182 September 23, 2026 No. 883
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
R. M.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
MICHAEL MOHR,
Respondent-Appellant.
Lincoln County Circuit Court
25PO05416; A188092
Marcia L. Buckley, Judge.
Submitted April 7, 2026.
Michael Mohr filed the brief pro se.
No appearance for petitioner-respondent.
Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Jacquot, Judge.
TOOKEY, P. J.
Affirmed; additionally, respondent is directed to pay
$250 to the Appellate Court Services Division of the Oregon
Judicial Department.
Cite as 353 Or App 182 (2026) 183
184 R. M. v. Mohr
TOOKEY, P. J.
In this civil action, respondent appeals an
order continuing a restraining order under the Family
Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA) after a contested hearing.1
Respondent is a self-represented party, and petitioner has
not filed an answering brief. As explained below, we affirm
the trial court’s order.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE USE OF
FABRICATED CASES
We first address artificial intelligence and the use
of fabricated cases by parties appearing before the Oregon
Court of Appeals. The use of artificial intelligence by parties in a manner that results in fabricated cases being cited by
parties has become, at times, a hindrance to this court’s core mission of fully considering the merits of each case, providing a thorough and prompt review of issues raised by each
case, and resolving cases for parties.
When parties use artificial intelligence that generates fabricated legal authorities, and when they then
set forth arguments based on those fabricated authorities,
we cannot properly consider the issues presented by cases.
This is so because we are faced with the task of recognizing
and identifying fabricated authorities and then responding
to the use of those authorities. In this process, our court’s
resources are diverted to, among other things, preparing
show cause orders, considering whether to allow the amendment and refiling of briefing, and determining whether to
impose financial sanctions, and, if so, the amount of those
sanctions. As a result, we are diverted from giving timely
decisions to parties regarding the merits of their disputes.
Here, respondent’s opening brief contained citations to three fabricated cases. We issued an order to show
cause why respondent’s brief should not be stricken and why
sanctions should not be imposed in the amount of $1,500, or
$500 for each fabricated authority. See Ringo v. Colquhoun
Design Studio, LLC, 345 Or App 301, 306, 582 P3d 695
1
In I. T. v. Solis, 303 Or App 297, 298 n 1, 462 P3d 767 (2020), we stated in a footnote, “In civil restraining order cases, we ordinarily refer to the parties by their designation in the trial court.”
Cite as 353 Or App 182 (2026) 185
(2025) (sanctioning party in the amount of “$500 for each
fabricated citation and $1,000 for each false quotation or
substantive statement of law”).
Respondent filed a response in which he admitted
that these fabrications were the result of his reliance on
artificial intelligence. Respondent apologized for including
these citations in his brief and accepted full responsibility.
We continue to emphasize the strain that the inclusion of fabricated authorities puts on our judicial system in
that “[t]he time taken to address [a party’s] reliance on fabricated authority would have been far better utilized addressing other matters.” Powell v. Employment Dept., 347 Or App
55, 60, 586 P3d 1257 (2026); see also Williams v. Honl, 348
Or App 505, 513, 591 P3d 278 (2026) (“A [party]’s decision
to rely on generative artificial intelligence without adequate safeguards thus impedes the administration of justice in a
concrete way.”); Doiban v. OLCC, 347 Or App 742, 749, 587
P3d 435 (2026) (stating that petitioner’s inclusion of fabricated authority “has cost the court and respondent’s counsel substantial time and expense, pulling them and us away
from other work in our justice system”); Ringo, 345 Or App at
304 (“Every hour spent addressing false citations and statements of law is an hour diverted from those matters in which
attorneys have supported their arguments with precedent
that exists,” and “[e]very single time a [party] relies on false authority, the court will need to take the time to address the situation to, at a minimum, ensure that the public retains
confidence that the courts are not relying on fabricated law.”).
Although we move forward with respondent’s opening brief on the merits, we disregard the fabricated authorities and any support for his arguments those authorities
purport to provide.
Given all the circumstances, including respondent’s
acknowledgement of the errors and their severity, as well as
respondent’s limited financial resources, the court deems it
appropriate to sanction respondent in the reduced amount of
$250. See Order Imposing Sanctions, Entered June 4, 2026,
Cameron and Newell, (A188980), (“Given all of the circumstances, including respondent’s acknowledgement of the
186 R. M. v. Mohr
errors and their severity, the court deems it appropriate to
sanction respondent in the reduced amount of $250.”); Order
Imposing Sanctions, Entered June 16, 2026, Washington
v. Stack Metallurgical Company and SAIF Corporation,
(A188660), (“Given all of the circumstances, including petitioner’s acknowledgement (albeit a belated one) of the errors
and their severity—and especially in light of petitioner’s limited financial resources—the court deems it appropriate to
sanction petitioner in the reduced amount of $500.”).
MERITS DISCUSSION
Respondent raises five assignments of error. First,
respondent argues that “[t]he trial court abandoned neutrality by engaging in judicial advocacy, leading petitioner’s testimony, and showing partiality toward her.” Second, respondent argues that “[t]he trial court improperly shifted the
burden of proof onto respondent.” Third, respondent argues
that “[t]he trial court failed to include promised exceptions
in the final order, contrary to its own representation on the
record, and imposed an unreasonable 1,000-foot restriction.”
Fourth, respondent argues that “[t]he trial court erred by
issuing the Final FAPA Restraining Order without making
written findings of fact or legal conclusions.” Fifth, respondent argues that “[t]he trial court erred in issuing a restraining order where petitioner failed to prove either ‘abuse’ or
imminent danger of further abuse as required by statute.”
Having considered the briefing and the pertinent
parts of the record identified by respondent, we conclude
that the trial court did not err. In reaching that conclusion, we note that we have limited our review to claims of error
that are properly presented in the opening brief. It is respondent’s duty to identify the specific rulings that he challenges on appeal, to demonstrate that the claims of error were adequately preserved in the trial court, and to provide a cogent
argument that conforms to the applicable standard of review
and that is supported by legal authority and citations to the
record.2
2
See, e.g., ORAP 5.45(3) (“Each assignment of error must identify precisely the legal, procedural, factual, or other ruling that is being challenged.”); ORAP 5.45(4)(a) (“The court may decline to consider any assignment of error that requires the court to search the record to find the error or to determine if the error properly was raised and preserved.”); ORAP 5.45(5) (standard-of-review requirements). Cite as 353 Or App 182 (2026) 187
Although we recognize the challenges inherent in
representing oneself pro se in an appellate court and we may
allow for technical deficiencies up to a point, we cannot step out of our role as neutral arbiter to “make or develop a party’s argument.” Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern
Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as
clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003); see
also Briggs v. Lamvik, 242 Or App 132, 142 n 9, 255 P3d 518
(2011) (stating similar).
We have considered each of respondent’s arguments,
and we conclude that the trial court did not err in the ways
that respondent contends. As an initial matter, we conclude
that respondent did not make the arguments regarding his
first two assignments of error below before the trial court.
Thus, these arguments are not preserved, and we do not
exercise our discretion to review them for plain error. ORAP
5.45(1); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1991).
Regarding respondent’s third assignment of error,
following a hearing to continue a FAPA order, “[t]he court
may cancel or change any order issued under ORS 107.718
* * *.” ORS 107.716(3)(b). “[T]he continuation or cancellation of a FAPA order falls within the trial court’s statutory
authority.” K. R. M. v. Baker, 321 Or App 313, 317, 515 P3d
905 (2022) (holding that ORS 107.716(b)(3) allows the trial
court to continue the FAPA order despite the parties’ settlement agreement). To the extent the FAPA order differed
from what the trial court articulated during the hearing,
judges “may change [their] mind concerning the proper
disposition between the time of a hearing and [their] final
action which takes place when [they sign] the order disposing of the matter.” State v. Swain, 267 Or 527, 531, 517 P2d
684 (1974). “Generally, when a written judgment and oral
ruling conflict, the trial court’s decision is governed by the signed order, regardless of the evidence of the judge’s contrary intent.” Wright v. Lutzi, 326 Or App 29, 33, 530 P3d
517 (2023). Accordingly, the trial court did not err.
Respondent’s fourth assignment of error concerns
ORCP 62 A. “Whenever any party appearing in a civil action
tried by the court so demands prior to the commencement of
188 R. M. v. Mohr
the trial, the court shall make special findings of fact, and
shall state separately its conclusions of law thereon.” ORCP
62 A. However, respondent did not make any such request
until after the completion of the hearing. The trial court
did not err in denying respondent’s motion as untimely.
See ORCP 62 A (“In the absence of such a demand for special findings, the court may make either general or special
findings.”).
Finally, in his fifth assignment of error, respondent
assigns error to the trial court’s continuation of the FAPA
order. Respondent contends, “The trial court erred in issuing
a restraining order where petitioner failed to prove either
‘abuse’ or imminent danger of further abuse as required by
statute.”
“[W]e are bound by the trial court’s factual findings
if they are supported by any evidence in the record, and in
the absence of express factual findings, we presume that the
court made findings consistent with its ultimate judgment.
We review the trial court’s legal conclusions for legal error.” M. Z. v. Horning, 348 Or App 78, 79, 590 P3d 550 (2025)
(internal citation omitted). Following a contested hearing, a
trial court may continue a FAPA order if the court finds:
“(A) Abuse has occurred within the period specified in
ORS 107.710 (1);
“(B) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s
physical safety; and
“(C) The respondent represents a credible threat to the
physical safety of the petitioner or the petitioner’s child.”
ORS 107.716(3)(a); see M. M. B. v. Rivera, 340 Or App 614,
616, 572 P3d 315 (2025) (“[A]lthough a finding of an ‘imminent danger of further abuse’ is a requirement to obtain
an initial FAPA order, the standard for continuing a FAPA
order does not contain such a requirement.”). “Abuse * * *
is defined as intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placing another in fear of imminent bodily injury,” and “[f]ear
is judged by an objective standard and involves considering
the totality of the circumstances.” M. Z., 348 Or App at 83
(internal citations and quotations marks omitted).
Cite as 353 Or App 182 (2026) 189
We conclude that the record, in particular petitioner’s testimonial evidence regarding respondent’s actions
within the specific period, support the trial court’s determination that respondent’s actions met the statutory requirements, that petitioner could reasonably fear for her physical
safety, and that respondent represented a credible threat
to the physical safety of the petitioner. Specifically, petitioner’s testimonial evidence supported the conclusion that
respondent forcefully hugged petitioner against her will and
attempted to pull her out of her vehicle window on May 25,
2025, which was an act of abuse occurring within 180 days
of when petitioner filed her petition for the FAPA order on
June 6, 2025, as required by statute. Petitioner and respondent offered competing testimony as to whether the hug was
a forceful or consensual encounter. “[W]e generally defer to
the trial court for its assessment of credibility.” A. J. T. v. Croft, 311 Or App 574, 577, 492 P3d 778 (2021). Although
the trial court did not expressly state that it found petitioner’s testimony credible over respondent’s, based on the trial
court’s decision to continue the FAPA restraining order, we
can presume that was how the trial court considered the
credibility of the parties. See M. A. B. v. Buell, 366 Or 553, 565, 466 P3d 949 (2020) (explaining that “[w]hen a trial
court does not make express findings of fact, we will presume that the facts were decided in a manner consistent
with the [trial court’s] ultimate conclusion as long as there
is evidence in the record to support those implicit findings,” and “[t]hat includes accepting reasonable inferences and
reasonable credibility choices that the trial court could have made” (internal quotation marks omitted)). From our review
of the record, we understand that the trial court was not
persuaded by respondent and ultimately concluded that
petitioner reasonably feared for her physical safety and that
respondent represented a credible threat to her physical
safety. We conclude there is legally sufficient evidence in
the record supporting the trial court’s determinations, and
those determinations support the trial court’s continuation
of the FAPA restraining order.
Affirmed; additionally, respondent is directed to pay
$250 to the Appellate Court Services Division of the Oregon
Judicial Department.