[Cite as Ridgeway v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., 2026-Ohio-3731.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
JANICE RIDGEWAY, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 115881
v. :
SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, :
INC., ET AL.,
Defendants-Appellees. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: REVERSED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 24, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-24-105863
Appearances:
Sam A. Zingale, for appellant.
Carpenter Lipps LLP, David A. Wallace, and Tyler K.
Ibom, for appellee Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, J.:
Plaintiff-appellant Janice Ridgeway (“Ridgeway”) appeals an order
granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Select Portfolio
Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”). She claims the following error:
The trial court erred in granting defendant-appellee Select Portfolio
Servicing Inc.’s motion for summary judgment.
We find, as a matter of law, that Ridgeway is entitled to information
concerning the loan that encumbers her property and that the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of SPS on Ridgeway’s claim for declaratory
judgment. We, therefore, reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case to
the trial court to enter a judgment declaring that Ridgeway is entitled to the loan
information.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Ridgeway purchased a house located at 1568 East 108th Street in
Cleveland (“the property”) in June 2000. In November 2005, she deeded the house
to Sonya Durham (“Durham”). Durham borrowed $250,750.00 from Long Beach
Mortgage Company and signed a mortgage to secure payment on the loan. The
mortgage encumbers the property and was later assigned with the note to U.S. Bank
N.A. SPS is the servicer of the loan.
In December 2006, Durham deeded the property back to Ridgeway.
Ridgeway averred in the affidavit she submitted with her brief in opposition to SPS’s
motion for summary judgment that she had no idea that Durham allowed a
mortgage lien to encumber the property during the brief period of time that the
house was titled in Durham’s name.
Although the mortgage was never assigned to Ridgeway, she made
mortgage payments to prevent foreclosure. She states in her affidavit that she was
told the amount of the monthly payment, that she was instructed on how to make payments to SPS, and that she made payments to SPS until May 2024. (Ridgeway
Aff. ¶ 4.)
On May 9, 2024, Ridgeway received a notice that the mortgage was in
default and that foreclosure was a possibility. (Ridgeway Aff. ¶ 3.) After receiving
the default notice, Ridgeway contacted SPS to inquire about the terms of the
mortgage loan. (Ridgeway Aff. ¶ 4.) Although SPS had previously disclosed the
amount of the monthly payment, it informed Ridgeway that it could not provide her
with any loan information or answer any of her questions because she was not a
party to the mortgage. (Ridgeway Aff. ¶ 4.) As a result, Ridgeway filed a complaint
for declaratory judgment against SPS and Durham in an effort to obtain information
about the mortgage encumbering her property. In the prayer for relief, Ridgeway
requested a judgment declaring that Ridgeway has an interest in the mortgage that
encumbers her home and that she is entitled to information pertaining to the
mortgage. She also sought monetary damages to reimburse her for all the money
she has paid to SPS.
Ridgeway alleged that Durham defrauded her, caused financial harm as
a result of the fraud, and that Durham’s actions caused mental and psychological
injuries. However, Durham is not a party to this appeal; Ridgeway voluntarily
dismissed her without prejudice after the court granted SPS’s motion for summary
judgment. Therefore, this appeal only concerns Ridgeway’s claims against SPS.
SPS filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law because (1) there is no common-law or statutory basis for Ridgeway’s claims since she is not a signatory to either the note or mortgage, and
(2) the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) precludes SPS from providing Durham’s
personal account information to her because the GLBA prohibits the disclosure of
personal account information to third parties.
The trial court agreed with the arguments presented in SPS’s motion
and granted summary judgment in its favor. Ridgeway now appeals the trial court’s
judgment.
II. Law and Analysis
A. Summary Judgment
Appellate review of summary judgments is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio
Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary
judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving
party, the party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his
or her favor. Horton v. Harwick Chem. Corp., 73 Ohio St.3d 679 (1995), paragraph
three of the syllabus.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that he or she is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996).
Once the moving party satisfies its burden, the nonmoving party “may not rest upon
the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing
that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Civ.R. 56(E); Mootispaw v. Eckstein, 76 Ohio
St.3d 383, 385 (1996).
B. Declaratory Judgment
Ridgeway argues she is entitled to a declaration concerning her rights
and legal relations relative to the loan secured by the mortgage on her property even
though she is not the named borrower because it affects her property rights.
R.C. 2721.03, which governs declaratory judgments, provides, in
relevant part:
Subject to division (B) of section 2721.02 of the Revised Code, any
person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writing
constituting a contract or any person whose rights, status, or other
legal relations are affected by a constitutional provision, statute, rule
as defined in section 119.01 of the Revised Code, municipal ordinance,
township resolution, contract, or franchise may have determined any
question of construction or validity arising under the instrument,
constitutional provision, statute, rule, ordinance, resolution, contract,
or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal
relations under it.
(Emphasis added.)
Thus, R.C. 2721.03 provides that persons who are either a party to a
written contract or because his or her rights are affected by the contract may obtain
a declaration regarding the construction or validity of the contract and regarding the
interested person’s status or legal relations under the contract.
In Lakhi v. Meritra Health Care, L.L.C., 2022-Ohio-3062, ¶ 17 (10th
Dist.), quoting Morgain v. Mikhail, 2008-Ohio-4598, ¶ 66 (10th Dist.), the court expressly held that a promissory note is a valid and binding contract. Indeed,
R.C. 1335.02(A)(3) defines the term “loan agreement” in part as
one or more promises, promissory notes, agreements, undertakings,
security agreements, mortgages, or other documents or commitments,
or any combination of these documents or commitments, pursuant to
which a financial institution loans or delays, or agrees to loan or delay,
repayment of money, goods, or anything of value, or otherwise extends
credit or makes a financial accommodation.
Therefore, the promissory note secured by the mortgage on
Ridgeway’s property is a loan-agreement contract.
The Declaratory Judgment Act is remedial in nature and must,
therefore, be liberally construed and administered. Highland Tavern, L.L.C. v.
DeWine, 2023-Ohio-2577, ¶ 22 (“The legislature specified in R.C. 2721.13 that ‘[t]he
provisions of [the declaratory-judgment] chapter are remedial and shall be liberally
construed and administered.’”). The purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act is to
“afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other
legal relations.” Swander Ditch Landowners’ Assn. v. Joint Bd. of Huron & Seneca
Cty. Commrs., 51 Ohio St.3d 131, 134 (1990).
In Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, 30 Ohio St.3d 108, 111 (1987), the
Ohio Supreme Court explained:
The General Assembly intended the declaratory judgment action to be
available to “any person interested” under a written contract or
instrument of any nature for purposes of establishing rights and duties
thereunder. Any limitation of such persons . . . to bring such an action
frustrates the legislative intent.
Nowhere in R.C. Chapter 2721 is there any provision which narrows the
broad right conferred by R.C. 2721.03. This court is not justified in
creating its own limitations on that right in contravention of this clearly
expressed legislative purpose. This is particularly true given the
mandate embodied in R.C. 2721.13, which states that “[s]ections
2721.01 to 2721.15, inclusive, of the Revised Code are remedial, and
shall be liberally construed and administered.”
Id.
The trial court did not liberally construe the Declaratory Judgment
Act. It did not consider the effect of the mortgage on Ridgeway’s property or on her
right to protect her property. Presumably, the trial court denied her claim pursuant
to SPS’s argument that the GLBA, 15 U.S.C. 6802, prohibits lenders from disclosing
the personal account information of its customers to third parties.
However, the GLBA does not provide an absolute bar to disclosure of
customer-account information. To the contrary, 15 U.S.C. 6802(e) lists a set of
exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure. As relevant here, 15 U.S.C.
6802(e)(8) provides:
(e) Subsections (a) and (b) shall not prohibit the disclosure of
nonpublic personal information—
(8) to comply with Federal, State, or local laws, rules, and other
applicable legal requirements; to comply with a properly authorized
civil, criminal, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by
Federal, State, or local authorities; or to respond to judicial process or
government regulatory authorities having jurisdiction over the
financial institution for examination, compliance, or other purposes as
authorized by law.
The key phrase is that the GBLA “shall not prohibit” disclosure “to comply with
Federal, State, or local laws . . . or to respond to judicial process.” Thus, if a court issues a valid order compelling production of information, the GLBA is not a defense
against compliance. The exception does not create an independent right for a
litigant to obtain information, nor does it require a judge to compel disclosure
without adequate cause. However, Ohio’s Declaratory Judgment Act creates a
judicial process whereby the information may be compelled if the plaintiff
demonstrates that his or her rights are affected by the contract or instrument.
Preferred Risk Ins. Co., 30 Ohio St.3d 108, at 111.
Justice requires disclosure of the mortgage-loan information.
Ridgeway has paid thousands of dollars to SPS in an effort to save her home from
foreclosure. And, SPS disclosed to Ridgeway the amount of the monthly mortgage
payment when it was in its interest to do so even though the monthly mortgage
payment was the confidential loan information of the borrower. It is only fair that
Ridgeway should discover the remaining balance and payoff amount of the loan
since she has paid thousands of dollars to the loan over many years and the mortgage
affects Ridgeway’s property rights. The remedial nature of the Declaratory
Judgment Act creates a process by which the court could compel SPS to provide the
terms of the loan and the remaining balance to Ridgeway.
Several cases have interpreted Section 6802(e) as allowing disclosure
of protected customer information in response to civil discovery or some judicial
process. For example, in Marks v. Global Mtge. Group, Inc., 218 F.R.D. 492 (S.D.W.
Va. 2003), plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging various statutory and common-law
violations arising out of the defendants’ lending, loan-brokerage, and loan-servicing practices, including violations of the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, and the West Virginia Consumer Protection Act. One of the
defendants objected to the magistrate judge’s order compelling discovery of the
nonpublic personal information of its customers. The court found that 15 U.S.C.
6802(e)(8) allowed a financial institution to disclose personal financial information
of its customers to comply with a discovery request. Id. at 496. The court explained
that the judicial-process exception was independent from, and in addition to, the
exception permitting disclosure to comply with a government regulatory
investigation. Thus, when a party must disclose information pursuant to a discovery
request, the party is responding to judicial process.
In Tennell v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78050 (D. Or.
May 4, 2020), the court relied on Marks and held that Section 6802(e)(8) permits
disclosure of private customer information in response to court-ordered discovery.
The court is the gatekeeper making sure that the discovery is warranted under the
circumstances of the case.
In sum, the Declaratory Judgment Act is a remedial statute that must
be liberally construed to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity concerning
one’s rights, status, and legal relations. Although the GBLA generally requires that
banking institutions keep their customer accounts confidential, there are exceptions
that allow disclosure as part of a judicial process if disclosure is warranted under a
law such as the Declaratory Judgment Act.
Therefore, the trial court erred in granting SPS’s motion for summary
judgment, and the sole assignment of error is sustained.
Judgment reversed and case remanded to the trial court to issue a
judgment declaring that SPS must provide Ridgeway with information concerning
the mortgage that encumbers the property.
It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the
common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, JUDGE
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCURS;
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., DISSENTS (WITH SEPARATE OPINION)
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., DISSENTING:
Respectfully, I dissent. I would affirm the trial court’s decision
granting SPS’s motion for summary judgment and declining to provide Ridgeway a
declaration of rights flowing from the note and mortgage entered into by Durham
alone.
The right to declaratory relief under R.C. Ch. 2721 is not unlimited; it
is available only in prescribed circumstances. Relevant here, “[A]ny person
interested under a . . . written contract, or other writing constituting a contract” may
“obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations under it.”
R.C. 2721.03.
Under certain circumstances, courts may decline to declare rights
under a written instrument in response to a declaratory-judgment action. “A trial
court may dismiss a complaint for declaratory judgment without addressing the
merits of the case if there is (1) neither a justiciable issue nor an actual controversy
between the parties requiring speedy relief, or (2) the declaratory judgment will not
terminate the uncertainty or controversy.” M6 Motors, Inc. v. Nissan of N. Olmsted,
L.L.C., 2014-Ohio-2537, ¶ 18 (8th Dist.). See R.C. 2721.07 (“Courts . . . may refuse
to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree . . . if the judgment or decree
would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the action or
proceeding in which the declaratory relief is sought.”). See also Miller Transp., Inc.
v. Hocking Athens Perry Community Action, 2024-Ohio-1017, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.)
(Court did not err in dismissing declaratory-judgment action concerning a contract
where the complaint did not allege that the plaintiff was a party or an intended thirdparty beneficiary to the contract.).
A declaratory-judgment action must be initiated by a proper party.
‘“[O]nly . . . persons who are legally affected are proper parties”’ to a declaratoryjudgment action. Driscoll v. Austintown Assocs., 42 Ohio St.2d 263, 273 (1975), quoting Schriber Sheet Metal & Roofers v. Shook, 64 Ohio App. 276, 285 (2d Dist.
1940). “A party is ‘legally affected’ if the party has a legal interest in rights that are
the subject matter of the cause of action.” M6 Motors at ¶ 33, quoting Rumpke
Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. State, 2010-Ohio-6037, ¶ 14. “A mere ‘practical interest in
the outcome of the action’ is insufficient.” Deckman v. Joseph, 2025-Ohio-2360,
¶ 28 (8th Dist.), quoting M6 Motors at ¶ 34 (Plaintiff-son had no legal interest in the
outcome of declaratory-judgment action concerning decedent-father’s lifeinsurance policy that did not name him as a beneficiary.). See Driscoll at 273 (In
declaratory-judgment action attacking constitutionality of zoning as applied to a
parcel of property, surrounding property owners had no legal interest impacted by
the case and were not necessary defendants notwithstanding their “practical interest
in the outcome.”).
Of significance to this dispute is the long-standing principle that a
mortgage creates a security interest encumbering real estate that exists
independently from ownership of that real estate. See Chesapeake Exploration,
L.L.C. v. Buell, 2015-Ohio-4551, ¶ 87 (“A mortgage . . . does not affect the present
ownership of [a] property, but creates in the mortgage holder, upon the default of
the borrower, the ability to exercise rights of ownership.”).
It is undisputed that Ridgeway was not a party to the note or mortgage
about which she asked the court to provide a declaration of her rights. Attached to
SPS’s motion for summary judgment, labeled exhibit Nos. 1 and 2, were documents
titled “Note” and “Mortgage,” respectively. During the time Durham was the title owner of the property, she borrowed money and encumbered the property with the
mortgage as security for the loan reflected in the note. Only Durham signed the
Note; only Durham signed the Mortgage. In her appellate brief and in her affidavit
filed along with her opposition to SPS’s motion for summary judgment, Ridgeway
admitted that she has never been a party to any mortgage on the property. While
the property was quit-claimed to Ridgeway after the creation of the loan and security
interest, the face of the mortgage reveals that it was filed with the County Recorder’s
office prior to Ridgeway becoming the title holder. Ridgeway identified no provision
in either the note or the mortgage that affords her any legal rights or obligations
under either document.
In light of the foregoing, while Ridgeway’s residence on the property
may give her a practical interest in the mortgage that encumbers it, I would find that
her practical interest alone does not make her an appropriate party to this
declaratory-judgment action.