TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00740-CV
Alexandria Hollowell, Appellant
v.
Lori Dominguez, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. C-1-CV-24-004371, THE HONORABLE ERIC SHEPPERD, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The county court at law (county court) ordered Alexandria Hollowell to pay Lori
Dominguez $7,165 in unpaid rent. Hollowell contends that the county court (1) erred in
proceeding based on improper service and falsified documents, (2) was influenced by retaliatory
conduct, (3) failed to recognize a domestic violence and stalking victim’s lease-termination
rights, (4) lacked jurisdiction over the property after Hollowell vacated the premises, (5)
improperly disregarded Hollowell’s pending bankruptcy that nullified the lease, (6) failed to
address discrimination against Hollowell’s ADA-protected service animal, (7) improperly failed
to transfer key exhibits, and (8) awarded an improperly inflated judgment amount. Largely
because we must presume that the evidence introduced at the county court’s trial supported the
judgment, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
The clerk’s record contains documents outlining the progress of this case from
justice court to county court that provide context for our assessment of the case. Hollowell
stated that no reporter’s record was requested.
Hollowell was the only tenant listed in the lease of a house from Dominguez.
Hollowell agreed to pay $1,950 monthly from May 8, 2023 to April 30, 2025. The lease outlined
Hollowell’s statutory right to terminate the lease early by providing Dominguez documentation
that Hollowell needed protection from family violence or stalking. See Tex. Prop. Code
§§ 92.016, .0161.
On June 25, 2024, Dominguez filed her eviction suit seeking possession of the
residence and unpaid rent for April, May, and June 2024 totaling $5,900. The clerk’s record
indicates challenges with service of citation, but the justice court’s judgment states that both
parties appeared at the trial. In its judgment for Dominguez, the justice court found that monthly
rent was $1,950, that Dominguez was entitled to possession of the premises, and that Hollowell
owed Dominguez $6,271 in unpaid rent. Hollowell also attached a motion to extend the
automatic stay in bankruptcy court dated July 25, 2024; no order from the bankruptcy court in
the record shows how the court ruled. Hollowell undisputedly moved out on or before July 30,
2024. Hollowell appealed the justice court’s judgment.
On October 15, 2024, the county court held a trial de novo at which both parties
appeared. In its October 21, 2024 final judgment, the court awarded Dominguez $7,165 in
unpaid rent.
Hollowell attached several documents to the “Answer/Appeal Reasons” filed
November 8, 2024—weeks after the date of the county court’s final judgment:
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• A document indicating that Hollowell’s Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition was discharged
March 31, 2024.
• A Notice to Pay or Quit from Dominguez dated May 16, 2024, requesting that
Hollowell pay $3,900 in unpaid rent for April and May 2024 or vacate the premises
by June 15, 2024.
• A letter dated July 16, 2024, from a victim counselor at the Travis County District
Attorney’s Office confirming that Hollowell had endured domestic violence that was
part of a 2022 prosecution and that Hollowell was taking protective steps needed for
safety, including seeking a new residence; the record is unclear when this document
was brought to a court’s attention.
This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Because Hollowell did not request and the reporter did not prepare a record of the
county court’s trial de novo, this cause is submitted on the clerk’s record only. When there is no
reporter’s record, we indulge every presumption in favor of the trial court’s findings. Bryant
v. United Shortline Inc. Assurance Servs., N.A., 972 S.W.2d 26, 31 (Tex. 1998); see also Allen
v. Wells Branch Self Storage, No. 03-14-00670-CV, 2015 WL 5096713, at *1 n.3 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 25, 2015, pet. dism’d) (without a reporter’s record, “we must presume that the trial
court heard sufficient evidence to support any fact findings that were necessary to support
its judgment”).
Hollowell challenges the county court’s power to hear the case because of
improper service and a falsified document relating to service. But Hollowell waived complaints
about improper service by filing a statement of inability to pay at the county court and appearing
at the trials in both courts. Baker v. Monsanto Co., 111 S.W.3d 158, 161 (Tex. 2003) (“general
appearance” in suit waives any defect in manner of service); see also Redmond v. Kovar,
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No. 09-17-00099-CV, 2018 WL 651272, at *4 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (by
appearing personally for trial before both justice court and county court at law, defendant waived
any complaint as to defective service). Hollowell’s complaints that a document—including an
Officer’s Request for Alternative Service Under Rule 510.4(c)—was falsified and undermined
service go to the propriety of service and, thus, were waived by Hollowell’s appearance at both
the justice court and the county court.
Hollowell claims the court lacked jurisdiction over the property at the time of the
October 2024 judgment after Hollowell vacated the premises in July 2024. But “[a]n eviction
suit does not bar a suit for trespass, damages, waste, rent, or mesne profits.” Tex. Prop. Code
§ 24.008. Hollowell’s challenge to the money judgment maintained the county court’s
jurisdiction despite the mootness of the possession issue. See Daftary v. Prestonwood Mkt.
Square, Ltd., 399 S.W.3d 708, 711 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (“While the issue of
possession became moot when the [tenants] vacated the property, the entire case was not moot
because [the landlord]’s claims for damages and attorney’s fees continued to present live
controversies.”). The mootness of the possession issue did not affect the court’s jurisdiction over
the claim for back rent.
Hollowell asserts that the county court improperly failed to transfer key exhibits
from the justice court. Errors by the county court must be preserved by presenting the complaint
to the county court and obtaining a ruling. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). Hollowell does not cite
where in the record this complaint was presented to the county court or a ruling was made.
Further, to merit reversal, errors must probably cause the rendition of an improper judgment or
prevent the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals. See id. 44.1(a).
Hollowell’s bare claim that the “court’s reliance on an incomplete record significantly prejudices
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Appellant’s case” does not show what exhibits were not transferred and how that impaired the
defense. Moreover, the trial at the county court is a trial de novo independent of the justice-court
trial, so it is not apparent how the failure to transfer any exhibit from the trial court had any
bearing on the conduct of the trial at the county court. See Zhao v. Sea Rock Inc., 659 S.W.3d
119, 123 n.4 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2022, pet. denied) (“An appeal from justice court to county
court vacates the justice court’s judgment, and the county court must try the matter ‘de novo,’ or
in other words, the county court must hold a ‘new trial in which the entire case is presented as if
there had been no previous trial.’ See Tex. R. Civ. P. 506.3”). A trial de novo is generally
defined as a new trial on the entire case, on both questions of fact and issues of law. See id.
Finally, Hollowell did not request a reporter’s record, so we have no exhibits from the county
court’s record. See generally Tex. R. App. P. 34.6(g). Hollowell had the opportunity at the trial
de novo at the county court to offer any necessary exhibits but has not shown that any failure to
transfer an exhibit from the justice court was harmful.
Hollowell argues that the judgment was influenced by retaliation, contending that
Dominguez’s actions were in response to and disregarded Hollowell’s right as a victim of family
violence and stalking to terminate the lease early. See Tex. Prop. Code §§ 92.016 (family
violence), .0161 (stalking). But Dominguez sent notice of late rent in May 2024 and started the
eviction proceedings in June 2024, while the earliest notice in the record of Hollowell’s domestic
violence history is the July 16, 2024 letter from the DA’s office addressed “To Whom it May
Concern.” The record does not show whether or when Dominguez received that letter and
information. The letter was written after she began the eviction proceedings on the day of the
justice-court hearing. No response or retaliatory conduct is apparent on the face of the record.
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Hollowell’s complaint that the court failed to address discrimination against
Hollowell’s Americans with Disabilities Act-protected service animal focuses on an assertion
that Dominguez posted the Notice to Pay or Quit on the outside of Hollowell’s front door rather
than the inside because Hollowell had a dog in the house; Hollowell claims the dog is a service
dog, but Dominguez argues that Hollowell had not provided documents supporting that claim.
Relevant to the back-rent claim, Hollowell does not assert non-receipt of the Notice to Pay or
Quit—rather, Hollowell acknowledged receiving it by including it as an exhibit to the
“Answer/Appeal Reasons.” Hollowell appeared at the justice court and the county court to
defend against the claim. Hollowell does not show that this notice complaint was presented to
the county court unsuccessfully or explain how any flaw in the placement of the notice affected
the judgment or the ability to pursue this appeal. Regardless of any ADA-based claim,
Hollowell has not shown preservation of the asserted error with respect to necessary notice in
this case. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1, 44.1.
Hollowell contends that the court improperly disregarded the pending bankruptcy
action’s nullification of the lease. But the record does not show nullification of the lease. A
bankruptcy discharge under section 727 as here “discharges the debtor from all debts that arose
before the date of the order for relief[.]” 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). The discharge notice in the clerk’s
record is dated March 29, 2024, and filed March 31, 2024. Dominguez requested unpaid rent
beginning in April 2024. The record does not show that the March 2024 discharge affected
Hollowell’s subsequent obligations to pay rent for months during which Hollowell occupied
the premises.
Hollowell complains that the court awarded an improperly inflated judgment
amount of back rent. Hollowell contends that Dominguez arbitrarily increased the judgment
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amount from $6,271 (awarded by the justice court) to $7,165 (awarded by the county court).
However, the differing judgment amounts were court judgments—not Dominguez’s actions—
and the county court’s judgment followed a trial de novo at which it was not bound by the justice
court’s award. See Zhao, 659 S.W.3d at 123 n.4 (appeal from justice court vacates justice
court’s judgment and county court tries matter as if there had been no previous trial). The
absence of the reporter’s record at the county court requires that we presume that the record
supported the county court’s findings and judgment on the issue of the amount of rent unpaid and
due. 1 See Curry, 472 S.W.3d at 349–50.
CONCLUSION
We overrule all of Hollowell’s issues and affirm the judgment.
Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Kelly and Ellis
Affirmed
Filed: September 18, 2026
1 Dominguez’s argument in her brief shows how the trial court may have calculated the rent award larger than that awarded by the justice court. She explains that four months (April through July) of rent ($7,800), minus an amount donated ($325) and a deduction for a four-day water outage ($260), yields a total of $7,215. The award of $7,165 was slightly less than that amount.
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