Before
de GROOT, MOSLEY, and HARRIS
Appellate Military Judges
UNITED STATES
Appellee
v.
Kareem A. RANDALL
Culinary Specialist Seaman (E-3), U.S. Navy
Appellant
No. 202500170
Decided: 23 September 2026
Appeal from the United States Navy-Marine Corps Trial Judiciary
Military Judge:
Matthew C. Cox
Sentence adjudged 19 October 2021 by a special court-martial tried at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, consisting of a military judge sitting alone. Sentence in the Entry of Judgment: reduction to E-1 and confinement for 35 days.
For Appellant:
Lieutenant Commander Michael W. Wester, JAGC, USN
For Appellee:
Lieutenant Michael G. Osborn, JAGC, USN
Commander John T. Cole, JAGC, USN
United States v. Randall, NMCCA No. 202500170
Opinion of the Court
Judge HARRIS delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Senior
Judge de GROOT and Judge MOSLEY joined.
This opinion does not serve as binding precedent but
may be cited as persuasive authority under
NMCCA Rule of Appellate Procedure 30.2.
HARRIS, Judge:
Appellant was convicted, pursuant to his pleas, of a single specification of aggravated assault by strangulation, in violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ),1 for strangling his shipmate, Seaman S.N.
Appellant asserts two assignments of error (AOE), renumbered here:
(1) Did the military judge abuse his discretion by accepting Appellant’s guilty plea without having Appellant disavow previous statements supporting self-defense?
(2) Should the findings be dismissed with prejudice based
on post-trial delay of over three years between adjournment and docketing with this Court?2
We find no prejudicial error and affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Appellant Pleaded Guilty to Strangling his Shipmate and Disclaimed Self-Defense.
In July 2020, Appellant was socializing with Seaman S.N. in her barracks room onboard Naval Station Norfolk. Seaman S.N. began to engage in what
1 10 U.S.C. § 928.
2 Appellant also asks whether his plea is provident in light of the military judge’s
failure to advise Appellant of every element of the charged offense. We carefully considered this additional AOE raised by Appellant and find it does not require discussion or relief. See United States v. Matias, 25 M.J. 356, 363 (C.M.A. 1987).
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Opinion of the Court
Appellant characterized as “play fight[ing].”3 She repeatedly struck Appellant’s body with her closed fists such that “it kind of left a sting.”4 Appellant responded by closing his hand around Seaman S.N.’s throat and squeezing until her face became red and she was “almost . . . gasping really hard for air.”5
In conjunction with his Care inquiry,6 the military judge advised Appellant that self-defense was a complete defense against the alleged strangulation and explained the contours of the defense. He then asked Appellant about the circumstances of the offense, including the “play fighting” Appellant described in the inquiry and in the stipulation of fact. Appellant stated: “During the encounter, sir, there were -- there was an issue where she wanted to play fight with me, I did not, and she kept hitting me, so in my mind, I felt that was the only way I could make her stop.”7
Appellant explained that the location Seaman S.N. repeatedly struck triggered an unpleasant memory and made the conduct more objectionable than it would otherwise have been.
The military judge then asked whether Appellant believed the force he used was required to protect him from Seaman S.N. Appellant responded that it was. The military judge reminded Appellant of the explanation of the defense of self-defense and asked Appellant if he believed at the time that he would immediately be physically harmed. Appellant responded that he did not believe so at the time, but that he did think Seaman S.N. was going to punch him. The military judge then asked whether “placing [Appellant’s] hand around her neck and squeezing was required to protect [Appellant] from her punches?”8 Appellant again responded in the affirmative.
After a brief recess to discuss matters with his counsel, Appellant returned and asserted that the amount of force he used was not, in fact, necessary to protect Appellant from Seaman S.N.’s “rough housing.”9 The military judge responded, “[o]kay, so that’s a little bit different than what—you know, what you had said earlier, so just explain to me, as best you can, why it is you believe it
3 R. at 26.
4 R. at 28.
5 R. at 25.
6 United States v. Care, 18 C.M.A. 535, 40 C.M.R. 247 (1969).
7 R. at 26.
8 R. at 30.
9 R. at 32.
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Opinion of the Court
wasn’t necessary to protect you from that rough housing?”10 Appellant explained:
the way she was aiming at—a traumatic experience . . . . It was
very annoying, very upsetting and the fact that it was in that
specific area, it was like, you know, a fly buzzing in my ear basically, and it was highly upsetting, highly annoying.
So, the amount of force that I used to make her stop was not
nearly as, you know, less than what she was doing. It was excessive and very over the top.11
Appellant detailed that there were several measures he could have taken short of strangling Seaman S.N., including moving her to the side and walking out the door, calling the barracks manager, calling the police or masters-at-arms, or simply staying away from her. Appellant then reiterated that his conduct was “very excessive,” and acknowledged that it was “likely to cause serious damage to [her] internal organs.”12
Following this exchange, the military judge confirmed that Appellant’s defense counsel had sufficient time to discuss the matter with him, and that counsel did not believe the defense of self-defense applied. He further confirmed that Appellant believed his actions were unlawful and were not undertaken with any legal justification or excuse.
B. Following a Change in the Law Providing Appellant Expanded
Rights to Post-Trial Review, Appellant Received Delayed Notification of His Right to Appeal.
The military judge accepted Appellant’s pleas, found him guilty, and sentenced him in accordance with the plea agreement on 19 October 2021. The military judge signed the Entry of Judgment on 15 December 2021. Pursuant to Article 65, UCMJ,13 an attorney reviewed the Record of Appellant’s trial on 5 January 2022 and found no error within the scope of that review. Based on the statutory scheme applicable at the time, Appellant then had one year to apply to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for further review pursuant
10 R. at 33.
11 R. at 33.
12 R. at 34.
13 10 U.S.C. § 865.
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Opinion of the Court
to Article 69(a), UCMJ.14 The Record does not indicate that Appellant ever applied for further review.
Effective 23 December 2022, Congress amended Articles 66 and 69,
UCMJ.15 These amendments expanded this Court’s jurisdiction to include any judgment of a special or general court-martial, irrespective of sentence, that includes a finding of guilty and also eliminated the Judge Advocate General’s substantive review of courts-martial.16 On 9 April 2024, in United States v. Hirst, this Court determined that so long as an appellant has not applied for relief to the Judge Advocate General of the Navy pursuant to Article 69, UCMJ, or appealed to this Court, we have jurisdiction over a general or special courtmartial conviction if the Article 65, UCMJ, review was completed within one year prior to Congress amending Articles 66 and 69, UCMJ, without regard to the sentence.17
As required by Article 65(c), UCMJ,18 the Navy and Marine Corps Appellate Review Activity advised Appellant on 13 May 2025 of his right to appeal. Appellant then filed his Notice of Appeal with this Court on 12 August 2025. Appellant moved for a single 30-day enlargement of time on 26 October 202519 but ultimately filed his brief on the same day as that motion.
II. DISCUSSION
A. There is No Substantial Conflict Between Appellant’s Plea and His Statements During the Providence Inquiry.
We review a military judge’s decision to accept a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion.20 In reviewing the providence of a plea, a military judge abuses his
14 10 U.S.C. § 869(a) (2016).
15 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, §
544, 136 Stat. 2395, 2582–84 (2022).
16 Id.; see also United States v. Hirst, 84 M.J. 615, 622–23 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App.
2024).
17 84 M.J. at 627; see also United States v. Folts, 86 M.J. 84 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
18 10 U.S.C. § 865(c); see also Hirst, 84 M.J. at 625 (emphasizing the non-discretionary nature of the statutory requirement for the Judge Advocate General of the Navy to notify individuals convicted of an offense at special or general court-martial of their eligibility for direct review under Article 66(b)(1)(A), UCMJ).
19 Appellant’s Mot. for First Enlargement of Time, dated 26 October 2025.
20 United States v. Aguirre, 86 M.J. 43, 52 (C.A.A.F. 2025) (citing United States v.
Forbes, 78 M.J. 279, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2019)).
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Opinion of the Court
or her discretion only where there is a substantial basis in law or fact for questioning the guilty plea.21 We afford broad discretion to military judges in accepting guilty pleas.22 However, the military judge’s determinations of questions of law arising during or after the plea inquiry are reviewed de novo.23 An appellant bears the burden of establishing that the military judge abused his or her discretion.24
Article 45(a), UCMJ,25 provides:
If an accused . . . after a plea of guilty sets up matter inconsistent
with the plea, or if it appears that he has entered the plea of
guilty improvidently or through lack of understanding of its
meaning and effect . . . , a plea of not guilty shall be entered in
the record, and the court shall proceed as though he had pleaded
not guilty.
Thus, “[i]f an accused sets up matter inconsistent with the plea at any time during the proceeding, the military judge must either resolve the apparent inconsistency or reject the plea.”26 “Military judges often can ‘resolve’ apparent inconsistencies by asking the accused questions and receiving answers that show no actual inconsistency exists.”27 To rise to the level of inconsistency contemplated by Article 45(a), matters raised at trial must have reasonably raised the question of a defense or must have been inconsistent with the plea in some
21 Id. (citing United States v. Inabinette, 66 M.J. 320, 322 (C.A.A.F. 2008)); see also
United States v. Saul, 86 M.J. 30, 33 (C.A.A.F. 2025) (“[O]nce the military judge has accepted a plea as provident and has entered findings based on it, an appellate court will not reverse that finding and reject the plea unless it finds a substantial conflict between the plea and the accused’s statements.”) (quoting United States v. Garcia, 44 M.J. 496, 498 (C.A.A.F. 1996)).
22 Id. (citing United States v. Moratalla, 82 M.J. 1, 4 (C.A.A.F. 2021)).
23 Id. (citing Inabinette, 66 M.J. at 321).
24 Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 74 M.J. 20, 21–22 (C.A.A.F. 2015)).
25 10 U.S.C. § 845(a).
26 Saul, 86 M.J. at 33 (quoting Garcia, 44 M.J. at 498) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
27 Id. (citations omitted).
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United States v. Randall, NMCCA No. 202500170
Opinion of the Court
respect.28 In determining on appeal whether there is a substantial inconsistency, we consider the “full context” of the plea inquiry, including the stipulation of fact.29
Appellant’s initial statements certainly raised the possibility of self-defense. However, the military judge properly obtained explanations clarifying that Appellant understood the defense was not applicable in his case. The military judge correctly advised Appellant that for the defense to apply, Appellant must have actually believed the force used was necessary to protect himself. 30 Appellant’s subsequent explanations make clear that while he was acting to stop Seaman S.N. from striking him, Appellant understood at the time of the offense and at the time of the plea that strangling her was wildly excessive relative to the force necessary to stop her “annoying” punches. Further, Appellant acknowledged that the strangulation was likely to produce grievous bodily harm. The stipulation of fact also expressly disclaimed self-defense and provided details consistent with Appellant’s explanation during the Care inquiry: “[p]lacing my hands around her neck was not the appropriate response to what she was doing to me. I could have pushed her away or avoided hitting her and walked away.”31 Considering the full context of the plea inquiry, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that the military judge abused his discretion in accepting Appellant’s plea.
B. Appellant Suffered No Prejudice From Post-trial Delay, and the Delay Does Not Otherwise Warrant Relief.
1. Appellant Has Not Been Denied Due Process
We review claims raising the right to speedy post-trial review de novo.32 “The right to timely appellate review has both statutory and constitutional roots. A military appellant’s right to a full and fair review . . . embodies a concomitant right to have that review conducted in a timely fashion.”33
28 United States v. Goodman, 70 M.J. 396, 399 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citing United States
v. Roane, 43 M.J. 93, 98 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).
29 Id. (citing United States v. Smauley, 42 M.J. 449, 452 (C.A.A.F. 1995)).
30 R. at 22, 30.
31 Pros. Ex. 1 at 2.
32 United States v. Anderson, 82 M.J. 82, 85 (C.A.A.F. 2022) (citing United States
v. Moreno, 63 M.J. 129, 135 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).
33 Id. (quoting Toohey v. United States, 60 M.J. 100, 101–02 (C.A.A.F. 2004)).
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Opinion of the Court
In conducting a post-trial review of whether an appellant’s Article 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866 [ ], and constitutional rights to
timely review have been infringed, we evaluate the four factors
set forth by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo for assessing
pretrial speedy trial issues. 407 U.S. 514, 530 [ ] (1972). These
factors include: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for
the delay; (3) the appellant’s assertion of the right to timely review and appeal; and (4) prejudice.” Moreno, 63 M.J. at 135. An
analysis requires determining which factors favor the government or the appellant and then balancing these factors. Id. at
136. No single factor is dispositive, and absence of a given factor
does not prevent finding a due process violation. Id.34
We recognize three types of cognizable prejudice for purposes of an appellant’s due process right to timely post-trial review: (1) oppressive incarceration; (2) “particularized” anxiety and concern “that is distinguishable from the normal anxiety experienced by prisoners awaiting an appellate decision;” and (3) impairment of the appellant’s grounds for appeal or ability to present a defense at a rehearing.35
“Of those, the most serious is the last, because the inability of a
defendant adequately to prepare his case skews the fairness of
the entire system.” In addition, where an appellant has not
shown prejudice from the delay, we cannot find a due process
violation unless the delay is so egregious as to “adversely affect
the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system.”36
“Post-trial review begins by determining whether there is a facially unreasonable delay sufficient to trigger a due process analysis.”37 In United States v. Moreno, The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces established a presumption of facially unreasonable delay where: (1) the convening authority did not take action within 120 days of the completion of trial; (2) the record was not docketed with the court of criminal appeals within 30 days of the convening authority’s action; or (3) the court of criminal appeals did not render a decision within
34 Id. at 86.
35 United States v. St. Helen, No. 202400264, 2026 CCA LEXIS 320 at *17 (N-M.
Ct. Crim. App. July 10, 2026) (quoting Moreno, 63 M.J. at 138–40).
36 Id. (citations omitted).
37 Anderson, 82 M.J. at 86 (citing Moreno, 63 M.J. at 136).
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Opinion of the Court
18 months of docketing.38 However, the first two Moreno deadlines were superseded by statutory and regulatory changes, and we now test for prejudice where the time between announcement of sentence and docketing with this Court exceeds 150 days.39 Consistent with the Court’s opinion in United States v. St. Helen,40 and our sister service court’s decision in United States v. Boren,41 we decline to hold as facially unreasonable any specific timeframe for delay in direct appeal cases docketed under Article 66(b)(1)(A). Instead, we will look to the specific facts and circumstances of Appellant’s case.42
The military judge sentenced Appellant on 19 October 2021. Appellant’s case was docketed with this Court 1,363 days later, on 13 August 2025. This delay included a period of over one year that the Government took to notify Appellant of his right to appeal after the Hirst decision. Such a delay is, on its face, unreasonable.
Nor has the Government reasonably explained the length of delay. We agree with the Government that much of the delay is attributable to a change in the law that occurred after Appellant’s sentencing.43 We also agree that a limited amount of the delay is attributable to Appellant, who did not file his notice of appeal for over 90 days from the day the Government mailed his notification. However, the Government further offers that its retroactive review of court-martial convictions and efforts to notify affected servicemembers following the Hirst decision were a “considerable undertaking.”44 While we can imagine a significant administrative burden associated with that responsibility, the Government’s proffered characterization of its efforts offers precious little for this Court to use in evaluating whether that burden somehow justifies the specific delay in Appellant’s case. Lacking a sufficient explanation of the period of over one year after the Hirst order that the Government took to notify Appellant, we must determine that this factor weighs in favor of Appellant.
38 Moreno, 63 M.J. at 142.
39 United States v. Rivera, 81 M.J. 741, 746 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2021).
40 2026 CCA LEXIS 320 at *16.
41 No. ACM 40296, 2025 CCA LEXIS 103 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Mar. 19, 2025), aff’d
No. 25-0195, 2026 CAAF LEXIS 229 (C.A.A.F. Mar. 6, 2026).
42 St. Helen, 2026 CCA LEXIS 320 at *16.
43 Appellee’s Answer at 27.
44 Appellee’s Answer at 27.
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Opinion of the Court
The remaining Barker factors favor the Government. Appellant concedes that he has not demanded speedy post-trial review.45 Appellant also claims no prejudice to his right to appeal and offers only the bald claim that he has suffered “the weight of a faulty conviction” while awaiting review by this Court.46 We find nothing at all faulty in Appellant’s conviction. We have already rejected his substantive claims above and see no other error in the conduct of his court-martial. His conviction resulted from a valid guilty plea, and his term of confinement was completed before the entry of judgment—long before the statutory change and administrative lethargy underlying this AOE. These factors weigh heavily against Appellant.
Finally, the delay in Appellant’s post-trial review is not so egregious as to adversely affect the public’s perception of the fairness and integrity of the military justice system. We do not endorse delayed notification or the delayed processing of any appeal. However, the unique circumstances that brought about Appellant’s expanded post-trial rights and delayed review of Appellant’s guilty plea findings and sentence can hardly be expected to undermine public confidence in the fairness of the military justice system. Appellant has suffered no deprivation of due process.
2. Relief is Not Appropriate Under Article 66(d)(2)
Even where there is no due process violation, we consider whether excessive post-trial delay warrants relief pursuant to our authority under Article 66(d)(2), UCMJ.47 This Court “may provide appropriate relief if [an appellant] demonstrates error or excessive delay in the processing of the court-martial after the judgment was entered . . .”48 Such relief need not be “meaningful,” but must be what this Court, in its discretion, considers “appropriate.”49 In light of the unique circumstances arising from the change in the law and the absence of any actual prejudice, we do not find any relief to be appropriate in Appellant’s case.
45 Appellant’s Brief at 29.
46 Appellant’s Brief at 29–30.
47 10 U.S.C. § 866(d)(2); see also United States v. Valentin-Andino, 85 M.J. 361,
364–65 (C.A.A.F. 2025).
48 Id.
49 Valentin-Andino, 85 M.J. at 366.
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Opinion of the Court
III. CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of the record and briefs of appellate counsel, we have determined that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact, and no error materially prejudicial to Appellant’s substantial rights occurred.50 However, we note that the Entry of Judgment does not adequately summarize the charge and specification.51 Although we find no prejudice, Appellant is entitled to have court-martial records that correctly reflect the content of his proceeding.52 In accordance with Rule for Courts-Martial 1111(c)(2), we modify the Entry of Judgment and direct that it be included in the record.
The findings and sentence are AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
MARK K. JAMISON
Clerk of Court
50 Articles 59 & 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859, 866.
51 See United States v. Wadaa, 84 M.J. 652, 655 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2024).
52 United States v. Crumpley, 49 M.J. 538, 539 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 1998).
11
UNITED STATES NMCCA NO. 202500170
v. ENTRY
OF
Kareem A. RANDALL JUDGMENT
Culinary Specialist Seaman (E-3)
U.S. Navy As Modified on Appeal
Accused
23 September 2026
On 19 October 2021, the Accused was tried at Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia, by a special court-martial, consisting of a military judge sitting alone. Military Judge Matthew C. Cox presided.
FINDINGS
The following are the Accused’s pleas and the Court’s findings to all offenses the convening authority referred to trial:
Charge: Violation of Article 128, Uniform Code of Military Justice,
10 U.S.C. § 928.
Plea: Guilty.
Finding: Guilty.
Specification: In that Culinary Specialist Seaman Kareem
Randall, U.S. Navy, USS GEORGE H. W. BUSH
(CVN 77), on active duty, did, at or near, Norfolk,
Virginia, on or about 19 July 2020, assault
Culinary Specialist Seaman S.N., U.S. Navy, by
strangling her.
Plea: Guilty.
Finding: Guilty.
United States v. Randall, NMCCA No. 202500170
Modified Entry of Judgment
SENTENCE
On 19 October 2021, the military judge sentenced the Accused to the following:
Confinement for 35 days.
Reduction to E-1.
FOR THE COURT:
MARK K. JAMISON
Clerk of Court
2