UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
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JANE DOE, )
)
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Plaintiff, )
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V. ) Civil Case No. 25-2978 (RJL)
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JOHN ROE, etal., )
)
Defendants. )
- - - -- - -- -~ )
V\..
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(September d.:..\, 2026) [Dkt. #13]
Jane Doe ("plaintiff' or "Jane") alleges that fellow Catholic University of America
student John Roe ("John") sexually assaulted her in October 2024. See Am. Compl. [Dkt.
#11]. Jane brings assault and battery claims against John and, separately, asserts four
claims against defendant Catholic University of America ("the University") arising from
the University's alleged handling of the assault. Id. Specifically, she asserts two claims
under Title IX for pre-assault deliberate indifference (Count I) and post-assault deliberate
indifference (Count II), as well as tort claims for gross negligence (Count III) and
negligence per se (Count IV).
The University now moves under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) to
dismiss the four claims for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Def.'s Mot.") [Dkt. #13]. Accepting Jane's well-pleaded factual
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allegations as true, I find that the Amended Complaint plausibly states a Title IX claim
based on the University's alleged post-assault deliberate indifference. Her allegations,
however, do not state viable claims for pre-assault deliberate indifference, gross
negligence, or negligence per se. Accordingly, I will GRANT the University's motion to
dismiss Counts I, III, and IV and DENY the motion as to Count II.
BACKGROUND
I. Alleged Assault
Jane Doe was a freshman at the Catholic University of America in fall 2024. Am.
Compl. ,r 1. She met defendant John Roe, another freshman student and a member of the
football team, when John reached out via social media to invite her to a party. Id. ,r 19. On
October 18, 2024, Jane consumed several alcoholic drinks in her dorm room and then met
John at the "rugby house" around 11 :00 PM. Id. ,r 20. John and Jane had several additional
drinks before John escorted Jane to his dorm room. Id. ,r 21. Jane claims that once she
entered John's dorm room, John kissed her without consent. Id. ,r 23. John then allegedly
pinned Jane down on his bed, strangled her, and removed her clothes. Id. ,r 25. Jane claims
she "was unable to breathe, move, speak, or swallow," and that John raped and sodomized
her. 1 Id. ,r,r 25-26. John asked Jane to stay the night, which she declined. Id. ,r 27.
Jane then walked back to her dormitory and told six people about the assault: her
friends Oceane Regis and Rosary Tambunan, her sister and mother, her resident advisor
1
John, the other defendant in this case, refutes these facts. See Answer [Dkt. #17]. However, "[i]n evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, [we] must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged." KLEO AG v. Rivada Networks, Inc., 148 F.4th 741, 745 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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and community director. Id. ,r 28. Jane also blocked John on social media after he
messaged her asking, "Are you good?" Id. ,r 30. On October 20, 2024, she underwent an
examination by a sexual assault nurse examiner ("SANE"). Id. ,r 31.
II. Initial Response, Investigation, and Hearing
On October 20, 2024, the University issued a "no-contact" order, prohibiting John
from engaging with Jane. See Ex. B to Def.' s Mot., Title IX Decision on Appeal ("Appeals
Decision") [Dkt. #13-3] at 6 n.3. On October 25, 2024, Jane filed a formal complaint
against John. See Ex. A to Def.'s Mot., Title IX Hr'g Board's Determination of
Responsibility Mem. ("Determination Mem.") [Dkt. #13-2] at 2. On the same day, the
University notified John of the complaint and initiated the investigation process. Id. The
University interviewed witnesses and examined messages, photographs, and medical
records. Id. Jane and John also submitted expert witness reports, and Jane submitted letters
from University instructors, her mother, and her sister attesting to her character. Id.
The University held a Title IX hearing on February 24, 2025. Determination Mem.
at 2. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Hearing Board found John responsible for sexual
assault and recommended expulsion. Id. In reaching its decision, the Hearing Board
referred to photos taken by Jane's mother which showed significant bruising on Jane's
neck. Id. at 4. The Hearing Board noted that "[a]t the time of the hearing, the rape kit
results [from the SANE exam] were not available for review," but that the photographs and
medical records effectively served as "compelling evidence that a traumatic event resulting
in physical injury had occurred on the morning of October 19, 2024." Id. The Hearing
Board also found Jane's "immediate" outcry testimony to numerous witnesses to be "the
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most influential evidence in this case." Id.
The Hearing Board did not find John' s testimony to be credible. See Determination
Mem. at 5. The Board questioned his account of the events and his claim that Jane did not
have any bruising on her neck when she left. Id. The Hearing Board also "drew a negative
inference" from the fact that John's father did not submit a character reference on his son's
behalf. Id.
III. Appeal of Hearing Board's Decision
John appealed the Hearing Board's decision. See Appeals Decision at 2. Lawrence
Morris ("Morris"), the University' s Chief of Staff, considered the appeal pursuant to the
University's Title IX Grievance Procedures. Id.; see also Ex. D to Def.'s Mot., Title IX
Grievance Procedures ("Grievance Procedures") [Dkt. #13-5] at 14-15. There are three
bases under which the Chief of Staff may overturn a Hearing Board decision: (1) a finding
of"procedural irregularity that affected the outcome of the matter;" (2) "new evidence that
was not reasonably available at the time the determination regarding responsibility or
dismissal was made, that could affect the outcome of the matter;" and (3) "[e]vidence
showing a Title IX Coordinator, investigator, or decision-maker had a conflict of interest
or bias." Title IX Grievance Procedures at 14. John appealed on all three grounds. See
Appeals Decision at 1.
Morris granted John's appeal, finding both new evidence and a procedural
irregularity affected the outcome of the matter. Id. Regarding the new evidence, Morris
noted that Jane had sexual intercourse with an abusive ex-boyfriend several days before
the alleged attack, which "calls into question" that Jane's injuries were caused by John. Id.
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at 3. Morris also cited new medical evidence from the SANE exam, and evidence of Jane's
"false testimony" during the original Hearing Board. Id. at 3-5. Morris pointed to
statements from Jane's friends Rosary Tambunan, Celeste Hurtado, and "E.B.," that
suggested Jane's recollections of the assault were inconsistent. Id. at 5. According to
Morris, this evidence was not "reasonably available" to John during the investigation
because John "had no reasonable expectation" that Jane's friends "had exculpatory
information or that they would share" the information with him. Id. at 6.
Regarding the procedural irregularity, Morris took issue with the Hearing Board's
decision to draw a "negative inference from the absence of a character reference from
[John's] father." Appeals Decision at 6. Morris explained that character witnesses are
permitted but not required, and that John's father would have provided a character
reference "but for his attorney's advice." Id. at 7. Morris described the negative inference
as a "procedural irregularity that was of such weight to have affected the outcome of the
matter." Id.
Morris issued his decision on March 24, 2025. Appeals Decision at 1. He elected
to return the case to a "new Hearing Board to consider evidence and responsibility," and
referred the case "to the Dean of Students for additional proceedings consistent with this
opinion." Id. at 11. On March 25, 2025, Jane withdrew from the University and declined
to participate in further Title IX proceedings. See Ex. E to Def.'s Mot., Withdrawal
Acknowledgement Letter [Dkt. #13-6] at 1.
IV. Current Suit
Jane filed this action against John Roe and the University on September 2, 2025.
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See Comp 1. [Dkt. # 1]. Jane later moved for leave to correct her complaint, the Court
granted that request, see Min. Order (Oct. 15, 2025), and Jane filed the operative Amended
Complaint, see Am. Compl. Against the University, Jane alleges two claims under Title
IX for "pre-assault deliberate indifference" (Count I) and "post-assault deliberate
indifference" (Count II), as well as District of Columbia claims for gross negligence (Count
111) and negligence per se (Count IV). See Am. Compl. ,r,r 68-69, 70-72, 73-74, 75-76.
The University moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the four claims for failure to state a
claim. See Def.' s Mot. Jane opposes the motion, which is now ripe for review. See Pl.' s
Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss ("Pl.'s Opp'n") [Dkt. #16].
LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must "state a claim
upon which relief can be granted." Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 552 (2007).
Although "detailed factual allegations" are not necessary to withstand a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, id. at 555, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, [if] accepted as true,
to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,"' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Though a plaintiff may survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion even if '"recovery is very remote and unlikely,"' the facts alleged in the complaint
"must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555-56.
ANALYSIS
I. Title IX Claims
"Title IX seeks to eliminate sex-based discrimination in education programs that
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receive federal funds." Doe v. Columbia, 151 F.4th 435,445 (D.C. Cir. 2025). The statute
provides that, "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex ... be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 168 l(a). An individual may enforce
this provision against federally funded universities. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281 (1998). While a university is generally not liable for torts
committed by students, "in certain limited circumstances," a university may be held liable
for its own deliberate indifference to known acts of sexual harassment committed by one
student against another. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. ofEduc., 526 U.S.
629, 643 (1999).
a. Pre-Assault Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiff claims the University is liable for "pre-assault deliberate indifference"
because it "had actual knowledge prior to Plaintiffs rape that its policies and procedures,
as implemented, made female students vulnerable to on-campus rapes," particularly by
older male athletes. Am. Compl. ,r 69. Unfortunately, plaintiff does not meet Title IX's
demanding "actual knowledge" threshold for a pre-assault deliberate indifference claim.
Pre-assault deliberate indifference claims are cognizable under Title IX, but only in
limited circumstances. See, e.g., Raihan v. George Washington Univ., 324 F. Supp. 3d
102, 109 (D.D.C. 2018). The plaintiff must plausibly allege that an appropriate university
official had "actual knowledge" of a concrete risk of sexual harassment in a setting under
the university's control and responded with deliberate indifference. See Gebser, 524 U.S.
at 290.
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While our Circuit has not addressed the circumstances under which a university's
"pre-assault" conduct may satisfy Title IX's actual knowledge requirement, two prominent
out-of-circuit decisions illustrate the notice required to state such a claim. In Simpson v.
University of Colorado Boulder and Williams v. Board of Regents of University System of
Georgia, the alleged risks were highly specific and known to responsible university
officials before the plaintiffs' assaults. In Simpson, the university allegedly knew that
sexual assaults had occurred in connection with its football-recruiting program, where
female students were encouraged to show recruits a "good time," and nevertheless
continued that defined program without meaningful safeguards. Simpson, 500 F.3d 1170,
1184-85 (10th Cir. 2007). In Williams, officials allegedly admitted and housed a student
athlete despite knowing of his serious prior sexual misconduct at other schools, thereby
disregarding a known risk posed by an identified student. Williams, 477 F.3d 1282, 1295
(11th Cir. 2007). Together, these cases establish that "actual knowledge" may be plausibly
alleged where an institution is on notice of recurring sexual misconduct within a specific
program, or of a particular student's known propensity for such misconduct.
The only decision in this district to consider a pre-assault deliberate indifference
claim marks the other side of that line. In Raihan v. George Washington University, the
plaintiff alleged that the University failed to implement sexual assault reforms that it had
adopted following a federal investigation. 324 F. Supp. 3d at 111. The court concluded
that such allegations of institutional shortcomings did not establish actual knowledge. Id.
at 110. In other words, broad notice of campus sexual assault and alleged failures in
response systems do not, without more, establish that a university actually knew of a risk
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that would make a student vulnerable to assault.
Here, plaintiffs allegations are more analogous to those found in Raihan than to the
particularized allegations at issue in Simpson and Williams. Plaintiff does not allege that
the University knew John had a history of sexual misconduct, see Williams, 477 F. 3d at
1294, or identify a discrete University program analogous to the recruiting program in
Simpson that had several known prior assaults in the same setting, Simpson, 500 F.3d at
1181. Instead, plaintiff alleges generally that the University "suffers from a pattern and
practice of older male athletes raping female freshmen students too intoxicated to consent
to sex after alcohol-fueled parties on University property." Am. Compl. ,r 69. That allegation is insufficient to plausibly establish actual knowledge. 2
b. Post-Assault Deliberate Indifference
Plaintiffs second Title IX claim concerns the University's response to the alleged
assault, and, in particular, Chief of Staff Lawrence Morris's decision to vacate the Hearing
Board's decision. Plaintiff alleges that Morris displaced the Hearing Board's credibility
and responsibility determinations by arbitrarily crediting unreliable material. See Am.
Compl. ,r,r 71-72; Pl.'s Opp'n at 8. At this stage, I find that these allegations plausibly
state a claim that the University responded to known sexual harassment with deliberate
indifference.
2 Plaintiff refers to two previous sexual assaults involving Catholic University: Latham v. Catholic Univ., No. 1 :08-cv-1852 (D.D.C.), and Cavalier v. Catholic Univ., No. l:16-cv-2009 (D.D.C.). See Pl.'s Opp'n at 4-5. Those references, however, do not support an inference that the University had notice of the particular risk alleged here. Plaintiff does not allege that either matter involved John, the "rugby house," the same University personnel, or a continuing practice that created the risk Jane faced in October 2024. Two incidents do not plausibly establish that the University had actual knowledge that John, or an identifiable University practice, posed a risk to plaintiff.
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Generally, "[i]t is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school
administrators which the court may view as lacking in wisdom or compassion." Doe v.
Am. Univ. , 2020 WL 5593909, at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2020) (quoting Plummer v. Univ.
ofHous., 860 F.3d 767, 772 (5th Cir. 2017)). However, courts may find that an institution
acted with deliberate indifference when its response to an incident is clearly unreasonable
under the circumstances. See, e.g., Cavalier v. Catholic Univ. ofAm., 513 F. Supp. 3d 30,
51 (D.D.C. 2021 ).
Plaintiff plausibly claims that much of the material Morris characterized as "new"
predated the February 2025 hearing and was available to John, including evidence
concerning plaintiffs prior relationship, possible alternative causes of her injuries, the
SANE examination, and asserted inconsistencies in her account. See Am. Compl. ,r 42;
Pl. 's Opp'n at 11. Whether that evidence was genuinely unavailable cannot be resolved
against plaintiff at the pleading stage. Indeed, if it was not genuinely new, Morris's ruling
could be understood as allowing John a "second bite at the apple" after an adverse finding.
Pl.'s Opp'n at 9.
Plaintiff also plausibly alleges that Morris drew unsupported adverse credibility
inferences from that evidence. Morris relied in part on plaintiffs prior sexual relationship
and allegations of past abuse by another partner as alternative explanations for her injuries.
Appeals Decision at 2-3. Yet the Amended Complaint alleges that the Hearing Board
considered photographs of bruising on plaintiffs neck taken immediately after the incident,
contemporaneous medical records, and testimony from outcry witnesses, and that Morris
identified no evidence connecting the purported prior events to the particular injuries
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documented after the alleged assault. Am. Compl. ,r 40; Determination Mem. at 4. Taken
as true, those allegations support an inference that Morris ·used speculative material to
overturn the Board's credibility determinations.
The alleged procedural irregularity provides further support for plaintiffs claim.
Morris concluded that the initial Board's adverse inference from the absence of a character
reference from John's father may have affected the result. Appeals Decision at 6-7.
Plaintiff alleges, however, that character evidence was optional and that John chose not to
submit his father's statement on advice of counsel. Am. Comp 1. ,r 51. She further alleges
that Morris treated this discrete issue as sufficient to vacate a decision otheiwise grounded
in physical evidence, medical documentation, and the Board's credibility findings. Id. ,i 6.
I need not decide whether Morris correctly assessed that issue. It is enough that plaintiff
plausibly alleges Morris' treatment was disproportionate and selectively favorable to John.
Taken together, the allegations describe more than mere dissatisfaction with the
outcome of a campus proceeding. Plaintiff alleges that a senior University official set aside
a completed responsibility finding based on purportedly new evidence that may have been
previously obtainable; used speculative material to undermine her credibility; and required
her to undergo another contested hearing after the University had initially credited her
account and expelled John. 3 A reasonable factfinder could conclude that this process was
3 The University correctly notes that Morris did not exonerate John, but instead ordered a new hearing. See Appeals Decision at 11. That fact may ultimately weigh in the University's favor. It is not, however, dispositive at this stage. Plaintiff alleges that the ruling vacated John's expulsion, permitted him to remain on campus, and placed her in the position of either returning to a campus where her alleged assailant remained or participating in a second adversarial hearing to obtain relief. See Pl. ' s Opp'n at 11 . She withdrew from the University the following day and declined to continue in the Title IX process. Id. These allegations plausibly establish a connection between the appeal decision and her asserted loss of equal access to educational opportunities.
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arbitrary and one sided.
Plaintiff must ultimately prove that Morris's decision was "clearly unreasonable,"
and that it caused her educational harm. Raihan, 324 F. Supp. 3d at 112. That showing
may be difficult, particularly given the University's no-contact order, investigation, and
initial expulsion of John. See Determination Mem. at 2. But those issues require a
developed factual record. At the motion to dismiss phase, "the court's responsibility is
limited to deciding whether the complaint contains any factual allegations sufficient to
support the reasonable inference that the [University] is liable for the misconduct alleged."
Doe 1 v. Howard Univ., 396 F. Supp. 3d 126, 136 (D.D.C. 2019) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support a finding that the
University's reversal of John's expulsion was clearly unreasonable.
II. Gross Negligence
Plaintiff next claims that the University created a dangerous campus environment
and failed to take reasonable steps to protect female students from sexual assault by
University athletes. Am. Compl. ,r 74. Plaintiff alleges that the University owed her a duty
to provide safe premises, and that this duty arises from both an asserted "special
relationship" between the University and its students and the doctrines of res ipsa loquitur
and in loco parentis. Id. However, neither theory states a viable claim for gross negligence.
To establish negligence under D.C. law, "a plaintiff must prove a duty of care owed
by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty by the defendant, and damage to the
interests of the plaintiff, proximately caused by the breach." Sigmund v. Starwood Urb.
Retail VI, LLC, 617 F.3d 512, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Gross negligence, in tum, requires,
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"an extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care as to support a finding of wanton,
willful and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the rights and safety of others."
Atkinson v. D.C., 281 A.3d 568, 571 (D.C. 2022). "[T]he question of whether a defendant
owes a duty to a plaintiff under a particular set of circumstances is entirely a question of
law that must be determined only by the court." Tofu v. Ayodeji, 945 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.
2008).
Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the University owed a tort duty independent
of its contractual relationship with plaintiff as a student. Under D.C. law, "the relationship
between a university and its students is contractual in nature," Chenari v. George
Washington Univ., 172 F. Supp. 3d 38, 47 (D.D.C. 2016), and a tort claim between
contracting parties "must stand as a tort even if the contractual relationship did not exist,"
Bloom v. PNC Bank, NA., 659 F. Supp. 3d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2023). The asserted duties,
namely "to properly warn, train, and educate University students and staff how to avoid
sexual assault, and if necessary, to fairly resolve sexual assault complaints," Am. Compl.
,r 74, arise from the services the University provides to its students. Plaintiff identifies no separate common law duty to protect her from John's alleged criminal conduct.
Nor do the allegations establish a "special relationship" that would give rise to such
a duty. See Sibley v. St. Albans School, 134 A.3d 789, 798 (D.C. 2016) (noting that "[t]he
relationship between a student and his school ... is not enough, without more, to impose
the predicate duty of care" for a negligence claim). The University does not owe a blanket
duty of care to adult students merely because it operates residence halls, provides security
and safety policies, or maintains Title IX procedures. Plaintiff does not allege that the
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University knew John had committed prior misconduct or had notice of an immediate risk
on the night of the alleged assault. Cf Cavalier v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 306 F. Supp. 3d 9,
40 (D.D.C. 2018) (concluding that a special relationship could arise where the university
affirmatively undertook to protect a student by repeatedly assuring her that a no-contact
order was in place and that it would enforce the order upon notice of violations). The
generalized allegation of misconduct by older male athletes at parties does not establish the
presence of any "special relationship."
Neither res ipsa loquitur nor in loco parentis supplies the missing duty. "Res ipsa
loquitur permits a jury to infer negligence from the mere occurrence of the accident," and
may only be invoked if the undisputed facts establish: "( 1) the accident is of a kind that
ordinarily does not occur without negligence; (2) the instrumentality causing the injury was
within the defendant's exclusive control; and (3) the plaintiff did not contribute to or cause
the accident." Nixon v. Ippolito, 320 A.3d 1059, 1070 (D.C. 2024). That doctrine does not
apply here: the alleged assault was committed by John, a third party whose conduct was
not within the University's exclusive control, and the mere occurrence of the alleged
assault does not, without more, support an inference of negligence by the University. Nor
does the University's enrollment of students, or its receipt of tuition, place it in loco
parentis with plaintiff. Plaintiff identifies no authority from our Circuit recognizing an in
loco parentis relationship between a university and its students, and courts elsewhere have
rejected the premise that a college's provision of housing gives rise to such a relationship.
See, e.g., McCauley v. Univ. of the V.I, 618 F .3d 232, 245 (3rd Cir. 2010) ("The idea that
public universities exercise strict control over students via an in loco parentis relationship
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has decayed to the point of irrelevance.").
III. Negligence Per Se
Plaintiffs final claim alleges negligence per se based on the University's purported
violation of D.C. Code § 25-781. Am. Comp I. ,r 76. That provision prohibits the "sale or
delivery of alcoholic beverages" to a "person under 21 years of age" or "[a]n intoxicated
person." D.C. Code §§ 25-781(a)(l), (a)(2). Because plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
that the University violated that statute, I will dismiss Count IV.
"Under District of Columbia law, the [v]iolation of a statute or regulation may
constitute negligence per se only ( 1) if the statute is meant to promote safety; (2) if the
plaintiff is a member of the class to be protected by the statute; and (3) if the defendant is
a person upon whom the statute imposes specific duties." Goodwin v. D.C., 579 F. Supp.
3d 159, 175 (D.D.C. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even assuming that
plaintiff satisfies the first two requirements because she was underage and the statute was
enacted to protect persons in her position, she has not plausibly alleged that the University
is among the persons of whom the statute imposes specific duties. See, e.g., Night & Day
Mgmt., LLC v. Butler, 101 A.3d 1033, 1040 (D.C. 2014) (finding a nightclub could
potentially be held liable under D.C. Code§ 25-781); Doe v. De Amigos, LLC, 2014 WL
12785495, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan. 23, 2014) (same).
Moreover, plaintiff does not allege that any University employee or agent sold or
delivered alcohol. Jane consumed alcohol in her own room, and then she and John
consumed alcohol together at the rugby house and later in his dorm room. Am. Compl. ,r,r
18, 20-22. Those allegations identify John, not the University, as the person who supplied
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alcohol to Jane. Plaintiffs assertion that the University controlled the premises does not
establish a statutory violation. D.C. Code§ 25-781 prohibits the sale or delivery of alcohol;
it does not impose on every property owner a statutory duty to prevent all underage
drinking by students on its property. Plaintiff does not allege that the University operated
or hosted the gathering, authorized alcohol service, or knowingly permitted John to
provide alcohol to Jane while she was underage or visibly intoxicated. 4 Accordingly,
plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that the University violated D.C. Code§ 25-781, and I
will grant the University's motion to dismiss Count IV.
CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's Motion
to Dismiss [Dkt. #13] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. An
accompanying Order will issue contemporaneously with this opinion.
R�J.LEON
United States District Judge
4 The cases plaintiff cites concerning a property owner's common law obligation to take reasonable precautions against foreseeable third party misconduct do not alter this conclusion. See Doe v. Dominion Bank, 963 F.2d 1552, 1559 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the duties of a commercial landlord); Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartment Corp., 439 F.2d 477,481 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (same). Those common law premises liability principles do not establish that the University violated a duty specifically imposed by D.C. Code § 25-781. A generalized duty to take reasonable precautions on one's property does not transform the University into the "seller" or "deliverer" of alcohol for purposes of that statute.
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