Cite as 2026 Ark. App. 435
ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
DIVISION II
No. CV-26-179
Opinion Delivered September 23, 2026
JUNE MERRYMAN AND JASON WEST
APPEAL FROM THE SEBASTIAN
APPELLANTS COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FORT
SMITH DISTRICT
V. [NO. 66FJV-24-149]
ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HONORABLE SHANNON L. BLATT, HUMAN SERVICES AND MINOR JUDGE
CHILDREN
APPELLEES
AFFIRMED
KENNETH S. HIXSON, Judge
Appellants June Merryman (June) and Jason West (Jason) (sometimes referred to
herein collectively appellants) separately appeal after the Sebastian County Circuit Court
filed an order terminating their parental rights to their six children, Minor Child 1 (MC1)
(DOB 12-03-10), Minor Child 2 (MC2) (DOB 12-02-11), Minor Child 3 (MC3) (DOB 06-13-13), Minor Child 4 (MC4) (DOB 06-13-13), Minor Child 5 (MC5) (DOB 09-07-17), and
Minor Child 6 (MC6) (DOB 05-04-23). On appeal, June argues that the circuit court clearly
erred in finding that termination was in the children’s best interest. Jason argues that (1)
the circuit court clearly erred in finding that statutory grounds existed to support the
termination; (2) the circuit court clearly erred in finding that the Arkansas Department of
Human Services (DHS) complied with court orders and engaged in reasonable and active efforts to provide services; and (3) the circuit court’s findings in its fifteen-month review
order were clearly erroneous. We affirm.
I. Relevant Facts
On April 12, 2024, and on April 15, 2024, DHS filed a petition for emergency
custody and a petition for dependency-neglect of the children. In the affidavit attached to
the petition, a family-service worker (FSW) averred that she believed the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) applied because June reported Indian heritage with the Choctaw Tribe.
DHS became involved after it had received a call from the Barling Police Department. The
police officer who performed the welfare check reported that June seemed paranoid and
stated strange things, so the FSW visited the home. MC2 reported to the FSW that she and
her siblings had to work for their own food and prepare it because June does not give them
any food. She also stated that June does not like her and that she believed June was hurting
her siblings. The children expressed being nervous and scared when left home alone for
several hours. MC4 reported that June hit her across the face the previous week, and MC2
reported that June picks fights with them, which results in fistfights. The children further
explained that their mother drinks a lot, their parents fight in the home, and the police are
at their home a lot. Some of the children stated that they do not feel safe with their mother
and that they had previously been in foster care when they lived in South Carolina and
Arizona due to their parents’ fighting and lack of food.
June reported that her home was going into foreclosure and that they would not have
a home because Jason lost his job and was not paying the bills. The FSW averred that June
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appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, although the alcohol swab was negative. June
tested positive for buprenorphine and benzodiazepines, but June had prescriptions for those
medications. The house was dirty, and there was not enough food to feed six children. Jason
was incarcerated in the Benton County jail for violating a no-contact order. DHS exercised
a seventy-two-hour hold due to concerns that the caregiver’s mental instability,
developmental status, or cognitive deficiency seriously impaired the caregiver’s ability to
supervise, protect, or care for the children.
The circuit court granted the petition for emergency custody on April 15, 2024,
finding that there was probable cause to believe that the children were dependent-neglected
and that it was contrary to their welfare to remain in the parents’ custody. A probable-cause
order was filed on April 29, 2024. The court found that probable cause existed and
continued to exist, requiring that the children remain in the custody of DHS.
After DHS gave notice of the custody proceedings to the Choctaw Nation of
Oklahoma (Choctaw Nation), the Choctaw Nation responded and verified that all six
children were eligible for enrollment in the Choctaw Nation and that June was already an
enrolled member. Accordingly, the Choctaw Nation filed its notice of intervention, and the
circuit court filed an order acknowledging and accepting its intervention as permitted under
the ICWA on May 31, 2024.
An adjudication order was subsequently filed on June 21, 2024. June stipulated and
the circuit court found that the children were dependent-neglected on the basis of parental
unfitness. Although the circuit court found Jason to be the nonoffending parent, the circuit
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court found that he was unfit for custody or placement due to his incarceration. The circuit
court found that the allegations in the petition and accompanying affidavit were
substantiated by the proof. The circuit court further found that on the basis of the qualified
expert testimony regarding ICWA compliance, the children should remain in DHS’s custody
because their return “would result in severe physical or emotional harm to the child.” The
circuit court also found that, although the children’s current placement was not ICWA
compliant because a home was unavailable, “there is currently good cause to deviate from an
ICWA compliant placement” and that DHS had made active efforts to prevent the breakup
of the Indian family. DHS was ordered to continue to make active efforts to reunify the
family and to locate an ICWA compliant placement. The circuit court set the goal of case as
reunification, and DHS was given discretion regarding visitation. The parents were ordered
to follow the case plan, including the following services identified for each parent:
[S]ervices identified for June Merryman include: counseling (family), counseling
(individual), domestic violence education, drug assessments, drug screening,
employment services, family time, hair follicle testing, housing, legal services, mental
health services (outpatient), parenting – nurturing the families of Arkansas, parenting
skills, and psychological evaluations; and services for Jason West include: Counseling
(family), counseling (individual), domestic violence education, drug assessments, drug
screening, employment services, family time, housing, legal services, parenting skills,
DNA testing, and transportation.
On July 15, 2024, the circuit court held a review hearing, and an order was filed on
July 23, 2024. The circuit court continued the goal of reunification. It found that DHS had
complied with the case plan and court orders, made reasonable efforts to provide family
services and finalize a permanency plan for the children, and made active efforts. It ordered
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DHS to discuss the case with Jason and to be sure he is aware of the case plan and
requirements.
On August 26, 2024, the circuit court held a second review hearing, and an order was
filed on September 3, 2024. Jason was specifically found in this order to be the father of all
six children. The circuit court continued the goal of reunification and found the parents in
compliance with the case plan. Additionally, it ordered the parents to comply with the case
plan and court orders, to cooperate with the DHS and service providers, to visit the juveniles
regularly and be appropriate at those visits, and to provide DHS notice of any change in their
circumstances. The circuit court further found that DHS had complied with the case plan
and the orders and made reasonable and active efforts to achieve the goals of the case and
permanency for the children.
On October 7, 2024, the circuit court held a third review hearing, and an order was
filed on October 14, 2024. The circuit court again continued the goal of reunification,
found the parents compliant with the case plan, and ordered the parents to comply with the
case plan and court orders, to cooperate with the DHS and service providers, to visit the
juveniles regularly and be appropriate at those visits, and to provide DHS notice of any
change in their circumstances.
The parents thereafter filed a joint motion for trial home placement on December 6,
2024. Both DHS and the attorney ad litem filed responses disagreeing with the parents’
contention that a trial home placement was in the children’s best interest.
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On February 24, 2025, the circuit court held a fourth review hearing. At this hearing,
the circuit court continued the goal of reunification and ordered that the parents begin
unsupervised visitation with their children. The circuit court ordered that the parents be
granted four hours of unsupervised visitation the following two Fridays, followed by
unsupervised visitation the following two Saturdays from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., followed
by two weekends of unsupervised visitation from Friday through Sunday. The parents were
additionally ordered in relevant part to sign a release of information for medical and mentalhealth records, obtain Jason’s birth certificate, attend grief counseling,1 participate in the
reconsideration of the children’s IEPs, provide DHS proof of a valid driver’s license, and
provide DHS with proof of car insurance. DHS was ordered to make all necessary referrals
within forty-eight hours, assist Jason in obtaining his birth certificate if needed, make a
referral for grief counseling, follow up on the reconsideration of the children’s IEPs, make
the parents aware of all medical and dental appointments, provide the parents with a
schedule of the children’s extracurricular activities, make a referral for family counseling
within forty-eight hours, and fill out the necessary forms for MC4 to get a second medical
opinion at the Choctaw Nation Medical Clinic.
On March 15, 2025, DHS and the attorney ad litem filed an emergency motion to
modify visitation. They explained that the parents had not provided a valid driver’s license
and that the two unsupervised visits had not gone well. The children were upset at the last
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The parents had another child who died before this dependency-neglect case.
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visit because June demanded that the children go into the bathroom “to check them because
she knew DHS was recording the visits.” June also caused such a disturbance at MC4’s
medical appointment that she had been asked to leave the exam room. Moreover, June had
accused the caseworker and the children’s therapist of being inappropriately interested in
Jason. Accordingly, DHS and the attorney ad litem asked that the parents’ visitation be
supervised.
On March 21, 2025, the parents filed a joint answer generally denying the allegations
in the emergency motion to modify visitation. Although they admitted that June had been
asked to leave the examination room at MC4’s medical appointment, they alleged that it was
not because of a disturbance but because “the Doctor did not like [June] questioning his
decisions.”
On April 14, 2025, the circuit court held a permanency-planning hearing; an order
was filed on May 13, 2025; and an amended order was filed on June 10, 2025, to correct the
stated burden of proof. After this hearing, the circuit court set a goal of reunification with
a concurrent goal of adoption. The circuit court ordered that DHS had discretion as to
visitation and the discretion to begin any trial home placement upon the approval of the
attorney ad litem. It further ordered the parents to comply with the case plan and orders of
the court.
On July 4, 2025, the parents filed a joint motion for trial home placement. They
alleged that they had “made substantial strides and [had] completed all requirements of the
case plan.” They further alleged that they had concerns about the health and welfare of the
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children in DHS’s custody and made a maltreatment report to the Fort Smith Police
Department. They alleged that the children were being transported by someone who smoked
marijuana and used an inappropriate vehicle for the number of passengers she was
transporting; a doctor had found one of the children to be malnourished; a foster placement
took Life360 off the children’s phones to prohibit them from tracking the children’s
location; and one of the children put an Apple tracking device in June’s purse at the direction
of one of the foster parents. Accordingly, they asked that the children be immediately placed
back in their care.
On July 5, 2025, the parents also filed a joint petition to hold DHS in contempt.
They alleged that DHS had failed to start a trial home placement despite the fact that a
pending maltreatment investigation against them ended and resulted in “unsubstantiated
findings”; DHS had failed to provide them “CHRIS notes” as requested; DHS had
“interfered with [their] visitation rights”; DHS had failed to provide them with information
regarding the children’s activities and appointments; and DHS scheduled supervised
visitation for a day that Jason works and cannot attend.
DHS filed separate responses to the motion for trial home placement and the petition
for contempt on July 11, 2025. In addition to addressing the parents’ specific allegations
listed in the parents’ motion for trial home placement and explaining why they were either
inaccurate or did not warrant immediate placement of the children with the parents, DHS
alleged that trial home placement was
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not appropriate due to ongoing safety concerns, the need for further evaluation,
parent stability and recent changes in visitation status. Trial home placement
decisions are not solely based on the completion of services but must include a
current, comprehensive safety analysis. It remains the Department’s position [that]
the best interests of the children will not currently be served by returning [the
children] to the custody of the Defendants without further observation, medical
evaluation, individual counseling, grief counseling, additional visitation progress with
Triple P parenting, and confirmation of sustained parental stability and engagement.
In its response to the petition for contempt, DHS generally denied that it had willfully or
intentionally violated any court order. It further contested the parents’ contention that they
had made substantial strides in this case. Accordingly, DHS asked that both the motion and
petition be denied.
On July 18, July 25, and September 8, 2025, the circuit court held a fifteen-month
review hearing, and an order was filed on September 16, 2025. After the hearing, the circuit
court continued the previous goals and found that the return of the children to the parents
would result in severe physical or emotional harm. The circuit court also found that neither
parent was compliant with the case plan. Regarding June, it found that she refused to
participate in any further services, failed to complete parenting and domestic-violence classes
in compliance with the case plan, and fired her therapist and refused any referrals for
additional therapists. Regarding Jason, the court found that he lived in a two-bedroom
apartment with June and June’s mother, recently changed employment, had not attended
counseling since mid-July 2025, and failed to complete parenting and domestic-violence
classes in compliance with the case plan. Additionally, the circuit court found that DHS
had made active and reasonable efforts in the case and corrected any scrivener’s errors in its
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previous orders regarding the proper burden of proof. It ordered the parents to cooperate
with DHS; maintain stable housing, employment, and transportation; maintain contact with
DHS; allow DHS access to their home; comply with the case plan and court orders; and
complete parenting and domestic-violence classes and provide DHS with certificates of
completion. It prohibited any recordings during family time or the use of corporal
punishment. Further, the circuit court denied the parents’ motion for trial home placement
and ordered that their visits be limited to supervised therapeutic visitation.
DHS filed a petition for the termination of parental rights on September 26, 2025,
alleging several grounds for termination against appellants under Arkansas Code Annotated
section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 2025) (formerly Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-27-341(b)(3)(B)), including the failure-to-remedy, other-subsequent-factors, and aggravatedcircumstances grounds.
June’s counsel was permitted to withdraw from the case, and June chose to proceed
pro se. Although the circuit court filed orders addressing numerous pro se motions that
June filed, it is unnecessary to discuss them to resolve the issues raised on appeal.
On October 21, 2025, the circuit court filed an order clarifying visitation and stated
the following:
5. It was the intention of the Court and is the Court’s clarified ruling that the
parents, June Merryman and Jason West, shall have the statutory four (4) hours of
visitation per week with all the minor children in this case. In the event that the
therapists do not provide four (4) hours of therapeutic family time in a week, the
Department shall make arrangements for family time for the parents and children so
that there is at least a total family time of four (4) hours per week. For example, if the
therapists conduct only one (1) hour of therapeutic family time in a week, the
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Department shall make arrangements for three (3) hours family time for that week,
so that the parents and children shall have a total family time of not less than four (4)
hours per week.
6. The Department shall make up any and all missed visitation that has not
been provided to the parents for all time that the parents did not receive the aforesaid
four (4) hours per week.
7. All visitation shall be supervised. The parents are allowed to talk with the
children outside the presence of the therapists when the parents are in supervised
visitation that is supervised by someone other than the therapists.
8. The Orders of this Court do not give the Western Arkansas Counseling
and Guidance Center therapists or any other therapists any authority to alter, amend,
reduce or otherwise curtail the amount of time that the parents herein are awarded
under the Orders of this Court to visit with their children. The therapists have
authority to limit the amount of time that they conduct their supervised therapeutic
family time, but the Department must make arrangements for the parents and
children to have additional supervised family time that is not taken up by the
therapists’ therapeutic family time so that the parents have the statutory minimum
four (4) hours family time per week.
The attorney ad litem subsequently filed a motion and an amended motion to
suspend the parents’ supervised therapeutic family time. In support of this motion, the
attorney ad litem alleged that June had made threats and called the police during the visits,
which caused the children significant stress and anxiety. Despite the court’s previous order
prohibiting recordings, June and Jason had continued to record visits, causing the children
discomfort, anxiety, and a regression in therapy. In fact, a therapist was contacted on
November 10, 2025, to conduct an emergency telehealth session after MC3 expressed
suicidal ideations. Additionally, the attorney ad litem included letters from the children’s
therapists that recommended that the visits be terminated due to the safety concerns and
continued trauma being inflicted on the children during those sessions.
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On November 14, 2025, the circuit court entered an ex parte order suspending family
time and setting an emergency hearing for November 19, 2025. On November 19 and
December 1, 2025, the circuit court held a hearing on the motion to suspend family time,
and an order was filed on December 15, 2025. In its order, the circuit court found that
continued contact with the parents would endanger the physical, mental, and emotional
health of the four oldest female children, MC1, MC2, MC3, and MC4. As a result, the
circuit court suspended the parents’ visits with these four children. Regarding the two
youngest male children, MC5 and MC6, the circuit court ordered that the parents could
continue supervised therapeutic visitation or DHS-supervised visitation for a total of three
hours a week. DHS was permitted to initiate or increase any visitation between the parents
and MC1, MC2, MC3, and MC4 only with the approval of the attorney ad litem and the
Choctaw Nation representative. The circuit court further provided that if the parents
informed DHS that their home is ready, DHS was ordered to initiate the ICPC process on
the parents’ home.
On December 15 and 22, 2025, the circuit court held a termination-of-parental-rights
hearing. At the termination hearing, Kristin McAnally, the DHS program assistant assigned
to the case to supervise family time, testified that she had supervised at least twenty visits.
She explained that June had exhibited some concerning behaviors during family time. June
would excessively record the children and look for bruising or anything that she suspected
was a sign of abuse. June further made inaccurate allegations that the children were being
abused, trafficked, and coached by DHS. Ms. McAnally testified that although she did not
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have any initial concerns with Jason’s behavior around the children, she later observed Jason
throw his phone down onto a table after he was asked to put his phone away during a
supervised therapeutic visitation. She also saw Jason take MC5 by the arm when Jason
wanted MC5 to take a timeout and heard Jason raise his voice at the children on other
occasions. Ms. McAnnally testified that she did not notice any improvement in the parents’
behavior as visitation progressed and provided several examples of concerning behaviors she
observed during visitations.
Ms. McAnally explained that there was a visit in July 2025 at the mall. MC5 was not
feeling well and began throwing up, and June blocked Ms. McAnally and another worker
from helping with the situation, stating that she was the mother and she would deal with it.
Jason told MC5 to breathe, and the family ate some pizza after MC5 started to feel better.
June thereafter contacted EMS and the police stating that MC5 had not eaten and was living
in an abusive situation with a child molester. Ms. McAnally explained that MC5 had not
eaten before the visit because he was in court all day and was nervous because June had
wanted MC5 to testify at that hearing. June was belligerent, and EMS had to tell June to
back up and move away to allow them to assess MC5. The visit was terminated because of
June’s erratic behavior.
In June 2025, Ms. McAnnally took the children to McDonald’s for visitation with the
parents. MC3 complained that she was not feeling well and that her stomach hurt. Ms.
McAnnally took MC3 to the emergency room with the parents. Jason stayed in the waiting
room with the other children, and Ms. McAnnally and June stayed with MC3 during the
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examination. June immediately started making false accusations about malnutrition. MC3
was not diagnosed with malnutrition but was diagnosed with strep throat on that occasion.
During another visit in July 2025, there was an altercation in which June was
recording and calling Ms. McAnnally names. Other than telling June to stop, Jason did not
try to intercede or help the situation. Ms. McAnnally asked June to hand MC6 to her, and
June refused and walked toward the door with MC6. Because Ms. McAnnally thought June
was going to leave with MC6, she called the police. All the children were upset.
At the last visitation, the older girls did not want to be around June or Jason.
However, June kept following them, and the visitation “exploded from there.” The visitation
ended, and Ms. McAnnally remembered it being “very chaotic . . . to get out of the vicinity
of June and Jason with the children safely.”
Because of her observations, Ms. McAnnally thought any visitation still needed to be
supervised, and she expressed her opinion that the children should not be returned to their
parents. She did not think that Jason had benefited from the services he received and was
instead supportive of June and her actions. She explained that by the end of the case, the
children “dreaded” going to visits. Ms. McAnally could see their anticipation and anxiety.
She did not see either parent attempt to “de-escalate the children’s distress” or give them
either physical or verbal comfort when they were upset. Both parents had left the children
unattended during a visit. Even when Ms. McAnally attempted to redirect the parents, they
would not follow her instructions. Instead, June would get upset, and the visit would end.
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Kristin Hill, the assigned DHS case supervisor, testified as to the case history as
already outlined herein. Ms. Hill explained that in the beginning of the case, June was afraid
of Jason and concerned about the domestic violence that had occurred in the home. At one
point, June moved out of the home and had asked that her location not be shared with
Jason. Ms. Hill testified that DHS offered the following services to June: counseling,
maintaining housing, income, transportation, employment, a driver’s license, domesticviolence education, drug-and-alcohol assessment, random drug screens and hair-follicle tests,
family time, a psychological evaluation, and family counseling. She stated that DHS offered
the following services to Jason: maintaining housing, income, transportation, a valid driver’s
license, family counseling, domestic-violence education, individual counseling, parenting
education, and family time. However, neither parent fully complied with the case plan or
court orders.
Ms. Hill stated that she had attempted to set up a visit the previous weekend with
MC5 and MC6; however, the parents would not confirm the visit. They had asked for
transportation, but they had moved three hours away to Coalgate, Oklahoma. She offered
them gas cards, but the parents refused them, stating that it would be too much wear and
tear on their one vehicle.
June had a psychological evaluation performed in October of 2024. The report
recommended that June receive substance-abuse treatment, and her symptoms were
consistent with personality disorder, bipolar disorder, and PTSD. Although June was
ordered to complete an updated psychological evaluation and a psychiatric evaluation after
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the fifteen-month review hearing and a referral was made for the second psychological
evaluation on September 19, 2025, June refused to go and stated that doing too many
evaluations in a short time frame was not good for her mental health.
Ms. Hill explained that the parents attended counseling sporadically and that they
picked their own providers. In a July 9, 2025, note, the counselor’s records stated,
It is recommended that [June] see a psychiatrist or a psychiatric nurse practitioner for
medication evaluation, get a psychological evaluation to access for an accurate mental
health diagnosis. For example, bipolar with or without psychotic features versus
schizophrenia disorder and bipolar type versus schizophrenia, in home supportive
services if available for the family when the children are there for visits, family sessions
with the children at the agency that provides the treatment.
The note went on to state, “I did try to challenge some other delusional beliefs during
our last session, but she dismissed them and reiterated her beliefs . . . her current belief that
I am being harassed by DHS and/or CASA may hinder her willingness to continue working
with me.” June eventually terminated her relationship with the counselor on July 15, 2025.
Ms. Hill had not received any proof that June had continued individual counseling with
anyone else. She was did not know whether Jason had continued with any individual
counseling.
The case plan specified a place that was designated for the parenting and domesticviolence classes. However, the parents did not complete those classes through the identified
provider. Instead, the parents took parenting classes in another county. That said, Ms. Hill
was never given any certificates of completion from those programs. Although the parents
were asked to take domestic-violence classes separately, it was her understanding that the
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parents took classes together. DHS requested that the parents take the Triple P parenting
program, but they refused. Ms. Hill did not believe the parents exhibited anything they had
learned from any parenting classes “due to the continued paranoia, the lack of protective
parenting, the unsafe behaviors, [and] the lack of engagement.”
After the fifteen-month review hearing, Ms. Hill encouraged June to attend the family
sessions and complete the case plan, including Triple P and domestic-violence classes.
However, June said she would not do any more services for DHS and would find her own
services. She did not trust DHS. The parents first notified Ms. Hill that they had moved to
Oklahoma on October 24, 2025. DHS had not been able to “verify transportation, driver’s
license, registration of cars, etc., in the state of Oklahoma.” The parents further did not
provide any updated driver’s licenses or proof of employment. Except for a couple of pictures
that the parents sent, DHS had not seen the home. Further, even though the fifteen-month
review order stated that the parents should ask for a home study if they moved, they still had
not done so. Regardless, Ms. Hill stated that the parents were offered transportation and
gas cards and provided information to set up appointments.
Ms. Hill testified that despite DHS’s offer of services and providing redirection, June
still struggled with showing positive interaction in front of her children and with DHS. She
explained that there had been difficult interactions. June still exhibited concerning
behaviors of “paranoia, delusional statements, unfounded accusations, and inability to
regulate emotions.” In fact, Ms. Hill had taken over direct communications with the parents
because of June’s erratic behavior and the difficulty in dealing with both parents. Ms. Hill
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observed two visitations with the children. She said that June struggled to parent her
children on one of those visits. The children were distracted and running into different
rooms, but June could not bring the children back together.
Ms. Hill testified that she was concerned that Jason and June were still living together
and thought Jason’s living situation impacted his ability to reunite with the children. She
explained that DHS needed evidence of “safe, stable parenting and emotional stability in
meeting the children’s needs,” which had not been shown. She had concerns about Jason’s
“quiet withdrawal, . . . lack of engagement, and reinforce[ment of] the mother’s unsafe
behaviors[,] and statements also distress[ing] the children.” Thus, Ms. Hill testified that DHS
“still has concerns and is still worried about the emotional and physical well-being of the
children due to the parents’ inability to adequately supervise and protect the children due
to mental instability and the inability to adequately parent the children.” She did not think
the children should be returned to their parents. The parents were currently suspended
from visiting their older children, and one of the children even engaged in self-harm. Ms.
Hill further testified that there were not any other services available to the parents that DHS
had not yet provided to help achieve successful reunification. She explained that because
Jason had “not show[n] protective parenting due to the mother’s unsafe behaviors that cause
distress to the children[,] . . . there [was] no reasonable likelihood that continuing to offer
services to Jason West is likely to rehabilitate this parent or achieve the goal of reunification.”
Ms. Hill stated that the children are adoptable. She explained, “They’re a sibling
group of six. There are a few homes that are able to adopt them. Big sibling groups like
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that, we don’t have very many, but we do have some. They’re all great kids, and . . . we will
not have any issues with their adoptability.” Accordingly, Ms. Hill opined that adoption was
the permanency plan that was in the best interest of the children. Therefore, DHS
recommended adoption following the termination of parental rights on the basis that serious
and emotional harm to the children would occur if they were returned to the parents.
On cross-examination, Ms. Hill admitted that she could not find if and when a
referral had been made for Jason to undergo a psychological evaluation. Accordingly, she
agreed that because she could not prove that a referral had been made, any failure to
complete one should not be held against Jason. Ms. Hill further admitted that DHS was
ordered to help Jason obtain his driver’s license by helping him obtain his birth certificate.
However, she explained that Jason had failed to come to the office for the assistance that was
offered. Ms. Hill acknowledged that an investigation had revealed that MC6 had been
abused by an “unknown offender” while in DHS’s custody and that he had immediately
been removed from that placement thereafter. She further acknowledged that Jason had
been employed at two different jobs during the pendency of the case before he had moved
to Oklahoma. That said, Ms. Hill testified that Jason had indicated in a recent text that he
was looking for a job. Although the parents had not asked for a home study, Ms. Hill testified
that a home study had been requested two weeks before the termination hearing because
they take so long to complete.
Jane Merryman, June’s mother, testified that she had been living with June when June
lived in Barling, Arkansas. Jane testified that she thought June took good care of the
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children, kept the home clean, and had food for the children. Jane did not believe her
daughter is “crazy” or “delusional.” She further testified that she thought some of the
children were being abused while in DHS’s custody and that the children were being coached
to cover it up. She also claimed that she had been threatened outside the courtroom by
someone she did not know but was with the children.
Four of the children testified at the termination hearing. MC1 said that she did not
want to return home to her parents. She acknowledged that there was a possibility that she
would not be adopted with her siblings as a group; nevertheless, she did not want to return
home. She explained that she and her siblings had been in foster care several times and that
nothing seemed to change. She further explained that when she had lived with her parents,
there were incidents of dog attacks, domestic violence, and roaches in the home. She
believed that it would only get worse if she was returned to her parents’ care. MC1 testified
that Jason would not protect her or her siblings from June and that Jason would also hit
them. MC1 denied that DHS had manipulated, gaslighted, or encouraged her to go against
her parents.
MC2 similarly testified that she did not want to return home to her parents because
of the alcohol issues, the hitting, and the chaos. She also acknowledged that there was a
possibility that she would not be adopted with her siblings as a group. She had not seen any
change in her parents over the past year and did not have any faith in their ability to change.
MC2 described numerous incidents of domestic violence and abuse toward her and her
siblings that had occurred in the home when she lived with her parents. MC2 admitted that
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she had been diagnosed with depression when she lived with her parents and that she
recently went to a mental-health facility for self-harm and suicidal ideations and was on
medication.
MC3 admitted that she had mixed feelings about the visits with her parents being
suspended. Although she testified that she would be sad if she was not adopted with her
siblings, she did not want to be returned to her parents because her mom hit her dad “way
too much,” there was “way too much drama,” and she was tired of having to be subsequently
returned to foster care after being returned to her parents.
MC4 testified that she liked living with her parents, did not want to be adopted, and
wanted to move back home.
Blair Christenberry, an employee of the Choctaw Nation with the Indian Child
Welfare Program, was designated as an expert witness for purposes of ICWA without
objection. She testified that it was the tribe’s opinion that continued custody by either
parent would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the children. She
explained that the children were in two separate placements and that both placements were
meeting the children’s needs. Ms. Christenberry testified that the tribe was of the opinion
that DHS had made active efforts to explore relatives for ICWA compliant homes for
possible placement; however, no family had been located, and the tribe believed there was
good cause to deviate due to no familial or tribal placements open at the time. She further
testified that it was the tribe’s opinion that DHS had made active efforts to reunify the family
to prevent the breakup of the family and that those efforts had not proved successful. When
21
asked her opinion about whether it was in the children’s best interest to terminate parental
rights, Ms. Christenberry testified that there was evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
continued custody would likely result in serious emotional or physical damage to the
children.
When asked whether the tribe supported the Triple P parenting service that was
offered to the parents, Ms. Christenberry testified that the tribe strongly supported the
recommendation and that she specifically spoke to June about it. However, the parents
refused the service. She further stated that she had not seen any behavior changes in either
parent during the pendency of the case. Ms. Christenberry expressed her concerns that June
had delusional ideations, constantly thought someone was out to get her, and exhibited
erratic behavior. She was also concerned that Jason had an unhealthy connection to June
and refused to cease his relationship with June.
Jason West testified and agreed with June that he thought DHS caseworkers had
made “manipulating comments” to both of them. He also agreed with June’s contention
that the children’s foster parents had criminal records. He denied that the children were
ever upset or distressed due to June’s behavior. He also denied that he ever saw June hurt
the children or that June had ever “physically abused” him. Jason discussed his visitation
with the children during the pendency of the case. When asked about an incident in which
he was told to stop talking on the phone with June during a supervised therapeutic visitation,
Jason explained that on that occasion, June was unable to attend visitation because she had
to stay home with her sick mother. When June called his phone, he turned it on speaker
22
phone to allow June to talk with the children. Jason claimed that a DHS worker grabbed his
arm and tried to take away his phone. Jason admitted that he called the worker a “bitch”
and “tossed [his] phone on the table.” Although he claimed that DHS had previously
canceled visitation because he and June had been recording, he denied that he or June did
so.
Regarding his compliance, Jason testified that he and June had completed their
parenting and domestic-violence classes. Jason admitted that he took classes at a different
location than DHS had set up; however, he thought the information he had learned in the
parenting classes he took was “sufficient.” Jason claimed that DHS was given certificates of
completion from those classes. Jason further admitted that he and June had recently moved
to Oklahoma in October 2025 and that he did not call DHS to ask for a home study. He
explained that he had purchased a home in Oklahoma and that he made repairs to the home.
He had not obtained his permanent driver’s license due to a previous DUI, but he claimed
that he had a permit that allowed him to drive until he completed a “judicial review” to
“release the hold on [his] license.” He admitted that the permit was issued by the State of
Arkansas and that he had not changed his driver’s license after he moved to Oklahoma.
Jason claimed that he was currently employed in Oklahoma. Regarding the Triple P
parenting program, Jason testified that he could not complete the program because he was
told that DHS had “not set [it] up properly.” He claimed that he was still attending
individual counseling and that he was “working on acute grief therapy” in those sessions.
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June Merryman testified as the final witness. Much of June’s testimony centered on
her contention that DHS had put her children in an abusive situation. She explained that
her children were scared of DHS and denied that her children had seen any domestic abuse
between her and Jason. June admitted that MC1and MC2 had been in DHS’s care three
times; MC3 and MC4 had been in DHS’s care twice; and this was MC6’s first time in DHS’s
care. Although June acknowledged that some of the children testified that they did not want
to return to her home, June alleged that their testimony was the product “of a long process
of [DHS caseworkers and counselors] manipulating and brainwashing” them. She denied
that she was unstable when her children were removed from her custody, and she claimed
that she had not been “beating” her children. She further claimed that if the children were
returned to her custody, the only things she would change would be to spend more time
with the children and “watch them a little bit closer and make sure that corrupt people didn’t
have a chance to ever get back around them again.”
At the conclusion of the termination hearing, the parties gave closing arguments.
DHS generally argued that the evidence showed beyond a reasonable doubt that statutory
grounds were met, active efforts were made, reunification was unrealistic, and termination
of parental rights was not only appropriate but necessary in this case. June admitted that she
refused to do any more services and argued that she should not be “threaten[ed]” to do any
more services than she had already done. She claimed that she was stable and alleged that
DHS had “failed over and over and over in every case to protect from physical, sexual, and
serious emotional harm of all of [her] children.” She accused the DHS caseworkers and
24
therapists of retaliating against and gossiping about her and claimed that the process has
been a “witch hunt.” Jason’s counsel argued that Jason should not be held responsible for
June’s actions. He claimed that Jason had employment, income, housing, and transportation
throughout the case. He also claimed that Jason participated in parenting classes, domesticviolence classes, individual therapy, and therapy with the children. Jason’s counsel further
argued that DHS had failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the children’s
adoptability. Finally, the attorney ad litem argued that termination was in the children’s best
interest because the parents could not safely parent them. The circuit court took the matter
under advisement.
The circuit court filed an order terminating appellants’ parental rights on January 5,
2026. In a very lengthy and detailed order, the circuit court specifically found beyond a
reasonable doubt that all three grounds alleged in the petition supported termination and
that it is in the best interest of the children to terminate appellants’ parental rights. Relevant
to appellants’ points on appeal, the circuit court made the following specific findings:
June Merryman Testimony:
8. The Court found the parents testimony was not credible. Specifically,
June Merryman repeatedly demonstrated an inability or unwillingness to
acknowledge the impact of her behavior on the juveniles, instead minimizing,
deflecting or attributing concerns for the children’s welfare to others than herself.
The Court finds June Merryman engaged in repeated and targeted physical abuse
toward her daughter [MC2] including prolonged physical punishment. The Court
finds this conduct was not isolated, accidental or situational, but occurred as a
broader pattern in which [MC2] was singled out for harm. The Court credits [MC2’s]
testimony as reliable and finds this abuse caused fear, emotional distress, physical
harm, and created a reasonable belief she was unsafe in her mother’s care. The Court
finds June Merryman’s testimony that she did not believe her behavior required any
25
change, and that the only action she would do differently would be to keep the Department of Human Services away from her children was unconvincing and demonstrates June Merryman’s lack of insight into the conditions that led to the removal of her children from her custody and the harm experienced by the juveniles.
Jason West Testimony:
9. The Court finds the testimony of Jason West was not credible.
Specifically, the Court finds Jason West’s testimony that there was no domestic violence in the home untruthful. The Court finds Jason West had testified June Merryman assaulted him with a hammer causing him to lose teeth, and such testimony is wholly inconsistent with his denial of domestic violence. The Court finds Jason West exercised authority over the juveniles while failing to intervene to stop harmful violent conduct between the parents and normalizing domestic violence within the home. The Court further finds this environment exposed all the juveniles to an ongoing substantial risk of serious emotional and physical harm.
Parents’ Testimony:
10. The Court found the parents testimony was not credible. Specifically, June Merryman and Jason West repeatedly demonstrated an inability or
unwillingness to acknowledge the impact of their behavior on the juveniles, instead minimizing, deflecting or attributing concerns to others than themselves. The Court finds the testimony of June Merryman and Jason West who testified the juveniles [MC1], [MC2], and [MC4] were untruthful, and the disclosures in the juveniles’ testimony was the product of influence, coaching, fraud or manipulation by multiple professionals including, but not limited to, therapists, caseworkers, supervisors, and CASA. The Court finds the parents’ testimony untruthful and reflects the parents’ pattern of attributing blame to third parties for the juveniles’ statements rather than acknowledging the harm the juveniles experienced within the home. Finally, the Court finds the testimony of both parents that they had completed their case plan, and their children never witnessed any physical violence between them directly contradicts the evidence in this case.
Findings of the Court:
11. Based upon the record in this case, the testimony of the witnesses and the pleadings, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the following:
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12. After considering the pleadings, testimony and admitted evidence, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the following grounds for involuntary termination of the parental rights of June Merryman:
C. The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the
juvenile division of the circuit court, to: (3) have subjected any juvenile to
aggravated circumstances meaning: (i) A juveniles have been abandoned,
chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated cruelty, sexually abused,
or a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood
that services to the family will result in successful reunification; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix). The Court incorporates its findings in
Paragraph 11 subsections aa-uu, et seq., of this Order in support of this ground
for termination. There is little likelihood services to the family will result in
successful reunification. June Merryman has prioritized her delusional
thoughts over reunification with her children by refusing her own mental
health treatment, medical treatment for the children, engaging in disruptive
behaviors during visits and doctor appointments, failing to deescalate
conflicts, and terminating her individual therapy against medical advice. The
parent subjected the juveniles to aggravated circumstances including, but not
limited to, chronic emotional harm, exposure to violence and mental
instability. The actions and circumstances of the parent, June Merryman,
demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt there is little likelihood services to the
family will result in successful reunification.
13. After considering the pleadings, testimony and admitted evidence, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the following grounds for involuntary termination of the parental rights of Jason West:
C. The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the
juvenile division of the circuit court, to: (3) have subjected any juvenile to
aggravated circumstances meaning: (i) A juvenile has been abandoned,
chronically abused, subjected to extreme or repeated cruelty, sexually abused,
or a determination has been or is made by a judge that there is little likelihood
that services to the family will result in successful reunification; ARK. CODE
ANN. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(B)(ix). The Court incorporates its findings in
Paragraph 11 subsections aa-uu, et seq., of this Order in support of this ground
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for termination. The Court finds the Department has made active reasonable
efforts throughout this case. Despite the Department’s efforts, Jason West has
failed to demonstrate his ability to safely care for the juveniles if the juveniles
were in his care and custody. Jason West has failed to comply with the orders
of the Court in participating in services required and is not compliant with
the case plan. Jason West placed his priority on his refusal to participate in
services in support of June Merryman’s refusals to participate and promoted
disruptive conduct during visits causing the juveniles’ serious emotional
distress. Jason West was aware of ongoing harm, instability and conflict in the
home and failed to take sufficient or effective action to protect the juveniles.
Jason West engaged in aggressive and inappropriate conduct toward the
juveniles further undermining their sense of safety. Jason West failed to
demonstrate sufficient insight to the impact of his inaction including at the
termination hearing and continues to minimize his role. Jason West’s failure
to protect was not isolated, but occurred repeatedly over time, conveying to
the juveniles that their safety was not a priority. The juveniles did not
experience Jason West as a protective parent and did not feel safe relying on
him to intervene during harmful events. Jason West has not attended
individual counseling since July 2025 and provided no proof of steady, stable
employment or housing. There is a substantial risk of serious emotional and
physical harm to the juveniles if returned to the care of either parent. Jason
West’s actions and circumstances since removal clearly demonstrate there is
little likelihood services offered to him would ever result in successful
reunification.
14. The Court finds based upon expert testimony of Blair Christenberry with the Choctaw Nation that the Indian Child Welfare Act applies to all juveniles. The Court finds, through her qualified expert testimony, that return of the children to the parents or Indian custodian would result in severe physical or emotional harm to the children. The Court further finds, based on the expert testimony, that the Department made active and reasonable efforts to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian Family and those efforts proved unsuccessful. The Court finds that after diligent searches for placements by the tribe and Department, there are currently no ICWA preferred placements available, and good cause exists to deviate from placement preferences. The juveniles are not in an ICWA compliant placement; however, the Court finds the placements necessary, the least restrictive, and in the best interests of the juveniles based upon the expert testimony of Blair Christenberry with the Choctaw Nation. The Court finds it in the best interest of the juveniles to remain in the custody of the Department because the parents are unfit, and the juveniles’ health and safety cannot be protected by the parents if returned to the parents.
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15. The Court also finds the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the juveniles. In making this finding, the Court considered all relevant factors, including the likelihood the juveniles would be adopted if the parental rights were terminated and the potential harm specifically addressing the effect on the health and safety of the juveniles that could be caused by returning the juveniles to the parent.
A. As to the juveniles’ adoptability, the Court finds the likelihood the
juveniles would be adopted if the parental rights were terminated based on
factors of the juveniles’ ages, personalities and physical health including, but
not limited to, the ages of the juveniles, good physical health, their ability to
form healthy attachments, respect for authority figures and loving
temperament. The Court finds the children to be articulate, well-groomed,
intelligent and respectful. The Court finds the likelihood the juveniles would
be adopted given the factors articulated in the testimony of Kristen Hill as well
as the Court’s own observations of the juveniles in proceedings on September
8 and December 22, 2025.
B. As to potential harm, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the
potential serious emotional and physical harm for the health and safety of the
juveniles if the juveniles are returned to the parents based upon the parents’
longstanding domestic violence and parenting issues, June Merryman’s mental
and emotional instability and the parents’ indifference to the juveniles’
wellbeing based upon the parents’ failure to prioritize the children focusing
instead on recording family times and challenging caregivers, therapists, health
care providers, case workers and law enforcement in the
presence of the children.
16. The Court, therefore, grants the petition and terminates all parental rights between the parents, Jason West and June Merryman and the juveniles, [MC1, MC2, MC3, MC4, MC5, and MC6], pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-35-325.
Any prior orders directing the parents to pay on-going child support for the juveniles shall cease upon entry of this order. The Department is relieved of providing reunification services to the parents.
19. The Department has made active reasonable efforts to finalize the juveniles’ permanency plan and to provide reasonable and meaningful efforts to provide appropriate family services to the family. Despite these efforts and services,
29
the juveniles cannot and should not be returned to or placed in the custody of the
parents.
June was appointed counsel, obtained an order of indigency for appeal, and filed a
timely notice of appeal on January 7, 2026, which was subsequently amended by June’s
appointed counsel on January 23, 2026. Jason filed his timely notice of appeal through
counsel on January 22, 2026. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
Ordinarily, a circuit court’s order terminating parental rights must be based on
findings proved by clear and convincing evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3) (Supp.
2025) (formerly Ark. Code Ann. § 9-27-341(b)(3)). A circuit court must find by clear and
convincing evidence that termination is in the best interest of the juvenile, taking into
consideration (1) the likelihood that the juvenile will be adopted if the termination petition
is granted; and (2) the potential harm, specifically addressing the effect on the health and
safety of the child, caused by returning the child to the custody of the parent. Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-35-325(b)(3)(A)(i) & (ii). The order terminating parental rights must also be based
on a showing of clear and convincing evidence as to one or more of the grounds for
termination listed in section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B).
However, for termination proceedings subject to the ICWA, the burden of proof is
beyond a reasonable doubt. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-35-312(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 2025) (formerly Ark.
Code Ann. § 9-27-325(h)(2)(B)); Wallace v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2020 Ark. App. 67, 595
S.W.3d 396. ICWA applies only to an “Indian child,” which is defined as any unmarried
30
person under the age of eighteen who is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) eligible
for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). Notice to an Indian tribe of an involuntary proceeding is required
when a juvenile court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved. 25
U.S.C. § 1912(a). Under the Indian Child Welfare Act, “[n]o termination of parental rights
may be ordered . . . in the absence of determination, supported by the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, including testimony of a qualified expert witness, that the continued custody
of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or
physical damage to the child.” 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (emphasis added). Also under the
ICWA, “any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination of parental
rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts have been
made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent the
breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C. §
1912(d) (emphasis added).
As we have previously clarified in other ICWA cases, this court’s review of
termination proceedings is de novo, and we will not reverse the circuit court’s findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Garris v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 118,
619 S.W.3d 67. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support
it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been made. Posey v. Ark. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 370 Ark. 500, 262
S.W.3d 159 (2007). In determining whether a finding is clearly erroneous, an appellate
31
court gives due deference to the opportunity of the circuit court to judge the credibility of
witnesses. Id.
III. June’s Appeal
June argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that termination was in the
children’s best interest. More specifically, even though she acknowledges Ms. Hill’s
testimony regarding the children’s adoptability, she nevertheless argues that the termination
must be reversed because “the record contains no meaningful adoptability evidence.” She
complains that “[w]ithout individualized, evidence-based findings as to each child’s
adoptability, there is no proof beyond a reasonable doubt that termination will achieve
permanency for these children.” We disagree.
Adoptability is not an essential element of proof in a termination case. Jones v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 446. In other words, the identification of would-be
adoptive parents is not a prerequisite to terminating a biological parent’s rights. Id. In fact,
termination can be proper even if the evidence shows adoption is unlikely if termination is
nonetheless in the child’s best interest. Robbins v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App.
593, 700 S.W.3d 919. The statute does not require any “magic words” or a specific quantum
of evidence regarding a child’s adoptability but simply provides that the circuit court consider
the likelihood that the child will be adopted in making its best-interest determination.
Krecker v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 537, at 11, 530 S.W.3d 393, 401. If there
is an adoptability finding, there must be evidence to support it. Gonzales v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2025 Ark. App. 496, 725 S.W.3d 778. This court has made it clear that a caseworker’s
32
testimony that a child is adoptable is sufficient to support an adoptability finding. Hardy v.
Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2026 Ark. App. 343, ___ S.W.3d ___; Krecker, supra.
Here, Ms. Hill testified that the children are adoptable and provided the following
explanation: “They’re a sibling group of six. There are a few homes that are able to adopt
them. Big sibling groups like that, we don’t have very many, but we do have some. They’re
all great kids, and . . . we will not have any issues with their adoptability.”
The circuit court specifically noted in its opinion that it relied on Ms. Hill’s testimony as
well as its own observations of the children that participated in the court proceedings on
September 8 and December 22, 2025.
Moreover, we do not find that the facts of this case are comparable to those in Grant
v. Arkansas Department of Human Services, 2010 Ark. App. 636, 378 S.W.3d 227, as June
contends. In Grant, this court reversed a termination decision because the only evidence of
adoptability was a caseworker’s opinion that the child was adoptable because “all children
are adoptable.” Id. at 13, 378 S.W.3d at 233. The child at issue in that case had autism, and
the condition had not been considered in determining whether he was adoptable. By
contrast, Ms. Hill’s testimony was not a generic statement that all children are adoptable.
Rather, Ms. Hill testified that she did not think there would be any issues with these children
being adopted. See Murray v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2011 Ark. App. 588, 385 S.W.3d 897.
She further discussed the existence of homes that would be willing to adopt all six children
together. She explained that there were not many homes willing to do so but that there were
some. Moreover, although not direct evidence on adoptability, the circuit court heard
33
testimony from multiple witnesses, including some of the children themselves, about the
children’s emotional capabilities and characteristics, which all inform adoptability. See
Stanley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 581, 507 S.W.3d 544. Thus, there was
evidence of adoptability in the record for the circuit court to consider in determining the
children’s best interests, and we cannot say that the circuit court erred in finding that the
children are adoptable.
June additionally argues that we must reverse the termination because the “circuit
court’s best-interest determination failed to account for the likelihood of sibling separation,
the strength of the sibling bond documented throughout the record, or the absence of any
identified adoptive resource capable of keeping the family unit intact.” She explains that the
children all lived together before they were removed; however, the children were currently
in two separate placements with MC1, MC2, MC5, and MC6 in one home together and
MC3 and MC4 in another home together. June argues that the children were closely bonded
and attended visitations together. Acknowledging Ms. Hill’s testimony that there were not
many homes for sibling groups of six, June argues that “[n]o evidence was presented that any
family had been identified willing to adopt all six children together, or that DHS has
undertaken any search with that objective.” Accordingly, June contends that a “best interest
finding that ignores the near-certain prospect of permanent sibling separation cannot be
sustained, particularly where, as here, the record is replete with evidence of a genuine and
close sibling bond.” We disagree.
34
DHS argues that this issue is not preserved because it was not argued at the
termination hearing, and we agree. See Lyall v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 81,
661 S.W.3d 240 (holding that because the appellant failed to raise the sibling-separation
argument before the circuit court, it was therefore not preserved for appeal). Nevertheless,
even if it were preserved, it is meritless.
Here, Ms. Hill specifically testified that the children were a sibling group of six and
that although there were not many homes willing adopt six children together, there were
some. As DHS correctly notes, there was no evidence that DHS intended to have the
children adopted separately. See Rocha v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2021 Ark. App. 454, 637
S.W.3d 299 (holding that appellant’s argument that the circuit court failed to consider how
the children would be affected if adopted separately was meritless because the evidence
demonstrates that DHS intended to place the children for adoption only as a sibling group).
Moreover, the Juvenile Code does not require certainty, let alone a “guarantee,” that siblings
be adoptable as a group. Corley v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 397, 556 S.W.3d
538. In fact, the case law provides that while keeping siblings together is a commendable
goal and an important consideration, it is but one factor that must be considered when
determining the best interest of the child. Id. Evidence of a precise adoptive placement is
not required and neither is evidence that the children be placed in the same foster home
before termination. Wilkerson v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2024 Ark. App. 88, 684 S.W.3d
319. At the termination hearing, three of the children acknowledged that they understood
there was no guarantee they would be adopted together as a sibling group; nevertheless, they
35
testified that they did not want to return to their parents’ home. Accordingly, after a de
novo review, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.
IV. Jason’s Appeal
Jason argues that (1) the circuit court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed
to support the termination; (2) the circuit court clearly erred in finding that DHS complied
with court orders and engaged in reasonable and active efforts to provide services; and (3)
the circuit court’s findings in its fifteen-month review order were clearly erroneous. We
address each of his arguments separately.
A. Statutory Grounds
Jason first argues that the circuit court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed
to support the termination. The circuit court granted the termination petition as to Jason
on the basis of the failure-to-remedy, other-subsequent-factors, and aggravated-circumstances
grounds. Here, the evidence clearly supported the aggravated-circumstances ground, and
only one ground is necessary to support the termination. See Campbell v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum.
Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 82.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-35-325(b)(3)(B) defines this ground as follows:
(ix)(a) The parent is found by a court of competent jurisdiction, including the
circuit court juvenile division, to:
(3)(A) Have subjected any juvenile to aggravated circumstances.
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(B) As used in subdivision (b)(3)(B)(ix)(a)(3)(A) of this section, “aggravated
circumstances” means:
(i) A juvenile has been abandoned, chronically abused, subjected to extreme
or repeated cruelty, sexually abused, or a determination has been or is made by a judge
that there is little likelihood that services to the family will result in successful
reunification[.]
Jason argues on appeal that the circuit court clearly erred in finding this ground
because DHS had failed to offer him grief counseling even though he was “traumatized by
[his] oldest child’s murder in 2021.” However, Jason’s citations in support of his argument
are to the transcript from the fifteen-month review hearing in which DHS caseworker Elysa
Turner testified that she did not set up grief counseling because “it was [her] understanding
that it would’ve been done though their therapist, and that [it] was [her] mistake to assume
that.” Jason did not argue at the termination hearing that he failed to receive grief counseling
or argue that this missing service would result in successful reunification. An argument must
be raised and developed before the circuit court to be preserved for review. Anderson v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2016 Ark. App. 428, 501 S.W.3d 831. Moreover, the aggravatedcircumstances ground does not require that DHS prove that meaningful services toward
reunification were provided. McLemore v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 57, 540
S.W.3d 730. Nevertheless, Jason’s own testimony at the termination hearing contradicts his
contention on appeal that he failed to receive grief counseling. Jason testified he was still
attending individual counseling and that he was “working on acute grief therapy” in those
sessions. Accordingly, Jason’s argument lacks merit.
37
Jason further argues under this point that the circuit court’s finding is inconsistent
with its earlier review orders finding that he was in compliance with the case plan and court
orders. Although he acknowledges that there was conflicting testimony, he claims that the
evidence showed that he was in fact the “calm, appropriate, and stabilizing” parent. Jason
claims that because he was the nonoffending parent, there were repeated compliance
findings until September 2025, and his visitation was expanded to unsupervised and
weekend visitation, the evidence does not support the circuit court’s conclusion that services
were unlikely to succeed beyond a reasonable doubt. Again, his arguments lack merit.
Jason’s arguments regarding his compliance with the case plan and court orders are
misplaced. Even full compliance with the case plan is not determinative; the issue is whether
the parent has become a stable, safe parent able to care for his or her child. Holland v. Ark.
Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2023 Ark. App. 548, 680 S.W.3d 52. This court has held that a parent’s
continued inability to protect and care for his or her child and failure to benefit from the
services provided are sufficient to demonstrate little likelihood that further services will result
in a successful reunification. Id.
Unfortunately, Jason’s progress in this case was not as significant as he characterizes
it in his appellate brief. Here, multiple witnesses testified that Jason had not shown that he
benefited from the services he was provided and that the children could not be returned to
him. Ms. McAnally testified that she did not notice any improvement in the parents’
behavior as visitation progressed and provided several examples of concerning behaviors she
observed during visitations. She explained that she observed Jason throw his phone down
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onto a table, raise his voice at the children on some occasions, and fail to “de-escalate the
children’s distress.” She further stated that Jason was supportive of June and her actions.
Ms. Hill’s testimony echoed that of Ms. McAnally. Ms. Hill testified that she had
concerns about Jason’s “quiet withdrawal, . . . lack of engagement, and reinforce[ment of]
the mother’s unsafe behaviors[,] and statements also distress[ing] the children.” She
highlighted the fact that although the parents had been given periods of unsupervised
visitation during the pendency of the case, the parents were currently suspended from
visiting their older children, and one of the children even engaged in self-harm. Ms. Hill
further testified that there were not any other services available to the parents that DHS had
not yet provided to help achieve successful reunification. She explained that because Jason
had “not showed protective parenting due to the mother’s unsafe behaviors that cause
distress to the children[,] . . . there [was] no reasonable likelihood that continuing to offer
services to Jason West is likely to rehabilitate this parent or achieve the goal of reunification.”
MC1 testified that she did not think Jason would protect her, and MC2 testified that
she had not seen any change in her parents over the past year and did not have any faith in
their ability to change. Ms. Christenberry testified that there was evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that continued custody would likely result in serious emotional or physical
damage to the children, and she stated that she was concerned about Jason’s unhealthy
connection to June. We hold that this evidence was sufficient. Although Jason provided
contradictory testimony, the credibility of any witness’s testimony is to be assessed by the
trier of fact—and the trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of it. Gibby v. Ark. Dep’t of
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Hum. Servs., 2022 Ark. App. 146, 643 S.W.3d 794. Here, the circuit court specifically found
that Jason’s testimony was not credible.
Finally, Jason’s argument that the facts in Richie v. Arkansas Department of Human
Services, 2023 Ark. App. 219, are “similar enough” to require reversal is unavailing. The
circuit court in Richie terminated appellant’s parental rights based on a concern that he was
still in a relationship with the children’s mother. However, all the evidence demonstrated
that appellant had severed his relationship with the children’s mother and had even
progressed enough to receive unsupervised visitation. Those are not the facts here. Given
the evidence presented in this case, we hold that the circuit court’s finding that there was
little likelihood that services would result in successful reunification was not clearly
erroneous. Because we conclude that DHS adequately proved the aggravated-circumstances
ground, we need not discuss the remaining grounds found by the circuit court. See Kohlman
v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2018 Ark. App. 164, 544 S.W.3d 595.
B. Active Efforts
Jason next argues that the circuit court clearly erred in finding that DHS complied
with court orders and engaged in reasonable and active efforts to provide services. Recall
that under the ICWA, “any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or termination
of parental rights to, an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that active efforts
have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent
the breakup of the Indian family and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful.” 25 U.S.C.
§ 1912(d) (emphasis added). Unfortunately, the basis for Jason’s argument that the circuit
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court clearly erred is once again his allegation that DHS had failed to provide him grief
counseling.
As already noted above, Jason’s citations in support of his argument that DHS failed
to provide him grief counseling are from the fifteen-month review hearing and not the
termination hearing. Jason did not argue at the termination hearing that he failed to receive
grief counseling; instead, he testified he was still attending individual counseling and that he
was “working on acute grief therapy” in those sessions. Further, Ms. Christenberry testified
that it was the tribe’s opinion that DHS had made active efforts to reunify the family in
efforts to prevent the breakup of the family and that those efforts had not proved successful.
She had not seen any behavior changes in either parent during the pendency of this case.
The circuit court was within its province to rely on this testimony in making its finding that
active efforts had been made, and Jason failed to rebut Ms. Christenberry’s testimony that
active efforts had been made with evidence that he was not offered grief counseling. See
Ritter v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2017 Ark. App. 9, 511 S.W.3d 343. Accordingly, we affirm
the order terminating Jason’s parental rights.
C. Fifteen-Month Review Order
Jason’s last argument is that the circuit court’s findings in its fifteen-month review
order were clearly erroneous. His argument states the following:
A. The findings that DHS complied with court orders and that DHS made
reasonable and active efforts is clearly erroneous.
This is the same argument we make in Section II of Part 1. We adopt and
incorporate that argument.
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B. The finding that Jason had not participated in counseling since July 2025 is
clearly erroneous.
The circuit court found that Jason “has not attended individual counseling
since mid-July 2025.” It was June who refused individual counseling, not Jason. Jason
was still attended as of the termination hearing.
C. The finding Jason had not made significant and measurable progress or a
genuine and sustainable investment is clearly erroneous.
This section adopts the discussion from Section I.B of Part 1.
D. The finding Jason had not demonstrated sufficient parenting skills is clearly
erroneous.
This section adopts the discussion from Section I.B.2 of Part 1.
Unfortunately, Jason’s challenge is developed no further. Even if we were to agree
that any of the circuit court’s findings in this review order were erroneous, Jason fails to
explain why this requires us to reverse the termination order. We have held that failure to
develop an argument precludes review on appeal. See Hall v. Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 2012
Ark. App. 245, 413 S.W.3d 542. Further, a mere conclusory statement without convincing
argument or authority is not effective to raise a point on appeal. Id. Even if we were to
consider the argument properly raised and developed, under the circumstances presented in
this case, we cannot say that the circuit court clearly erred in terminating Jason’s parental
rights for the reasons already set out herein.
Affirmed.
TUCKER and WOOD, JJ., agree.
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Elizabeth James, Arkansas Commission for Parent Counsel, for separate appellant June
Merryman.
Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for separate appellant
Jason West.
Ellen K. Howard, Ark. Dep’t of Human Services Office of Chief Counsel, for appellee.
Linda J. Hamilton, attorney ad litem for minor children.
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