UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JACQUELINE JACKSON,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-302 (EGS)
v.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Jacqueline Jackson (“Ms. Jackson”) brings this
suit against the District of Columbia (the “District”), Katie
Lundgren (“Ms. Lundgren”), and Doris Peña (“Ms. Peña”)
(collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12132 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (the
“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794 et seq.; and the D.C.
Family and Medical Leave Act (“D.C. FMLA”), D.C. Code § 32-503
et seq. See Compl., ECF No. 1. 1 Ms. Jackson also alleged four
tort claims against Defendants. See id. In February 2026, the
Court granted Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the
tort claims against the District and the individual defendants
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the Court refers to the ECF page numbers, not the page numbers of the filed documents.
1
to the extent they were sued in their official capacities. See
Jackson v. District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 25-302, 2026
WL 493943 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2026).
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Ms. Jackson’s Complaint (“Motion to Dismiss”). See Defs.’ Mot.
to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. (“Mot.”), ECF No. 12. Ms. Jackson
opposes the Motion. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss.
Pl.’s Compl. (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 16. Defendants filed a Reply,
see Defs.’ Reply in Further Supp. of their Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s
Compl. (“Reply”), ECF No. 17; and Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña
filed an additional Reply regarding any tort claims against
them, see Ms. Lundgren’s and Ms. Peña’s 2 Reply in Further Supp.
of their Mot. to Dismiss Pl.’s Compl. Against Them Individually
(“Individual Reply”), ECF No. 18.
Upon careful consideration of the Motion, Opposition, and
Replies thereto; and for the reasons stated below, the Motion is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the
Complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of
2 Collectively, the “Individual Defendants.”
2
deciding this motion and construes in Ms. Jackson’s favor. See
Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Ms. Jackson is a Black woman with disabilities. See Compl.,
ECF No. 1 ¶ 8. She started her career as an “educational
aid/paraprofessional” at CentroNia, where she worked until
February 2014 when she joined the D.C. public school system
(“DCPS”). Id. ¶¶ 20, 22. She began working at Marie Reed
Elementary School (“Marie Reed”) during the 2018–19 school year.
Id. ¶ 22.
1. Sexual Harassment Allegations
Ms. Jackson first met Ms. Peña when they worked together at
CentroNia. See id. ¶ 25. Ms. Jackson alleges that Ms. Peña
“sexually harassed [her] by assaulting her while they were at
work” in June 2007 and January 2008, which she reported to
CentroNia colleagues at the time. See id. ¶¶ 26–30. When she
joined the staff at Marie Reed, she learned that Ms. Peña also
worked there, but besides “warn[ing] her to not engage in the
sexually harassing conduct she did while they were at their
former school,” they “did not interact much until the 2022–2023
school year.” Id. ¶¶ 32–33, 35.
On March 1, 2023, Ms. Jackson and other union members,
including Ms. Peña, “lined up at around 1:45 pm to take a
photograph in the school’s hallway.” Id. ¶ 37. Ms. Jackson
alleges that when they were lining up, Ms. Peña “surprised [her]
3
by standing next to her for the photograph and laying her head
on [her] right breast,” which she considered to be “of a sexual
nature.” Id. ¶¶ 38, 40. Ms. Jackson “yelled” at Ms. Peña and
switched places with another colleague for the photograph. Id. ¶
39.
Around 3:30 pm that same day, Ms. Jackson was leaving her
classroom when she ran into Ms. Peña speaking to another
colleague in the hallway. Id. ¶ 41. Ms. Jackson told her that
“she needed to speak with her because she wanted to make it
clear that she wanted the sexually harassing behavior to stop.”
Id. ¶ 42. Ms. Jackson alleges that after Ms. Peña finished her
conversation with their other colleague, she “once again, placed
her head on [Ms. Jackson’s] right breast.” Id. ¶ 43. Ms. Jackson
“immediately responded by yelling at her to make it clear that
the sexual advances were not welcome,” and in response, Ms. Peña
“simply smiled back at her.” Id. ¶¶ 43–44.
That evening, Ms. Jackson emailed Ms. Lundgren, the
principal of Marie Reed, to inform her of Ms. Peña’s behavior,
both that day and at their previous job. See id. ¶¶ 11, 48. The
next day, on March 2, 2023, Ms. Jackson met with Ms. Lundgren to
“report her complaints of sexual harassment from [Ms. Peña].”
Id. ¶ 49. Ms. Lundgren responded to Ms. Jackson by “point[ing]
out that [Ms. Jackson] had been in her office a lot.” Id. ¶ 51.
Ms. Lundgren also “asked [Ms. Jackson] what her plans were for
4
the next school year” and that she would “support [Ms.
Jackson’s] request to transfer out of the school if she made
one.” Id. ¶¶ 52–53. Ms. Jackson understood Ms. Lundgren’s
comments “as a threat” and as “suggesting that she should leave
the school.” Id. ¶¶ 54–55.
The next day, on March 3, 2023, Ms. Lundgren emailed Ms.
Jackson, “thank[ing] her for discussing concerns about [Ms.
Peña] and stating that she spoke to [Ms. Peña] and told her that
[Ms. Jackson] felt uncomfortable with her physical contact.” Id.
¶ 58. She wrote that Ms. Peña said “that she was sorry for
making [Ms. Jackson] uncomfortable and that it would not happen
again,” and Ms. Lundgren advised Ms. Jackson to “keep her
distance from Ms. Peña to avoid physical touch that could be
uncomfortable or misunderstood in the future.” Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
Finally, Ms. Lundgren stated that she reviewed security footage
from the first incident, but that it “essentially appeared that
there was nothing untoward” about what had occurred. Id. ¶ 62.
Ms. Lundgren did not mention the second incident. Id. ¶ 63.
Ms. Jackson was not satisfied with Ms. Lundgren’s response,
and she emailed Ms. Lundgren to tell her that she “disagree
vehemently” with Ms. Lundgren’s interpretation of the incidents.
Id. ¶ 64. She also reiterated in her email that Ms. Peña should
not put her head on her breast, and that she would continue to
5
keep her distance from Ms. Peña to “avoid [Ms. Peña] violating
[Ms. Jackson’s] body again.” Id. ¶ 65.
On March 4, 2023, Ms. Jackson filed a police report
regarding the incidents with Ms. Peña and initiated an EEO
complaint and a complaint with DCPS’s Office of Labor Management
& Employee Relations (“LMER”). See id. ¶¶ 66, 68–69.
2. Racial and Disability Harassment Allegations
In a separate incident from her encounters with Ms. Peña,
Ms. Jackson alleges that she became injured when “she tripped
over a student’s foot when she was assisting the student and
fell down on the ground” on September 15, 2022. Id. ¶ 84. Ms.
Jackson’s knee and hip had been “originally damaged” in 2020.
See id. ¶ 86. After her fall at Marie Reed, she went to the
hospital the same day and for a follow-up appointment on
November 14, 2022, where it was determined she sprained her knee
and hip. Id. ¶ 85. She was allowed to return to work “in a
limited work capacity” on October 11, 2022, and she received a
“reasonable accommodation that allowed her to work in a pre-K
class, which required her to use less mobility than if she was
in a kindergarten class.” Id. ¶¶ 88–89.
In January 2023, Ms. Lundgren asked if she was willing to
switch to a kindergarten classroom full-time because the two
employees who worked in that classroom, who were both of
Hispanic descent, were not getting along. Id. ¶ 91. Ms. Jackson
6
agreed to switch “[t]o do what was best for the students.” Id.
Ms. Jackson, however, noticed that the switch to the
kindergarten “exacerbated her condition because it required
additional walking, which caused her significant pain.” Id. ¶
92.
In her new kindergarten classroom, a student began
“grabbing [Ms. Jackson’s] cane . . . [which] appeared to be
trying to cause [her] to fall.” Id. ¶ 93. This behavior
continued throughout the first weeks of January 2023, and while
Ms. Jackson spoke with the student and the teacher in the
classroom, Ms. Guillen, after each incident, the student
continued to grab her cane. Id. ¶ 94–95. On January 17, 2023,
Ms. Jackson emailed Ms. Guillen and Ms. Lundgren about how the
child “harassing her was causing her to feel unsafe in the
classroom, that she was experiencing additional pain based on
her physical disabilities due to the additional walking she had
to do,” and that “she wanted to transfer back to the pre-K
classroom she had been in before the transfer.” Id. ¶ 96. Ms.
Lundgren met with Ms. Jackson the next day about her concerns,
and Ms. Jackson provided Ms. Lundgren with “medical
documentation showing her medical restrictions to assist [Ms.
Lundgren] in working out a different schedule and classroom
assignment.” Id. ¶ 97–98.
7
On January 25, 2023, Ms. Lundgren provided Ms. Jackson with
a new schedule to accommodate her requests, which would have her
splitting her time between Ms. Guillen’s kindergarten classroom
and a pre-K classroom. Id. ¶ 99–100. Ms. Jackson responded to
Ms. Lundgren’s “proposed schedule,” advising Ms. Lundgren that
“the schedule as a whole was too active . . . as it required her
to work in two classes,” and that she “wished she could just
stay in one class to best assist her accommodations that she
needed.” Id. ¶ 101. However, Ms. Lundgren “enforced the new
schedule,” which was implemented on January 31, 2023. Id. ¶ 103.
On February 2, 2023, the same student with whom she had
trouble in January “crawled under the table and crawled between
[Ms. Jackson’s] legs twice to try to pull her down while she was
standing and trying to assist students.” Id. ¶ 104. Ms. Jackson
returned to Ms. Lundgren’s office later that day and
“desperately requested” to transfer classrooms because she felt
unsafe being around that particular student and due to her
mobility concerns. Id. ¶ 105. Ms. Lundgren denied her request,
but she promised to have a meeting with the student and their
parents. Id. ¶ 106, 110. However, the promised meeting never
occurred. Id. ¶ 111. Ms. Jackson also alleges that Ms. Lundgren
“proceeded to talk [Ms. Jackson] out of her desire to transfer.”
Id. ¶ 109.
8
3. FMLA Leave and Termination
“Due to the emotional distress she was experiencing as a
result of the sexual assaults and harassment,” Ms. Jackson began
“calling out” of work in March 2023. Id. ¶ 74. She received a
note from her doctor excusing her from work between March 1 and
March 24, 2023 due to her “emotional distress.” Id. ¶ 75. On
March 28, 2023, Ms. Jackson sought FMLA leave for Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder. Id. ¶ 77. Another doctor signed off on her
request from March 28 through April 24, 2023. Id. Ultimately,
she extended her leave through May 2023. Id. ¶ 78, 112. Her
March and April requests were approved by the school. Id. ¶ 82.
On April 29, 2023, Ms. Jackson received additional
documentation from a psychiatrist who stated that Ms. Jackson
“needed to be off from work from May 1, 2023 through June 1,
2023.” Id. ¶ 81.
On May 8, 2023, Ms. Jackson emailed LMER to inform them
that “she felt she was being discriminated against and
retaliated against by her school.” Id. ¶ 114.
On June 23, 2023, Ms. Jackson asked Human Resources (“HR”)
about returning to work at Marie Reed. Id. ¶ 115. The next day,
an HR representative contacted her and informed her that she
should have received a reduction-in-force (“RIF”) letter. Id. ¶
116. She received the letter on June 27, 2023 and “learned that
the letter was dated May 24, 2023.” Id. ¶ 117. Ms. Jackson
9
believes that Ms. Lundgren intentionally failed to provide the
letter to her, which “substantially impacted [her] ability to
become gainfully employed.” Id. ¶ 118–19.
B. Procedural Background
On March 4, 2023, Ms. Jackson filed an EEOC claim against
DCPS. Id. ¶ 13. On July 14, 2023, the D.C. Office of Human
Rights (“OHR”) docketed her Charge of Discrimination. Id. ¶ 16.
Ms. Jackson filed an Amended Charge on December 11, 2023. Id. On
November 4, 2024, Ms. Jackson received a Determination of Charge
and Right to Sue letter from the EEOC. Id. ¶ 17.
Ms. Jackson timely filed her Complaint on February 2, 2025.
See Compl., ECF No. 1. In her Complaint, Ms. Jackson alleges
eleven counts of hostile work environment, discrimination,
retaliation, and common law torts. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 121–
268 (alleging Count I: Sexual Harassment in violation of Title
VII; Count II: Disability Harassment in violation of the ADA,
the Rehabilitation Act, and D.C. FMLA; Count III: Reprisal
Harassment in violation of Title VII, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act and D.C. FMLA; Count IV: Racial
Discrimination in violation of Title VII; Count V: Disability
Discrimination in violation of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act,
and D.C. FMLA; Count VI: Reprisal Based Upon Prior EEO Activity
in violation of Title VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and
D.C. FMLA; Count VII: Wrongful Discharge in violation of Title
10
VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and D.C. FMLA; Count VIII:
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count IX:
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress; Count X: Negligence;
and Count XI: Violation of Hate Crime Statute in violation of
D.C. Code § 22-3704).
Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss on March 13, 2025,
seeking to dismiss Ms. Jackson’s Complaint in its entirety. See
Mot., ECF No. 12. The same day, Defendants filed their Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that Counts VII–IX against
the District of Columbia are barred because Ms. Jackson failed
to comply with the notice requirements of D.C. Code § 12-309.
See Def.’s Mot. for Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 14. Defendants’
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was unopposed, and the Court
granted the motion on February 23, 2026, dismissing the tort
claims against the District and the Individual Defendants to the
extent they were sued in their official capacities. See Order,
ECF No. 22.
Ms. Jackson filed her Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss
on April 10, 2025. See Opp’n, ECF No. 16. Defendants filed their
Reply on April 24, 2025, see Reply, ECF No. 17; and the
Individual Defendants filed their Reply regarding Counts VIII–XI
the same day, see Individual Reply, ECF No. 18.
The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.
11
II. Standard of Review
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 3
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Browning
v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C. Cir. 2002). To survive a
12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal (“Iqbal”), 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
[a] reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. The standard does not amount to a
“probability requirement,” but it does require more than a
3 As a threshold matter, Ms. Jackson argues that “Defendants have effectively converted their Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by including two exhibits to their Motion,” and therefore she is “compelled to oppose their Motion as one for Summary Judgment.” Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 8 n.1. Ms. Jackson is mistaken. “Where a document is referred to in the complaint and is central to the plaintiff’s claim, such a document attached to the motion [to dismiss] papers may be considered without converting the motion to one for summary judgment.” Vanover v. Hantman, 77 F. Supp. 2d 91, 98 (D.D.C. 1999), aff’d 38 F. App’x 4 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Defendants attach security footage of the incidents that gives rise to the Complaint, which are explicitly referenced in the Complaint. The Court can consider these exhibits if it so chooses. However, it is premature at this stage to consider these exhibits, and therefore all exhibits attached to both the Motion to Dismiss and Ms. Jackson’s Opposition will be disregarded. The Court will treat this motion as a motion to dismiss.
12
“sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
When evaluating a 12(b)(6) motion, the Court “may consider
only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either
attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of
which [courts] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis
Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Furthermore, the court “must accept as true all of the factual
allegations contained in the complaint.” Atherton v. D.C. Off.
of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). The court must also give the plaintiff the
“benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts
alleged.” Id. at 677 (internal quotations omitted). However, the
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched
as a factual allegation.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986). And “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements” are not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678.
13
III. Analysis
A. Plaintiff’s Abandoned and Conceded Claims (Counts II–
III, V, VII–XI)
1. Plaintiff’s Abandoned Claims (Counts VII–XI)
In her Opposition, Ms. Jackson expressly abandons four of
her claims; she states that “she does not intend to pursue her
tort claims any longer.” Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 19 n.3. Therefore,
the Court will dismiss Counts VII–XI to the extent she sued the
individual defendants in their individual capacities.
Ms. Jackson also abandoned her wrongful discharge claim
(Count VII). “It is well understood in this Circuit that when a
plaintiff files an opposition to a dispositive motion and
addresses only certain arguments raised by the defendant, a
court may treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to
address as conceded.” Hopkins v. Women’s Div., Gen. Bd. of
Global Ministries, 284 F. Supp. 2d 15, 25 (D.D.C. 2003); see
also Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., No. 02-2069, 2003 WL 21854800,
at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 5, 2003), aff’d, 389 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir.
2004). Ms. Jackson fails to address Defendants’ arguments
regarding her wrongful discharge claim in her Opposition. See
generally Opp’n, ECF No. 16. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss
Count VII of the Complaint.
14
2. Plaintiff’s Conceded Claims (Counts II, III, V)
Local Rule 7.1(b) states:
Within 14 days of the date of service or at such
other time as the court may direct, an opposing
party shall serve and file a memorandum of points
and authorities in opposition to the motion. If
such a memorandum is not filed within the
prescribed time, the court may treat the
motion as conceded.
(emphasis added). And as noted above, if a plaintiff files an
opposition addressing only certain points raised by the
defendant in their motion to dismiss, those points can be
considered conceded by the court. See Fox, 2003 WL 21854800, at
*2.
In her Opposition to Defendants’ arguments regarding Counts
II (disability harassment), III (reprisal harassment), and V
(disability discrimination), Ms. Jackson restates the factual
allegations in her Complaint and comes to legal conclusions
without providing supporting authority. See Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at
25–31, 34. Ms. Jackson cites no legal authority to refute
Defendants’ arguments regarding Counts II (disability
harassment) and III (reprisal harassment), see id. at 25-31;
other than citing a case that states the elements for a hostile
work environment claim, see id. at 27, 30 (citing Trant v.
Murray, 589 F. Supp. 3d 50, 54 (D.D.C. 2022). Similarly, Ms.
Jackson cites no legal authority to refute Defendants’ arguments
regarding Count V (disability discrimination), citing only Ward
15
v. McDonald, 762 F. 3d 24, 31, 32 (D.C. 2014), which states the
elements for a failure to accommodate claim. See Opp’n, ECF No.
16 at 34.
In sum, Ms. Jackson provides no legal authority to refute
Defendant’s arguments that Counts II (disability harassment),
III (reprisal harassment), and V (disability discrimination)
should be dismissed. 4 “The court's role is not to act as an
advocate for the plaintiff and construct legal arguments on
[their] behalf in order to counter those in the motion to
dismiss.” Stephenson v. Cox, 223 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (D.D.C.
2002). Therefore, the Court concludes that Ms. Jackson has
conceded the Defendants’ arguments as to Counts II, III, and V,
and those counts will be dismissed.
B. Claims Against Individual Defendants
Defendants argue that Title VII, the ADA, the
Rehabilitation Act, and the D.C. FMLA do not provide for claims
of individual liability, and therefore the claims against Ms.
Lundgren and Ms. Peña must be dismissed. See Mot. to Dismiss,
ECF No. 12 at 20, 31. Regarding Ms. Jackson’s sex, race, and
disability discrimination claims under Title VII, the ADA, and
the Rehabilitation Act, Defendants are correct. While she does
4 Nor does she make any legal argument as to why these claims would succeed on the merits, even though she claims to be responding to the Motion to Dismiss as an Opposition to a Motion for Summary Judgment. See Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 8 n.1.
16
not explicitly state whether she sues Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña
in their official or individual capacities, the Court construes
the remainder of Ms. Jackson’s allegations against Ms. Lundgren
and Ms. Peña under these statutes as that she is suing them in
their individual capacity, as Ms. Jackson argues at other times
in her opposition that liability is imputed to the District of
Columbia for Ms. Lundgren and Ms. Peña’s behavior. See, e.g.,
Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 23. However, these statutes do not provide
for individual liability. See Cruz-Packer v. District of
Columbia, 539 F. Supp. 2d 181, 186 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing Gary v.
Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“Title VII does not
impose liability on individuals in their personal capacity.”);
Di Lella v. Univ. of D.C. David A. Clarke Sch. of Law, 570 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 8 n.8 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[T]here is no individual
liability under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act.”).
Ms. Jackson also claims that Ms. Lundgren retaliated
against her for requesting leave under the D.C. FMLA. See
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 166, 204. This Court does not need to
determine whether the D.C. FMLA statute provides for individual
liability, as Ms. Jackson explicitly states that “Defendants
and/or their agents were acting within the course of and scope
of their employment during these harassing incidents.” Id. ¶¶
169, 207. The Court interprets these statements to mean that she
is not suing Ms. Lundgren in her individual capacity for
17
violations of the D.C. FMLA, but rather as an agent of her
employer. Because Ms. Jackson does not allege that Ms. Lundgren
retaliated against her in her individual capacity under the D.C.
FMLA, this claim against Ms. Lundgren will be dismissed.
Accordingly, Count I against Ms. Peña will be dismissed,
and Counts II, III, V, and VI against Ms. Lundgren will be
dismissed. Only Ms. Jackson’s claims against the District
remain.
C. CMPA’s Applicability
The District argues that Ms. Jackson has failed to exhaust
her administrative remedies because her claims are subject to
the D.C. Comprehensive Merit Personnel Act (“CMPA”). See Opp’n,
ECF No. 16 at 18–20. “With few exceptions, the CMPA is the
exclusive remedy for a District of Columbia public employee who
has a work-related complaint of any kind.” Osekre v. Gage, 698
F. Supp. 2d 209, 211 (D.D.C. 2011). However, an employee
alleging unlawful discrimination must pursue their claims
through the Office of Human Rights. See King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d
656, 664 (D.C. 1993); Davis v. District of Columbia, 949 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2013) (“[T]he CMPA does not apply to
allegations of discrimination.”).
Ms. Jackson’s remaining claims are that the District
discriminated against her. Allegations of discrimination are
squarely within the investigatory purview of the D.C. Office of
18
Human Rights. Ms. Jackson filed a complaint with the EEOC and
the D.C. Office of Human Rights. 5 Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 13, 16.
She received a Determination of Charge and Right to Sue letter
on November 4, 2024. Id. ¶ 17. Accordingly, the Court concludes
that Ms. Jackson has exhausted her administrative remedies.
D. Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims
1. Hostile Work Environment (Count I)
Under Title VII, it is an “unlawful employment practice for
an employer ... to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her]
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, ... sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). To prevail on a hostile work
environment claim, “a plaintiff must show that his employer
subjected him to discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and
insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive
working environment.” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1201
(D.C. Cir. 2008).
5 In the District of Columbia, the EEOC and the D.C. Office of Human Rights operate on a work sharing agreement, “and under the terms of this agreement, charges filed with the EEOC are deemed simultaneously filed with the DCOHR.” Lee v. District of Columbia, 733 F. Supp. 2d 156, 161 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Schuler v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 514 F.3d 1365, 1372–73 (D.C. Cir. 2008)).
19
To make a prima facie Title VII hostile work environment
due to sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the employee was a member of a protected
class; (2) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome[ ] sexual harassment ...; (3) the
harassment complained of was based upon sex;
(4) the charged sexual harassment had the
effect of unreasonably interfering with the
plaintiff's work performance and creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment ...; and (5) the existence of
respondeat superior liability.
Davis v. Coastal Int’l Sec., Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1122–23 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). While Ms. Jackson is not required to plead in her
Complaint all elements of a prima facie case or “plead law or
match facts to every element of a legal theory, the alleged
facts [in her Complaint] must be able to support such a claim.”
Tucker v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 764 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2011)
(quoting Krieger v. Fadely, 211 F.3d 134, 136 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
The Court concludes that Ms. Jackson has not pled
sufficient facts to show that respondeat superior liability
plausibly exists. Ms. Jackson’s alleged harasser was her
coworker, Ms. Peña. “If the harassing employee is the victim's
co-worker, the employer is liable only if it was negligent in
controlling working conditions.” Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570
U.S. 421, 424 (2013). An employer may be held liable only “if
the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and
failed to implement prompt and appropriate corrective action.”
20
Curry v. District of Columbia, 195 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
When considering whether an employer’s response to alleged
harassment is adequate, “courts should look to ‘the amount of
time that elapsed between the notice and remedial action, the
options available to the employer, possibly including employee
training sessions, transferring the harassers, written warnings,
reprimands in personnel files, or termination, and whether or
not the measures ended the harassment.’” Johnson v. Shinseki,
811 F. Supp. 2d 336, 350 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Curry, 195 F.3d
at 662 n.17). Ms. Jackson’s own allegations show that the
District promptly and appropriately responded to the alleged
harassment. Here, Ms. Lundgren met with Ms. Jackson the day
after the latter emailed her with concerns about Ms. Peña’s
behavior. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48–49. Ms. Lundgren also
spoke with Ms. Peña, who agreed to stay away from Ms. Jackson
and apologized. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. Ms. Lundgren acted quickly once
she learned of Ms. Jackson’s complaints about Ms. Peña, and her
discussion with Ms. Peña resulted in Ms. Peña agreeing to cease
the behavior about which Ms. Jackson complained. See Compl., ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 48–49, 58–59 (stating that within two days of the
incident, Ms. Lundgren relayed to Ms. Jackson that Ms. Peña
apologized and stated that “it would not happen again”). There
is no allegation that the behavior happened again. See generally
21
id. Ms. Jackson does not allege that she reported the behavior
that occurred at CentroNia prior to reporting the behavior that
occurred in March 2023. See generally Compl., ECF No. 1. The
District apparently had no knowledge of this prior incident, see
Curry, 195 F.3d at 660; and therefore could not have anticipated
there to be any future issues between the two women. Because Ms.
Jackson fails to allege facts supporting respondeat superior
liability, Count I of the Complaint will be dismissed.
2. Race Discrimination (Count IV)
To state a prima facie case of racial discrimination under
Title VII, a plaintiff must show that “(1) [they are] a member
of a protected class, (2) [they] suffered an adverse employment
action, and (3) the unfavorable action gives rise to an
inference of discrimination (that is, an inference that [their]
employer took the action because of [their] membership in the
protected class).” See Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). A plaintiff must “allege some facts that demonstrate
[their] race was the reason for defendant's actions and cannot
merely invoke his race in the course of a claim's narrative.”
Doe #1 v. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 554 F. Supp. 3d 75, 102
(D.D.C. 2021) (citing Bray v. RHT, Inc., 748 F. Supp. 3, 5
(D.D.C. 1990), aff’d sub nom. Bray v. Hebble, 976 F.2d 45 (D.C.
Cir. 1992)).
22
The parties dispute whether the third prong has been
satisfied: whether Ms. Jackson’s employer took an unfavorable
action because of Ms. Jackson’s race. See Mot., ECF No. 12 at
28–29; Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 32; Reply, ECF No. 17 at 17–19. Ms.
Jackson claims that Ms. Lundgren “subjected her to racial
discrimination when she refused to allow [her] to transfer out
of a kindergarten classroom . . . unlike her Hispanic colleague
that was allowed to switch upon request.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶
182. She also claims that she was “treated unfavorably as
compared with her Hispanic colleague, [Ms. Peña],” when she
received a RIF letter, which Ms. Peña did not. Id.
The Court agrees with Defendants that the allegation that
her Hispanic colleagues were allowed to switch upon request are
“mere conclusory invocations” of race for legitimate employment
decisions. Mot., ECF No. 12 at 28–29; see also Doe #1, 554 F.
Supp. 3d at 102 (“[A] plaintiff must allege some facts that
demonstrate his race was the reason for defendant's actions and
cannot merely invoke his race in the course of a claim's
narrative.” (citation modified)). Ms. Jackson acknowledges that
she was asked to switch classrooms with the Hispanic colleague
who made the request because two colleagues “were not getting
along.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 91. Ms. Jackson does not allege any
other facts that would indicate that she was switched with this
colleague due to her race. In fact, she acknowledges that she
23
was asked to switch because of the personality conflict between
the two coworkers. See Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 32.
Ms. Jackson also argues she was “treated unfavorably as
compared with her Hispanic co-worker, [Ms. Peña]”, Compl., ECF
No. 1 ¶ 182; and that Ms. Peña, “who was . . . Hispanic, was
not issued a RIF,” despite Ms. Jackson’s complaints to Ms.
Lundgren that Ms. Peña sexually assaulted her. Opp’n, ECF No. 16
at 32. “Where a plaintiff seeks an inference of discrimination
based on ‘disparate treatment,’ the plaintiff must further show
that ‘all of the relevant aspects of her employment situation
were “nearly identical” to those’ of the other employees who did
not suffer similar adverse employment actions.” Budik v. Howard
Univ. Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Neuren
v. Adduci, Mastriani, Meeks & Schill, 43 F.3d 1507, 1514 (D.C.
Cir. 1995)). Ms. Jackson fails to allege facts that show that
her employment situation was “nearly identical” to Ms. Peña’s.
In fact, Ms. Jackson indicates that their employment situations
are not identical. Although both are paraprofessionals, they had
different job titles and responsibilities: Ms. Jackson was “an
educational aide and paraprofessional,” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 9;
while Ms. Peña is a “dual language paraprofessional,” id. ¶ 12.
Moreover, Ms. Jackson alleges that she believes that Ms. Peña
should have been let go instead of her because of her
allegations of sexual harassment, not because Ms. Jackson was
24
being treated differently because of her race. Id. ¶ 182; Opp’n,
ECF No. 16 at 32 (stating that Ms. Peña was not issued a RIF,
“even after [Ms. Lundgren] knew from [Ms. Jackson] and the
security videos . . . that [Ms. Peña] sexually assaulted [Ms.
Jackson], [Ms. Jackson] informed her about two prior incidents
[Ms. Peña] committed against her, years prior, and LMER
substantiated [Ms. Jackson’s] claims against [Ms. Peña]”).
Accordingly, because Ms. Jackson has not pled sufficient
facts that she suffered an unfavorable employment action because
of her race, Count IV of the Complaint will be dismissed.
3. Reprisal Based on EEO Activity (Count VI)
Ms. Jackson’s remaining claim is that that the District
retaliated against her because she “requested a reasonable
accommodation and reported sexual harassment, discrimination,
and retaliation,” and because she “requested FMLA” leave.
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 204. 6
The statutes 7 she claims have been violated all have a
similar standard to prove a prima facie case of retaliation: (1)
6 Defendants argue that Ms. Jackson “refram[ed] her alleged FMLA ‘discrimination’ claim as one for retaliation” in her Opposition, Reply, ECF No. 17 at 21. Her Complaint, however, clearly alleges that she was retaliated against for requesting leave under the D.C. FMLA. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 202, 204, 208.
7 Ms. Jackson includes in her Complaint that the “unwelcome
retaliatory incidents” also violated her “right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.” Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 208. However, nowhere else in
25
that she engaged in protected activity, (2) that she suffered an
adverse or materially adverse employment action (depending on
the statute), and (3) there was a causal relationship between
the two. See Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(Rehabilitation Act); McGrath v. Clinton, 666 F.3d 1377, 1379–80
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (Title VII); Mayers v. Laborers’ Health &
Safety Fund of N. Am., 478 F.3d 364, 368 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (ADA);
Alford v. Providence Hosp., 945 F. Supp. 2d 98, 108 (D.D.C.
2013) (D.C. FMLA). “[A] plaintiff need not plead each element of
his prima facie case to survive a motion to dismiss.” Jackson v.
Dist. Hosp. Partners, L.P., No. CV 18-1978, 2019 WL 3502389, at
*5 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2019). The parties dispute whether Ms.
Jackson suffered an adverse employment action and if there was a
causal connection between the two. 8
a. Adverse Employment Action
Ms. Jackson alleges that she has suffered adverse
employment actions due to her “opposition and/or protected
activity” because Defendants did not
remedy[] the issue of the student in Ms.
Guillen’s class regularly trying to injure
her Complaint nor in the briefing materials does this argument appear again, except as a conclusory statement with no legal support. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 129, 170, 208. Therefore, the Court will disregard this argument.
8 Defendants state that “[t]he same operative facts discussed in
section III apply [to their argument in section VI].” Mot., ECF No. 12 at 31. The Court will consider their arguments in section III as incorporated into their arguments in section VI.
26
her, preventing her from allowing her to
transfer completely out of Ms. Guillen’s class
to avoid that student, not properly responding
to Plaintiff’s concerns regarding the sexual
assaults perpetrated on her by [Ms. Peña], and
ultimately, terminating her.
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 206.
Under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege that she suffered
a “materially adverse action” in her retaliation claim, rather
than simply an “adverse employment action.” See Rhone v. Rubio,
No. 24-3389, 2025 WL 3017791, at *9 (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2025). “A
‘materially adverse action’ is one that would have ‘dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’” Bain v. Off. of Att’y Gen., 648 F. Supp. 3d
19, 55 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. White (“Burlington”), 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). “It does not
reach every minor and even trivial employment action . . . and
an adverse action for this purpose typically . . . involves a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, or reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities.” Id. (citation modified).
“The D.C. Circuit has held that the framework for analyzing
anti-retaliation suits under the Rehabilitation Act mirrors that
applied for retaliation suits under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act.” Hovsepyan v. Blaya, 770 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269
(D.D.C. 2011) (citing Smith v. District of Columbia, 430 F.3d
27
450, 455 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The standard is the same under the
ADA. See Shinabargar v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of D.C., 164 F.
Supp. 3d 1, 16 (D.D.C. 2016) (stating the same standard under
the ADA as the Rehabilitation Act’s for retaliation claims).
“[P]urely subjective injuries, such as dissatisfaction with a
reassignment, public humiliation, or loss of reputation, are not
adverse actions.” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C.
Cir. 2006) (citation modified).
Ms. Jackson claims that she was retaliated against by the
Defendants under the D.C. FMLA. The standard for establishing a
prima facie case of retaliation under the D.C. statute is the
same as it is under the federal FMLA statute, which, in relevant
part here, requires that she show that she suffered an “adverse
employment action.” Alford, 945 F. Supp. 2d at 108. The D.C.
Circuit has not yet determined whether the materially adverse
standard, rather than the lower standard of “adverse action,”
applies to FMLA claims. See Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778
F.3d 158, 162–63 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
The Court concludes that Ms. Jackson has not alleged
sufficient facts to support that she suffered a materially
adverse employment action with respect to her dissatisfaction
with the handling of her complaint against Ms. Peña. She
disagrees with Ms. Lundgren’s handling of her complaint against
Ms. Peña, but her disagreement is not a materially adverse
28
employment action. See Bonnette v. Shinseki, 907 F. Supp. 2d 54,
70 (D.D.C. 2012) (“A materially adverse action is one that
results in significant harm or hardship, such as affecting the
plaintiff's position, grade level, salary, or promotion
opportunities and might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” (citation
modified)). Furthermore, Ms. Jackson was not dissuaded from
making a charge of discrimination, demonstrated by the fact that
she filed her EEO charge after she complained to Ms. Lundgren.
See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 48, 68 (establishing the timeline of
Ms. Jackson’s complaints to Ms. Lundgren and the EEOC).
Accordingly, because Ms. Jackson fails to allege sufficient
facts to state a claim of retaliation regarding the handling of
her complaint about Ms. Peña’s behavior, her claim of
retaliation stemming from her dissatisfaction of how her
complaint was handled will be dismissed.
It is also clear that Ms. Jackson was not satisfied with
Ms. Lundgren’s attempts to accommodate her by moving her to the
kindergarten classroom part-time. However, dissatisfaction with
a reassignment is not a “materially adverse” action. See
Bonnette, 907 F. Supp. 2d at 70 (“ The law is clear that purely
subjective injuries, such as dissatisfaction with a
reassignment, public humiliation, or loss of reputation, are not
adverse actions.” (citation modified)). Again, Ms. Jackson does
29
not allege facts that would show that the actions taken by
Defendants regarding her accommodation request would “reasonably
dissuade” a reasonable employee from making a charge of
discrimination. Therefore, the Court will also dismiss Ms.
Jackson’s retaliation claim as it pertains to her classroom
assignment.
Drawing all inferences in her favor, Ms. Jackson argues
that she was terminated while and because she was on FMLA leave.
See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 77, 83, 113–20; Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at
37. She also alleges that her termination violated Title VII,
the ADA, and the Rehabilitation Act. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶
201–15 (Count VI).
For the reasons explained below, the Court determines Ms.
Jackson has alleged sufficient facts that her termination was a
materially adverse employment action, which satisfies the second
prong of the Title VII, Rehabilitation Act, and ADA standard,
and the “adverse employment action” standard under the D.C.
FMLA. The Court will consider her arguments regarding causal
connection only in regard to her termination.
b. Causal Connection
The parties disagree whether Ms. Jackson has sufficiently
alleged that there was a causal connection between Ms. Jackson’s
protected activity and her termination. See Mot., ECF No. 12 at
31–32; Opp’n, ECF No. 16 at 34–37; Reply, ECF No. 17 at 21–22.
30
Defendants argue that Ms. Jackson’s “Complaint fails because her
EEO complaint is not temporally proximate to her termination
three months later.” Mot., ECF No. 12 at 31 (citing Burlington,
548 U.S. at 68).
A plaintiff can establish that “a causal link between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action [is]
satisfied merely by close temporal proximity between the two
events.” Peters v. District of Columbia, 873 F. Supp. 2d 158,
200 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.s. 268, 273 (2001)). When using temporal proximity as the sole
method to establish a causal link, the two events must have
occurred “very close in time.” Woodruff v. Peters, 482 F.3d 521,
529 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Although neither the Supreme Court nor
the D.C. Circuit has established a bright-line three-month rule,
three months is perceived as approaching the outer limit.”
McNair v. District of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 3d 81, 89 (D.D.C.
2016) (cleaned up); see also Hamilton v. Geithner, 666 F.3d
1344, 1357–58 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Although the Supreme Court has
cited circuit decisions suggesting that in some instances a
three-month period between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action may, standing alone, be too lengthy to
raise an inference of causation, neither the Supreme Court nor
this court has established a bright-line three-month rule.”).
However, “[o]n a motion to dismiss, it is sufficient for
31
plaintiffs to ‘plead causation simply by alleging that the
adverse actions were caused by [their] protected activity.’”
Guisbert v. Wash. Convention & Sports Auth., Civil No. 19-cv3828, 2020 WL 5798444, at *2 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2020) (citing
Bartlette v. Hyatt Regency, 208 F. Supp. 3d 311, 323 (D.D.C.
2016)); see also Winston v. Clough, 712 F. Supp. 2d 1, 11
(D.D.C. 2010) (collecting cases).
Defendants argue that Ms. Jackson has not shown that there
was a causal link between her EEO complaints (made in early
March) and FMLA leave (which was approved in late March), and
her termination, which occurred in June. See Mot., ECF No. 12 at
31–32; Reply, ECF No. 17 at 21–22. While Ms. Jackson received
the letter informing her of the reduction in force and her
termination in late June 2023, see Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 116–17;
the letter itself was dated May 24, 2023, id. ¶ 117. If the
adverse employment action is receiving the notice itself, the
temporal proximity between her protected activity and adverse
employment action falls within three months. However, the Court
need not decide whether the date of the notice or the date of
her receipt of the notice controls. Ms. Jackson has sufficiently
alleged to survive at this stage that she was terminated because
of her EEO activity and because she took FMLA leave, and because
“temporal proximity is not the only way to allege causation. . .
at this early stage, plaintiff has alleged just enough for her
32
retaliation claim . . . to survive a motion to dismiss.” Menoken
v. McGettigan, 273 F. Supp. 3d 188, 202 (D.D.C. 2017).
Moreover, “[a] large gap between protected activity and
retaliation is not necessarily fatal to a claim when the
plaintiff can point to other factors leading to an inference of
causation.” Lawson v. Sessions, 271 F. Supp. 3d 119, 137 (D.D.C.
2017) (citation omitted). Ms. Jackson has also alleged that Ms.
Lundgren pointed out that she had been in her office a lot and
that she would support her requests to transfer, which Ms.
Jackson “took . . . as a threat” for complaining about her
coworker. See Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 51–54. Taken as true at the
pleading stage, these facts support Ms. Jackson’s arguments that
there was a causal connection between her EEO complaints and
FMLA leave and her termination.
Accordingly, Ms. Jackson has alleged sufficient facts to
state a claim that she was terminated in retaliation for making
an EEO charge and for taking FMLA leave, in violation of Title
VII, the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the D.C. FMLA statute.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 12.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Counts I to V, and VII to XI of
the Complaint is GRANTED. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Count VI
of the Complaint is GRANTED regarding Ms. Jackson’s complaints
33
of sexual assault and transfer from the classroom and DENIED
regarding her termination.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
September 24, 2026
34