Williams of Chicago, IL.
Catherine M. Yang, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, for the defendant. Of counsel on the brief was Joshua Paul Angelo, Office of Chief Counsel for Trade Enforcement and Compliance, U.S. Department of Commerce, and Leslie Mae Lewis, U.S. Department of Commerce, of Washington, DC.
Restani, Judge: Before the court are Commerce’s final results of redetermination pursuant
to court remand in the administrative review of the countervailing duty (“CVD”) and antidumping
duty (“AD”) orders on wood mouldings and millwork products from the People’s Republic of
China (“China”). See Wood Mouldings and Millwork Products from the People’s Republic of
China: Final Results and Partial Rescission of Countervailing Duty Administrative Review; 2020–
2021, 88 Fed. Reg. 62,319 (Dep’t Commerce Sep. 11, 2023) (“Final Countervailing Duty
Results”); Wood Mouldings and Millwork Products from the People’s Republic of China: Final
Results of Antidumping Duty Administrative Review; Final Determination of No Shipments; and Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 2 Public Version
Partial Rescission; 2020–2022, 88 Fed. Reg. 62,539 (Dep’t Commerce Sep. 12, 2023) (“Final
Antidumping Duty Results”) (together with the Final Countervailing Duty Results, the “Final
Results”); Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, Court No. 23-216, ECF
No. 66-1 (May 1, 2026) (“CVD Remand Results”); Final Results of Redetermination Pursuant to
Court Remand, Court No. 23-217, ECF No. 59-1 (May 1, 2026) (“AD Remand Results”) (together
with CVD Remand Results, the “Remand Results”).
Plaintiffs China Cornici Co., Ltd. (“China Cornici”) and RaoPing HongRong Handicrafts
Co., Ltd. (“RaoPing”) (together with China Cornici, “Plaintiffs”) request that the court hold aspects
of the Remand Results unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise not in accordance with
law. The United States (“the government”) asks that the court sustain Commerce’s Remand
Results in both reviews at issue. This case concerns the limits of available relief where a party has
made good-faith efforts to correct errors in entry documentation but has failed to ensure the
suspension of, or protest, liquidation for the entries at issue.
For the following reasons, the court sustains the Remand Results.
BACKGROUND
The court assumes familiarity with the facts of this case, as set forth in its prior opinion
ordering remand to Commerce. See China Cornici Co. v. United States, 799 F. Supp. 3d 1373
(CIT 2025) (“China Cornici I”). It recounts here only those facts pertinent to the issues raised on
remand. On September 11 and 12, 2023, Commerce issued the final results of its administrative
reviews of countervailing and antidumping duties on wood moulding and millwork products from
China. See Final Countervailing Duty Results; Final Antidumping Duty Results. In the Final
Countervailing Duty Results, Commerce assigned China Cornici and RaoPing the China-wide
countervailing duty rate. See Final Countervailing Duty Results at 62,320–22. In the Final Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 3 Public Version
Antidumping Duty Results, Commerce assigned China Cornici the China-wide antidumping duty
rate of 220.87% and RaoPing a separate antidumping rate of 0.00%. See Final Antidumping Duty
Results at 62,540–42.
Commerce assigned China Cornici the China-wide rate in both reviews because it
determined that the company lacked suspended entries of subject merchandise during the
applicable period of review (“POR”). Wood Mouldings and Millwork Products from the People’s
Republic of China: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2020-2021
Countervailing Duty Administrative Review at 35–38 (Dep’t Commerce Sep. 1, 2023)
(“Countervailing Duty IDM”); Wood Mouldings and Millwork Products from the People’s
Republic of China: Issues and Decision Memorandum for the Final Results of the 2020-2022
Antidumping Duty Administrative Review at 39–40 (Dep’t Commerce Sep. 5, 2023)
(“Antidumping Duty IDM”). China Cornici lacked the necessary suspended entries because it
mislabeled its entries, causing U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“Customs”) to liquidate
entries of subject merchandise without collecting cash deposits. Countervailing Duty IDM at 36–
38; Antidumping Duty IDM at 39–40. Commerce also rescinded its review of RaoPing in the
agency’s CVD proceeding for a lack of suspended entry. See Countervailing Duty IDM at 36–38.
Commerce, however, as indicated granted RaoPing a separate rate in its AD review. Antidumping
Duty IDM at 36. RaoPing requested that Commerce apply this separate rate to entries from Chen
Chiu Global Corporation (“Chen Chiu”), the Taiwanese company that sold RaoPing’s merchandise
in the United States. See id. at 35. Commerce refused RaoPing’s request because Chen Chiu was
not reviewed under the same antidumping duty administrative review and did not submit its own
application for a separate rate. Id. at 36–37.
In China Cornici I, the court held that Commerce lacked the authority to rescind the Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 4 Public Version
administrative reviews solely due to a lack of suspended entries and that Commerce ignored
overwhelming record evidence showing entries of subject merchandise during the POR. 799 F.
Supp. 3d at 1381–83. The court further held that Commerce unreasonably denied Chen Chiu a
separate rate because it departed, without explanation, from the language of 19 C.F.R.
§ 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C). 1 Id. at 1384. The court remanded to Commerce to “reconsider its
determinations (1) to rescind the administrative reviews for China Cornici and RaoPing, and (2)
to refuse to apply RaoPing’s separate antidumping duty rate to Chen Chiu’s entries.” Id. at 1384–
85.
On remand, Commerce reopened the record and solicited additional information from both
Plaintiffs and Customs. See CVD Remand Results at 2; AD Remand Results at 2–3. In the CVD
Remand Results, Commerce determined not to rescind its administrative review with respect to
China Cornici and RaoPing. CVD Remand Results at 7, 11. It thus assigned both companies the
CVD cash deposit rate of the non-examined companies under review rate, i.e., 8.89% for the 2021
POR. Id. at 7–8, 11. Commerce, however, refused to issue assessment instructions to Customs to
assess countervailing duties on China Cornici’s and RaoPing’s POR entries because those entries
had already been liquidated. Id. at 8, 11. Commerce explained that it “lacks the authority to
reliquidate entries and only the [c]ourt can do so.” Id.
In the AD Remand Results, Commerce likewise determined not to rescind its
administrative review with respect to China Cornici. See AD Remand Results at 2. Commerce
determined that China Cornici was not eligible for a separate rate and thus assigned it the China1
If an entity with a separate antidumping duty rate in a nonmarket economy sells goods through a third-country reseller, Commerce “will normally instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to apply the current separate cash deposit rate applicable to the nonmarket economy country exporter . . . that supplied the subject merchandise to the reseller to those entries of the subject merchandise.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C).
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 5 Public Version
wide rate. Id. at 13. Commerce further determined that Chen Chiu was ineligible for a separate
rate but determined that Chen Chiu may claim RaoPing’s separate cash deposit rate for future
shipments of subject merchandise exported by RaoPing. See id. at 14–15. As with the CVD
Remand Results, Commerce determined that it lacked the authority to order reliquidation for those
entries at issue during the POR. See id. at 13; CVD Remand Results at 8, 11.
On June 1, 2026, China Cornici and RaoPing filed their comments on the Remand Results.
Pls.’ Comments on Remand Redetermination, Court No. 23-216, ECF No. 69 (June 1, 2026) (“Pls.
Cmts.”). 2 On July 16, 2026, the government filed its response thereto. Def.’s Resp. to Comments
on Remand Redetermination, ECF No. 73 (July 16, 2026) (“Gov. Resp.”).
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(a)(2).
The court will uphold Commerce’s determinations in countervailing and antidumping duty reviews
unless they are “unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i). “‘Substantial evidence’ means ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Crawfish Processors All.
v. United States, 483 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Consol. Edison v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). “The results of a redetermination pursuant to court remand are also
reviewed for compliance with the court’s remand order.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 219
F. Supp. 3d 1300, 1307 (CIT 2017) (citation modified) (citation omitted).
2
Where filings in the dockets for Court Nos. 23-216 and 23-217 are materially similar, the court cites only to the docket entries in Court No. 23-216. Unless indicated, all ECF numbers listed are those in Court No. 23-216.
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 6 Public Version
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Will Address Plaintiffs’ Comments on the Remand Results
At the threshold, the court addresses whether China Cornici and RaoPing waived their
arguments by failing to exhaust their administrative remedies. In their comments, Plaintiffs object
to Commerce’s truncated deadline to submit comments on the draft remand results and subsequent
decision to reject as untimely Plaintiffs’ April 29, 2026 and April 30, 2026 objections. Pls. Cmts.
at 25–28; see Letter from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to Respondents
(Rejected) Objection to Deadline for Cmts, AD P.R.R. 6 (Apr. 29, 2026) (“April 29 Objection”);
Letter from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to Respondents Objection to Removal
of Document, AD P.R.R. 3 (Apr. 30, 2026) (“April 30 Objection”). 3 They argue that the
compressed schedule denied them an opportunity to meaningfully respond and preemptively ask
the court to reject any resultant exhaustion argument, or otherwise grant them leave to submit their
objection on the record. Pls. Cmts. at 25–28.
Sure enough, the government advances a waiver argument in its response. See Gov. Resp.
at 9–17. Specifically, it argues that neither plaintiff filed comments to set forth their objections to
the draft remand results at the administrative level, such that Commerce could not consider their
arguments and potentially change its determinations. Id. at 10. It adds that Plaintiffs failed to
timely request an extension before the agency. Id. at 14. The government further argues that
Commerce reasonably rejected Plaintiffs’ objections that were filed five days after the comment
deadlines. Id. at 11–12.
3
The parties’ joint appendices contain the record for both the CVD Remand Results and the AD Remand Results. See Confidential Joint App., ECF No. 74 (July 30, 2026); Public Joint App., ECF No. 75 (July 30, 2026). Where the documents submitted as part of the record for both Remand Results are materially similar, the court cites only to one record document. Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 7 Public Version
“The prescribed avenue for challenging remand results requires that a party first file
comments on the draft results at the administrative level, setting forth the party’s objections.”
Taian Ziyang Food Co. v. United States, 37 CIT 947, 963, 918 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1361 (2013).
Commerce has “broad discretion” to establish its own rules governing the establishment and
enforcement of time limits. Yantai Timken Co. v. United States, 31 CIT 1741, 1755, 521 F. Supp.
2d 1356, 1370 (2007), aff’d 300 F. App’x 934 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). “Commerce’s
discretion in setting time limits to comment on draft results of redetermination is broad, as there is
no statute or regulation governing its conduct in this situation.” Timken Co. v. United States, 179
F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (CIT 2016). When Commerce, however, “provides interested parties an
opportunity to comment, as it did here, Commerce’s discretion is limited because where a right to
be heard exists, due process requires that right be accommodated at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Id. (citation modified) (citation omitted).
The court remanded to Commerce on September 5, 2025, and set a deadline for remand
results on December 4, 2025. China Cornici I at 1385. On September 30, 2025, the appropriations
act that had been funding Commerce expired, and those appropriations lapsed until Congress
appropriated funds for Commerce on November 12, 2025. Def.’s Consent Mot. for an Extension
of Time for the Dep’t of Commerce to Issue Remand Results at 2, ECF No. 60 (Nov. 28, 2025).
As a result of the shutdown, on December 1, 2025, and thereafter again on January 26, 2026, the
court granted extensions to file the remand results until May 1, 2026. See Order, ECF No. 61
(Dec. 1, 2025); Order, ECF No. 63 (Jan. 26, 2026). While granting the second extension, the court
advised that it did “not expect to grant further extensions if another agency does not complete
necessary tasks timely. In such a case Commerce necessarily would be required to weigh the
evidence it has.” Order at 1, ECF No. 63 (Jan. 26, 2026). On April 22, 2026, Commerce issued Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 8 Public Version
its draft remand results and required comments by 5:00 P.M. Eastern Time on April 24, 2026.
Other from USDOC to File Pertaining to Interested Parties Draft Remand Redetermination at 12,
CVD C.R.R. 2 (Apr. 22, 2026) (“Draft CVD Remand Results”); Other from USDOC to File
Pertaining to Interested Parties Draft Remand Redetermination at 18, AD C.R.R. 2 (Apr. 22, 2026)
(“Draft AD Remand Results”). Commerce did not allow Plaintiffs to submit new factual
information in response. Draft CVD Remand Results at 12; Draft AD Remand Results at 18.
Plaintiffs did not request an extension during this time but submitted an objection on April 29,
2026. See April 29 Objection. Commerce rejected and removed that objection from the
administrative remand record. Memo from USDOC to File Pertaining to Interested Parties
Rejection of Submission, AD P.R.R. 5 (Apr. 30, 2026). Plaintiffs filed an objection to that removal
on April 30, 2026, which Commerce also rejected and removed from the record. April 30
Objection; Rejection Memo from USDOC to File Pertaining to Interested Parties Rejection
Objection to Deadline for Cmts, AD P.R.R. 4 (Apr. 30, 2026).
The court will address Plaintiffs’ arguments on the merits. Commerce’s preparation of the
Remand Results was hampered by the 2025 lapse in appropriations. While the agency no doubt
endeavored to abide by the court’s remand deadline (and other deadlines affected by the lapse in
appropriations), the pause in Commerce’s operations appears to have created a backlog.
Resultantly, even with the extension, Commerce issued its draft results nine calendar days before
the May 1, 2026 remand deadline and offered only a two-day turnaround for comments. Draft
CVD Remand Results at 12; Draft AD Remand Results at 18. Plaintiffs could—and indeed
should—have avoided any risk of waiver by submitting comments in the period allotted. But due
process concerns prevent strict application of the exhaustion doctrine on the particular facts of this
case given that Commerce analyzed newly submitted record evidence for the first time and gave Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 9 Public Version
Plaintiffs only two days to respond. Thus, the court will reach the merits of Plaintiffs’ legal
arguments.
Due process does not, however, require remand to Commerce for Commerce to consider
the April 29 Objection. The two-day turnaround on the draft comments was brief, but the court
has ruled that it will address the merits of Plaintiffs’ legal arguments. Moreover, Plaintiffs were
aware of the issues on remand and were given an opportunity to submit evidence ahead of the draft
remand results. Cf. Timken Co., 179 F. Supp. 3d at 1176–77 (upholding seven-day comment
period where respondent knew that court had remanded to Commerce to apply its differential
pricing analysis). Specifically, Commerce sent questionnaires to Plaintiffs, through which
Plaintiffs were apprised of deficiencies in the previous record and given an opportunity to
supplement their submissions. 4 See, e.g., Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce
Pertaining to RaoPing Supp QR – Narrative, CVD C.R.R. 26 (Jan. 14, 2026); Resp. from Clark
Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to RaoPing 2d Supp QR – Narrative, CVD C.R.R. 16
(Mar. 9, 2026); Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Supp
QR, AD C.R.R. 7 (Mar. 16, 2026) (“China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp.”). Plaintiffs have not
explained in particular terms why further remand would lead to a different result. To the extent
4
The questionnaires sent to Plaintiffs detailed the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ evidence and asked for targeted supplemental evidence or explanation. See, e.g., Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to RaoPing Supp QR – Narrative, CVD C.R.R. 26 (Jan. 14, 2026); Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to RaoPing 2d Supp QR – Narrative, CVD C.R.R. 16 (Mar. 9, 2026); Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Supp QR, AD C.R.R. 7 (Mar. 16, 2026). Thus, the questionnaires issued by Commerce here stand in contrast to that in TNC Kazchrome JSC v. United States, No. 25-00128, 2026 WL 2668862 (CIT Sep. 10, 2026). There, the respondent had informed Commerce that it understood that its parent companies did not need to respond to Commerce’s questionnaire, and Commerce failed to notify the respondent that the respondent’s understanding was incorrect. Id., at *2. Instead, Commerce stated that it “had identified certain areas of Kazchrome’s response that require additional information” but “neither referred to any deficiencies nor—more importantly—stated that the previous response had not complied with instructions.” Id. (citation modified). Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 10 Public Version
Plaintiffs seek to submit new factual evidence, any deficiencies in the evidentiary record are a
result of Plaintiffs’ own inability to furnish an appropriate record either in the underlying review
or on remand. See QVD Food Co. v. United States, 658 F.3d 1318, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
burden of creating an adequate record lies with [interested parties] and not with Commerce.”
(citation modified)). Nor will the court grant leave for Plaintiffs to file their April 29 and April 30
objections on the record. As noted above, Plaintiffs failed to request an extension before the
deadline set by Commerce and now characterize their objections as “procedural.” See Pls. Cmts.
at 26. By evaluating Plaintiffs’ procedural arguments and by deciding to address Plaintiffs’ legal
arguments on the merits, the court has addressed any procedural concerns.
II. Neither Commerce Nor the Court Can Offer Relief for the POR Entries
Plaintiffs argue that Commerce did not comply with the court’s remand order in China
Cornici I by failing to address how prior disclosures and duty deposits should affect its
proceedings. Pls. Cmts. at 15. They take issue with Commerce’s determination that it could not
order reliquidation of POR entries and argue that Commerce should have identified the precise
statutory mechanism and the instructions necessary to implement the court’s remand order. See
id. at 17. According to Plaintiffs, 19 U.S.C. § 1592 allows restoration of lawful duties irrespective
of liquidation finality, such that Commerce should not retain the incorrect duties assessed for those
POR entries. Id. at 17.
The government responds that Commerce fully complied with the court’s remand order.
Gov. Resp. at 17. According to the government, the court remanded to Commerce (1) to reconsider
its decision to rescind the administrative reviews as to Plaintiffs, and (2) to consider under what
circumstances and how to adjust its proceedings when a party completes prior disclosures and duty
deposits to remedy entry paper mistakes—which Commerce did. Id. at 19. The government adds Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 11 Public Version
that Commerce reasonably determined that it could not order Customs to reliquidate the POR
entries, noting that the remedy for liquidated entries is contained in 19 U.S.C. § 1514 and that 19
U.S.C. § 1592 does not allow private parties to effectuate reliquidation. Id. at 20–22.
The final liability for antidumping and countervailing duties is determined retrospectively,
after importation, and often after a periodic administrative review of the applicable orders. 19
C.F.R. § 351.212(a). This final computation of duties is referred to as “liquidation.” Acquisition
362, LLC v. United States, 59 F.4th 1247, 1252 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). To aid this
retrospective system, Customs will delay liquidation of entries covered by an antidumping or
countervailing duty order until the final duties are calculated. See id. Subject entries of
merchandise are “liquidated in accordance with the determination of [Commerce]” “[u]nless such
liquidation is enjoined by the court.” 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(c)(1). Once an entry has been liquidated,
“the duties paid cannot be recovered even if the payor subsequently prevails in its challenge to the
antidumping order.” Cambridge Lee Indus., Inc. v. United States, 916 F.2d 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 710 F.2d 806, 809–10 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Liquidation is generally “final and conclusive upon all persons . . . unless a protest is filed” within
180 days of liquidation pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c). 5 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). The court may
order reliquidation absent a protest in limited circumstances. See Shinyei Corp. of Am. v. United
States, 355 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
A person who has discovered a material error regarding the documentation for merchandise
entering the United States may disclose that error before Customs is made aware of it through a
prior disclosure. 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a), (c)(4). If the United States has been deprived of lawful
duties, taxes, or fees as a result of a material error, Customs shall require that lawful revenue to be
5
Only certain decisions of Customs are protestable. See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 12 Public Version
repaid, notwithstanding liquidation. 19 U.S.C. §§ 1514, 1592(d).
There are three relevant POR entries at issue, CVD Remand Results at 3 n.14, 10; AD
Remand Results at 4: (1) Entry [[ ]], which entered as a Type 01 entry 6 on [[
]] ( “Entry 1”), China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 10; (2) Entry [[
]], 7 which entered as a Type 01 entry on [[ ]] (“Entry 2”) (together with Entry 1, the “China Cornici Entries”), id.; and (3) Entry [[ ]], which entered as a Type 03
entry on [[ ]] (the “RaoPing Entry”). See also Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to RaoPing 2d Supp QR – Exs. – Part 4, Ex. S2-3 at 1, CVD C.R.R. 12 (Mar.
9, 2026) (showing [[ ]] entry date and [[ ]] entry summary date). But see Data from USDOC to File Pertaining to Interested Parties Attachment – Entry Data at 1, CVD
C.R.R. 3 (July 30, 2026) (“RaoPing Entry Datasheet”) (showing [[ ]] entry date). All three entries have been liquidated: Entry 1 on [[ ]], China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 10; Entry 2 on [[ ]], id.; and the RaoPing Entry on [[ ]]. RaoPing Entry Datasheet at 2.
On June 28, 2021, China Cornici’s U.S. importer, Larson-Juhl US LLC (“Larson-Juhl”),
filed a prior disclosure with Customs, covering all subject entries from [[ ]] through the date of submission. Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China
Cornici Supp QR – Exs. Part 1, Ex. 3 at 2, CVD C.R.R. 7 (Mar. 16, 2026) (“Prior Disclosure Part
I”). This included the China Cornici Entries but not the RaoPing Entry. Resp. from Clark Hill
6
Type 01 and Type 03 are entry codes used by Customs to categorize goods. Type 01 encompasses goods for general consumption; Type 03 is used to denote goods that are subject to antidumping or countervailing duties. See ACE Transaction Details, U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., https://www.cbp.gov/trade/automated/ace-transaction-details.
7
Commerce determined that this entry is not part of the AD review because it had an entry date outside of the applicable POR. AD Remand Results at 4.
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 13 Public Version
PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Supp QR – Exs. Part 2 at 2, CVD C.R.R. 6
(Mar. 16, 2026) (“Prior Disclosure Part II”). Larson-Juhl informed Customs that it would submit
a Post-Summary Correction (“PSC”) for these entries that would change the entry Type from 01
to 03. Prior Disclosure Part I at 2. On August 23, 2021, Larson-Juhl perfected its disclosure. Id.
at 3. It stated that the manufacturers of the subject entries would request administrative review in
February 2022 and thus requested that “the Entry Type Code for all unliquidated entries be reset
to Type 03 and that liquidation of the entries be suspended” pending issuance of liquidation
instructions. Id. at 4; Prior Disclosure Part II at 1. It further stated that a “protest covering the
liquidated entries [would] ask [Customs] to reliquidate the entries at the rate established in the
administrative review.” Prior Disclosure Part II at 1.
On July 7, 2022, Larson-Juhl filed a protest for entries that were within the 180-day protest
window. Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Supp QR -Narrative at 4, CVD C.R.R. 8 (Mar. 16, 2026) (“China Cornici CVD Questionnaire Resp.”); Resp.
from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Exs. Segment 3 at 2, AD
C.R.R. 4 (Mar. 16, 2026) (“July 8, 2022 Correspondence”); Protest 390122127024, Case No. 23-32, ECF No. 10-1 (Apr. 6, 2023) (the “Protest”). This did not include China Cornici Entries that
were liquidated more than 180 days prior to July 7, 2022. See Protest. Customs denied LarsonJuhl’s Protest on August 15, 2022. Id. That denial is the subject of Larson-Juhl US LLC v. United
States, Case No. 23-032. See Summons, Case No. 23-32, ECF No. 1 (Feb. 10, 2023).
As discussed, Commerce rescinded China Cornici’s CVD and AD reviews and RaoPing’s
CVD review because it determined that the parties lacked suspended entries of subject
merchandise. See Countervailing Duty IDM at 36–38; Antidumping IDM at 39–40. The court
remanded to Commerce to reconsider its rescission determinations and to “consider under what Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 14 Public Version
circumstances and how to adjust its proceedings when prior disclosures and deposits of duties are
made in an attempt to remedy mistakes on entry papers, addressing all the statutes at play.” China
Cornici I at 1383.
On remand, Commerce solicited further information from Plaintiffs and Customs regarding
China Cornici and RaoPing’s POR entries and communicated with Customs regarding Customs’
processes with respect to mislabeled entries. CVD Remand Results at 5; AD Remand Results at
2. Customs explained that an importer has three options to correct an error in its entry
documentation. CVD Remand Results at 5–6; AD Remand Results at 6–7. First, the importer
may file a PSC if the entry has not yet liquidated and may change the entry type from Type 01 to
Type 03 and add the relevant AD/CVD information; second, if the entry has already liquidated,
the importer may file a protest with Customs; 8 and third, the importer may file a prior disclosure
at any time before Customs discovers the error, which guards against the risk of penalty but does
not otherwise change the liquidation status or entry type of the merchandise. CVD Remand Results
at 5–6; AD Remand Results at 6–7.
Commerce found that, although China Cornici had mislabeled entry paperwork, it had
taken steps to remedy its mistake by filing a prior disclosure. CVD Remand Results at 7; AD
Remand Results at 8. Accordingly, it determined not to rescind its reviews with respect to China
Cornici and to assign China Cornici the non-examined companies’ rate in the CVD review and the
China-wide entity rate in the AD review. CVD Remand Results at 7–8; AD Remand Results at 8,
13. Commerce, however, determined that it could not issue assessment instructions to Customs
for the POR entries because those entries had already liquidated. CVD Remand Results at 8; AD
Remand Results at 13. Likewise, Commerce determined not to rescind its CVD review of
8
The court does not determine here what relief may be available as a result of such protest. Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 15 Public Version
RaoPing, finding that RaoPing was the manufacturer of a Type 03 entry during the POR. CVD
Remand Results at 11. Commerce assigned RaoPing the non-examined companies’ rate but did
not issue assessment instructions for the RaoPing Entry because it had already been liquidated. Id.
Commerce reasonably determined not to rescind its reviews of China Cornici and RaoPing,
given that record evidence shows both companies had subject entries during the POR. Commerce
also reasonably determined that it could not order reliquidation for the POR entries because those
entries had already been liquidated. As an initial matter, Commerce is correct that it cannot order
Customs to reliquidate entries in this case. Here, the record shows that each of the POR entries
has liquidated. 9 China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 10; RaoPing Entry Datasheet at 2. Once
an entry has liquidated, Customs’ ability to reliquidate is limited. Within a 90-day period, it may
voluntarily reliquidate entries. 19 U.S.C. § 1501; 19 C.F.R. § 173.3. Beyond that 90-day period,
it may reliquidate entries where a party has filed a valid protest, 19 U.S.C. § 1514; 19 C.F.R.
§ 173.2(d), where a party has paid excess duties on qualifying goods under certain free trade
agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 1520(d), and following an order from this court. 19 C.F.R. § 176.31(a).
None of those circumstances are at play here: The 90-day period for voluntary reliquidation has
passed, Plaintiffs did not timely protest liquidation, the subject entries are not subject to any
applicable free trade agreement, and, at the time of the Remand Results, the court had not ordered
reliquidation.
Plaintiffs attempt to bypass the liquidation hurdle by reading into section 1592(d) a
9
Plaintiffs characterize the issue on remand as “whether entries of subject merchandise existed, whether duties were tendered in connection with those entries, and how Commerce must determine lawful duties where the importer attempted to remedy entry-paper errors through Section 1592 prior disclosure.” Pls. Cmts. at 15. That characterization may describe the underlying determination of whether to rescind the administrative reviews. But whether Commerce, having made that determination, can order Customs to reliquidate entries at different rates is a separate issue.
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 16 Public Version
reliquidation authorization. The plain language of that statute, however, forecloses Plaintiffs’
argument. Subsection 1592(d) allows “lawful duties, taxes, and fees [to] be restored” “if the
United States has been deprived” of such revenue on account of negligent or intentional
misrepresentation—the finality of section 1514 notwithstanding. See 19 U.S.C. §1592(a), (d). As
the court noted in China Cornici I, “this provision appears to operate as an exception to the [section
1514] default rule that liquidation is final and conclusive upon all persons outside of a protest.”
China Cornici I at 1382 n.8 (citation modified) (citation omitted). But the exception is a precise
one: It requires an antecedent trigger, namely that the United States be deprived of lawful duties,
taxes, or fees, and allows only the “restor[ation]” “of [those] lawful duties, taxes, or fees.” 19
U.S.C. § 1592(d) (emphases added). Given that the United States was not deprived of lawful
revenue when the POR entries were liquidated, and that reliquidation here would not “restore” to
the government lost revenue, Commerce reasonably determined that it could not order Customs to
reliquidate the POR entries pursuant to section 1592(d).
Nor have the Plaintiffs asserted a jurisdictional basis that would allow the court to order
reliquidation. It is well settled that “in the context of judicial review under 19 U.S.C. § 1516a,
‘once liquidation occurs the trial court is powerless to order the assessment of duties at any
different rate.’” Kaptan Demir Celik Endustrisi Ve Ticaret A.S. v. United States, No. 24-00018,
2024 WL 3717055, at *1 (CIT Aug. 8, 2024) (quoting SKF USA, Inc. v. United States, 512 F.3d
1326, 1328–29 (Fed. Cir. 2008)). It is perhaps conceivable that Plaintiffs could avail themselves
of the court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) and request relief pursuant to Shinyei Corp., 10
10
In Shinyei Corp., the Federal Circuit considered a challenge to Commerce’s liquidation instructions issued after litigation regarding an administrative review of the antidumping duty order. See 355 F.3d at 1299–304. The court held that the CIT retained jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) over the challenge to Commerce’s liquidation instructions notwithstanding Customs’ liquidation of the subject entries and further determined that “the provisions of section Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 17 Public Version
but Plaintiffs have neither moved to amend their complaint nor provided a factual basis for section
1581(i) jurisdiction.
Thus, the court sustains the CVD Remand Results, as well as Commerce’s determination
not to rescind the administrative review with respect to China Cornici, in the AD Remand Results.
III. Commerce Reasonably Determined Not to Assign China Cornici a Separate Rate
in its AD review
Plaintiffs argue that Commerce improperly collapsed its multifactor de facto independence
inquiry into a single evidentiary demand when determining whether to assign China Cornici a
separate rate. 11 Pls. Cmts. at 18–19. According to Plaintiffs, Commerce did not properly weigh
record evidence in its determination. Id. at 19–20. They maintain that Commerce’s focus on the
lack of pre-sale negotiation emails was improper, given that a company may set export prices
independently even without evidence of pre-sale negotiations. Id. at 20. Plaintiffs also argue that
1514 . . . cannot be read to preclude reliquidation in this case.” Id. at 1304–05, 12. Shinyei relief has only been made available in limited circumstances. See, e.g., In re Section 301 Cases, 524 F. Supp. 3d 1355, 1364–66 (CIT 2021) (collecting cases).
The court makes no findings as to whether the court would have jurisdiction under section 1581(i), or whether Shinyei relief would otherwise be available. It notes, however, that Plaintiffs failed to remedy the assertedly incorrect liquidation of each POR entry at issue. With respect to Entry 1, Larson-Juhl did not notify Customs of its entry filing error until after it had been liquidated [[
]] and therefore foreclosed its ability to file a PSC that would have changed the entry from Type 01 to Type 03 and ensured suspension. See Prior Disclosure Part I. With respect to Entry 2, the PSC option was available, but Larson-Juhl did not pursue it. Prior Disclosure Part I; Prior Disclosure Part II. While in its prior disclosure perfection Larson-Juhl requested that Customs suspend the liquidation of the China Cornici Entries—and suggested that it would file a protest—it did not timely protest either liquidation. See Prior Disclosure Part II; China Cornici CVD Questionnaire Resp. at 4. With respect to the RaoPing Entry, nothing in the record suggests that any action was taken to prevent liquidation [[ ]]. The court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs’ inability to secure relief for the POR duties in the present action but underscores that their present predicament is a result of repeated inattentiveness. 11
Plaintiffs also suggest that the evidence supporting Commerce’s determination that China Cornici was de jure independent supports a determination that it was de facto independent. Pls. Cmts. at 18–19. The two inquiries are, however, separate. See Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v. United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 18 Public Version
Commerce did not give China Cornici a fair chance to submit an unaffiliated customer affidavit to
support its independent price-setting. Id. at 20–21.
The government counters that Commerce, on the separate rate application (“SRA”),
indicated that applicants must provide evidence that the applicant conducts independent price
negotiations, and that China Cornici affirmatively represented that it was submitting negotiation
emails as its price negotiation evidence. Def. Cmts. at 24–25. The government emphasizes that
China Cornici did not cure its evidentiary deficiencies even after Commerce issued a supplemental
questionnaire on remand requesting additional information. Id. at 25. Next, the government
argues that Commerce’s determination was adequately supported by the record evidence, even if
China Cornici’s view of the evidence is that it supports de facto independence. Id. at 27. Finally,
the government takes issue with China Cornici’s argument that it was not given adequate
opportunity to provide an affidavit, arguing that the SRA informed the company that it could have
provided such an affidavit. Id. at 28.
Commerce considers some countries, such as China, “nonmarket economies” where the
state distorts domestic commercial markets. See Jilin Forest Indus. Jinqiao Flooring Grp. Co. v.
United States, 145 F.4th 1308, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2025). As a result, Commerce generally applies
country-wide antidumping rates to all entities located in a nonmarket economy. Id. at 1311–12.
“Respondents may rebut this presumption and become eligible for a separate rate by establishing
the absence of both de jure and de facto government control.” Dongtai Peak Honey Indus. Co. v.
United States, 777 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Sigma Corp. v. United States, 117 F.3d
1401, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997)) (citation modified). Entities seeking this separate antidumping rate
are required to submit an SRA during the relevant administrative review. See 19 C.F.R. §
351.108(d)(2). Commerce considers three factors when determining whether an exporter enjoys Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 19 Public Version
independence from de jure government control. 12 Pirelli Tyre Co. v. United States, 638 F. Supp.
3d 1361, 1372 (CIT 2023), aff’d, 128 F.4th 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
Commerce considers four factors in determining whether an exporter is free of de facto
government control:
(1) whether the export prices are set by or are subject to the approval of a
government authority; (2) whether the respondent has authority to negotiate and
sign contracts and other agreements; (3) whether the respondent has autonomy from
the government in making decisions regarding the selection of management; and
(4) whether the respondent retains the proceeds of its export sales and makes
independent decisions regarding disposition of profits or financing of losses.
Id. Commerce considers these four factors to be conjunctive, and decisions from this court have
sustained the conjunctive approach. See, e.g., Yantai CMC Bearing Co. v. United States, 203 F.
Supp. 3d 1317, 1326 (CIT 2017).
On May 16, 2022, China Cornici submitted an SRA in the underlying administrative
review. Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Separate
Rate Application – Narr to Ex 5, AD P.R. 98, C.R. 55 (May 16, 2022) (“China Cornici SRA”). In
Section IV of its application, China Cornici submitted answers and supporting exhibits to
demonstrate the lack of de facto control, including beneficial ownership information, price
negotiation documentation, management selection, profit disposition, and affiliation. Id. at 11–20.
With respect to price negotiation, the SRA instructions stated that China Cornici “must provide
documentation supporting its certification that the applicant conducts independent price
negotiation,” including faxes or e-mail correspondence between the applicant and an unaffiliated
12
These are: “(1) an absence of restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter’s business and export licenses; (2) any legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; and (3) any other formal measures by the government decentralizing control of companies.” Pirelli Tyre Co. v. United States, 638 F. Supp. 3d 1361, 1372 (CIT 2023), aff’d, 128 F.4th 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2025).
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 20 Public Version
U.S. customer, purchase orders from unaffiliated U.S. customers, order confirmations, or logs of
telephone negotiations with an unaffiliated U.S. customer. Id. at 15–16. The instructions
explained to China Cornici that “if you do not have documentation to support your
certification . . . you may submit an affidavit as an alternative.” Id. at 16. 13 China Cornici attached
a price list and “negotiation emails” between China Cornici and an unaffiliated U.S. customer
relating to a price error in a sales invoice. Id.; id., Ex. 13.
In the AD Final Results, Commerce rescinded the AD review with respect to China
Cornici, so it did not reach the merits of China Cornici’s SRA. Antidumping IDM at 39–40; AD
Remand Results at 8. Following this court’s decision in China Cornici I, Commerce reopened the
record and requested supplemental information from China Cornici. AD Remand Results at 11–
12. Specifically, Commerce requested that China Cornici provide the email correspondence
supporting the price and quantity negotiation for the sales transaction noted in its SRA. See China
Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 16. It further stated that China Cornici could provide “email
correspondence related to any sale of subject merchandise after the first U.S. sale during the POR”
if it did not have the specific information Commerce sought. Id. In response, China Cornici stated
that it had “not located additional pre-sale emails memorializing the original price and quantity
negotiation” but provided additional email evidence cataloguing an email interaction regarding an
invoicing discrepancy. Id. at 17.
On remand, in conducting its AD review (already upheld above), Commerce considered
13
See also China Cornici SRA at 15 n.18 (“Applicants must provide documents showing price negotiation, not documents merely confirming that a sale will take place at a given price. If your firm . . . has no records of price negotiation, you are required to attach . . . an affidavit signed and dated [by] the unaffiliated U.S. customer attesting that it conducts independent price negotiation with the applying firm. Affidavits must provide adequate information to link the applicant to the party signing the affidavit.”).
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 21 Public Version
whether to assign China Cornici a separate rate. AD Remand Results at 8. Commerce determined
that, although the company had sufficiently demonstrated de jure independence, 14 it had failed to
provide sufficient evidence regarding de facto independence. Id. at 11. Specifically, Commerce
found that China Cornici had not shown that it set its own export prices independently of the
government. Id. at 11–12. It reasoned that China Cornici’s submitted evidence consisted only of
a price list and emails pertaining to an invoicing error, which did not show independent price
negotiation. Id. at 12. It further reasoned that Commerce could have produced an affidavit, as
noted in the SRA, but failed to do so. Id.
Commerce’s determination not to assign China Cornici a separate rate was reasonable.
Commerce may reasonably require a separate rate applicant to satisfy all four de facto
independence factors. See, e.g., Pirelli Tyre, 638 F. Supp. 3d at 1373 (“All four factors of the de
facto test must be satisfied to rebut the presumption of government control.”). On the basis of
China Cornici’s submitted evidence, Commerce reasonably determined that China Cornici did not
show independent price negotiation, and thus reasonably declined to assign it a separate rate. 15
See Zhejiang Quzhou Lianzhou Refrigerants Co. v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1308, 1321
(CIT 2018) (“Because Plaintiffs failed to satisfy one de facto criterion, Commerce had no further
obligation to continue with the [separate rate] analysis.” (citation modified) (citation omitted)).
China Cornici’s submitted evidence consists of a contextless list of export prices for various items
14
Plaintiffs, of course, do not challenge Commerce’s determination as to de jure independence, and the court finds it reasonable.
15
While China Cornici argues that Commerce improperly weighed the lack of price negotiation emails against the other assembled evidence, it nowhere explains what record evidence might support price negotiation. Irrespective, that two or more possible conclusions can be drawn from the record evidence does not mean that Commerce’s determination was unreasonable. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd. v. United States, 275 F.3d 1056, 1062 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being supported by substantial evidence.” (citation omitted)). Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 22 Public Version
and an email chain regarding an invoicing error. See China Cornici SRA at 16; Resp. from Clark
Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici Separate Rate Application – Ex. 6 to
Ex. 15, Exs. 8, 13, AD C.R. 58 (May 16, 2022) (“China Cornici SRA Exs.”); China Cornici AD
Questionnaire Resp. at 16–17. Missing from the price list is any explanation as to how those prices
are set and whether they are indeed negotiated independently. China Cornici SRA Exs., Ex. 8.
Moreover, the email exchange shows that China Cornici corrected an invoicing error and
establishes nothing beyond the fact that the company may cure clerical mistakes. China Cornici
SRA Exs., Ex. 13; Resp. from Clark Hill PLC to Sec of Commerce Pertaining to China Cornici
Exs. Segment 4, Ex. 6, AD C.R.R. 3 (Mar. 16, 2026). Nor do China Cornici’s narrative
explanations provide any further detail. See China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 17
(explaining that the email exchange “demonstrates that China Cornici communicated directly with
its unaffiliated U.S. customer regarding price and revised the commercial terms in the ordinary
course, without any government involvement”). 16
16
The court also disagrees with China Cornici that it was not given a meaningful opportunity to cure its deficient SRA with an affidavit. See Pls. Cmts. at 20–21. As an initial matter, the court has stated that Commerce “need not inform the parties of deficiencies in submissions, unless those submissions are responses to requests for information.” Sao Ta Foods Joint Stock Co. v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1291 n.15 (CIT 2020) (noting that “[s]ection 1677m(d) requires Commerce to notify a respondent of a deficient response to a request for information,” but that, “[b]y contrast, a company submits a separate rate application voluntarily so to rebut a presumption of governmental control and avoid an NME-wide rate.” (citation modified) (citation omitted)). But the voluntary versus involuntary distinction may have lost its usefulness, particularly in nonmarket economy cases. SRAs are routine and are required if a company is to escape onerous China-wide entity rates. What Commerce will consider is set forth in the SRA instructions. A better approach may be to assess whether adequate notice of what is required has been given. See case comparison in note 4, supra.
In any case, there is a difference between apprising a party of a deficient response and coaching it. Here, the SRA instructions clearly advised China Cornici that it could submit multiple categories of evidence to support its independent price negotiation certification—including an affidavit if it did not have other evidence. China Cornici SRA at 15–16. China Cornici chose to rely exclusively on negotiation emails, see id. at 16, and Commerce sufficiently explained why China Cornici’s chosen email evidence was deficient and gave it an opportunity to provide additional email Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 23 Public Version
Thus, the court sustains Commerce’s determination not to assign a separate rate to China
Cornici.
IV. The Court Sustains Commerce’s Determination as to Chen Chiu for the Entry at
Issue
Plaintiffs argue that Commerce improperly refused to apply RaoPing’s separate rate to
Chen Chiu entries. Pls. Cmts. at 25. They argue that, under Commerce’s regulations, Commerce
will normally apply the current separate cash-deposit rate applicable to a non-market-economy
reseller’s entries of subject merchandise. Id. at 23 (citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C)).
According to Plaintiffs, Commerce here departed from that rule without identifying a lawful
exception. Id. Plaintiffs maintain that applying RaoPing’s rate to entries proven to involve
RaoPing-produced merchandise would not allow Chen Chiu to resell merchandise from any
supplier at that rate. Id. Plaintiffs next argue that Commerce’s requirement that RaoPing be
identified on the entry summary condition is extra-regulatory. Id. at 24–25. They point out that
third-country reseller structures routinely involve commercial documents identifying the reseller
as seller/exporter to the U.S. customer while the nonmarket economy producer/exporter supplies
the goods. Id. at 25. They ask the court to remand with instructions that Commerce apply
RaoPing’s separate antidumping rate to entries tied to RaoPing-produced merchandise. Id.
The government counters that Commerce’s determination is consistent with its
regulations. Gov. Resp. at 29. It emphasizes that Commerce has a duty to avoid the evasion of
antidumping duties, and that Commerce’s determination recognizes the importance of identifying
the exporter and its relationship with the third-country reseller. Id. at 29–30. The government
evidence and did not prohibit other evidence. China Cornici AD Questionnaire Resp. at 16. That is sufficient for purposes of section 1677m(d); to hold otherwise would impermissibly shift the respondent’s burden to create the supporting record to Commerce.
Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 24 Public Version
adds that, insofar as Plaintiffs take issue with Commerce’s determination for the particular entry
during the POR, that argument fails because Commerce cannot order customs to reliquidate
entries. Id. at 30.
If an entity with a separate antidumping rate in a nonmarket economy sells goods through
a third-country reseller, Commerce “will normally instruct U.S. Customs and Border Protection to
apply the current separate cash deposit rate applicable to the nonmarket economy country exporter
. . . that supplied the subject merchandise to the reseller to those entries of the subject
merchandise.” 19 C.F.R. § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C).
In the underlying review, RaoPing requested that Commerce apply its separate rate to
entries from Chen Chiu. Antidumping IDM at 35. Commerce refused because it determined that
Chen Chiu was not reviewed under the same antidumping administrative review and therefore did
not submit its own application for a separate rate. Id. at 36–37. In China Cornici I, the court
remanded to Commerce to reconsider whether to assign Chen Chiu a separate rate. China Cornici
I at 1384–85. The court found that Commerce had not applied its regulation, which states that the
agency would normally apply RaoPing’s separate rate to a reseller like Chen Chiu. Id. at 1384
(citing 19 C.F.R. § 351.107(d)(1)(ii)(C)). The court drew issue with Commerce’s incorrect
demand that Chen Chiu submit a separate rate application. Id. It further drew issue with
Commerce’s unexplained denial of RaoPing’s rate in spite of the overwhelming evidence (and
even its concession) that RaoPing was the source for Chen Chiu’s goods. Id. The court instructed
Commerce that “[i]f some required step was missing for the entries at issue to be assigned
RaoPing’s rate[,] Commerce shall spell it out clearly.” Id.
On remand, Commerce identified the step and determined that “the importer must have
identified RaoPing as the Chinese exporter of the subject merchandise when filing its entry Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 25 Public Version
summary with [Customs]” for it to have been assigned RaoPing’s rate. 17 AD Remand Results at
14–15. Commerce explained that, had “the importer identified RaoPing as the exporter of the
goods, the entry would have continued to be suspended until the final results of the administrative
review,” after which Commerce would instruct Customs to liquidate the entries exported by
RaoPing at the separate rate. Id. at 15. It further explained that, for “Chen Chiu’s future shipments
of subject merchandise exported by RaoPing, the importer may claim RaoPing’s separate cash
deposit rate,” but may not do so where RaoPing is not the exporter of the subject merchandise. Id.
The court does not reach the issue of what entry documentation may reasonably be required
because the one POR entry at issue identified by the parties, the RaoPing Entry (i.e., Entry [[
]]), has been liquidated. See RaoPing Entry Datasheet. Nothing in the record suggests
that Plaintiffs protested that liquidation, assuming that that would be an appropriate remedy. 18
Thus, whether or not the entry summary should have more clearly identified RaoPing as the
manufacturer, Plaintiffs failed to have liquidation of the entry suspended or enjoined in a way that
would facilitate the court’s review here. See Kaptan Demir, 2024 WL 3717055, at *1. The court
notes, however, that the connection to the appropriate exporter on the relevant entry documentation
must be clear to avoid the type of problems that arose here. Because future Chen Chiu entries
outside the POR are not before the court, the court will not issue an advisory opinion as to what
17
On remand, Commerce also determined that, “for Chen Chiu to be eligible for its own separate rate, a review should have been requested of Chen Chiu and it should have submitted its own separate rate application in order to obtain its own separate rate in this administrative review.” AD Remand Results at 14. Commerce has still not explained how Chen Chiu, as a Taiwan-based company, could submit an SRA. See China Cornici I at 1384 n.10. This determination, however, has no bearing on whether and on what basis Chen Chiu, as a reseller, may be assigned RaoPing’s rate.
18
It appears from the underlying record that the RaoPing Entry was liquidated pursuant to Commerce’s automatic liquidation instructions because “the non-examined company under review [did] not [appear] in the [Customs] entry documentation.” See Countervailing Duty IDM at 36. Court Nos. 23-00216 & 23-00217 Page 26 Public Version
entry documentation may be required of resellers. Thus, the court sustains Commerce’s
determination as to RaoPing insofar as it relates to the Chen Chiu entry at issue.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court sustains Commerce’s Final Results of Redetermination
Pursuant to Court Remand, Court No. 23-216, ECF No. 66-1 (May 1, 2026), and Final Results of
Redetermination Pursuant to Court Remand, Court No. 23-217, ECF No. 59-1 (May 1, 2026).
Judgment will enter accordingly.
/s/ Jane A. Restani
Jane A. Restani, Judge
Dated: September 23, 2026
New York, New York