Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas
10-25-00396-CR
Bradley Hunter Golden,
Appellant
v.
The State of Texas,
Appellee
On appeal from the
19th District Court of McLennan County, Texas
Judge Thomas C. West, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 2024-683-C1
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Bradley Hunter Golden pled guilty to two counts of possession of a
controlled substance—one for methamphetamine, and the other for psilocin—
after the trial court denied his motion to suppress the introduction of the
substances into evidence. The trial court sentenced Golden to 25 years in
prison for each count. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.
BACKGROUND
With a felony arrest warrant for burglary of a motor vehicle with two
prior convictions in hand, officers from the Waco Police Department arrived at
Golden’s residence. Golden lived with his mother, to whom he paid rent. When
officers arrived, Golden’s mother was in the front yard, and the officers asked
her if Golden was home. She said yes. The officers then opened the front door
and called for Golden to come outside. He eventually did, and the officers took
Golden into custody and performed a protective sweep of the residence. A
brown Carhartt jacket like one which was known to have been worn by the
perpetrator of several recent automobile burglaries was seen in Golden’s room
during the sweep.
After conducting the sweep, a detective at the scene asked Golden’s
mother if the officers could search the property. She signed a written consent
form that allowed the officers to search everything on the premises except
Golden’s bedroom. 1 Upon receiving consent, the officers began searching the
premises, including an outbuilding located behind Golden’s bedroom. The
officers discovered recently stolen computers and other equipment in the
outbuilding. The detective then prepared a search warrant and affidavit to
allow the officers to search the entire property. Included as part of the probable
cause affidavit was the observation of the Carhartt jacket during the protective
sweep. The trial court signed the search warrant, and soon thereafter, officers
1
Golden did not give the officers consent to search his bedroom.
Golden v. State Page 2 began searching Golden’s bedroom in which they found drugs and firearms.
Golden moved to suppress the drugs—methamphetamine and psilocin—
found in his bedroom. The trial court denied Golden’s motion but did not issue
any findings of fact or conclusions of law.
MOTION TO SUPPRESS
In his sole issue on appeal, Golden contends the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of the drugs found in
his bedroom.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of
discretion under a bifurcated standard of review. State v. Torres, 666 S.W.3d
735, 740 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). While we afford almost total deference to the
trial court's determination of historical facts and the trial court's rulings on
mixed questions of law and fact, especially when those determinations are
based on an assessment of credibility and demeanor, we review pure questions
of law as well as mixed questions of law and fact that do not turn on an
assessment of credibility and demeanor de novo. Id. at 740-741.
When a trial court denies a motion to suppress and does not enter
findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling
and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling
as long as those findings are supported by the record. Wexler v. State, 625
Golden v. State Page 3 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021); Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 527
(Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The party that prevailed in the trial court is afforded
the strongest legitimate view of the evidence and all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from that evidence. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167; State v. GarciaCantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
Protective Sweep
Golden contends the protective sweep of the residence after his arrest
was improper because it was not based on specific, articulable facts, not within
the appropriate scope, and overly long in duration. Further, Golden asserts
that the Waco Police Department’s policy for blanket-wide protective sweeps
violates the objective, case-by-case test required by law.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV. A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls
within one of the “specifically defined and well-established” exceptions to the
warrant requirement. McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App.
2003). One of those exceptions is a “protective sweep” of the premises. See
Reasor v. State, 12 S.W.3d 813, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
A “protective sweep” is a “quick and limited search of premises, incident
to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of police officers or others.”
Golden v. State Page 4 Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 815 (quoting Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 328, 108 L.
Ed. 2d 276, 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990)); Davis v. State, 74 S.W.3d 90, 96 (Tex.
App.—Waco 2002, no pet.). An officer may sweep a residence only if he
possesses an “objectively reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable
facts, that a person in that area poses a danger to that police officer or to other
people in the area.” Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 817 (emphasis added). Further, a
protective sweep must not be a “full search of the premises.” Buie, 494 U.S. at
335. It may only extend to a “cursory inspection of those spaces where a person
may be found” and only last long enough to “dispel the reasonable suspicion of
danger.” Id. at 335; Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 816.
Officers may not conduct a protective sweep as a matter of right. State
v. Watson, 630 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2021, no pet.); Cooksey
v. State, 350 S.W.3d 177, 187 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.)
(protective sweep not automatically proper as police policy). It is permitted
only when “justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is
harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Watson, 630
S.W.3d at 457 (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 336 and Reasor, 12 S.W.3d at 816).
During the hearing on the motion to suppress, the detective stated that
they conducted a protective sweep “just usually—just for our safety. We don’t
want to be talking in the front yard with our back turned to the house and
Golden v. State Page 5 there be somebody there.” His only other reason for conducting the sweep in
this case was that Golden “mentioned to one of the other detectives that—
regarding the stolen vehicle, that he was—there was somebody with him in the
stolen vehicle or that the other person was driving or something, so….”
Although the detective agreed with the State that someone could have been
hiding under the bed with a gun, he offered no specific or articulable facts that
a person was in the residence and posed a danger to himself or others in the
area. At the end of the hearing, the detective also agreed with the trial court
that it is department policy to conduct a protective sweep. This testimony is
not sufficient to support an implied finding of a protective sweep.
Accordingly, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, because the detective could not express an “objectively
reasonable belief, based on specific and articulable facts, that a person in that
area pose[d] a danger to that police officer or to other people in the area[,]” the
protective sweep constituted an unreasonable search.
Our review, however, does not end here. We now turn to consider
whether the trial court properly denied the motion to suppress pursuant to the
search warrant issued after the unreasonable sweep of Golden’s home and
room.
Golden v. State Page 6
Correct Under Any Theory Applicable To The Case
As an appellate court, we should uphold the trial court's denial of a
motion to suppress so long as its ruling is correct on any legal theory applicable
to the case. McClintock v. State, 541 S.W.3d 63, 74 n. 20 (Tex. Crim. App.
2017). The State generally contends that regardless of whether the protective
sweep in this case was unreasonable, the trial court correctly denied Golden’s
motion to suppress the evidence seized because the warrant was based upon
observations made during the consented-to search of the residence and
outbuildings. 2 But the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained a
statement about the Carhartt jacket observed during the unreasonable sweep.
Nevertheless, when a search warrant is issued on the basis of an affidavit
containing unlawfully–obtained information, the evidence seized under the
warrant is admissible only if the warrant clearly could have been issued on the
basis of untainted information in the affidavit. Brackens v. State, 312 S.W.3d
831, 838 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. ref'd) (citing Pitonyak v.
State, 253 S.W.3d 834, 848 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref'd)); Hooper v.
State, Nos. 10-16-00388-CR, 10-16-00389-CR, 10-16-00390-CR, 10-16-00391-CR, 10-16-00392-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1268, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Waco
Feb. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op. not designated for publication). See also
2
Golden did not challenge in his motion to suppress or at the hearing, and does not on appeal, whether his mother’s written consent to search was voluntary; thus, we need not discuss it.
Golden v. State Page 7 Davila v. State, 441 S.W.3d 751, 761 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, pet.
ref’d) (“tainted” information will not invalidate otherwise valid warrant). If
the tainted information was clearly unnecessary to establish probable cause
for the search warrant, then the defendant could not have been harmed by the
inclusion of the tainted information in the affidavit. Brackens v. State, 312
S.W.3d at 838. When reviewing whether an affidavit for a warrant provided a
basis for finding probable cause, we do not consider each fact in isolation;
rather, we consider the totality of the circumstances. Davila, 441 S.W.3d at
761.
Here, the probable cause affidavit contained one sentence regarding the
protective sweep: “While conducting a sweep of the residence, Detectives
observed a brown Carhartt jacket in the room occupied by Bradley Golden.”
Without that information, the affidavit also reflected that during the
consented-to search of the outbuildings and sheds, the officers located two
laptops known to be recently stolen from a vehicle which had also been
reported stolen. Golden was a suspect in that vehicle theft. A black drawstring
backpack containing burglary tools was also located, which matched video
surveillance images of a black drawstring backpack worn by a male during the
commission of several other offenses. Thus, based on a totality of the
circumstances, this information would have been sufficient, without the
Golden v. State Page 8 information about the Carhartt jacket, to obtain the search warrant of the
residence and Golden’s room for property stolen and clothing worn during the
other offenses.
Accordingly, for this reason, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Golden’s motion to suppress, and Golden’s sole issue is overruled.
CONCLUSION
Having overruled Golden’s only issue on appeal, we affirm the trial
court’s judgments.
LEE HARRIS
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 24, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Affirmed
Do Not Publish
CRPM
Golden v. State Page 9