UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
AYLIN POLAT et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil Action No. 26-2555 (TJK)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM
Plaintiffs are 42 individuals who have Diversity Visa (“DV”) applications pending before
the Department of State (“DOS”) or the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services
(“USCIS”)—including 34 “consular” selectees living abroad and five “adjustment” selectees present in the United States. ECF No. 15 (“Am. Compl.”); see ECF No. 16. Last year, after a DV
recipient allegedly committed a mass shooting at Brown University, the agencies indefinitely
paused processing DV applications and adjustments, which the Court refers to as the “DV pauses.”
See Ivanov v. Trump, No. 26-cv-915 (RJL), 2026 WL 2494805, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 25, 2026); see
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 55, 70.
In July 2026, Plaintiffs—whose applications were subject to the DV pauses—sued the
agencies and now move for a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. ECF Nos. 1,
20. They argue the DV pauses are unlawful and request, among other things, an order directing
Defendants to process their pending DV applications by September 25—five days before the looming fiscal-year-end deadline. ECF No. 20 at 3. Thus, time is of the essence for Plaintiffs—as
“a[ny] selectee who does not receive a visa by September 30 loses eligibility for that fiscal year.”
Ivanov, 2026 WL 2494805, at *3. But Plaintiffs are members of subclasses certified by another court that recently vacated the DV pauses and ordered Defendants to expeditiously process DV
applications before the end of the fiscal year. See Medani v. Trump, No. 26-cv-6332, 2026 WL
2547287 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2026). Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ motion for injunctive relief,
arguing that Plaintiffs must present their claims “through the certified class action to the court that
entered the governing injunction.” ECF No. 21 at 19. The Court agrees, so it will deny the motion
and dismiss the case.
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right,” but only
“upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
555 U.S. 7, 22, 24 (2008). To obtain a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, a
plaintiff must show “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an
injunction is in the public interest.” Id. at 20; see also Dellinger v. Bessent, No. 25-5028, 2025
WL 559669, at *3 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 15, 2025) (noting that “[t]he standard for obtaining either a TRO
or a preliminary injunction is identical”). Plaintiffs’ motion falters at the first factor. Because they
are members of subclasses certified in Medani, Plaintiffs cannot succeed on the merits of their
claims here.
To repeat, Plaintiffs challenge Defendants’ DV pauses which have indefinitely paused final
adjudication of their DV applications—DOS’s DV Pause affecting the 34 consular plaintiffs and
USCIS’s policy memorandum, PM-602-0193, affecting the five adjustment plaintiffs. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 54–71; ECF No. 20 at 3. But last month, the Medani court temporarily vacated the DV
pauses and ordered DOS and USCIS “to the extent practicable and in good faith, to take all reasonable steps during the remainder of the . . . fiscal year to reconsider applications refused solely
under the [DV pauses]” and to “resume ordinary adjudication of pending applications.” Medani,
2
2026 WL 2547287, at *13. That relief was not limited to the plaintiffs in that suit. Rather, the
court certified three subclasses under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), including “all selectees and derivative beneficiaries under the FY-2026 Diversity Visa Program who are subject
to” the DV pauses. Id. at *5.
Plaintiffs do not dispute that they are members of these subclasses. See ECF No. 20 at 17.
Nonetheless, they ask the Court to grant them separate, particularized relief, including an order (1)
enjoining Defendants from applying the DV pauses to Plaintiffs’ applications specifically; (2)
compelling final action on each Plaintiff’s application by September 25, 2026; and (3) and directing Defendants, “within 24 hours, to transmit the order to every component responsible for a listed
case and, within 48 hours, to file a plaintiff-by-plaintiff status report identifying the responsible
component, completed steps, outstanding lawful requirements, and next action.” Id. at 3.
At the outset, the Court notes that other courts in this district have uniformly denied similar
requests from Medani class members seeking emergency, plaintiff-specific relief. See Ugrenyuk
v. Rubio, 26-cv-03181 (APM), 2026 WL 2836682, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 22, 2026); Gadasi v. Rubio,
No. 26-cv-2549 (CRC), 2026 WL 2754355, at *3 (D.D.C. Sept. 17, 2026); Khimich v. Rubio, No.
26-cv-3046 (RBW), ECF No. 12 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2026). In each case, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed the action. The same result is warranted
here.
To begin, the Court joins others in concluding that the first-to-file rule bars Plaintiffs from
succeeding on the merits. See Gadasi, 2026 WL 2754355, at *3; Ugrenyuk, 2026 WL 2836682,
at *1. “Under [that] rule, ‘where two cases between the same parties on the same cause of action
are commenced in two different Federal courts, the one which is commenced first is to be allowed
to proceed to its conclusion first’” except in “rare case[s] where the equities demand giving the
3
second-filed action priority.” Gadasi, 2026 WL 2754355, at *3 (quoting UtahAmerican Energy,
Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., 685 F.3d 1118, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The rule applies here. Medani was
filed a month before this case; Plaintiffs are members of Medani’s subclasses; DOS and USCIS
officials are defendants in both actions; and Plaintiffs’ APA claims largely overlap with those
asserted in Medani. Compare Am. Compl. ¶¶ 163–168, 174–200, with Medani, 2026 WL
2547287, at *3; see also Gadasi, 2026 WL 2754355, at *3 n.1 (summarizing the claims asserted
in Medani). Thus, “binding legal principles prevent the court from granting the individualized
relief sought here.” Ugrenyuk, 2026 WL 2836682, at *2.
Plaintiffs argue that Medani does not foreclose particularized relief for two reasons, but
neither are persuasive. First, they assert that Defendants have not demonstrated that they are adequately processing or re-processing their DV applications in compliance with Medani. ECF No.
20 at 17. But other courts in this District have rejected this argument. In Gadasi, for instance, the
plaintiffs argued “that the relief awarded in Medani has proven inadequate, pointing especially to
the Government’s slow initial compliance.” 2026 WL 2754355, at *4. “Even if true,” the court
said, the proper “recourse is to seek relief from [the Medani] court or appeal—not ask another
court to second-guess its remedy.” Id. So too here. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ dissatisfaction with Defendants’ alleged foot-dragging is understandable considering the impending statutory deadline at
the end of the month. But agency recalcitrance does not impact the maxim that this Court “lacks
jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal courts.” Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186,
192 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
Moreover, the Medani court has hardly been passive in enforcing its injunction. To the
contrary, it has ordered DOS to submit tri-weekly updates on the number of interviews held and
visas issued. Medani v. Trump (“Medani II”), No. 26-cv-6332, 2026 WL 2667529, at *2 (N.D.
4
Cal. Sept. 10, 2026). Thus, since “the Medani court remains actively engaged in enforcing its
injunction,” the first-to-file rule “applies with even greater force here.” Gadasi, 2026 WL
2754355, at *4.
Plaintiffs next argue, in a conclusory fashion, that case-specific relief “is compatible with
[Medani’s] classwide vacatur” and “does not ask this Court to modify the Northern District of
California’s order.” ECF No. 20 at 17. They are wrong. “A district court abuses its discretion
when it grants equitable relief that expands or supplants relief already being administered in a class
action involving the same parties and issues.” Gadasi, 2026 WL 2754355, at *4. And that is
precisely what Plaintiffs seek—an order compelling Defendants to process their applications by a
date certain and provide regular status reports on their progress. But courts “should not expend
judicial resources—and potentially produce contradictory decisions—by allowing the same [plaintiffs] multiple bites at the apple.” Id. (quoting UtahAmerican, 685 F.3d at 1124).
Plaintiffs also assert, without explanation, that such relief “respects statutory rank-order
processing and permits any genuine competing-priority or number-control issue to be reported.”
ECF No. 20 at 20. Not so. The Court fails to see how it could order the agencies to process
Plaintiffs’ applications on an expedited timetable without diverting resources from other selectees.
Rather, as other courts have concluded, “compelling final adjudication of [Plaintiffs’] applications” would inevitably “move them ahead of other Medani class members.” Ugrenyuk, 2026 WL
2836682, at *1. Thus, far from supporting an exception to the first-to-file rule, principles of equity
and comity strongly favor denying Plaintiffs the particularized relief they seek.
For these reasons, Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of the success of the merits of
their claims. That failure alone is sufficient to defeat a motion for a preliminary injunction. Ark.
Dairy Co-op Ass’n, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Moreover,
5
the same equitable principles underpinning the denial of Plaintiffs’ motion also support dismissing
the case. See Gadasi, 2026 WL 2754355, at *5; Ugrenyuk, 2026 WL 2836682, at *2. District
courts have inherent authority to sua sponte dismiss an action “duplicative of a parallel action
already pending in another federal court” as an exercise of “wise judicial administration.” Mendlow v. Libr. of Cong., 194 F.3d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Because Plaintiffs’ suit is duplicative of the
earlier-filed Medani action, the Court will exercise that discretion and dismiss this case.
For all these reasons, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
or Temporary Restraining Order and dismiss the case. A separate order will issue.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: September 24, 2026
6