[Cite as Washington v. VW Credit, Inc., 2026-Ohio-3735.]
COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
TIANA WASHINGTON, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
No. 116233
v. :
VW CREDIT, INC., :
Defendant-Appellee. :
JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 24, 2026
Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CV-25-117860
Appearances:
Tiana C. Washington, pro se.
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, and Jack Maib; Scale LLP,
and Corey Pedersen, pro hac vice, for appellee.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J.:
This appeal is before the court on the accelerated docket pursuant to
App.R. 11.1 and Loc.App.R. 11.1. “The purpose of an accelerated appeal is to allow
this court to render a brief and conclusory opinion.” State v. Priest, 2014-Ohio-1735,
¶ 1.
Plaintiff-appellant Tiana Washington (“Washington”) appeals the trial
court’s order granting defendant-appellee VW Credit Inc.’s (“VCI”) motion to stay
proceedings pending arbitration and denying her motion to vacate arbitration. For
the reasons stated below, the trial court’s order staying the proceedings pending
arbitration and denying the motion to vacate arbitration is affirmed and the case is
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History
On August 19, 2022, Washington entered into a retail installment sale
contract (the “contract”) with Volkswagen of Streetsboro to finance the purchase of
a 2022 Volkswagen Tiguan (the “vehicle”). Pursuant to the contract, Washington
was required to make 72 monthly payments of $696.51. The contract was assigned
to VCI.
The contract includes two sections that make up the arbitration
provision (the “arbitration agreement”). The first page of the contract contains a
section that states as follows:
Agreement to Arbitrate: By signing below, you agree that, pursuant
to the Arbitration Provision on page 5 of this contract, you or we may
elect to resolve any dispute by neutral, binding arbitration and not by a
court action. See the Arbitration Provision for additional information
concerning the agreement to arbitrate.
(Emphasis in original.) The fifth, and last, page of the contract contains the
following language, which states, in relevant part:
ARBITRATION PROVISION
PLEASE REVIEW — IMPORTANT — AFFECTS YOUR LEGAL
RIGHTS
1. EITHER YOU OR WE MAY CHOOSE TO HAVE ANY DISPUTE
BETWEEN US DECIDED BY ARBITRATION AND NOT IN COURT
OR BY JURY TRIAL.
Any claim or dispute, whether in contract, tort, statute or otherwise
(including the interpretation and scope of this Arbitration Provision,
and the arbitrability of the claim or dispute), between you and us or our
employees, agents, successors or assigns, which arises out of or relates
to your credit application, purchase or condition of this vehicle, this
contract or any resulting transaction or relationship (including any
such relationship with third parties who do not sign this contract) shall,
at your or our election, be resolved by neutral, binding arbitration and
not by a court action.
Any arbitration under this Arbitration Provision shall be governed by
the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et. seq.) and not by any state
law concerning arbitration.
Washington failed to make timely payments, and in October 2024, VCI
repossessed the vehicle. In December 2024, Washington filed a demand for
arbitration with the American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) pursuant to the
contract’s arbitration agreement.
On May 19, 2025, while the arbitration was pending, Washington filed
a complaint with the General Division of the Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
(the “trial court”) against VCI. The complaint contained claims alleging unjust
enrichment, fraud and misrepresentation, perjury, breach of contract, failure to
disclose, furnishing deceptive forms, unlawful repossession, civil liability, and requested punitive damages. On the same day, Washington filed a motion to vacate
arbitration, asserting that the arbitration proceedings should be vacated because of
fraud in the inducement of the arbitration agreement, breach of contract, and unjust
enrichment.
The arbitration between the parties remains pending with the AAA.
On July 7, 2025, VCI filed a motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative,
stay proceedings pending arbitration. The motion asserts that the case should be
stayed pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq. and R.C. 2711.02(B).
Washington filed a motion to strike VCI’s motion. The motion asserted the
arbitration agreement was void and that the contract was induced by fraud.
On January 27, 2026, the trial court held a hearing on the parties’
pending motions. On February 12, 2026, the trial court issued a journal entry
denying Washington’s motion to vacate arbitration and granting VCI’s motion to
stay proceedings pending arbitration. The order stated, in part, as follows:
[VCI] has presented unrefuted evidence that the arbitration provision
exists and was agreed to by [Washington]. [Washington] has failed to
meet her burden to prove the unenforceability of the arbitration
provision, either because of fraud or unconscionability.
This appeal followed. Washington raises the following assignments of
error for our review:
1. The trial court erred by denying Appellant’s Motion to Vacate the
Arbitration Award under R.C. 2711.10(A), (B), and (C) where the
arbitrator refused to consider material evidence.
2. The trial court erred by enforcing an arbitration award where the
arbitrator exceeded his powers under R.C. 2711.10(D) by issuing an
award in favor of a non-party to the RISC.
3. The trial court erred by enforcing an arbitration clause that was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
4. The trial court erred by compelling arbitration after the arbitrator
had already issued a Final Award and by failing to apply the mandatory
statutory standards under R.C. 2711.10.
II. Law and Analysis
As a preliminary matter, we note that Washington is a pro se litigant.
Washington’s status as a pro se litigant does not excuse any deficiencies in the appeal
or in the case below. In Ohio, “pro se litigants are held to the same standard as all
other litigants: they [] must accept the consequences of their own mistakes.”
Bikkani v. Lee, 2008-Ohio-3130, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), citing Kilroy v. B.H. Lakeshore
Co., 111 Ohio App.3d 357, 363 (8th Dist. 1996).
A. Conscionability of the Arbitration Agreement
We consider Washington’s third assignment of error first. In her third
assignment of error, Washington contends that the arbitration clause was
procedurally and substantively unconscionable.
As a preliminary matter, we address VCI’s assertion that this court
cannot consider whether the arbitration agreement was unconscionable because
Washington did not raise the issue with the lower court. VCI correctly asserts that
this court “will not consider a question not presented, considered or decided by a
lower court.” Kalish v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 73, 79 (1977). However, the trial court’s order includes analysis of whether the arbitration
agreement is unconscionable and states that “[Washington] asserts that the
arbitration is unconscionable for largely the same reasons she alleges fraud.”
Therefore, the record indicates that the trial court did consider and decide whether
the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and that Washington asserted the
argument. Thus, we will review the trial court’s determination of whether the
arbitration agreement was unconscionable.
A claim that an arbitration clause is unenforceable because it is
unconscionable is a question of law that is reviewed de novo, while giving deference
to the trial court’s factual findings. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 2008-Ohio-938, ¶ 37-38.
There is a presumption favoring arbitration when a claim or dispute
falls within the scope of an arbitration provision. Taylor Bldg. at ¶ 27, citing
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 471 (1998). See also R.C. 2711.01(A)
(Arbitration provisions are valid and enforceable unless grounds exist at law or in
equity for revoking the agreement.); R.C. 2711.02(B) (Trial courts are mandated to
refer claims to arbitration when the issue involved in the action is referable to
arbitration under an agreement in writing for arbitration.).
“Unconscionability is a ground for revocation of an arbitration
agreement.” Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 2009-Ohio-2054, ¶ 19, citing Taylor Bldg.
at ¶ 33. “The party asserting unconscionability of a contract bears the burden of
proving that the agreement is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.” Hayes at ¶ 20. This court has recently found that “[g]iven that both the substantive
and procedural prongs must be satisfied to establish unconscionability, the failure
to prove one of the prongs alleviates the necessity to review the remaining prong.”
Loomis v. O’Neill Healthcare — Middleburg Hts., 2026-Ohio-2079, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.),
citing Reno v. Bethel Village Condominium Assn. Inc., 2008-Ohio-4462, ¶ 13 (10th
Dist.).
In this case, Washington contends that the arbitration agreement was
both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. However, a court’s
determination of whether an arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable
is limited to “consideration of the terms of the agreement and whether they are
commercially reasonable.” Hayes at ¶ 33, citing John R. Davis Trust 8/12/05 v.
Beggs, 2008-Ohio-6311, ¶ 13 (10th Dist.); Dorsey v. Contemporary Obstetrics &
Gynecology, Inc., 113 Ohio App.3d 75, 80 (2d Dist. 1996). Washington’s contentions
regarding substantive unconscionability revolve around events that occurred during
the arbitration process itself, and not whether the terms of the agreement are
commercially reasonable. Therefore, Washington cannot establish that the
arbitration agreement is substantively unconscionable. It follows that Washington
cannot establish that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable. Therefore,
Washington’s third assignment of error is overruled.
B. Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
Washington’s first, second, and fourth assignments of error are not
ripe for review because there is no arbitration award in the record.
Pursuant to R.C. 2711.13, “[a]fter an award in an arbitration
proceeding is made, any party to the arbitration may file a motion in the court of
common pleas for an order vacating, modifying, or correcting the award[.]”
(Emphasis added.) See Cuyahoga Cty. v. Ohio Patrolmen’s Benevolent, Assn.,
2024-Ohio-1055, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.). Although Washington’s appellate brief states that
an arbitration award was issued in this case, the record is devoid of any indication
of a completed arbitration or an award.
Ripeness “‘is peculiarly a question of timing.’” State ex rel. Elyria
Foundry Co. v. Indus. Comm., 82 Ohio St.3d 88, 89 (1998), quoting Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 140 (1974). “The ripeness doctrine is
motivated in part by the desire ‘to prevent the courts, through avoidance of
premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements over
administrative policies. . . .” Id., quoting Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 148 (1967). “[T]o be justiciable, a controversy must be ripe for review.” Keller
v. Columbus, 2003-Ohio-5599, ¶ 26. “For a cause to be justiciable, there must exist
a real controversy presenting issues that are ripe for judicial resolution and which
will have a direct and immediate impact on the parties.” Cristino v. Ohio Bur. of
Workers’ Comp., 2014-Ohio-1383, ¶ 22 (10th Dist.).
This court has recently found that
[t]hree factors guide the ripeness inquiry: “(1) the likelihood that the
harm alleged by the plaintiffs will ever come to pass; (2) whether the
factual record is sufficiently developed to produce a fair adjudication of
the merits of the parties’ respective claims; and (3) the hardship to the
parties if judicial relief is denied at this stage in the proceedings.” Cleveland v. Johnson, 2025-Ohio-1731, ¶ 16 (8th Dist.), quoting Berry v. Schmitt,
688 F.3d 290, 298 (6th Cir. 2012).
In this case, Washington’s first, second, and fourth assignments of
error presuppose that an arbitration has taken place and that an award has been
issued. As noted above, there is no evidence in the record that an arbitration has
taken place or that an award has been issued. Therefore, Washington’s first, second,
and fourth assignments of error are not ripe for review and are thus overruled.
For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s order staying this case
pending arbitration is affirmed. The case is remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment
into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27
of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
DEENA R. CALABRESE, JUDGE
LISA B. FORBES, P.J., and
ANITA LASTER MAYS, J., CONCUR