RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 24, 2026
TO BE PUBLISHED
Supreme Court of Kentucky
2025-SC-0217-MR
SYLVANUS JOSEPH MCBRIDE APPELLANT
ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT
V. HONORABLE MARY K. MOLLOY, JUDGE
NO. 23-CR-00354
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE
OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG
AFFIRMING
Following a three-day jury trial, Appellant Sylvanus Joseph Aaron
McBride was convicted of numerous counts of possession or viewing of matter
portraying a sexual performance by a minor, four counts of first-degree
promoting a sexual performance by a minor, three counts of first-degree sexual
abuse, and one count of third-degree rape. The Kenton Circuit Court
sentenced McBride to seventy years in prison. McBride now appeals as a
matter of right, asserting that the trial court erred in permitting police
testimony regarding a report produced after extracting data from his cellphone.
Following careful review, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On January 2, 2023, McBride was sitting in his car, which he purchased
with his ex-girlfriend, Arin, when he was confronted and arrested by police on
an outstanding bench warrant. When Arin learned that the car had been
“abandoned,” she contacted the company from which they purchased the car,
and she located the vehicle. Upon looking inside the car, Arin found McBride’s
cell phone and looked through its contents. After searching through text
messages and photos, Arin found sexual photos and videos of McBride and
young girls, including her own daughter, A.A., and another girl, E.A., McBride’s
stepdaughter from a previous marriage. Arin also found photos of other young
girls on McBride’s phone that she opined appeared to have been downloaded
from the internet.
Specifically, in the video of McBride with A.A., Arin testified that McBride
had his penis next to A.A.’s foot. While she could not see A.A.’s face in the
video, she knew it was her daughter because of her unique skin tone and the
background seen in the video, which was A.A.’s bedroom at their previous
home. Arin noted that even at the time she found the video, A.A. had not
reached the age of twelve. Arin sent the videos that she believed included E.A.
to E.A.’s mother, Amanda, then called police. Sergeant Curtis Bush and Officer
Mairose responded. 1 When Sergeant Bush returned to the house after
stepping outside to make a phone call, Arin was showing Officer Mairose
content of an “explicit sexual nature” on McBride’s phone. When Sergeant
1 The briefs do not identify Officer Mairose’s first name.
2
Bush realized it the images depicted a young person, he instructed Officer
Mairose to turn the phone off and package it for evidence.
Prior to trial, the Commonwealth filed an expert witness disclosure
naming Ron Trenkamp, a computer forensic analyst, and outlining various
details of the phone investigation to which he would testify, including “how
data is examined and analyzed.” The notice also explained that the
Commonwealth sought to admit Trenkamp’s testimony “because he has
specialized training, knowledge, and expertise in the area of electronic forensic
examination.”
Trenkamp performed a Cellebrite extraction from McBride’s phone.
Cellebrite is an extraction software used to extract data from phones, then
convert the data into readable reports to aid law enforcement in investigations.
Trenkamp gave the Cellebrite report to Detective Kyle Wallace, a member of the
Internet Crimes Against Children (ICAC) Task Force. Detective Wallace realized
that there were photos and videos from McBride’s phone that the Cellebrite
software did not capture, so Trenkamp ran Axiom Magnet software to try to
capture more data. The Axiom software generated a report that was essentially
the same as the Cellebrite report. Then Trenkamp conducted a manual
examination of the phone and used the Cellebrite software to capture
screenshots of what he was seeing on the phone. He then provided the
Cellebrite report and screenshots to Detective Wallace.
Approximately one year after the expert disclosure was filed, on January
30, 2025, the Commonwealth filed a motion seeking to depose Trenkamp
3
because he would be out of town for training during the scheduled trial date of
March 4, 2025. The motion asserted that Trenkamp’s testimony was material
and necessary because he performed the forensic imaging and examination of
the electronic devices. However, the Commonwealth noted that Trenkamp was
not the investigating officer and did not conduct a material investigation of the
data extracted from the devices.
Trenkamp’s deposition was held on February 21. At the time, he was
employed as a computer forensic analyst for the Covington Police Department
for approximately eight years. He not only worked on cases from the Covington
Police Department but also assisted other agencies. Trenkamp had specialized
training in Cellebrite. Pertaining to McBride’s case, Trenkamp used both
Cellebrite and Magnet Axiom to do extractions and gave Detective Wallace the
extraction reports. 2 He explained he was not involved in investigating the data
he extracted from McBride’s phone, and once he extracted the data, Detective
Wallace sorted through it. Further, Trenkamp explained that sometimes
devices contain data that the extraction software does not recover. In these
instances, he manually looks at a device and takes screenshots of the text
messages or pictures.
2 When asked why he used two different extraction programs on McBride’s
phone, Trenkamp explained that the way each program recovers data is different. After doing the Cellebrite examination, some of the photos and videos that Detective Wallace felt were necessary could not be extracted. Essentially, there may be evidence on the phone that certain software is incapable of extracting, hence the benefit of using multiple programs.
4
On February 27, 2025, merely five days before trial, the Commonwealth
filed an expert witness disclosure for Detective Wallace. The disclosure cited
Allgeier v. Commonwealth, 915 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Ky. 1996), noting that
Kentucky courts have routinely recognized that police officers can provide
testimony and render opinions without being qualified as an expert witness.
The Commonwealth asserted that Detective Wallace could testify as to the data
contained in the Cellebrite report without being qualified as a traditional expert
because of his training and experience as a police officer. The Commonwealth
sought to elicit Detective Wallace’s testimony regarding the electronic evidence
in the case. McBride objected, noting it had already hired its own expert, in
part, to testify about things “made relevant” by the Commonwealth’s expert.
In response, McBride filed a motion in limine to exclude Detective
Wallace’s testimony. During a hearing on the motion, the Commonwealth
asserted it only disclosed Detective Wallace as an expert because Trenkamp
was unavailable to testify, and McBride countered instead that the
Commonwealth was dissatisfied with Trenkamp’s testimony, referencing
Trenkamp’s recent deposition testimony in an unrelated case in which he
stated he could not remember whether the extraction was a full file system,
and that he had certifications listed on his CV that were probably expired due
to being nearly thirty years old. McBride orally asked the court for a Daubert
hearing, which was denied.
The Commonwealth argued that Detective Wallace was qualified to do the
digital download in this case, even though he did not do it. McBride argued
5
that even though Detective Wallace could go through the extraction reports and
see images, the issue in this case was how those images ended up on
McBride’s device, which required metadata analysis. After considering the
parties’ arguments, the trial court denied McBride’s motion in limine. 3
McBride then moved to compel disclosure of Detective Wallace’s CV and
training. The trial court stated it would not require Detective Wallace to create
a CV, and the Commonwealth agreed to ask Detective Wallace for any list or
record of training he attended. The trial court ordered the Commonwealth to
provide Detective Wallace’s qualifications and training certificates to McBride
and specifically instructed McBride to inform the Court if the Commonwealth
failed to do so. 4 Ultimately, the Commonwealth provided six certificates from
trainings Detective Wallace attended on Cellebrite operations.
3 Although the expert witness notice regarding Detective Wallace was filed only
five days before trial, there is no indication in the record that McBride requested a continuance or any other relief. However, during the hearing on this issue defense counsel noted for the trial court that given the last-minute disclosure, they would not be ready for trial the following week.
4 McBride also argued the trial court abused its discretion in “not requiring
Detective Wallace to turn over his qualifications to the defense.” But during the hearing, the trial court stated it would not required Detective Wallace to create a CV, to which the Commonwealth stated it could ask the detective for records of his training or other qualifications. The trial court said “do that,” and specifically instructed McBride to inform the court if he did not receive the documents within a reasonable period of time. Therefore, the trial court plainly instructed the Commonwealth to provide Detective Wallace’s qualifications, and in fact the record contains the six certificates of the trainings he attended. Additionally, nothing in the record indicates that McBride informed the trial court that he did not receive the requested qualifications. Further, it is immaterial that three of Detective Wallace’s certifications occurred after the date the extractions took place. As explained below, there is a distinction between performing the extraction (as Trenkamp did) and investigating or reviewing the results (as Detective Wallace did).
6
Detective Wallace testified at trial and explained his role in the
investigation. When analyzing the Cellebrite report, Detective Wallace
determined that the photos and videos at issue in the case were not stored
locally on McBride’s phone, but rather in McBride’s Google Photos as part of an
account belonging to “joemcbride1990.” In addition to the photos and videos of
E.A. and A.A., he also found photos from the internet of undeveloped, young
girls in the Google Photos account. Detective Wallace also provided testimony
regarding his training and experience using Cellebrite and performing
extractions, including being certified to perform cellphone extractions on his
own.
Over the course of a three-day trial, the Commonwealth presented
testimony from numerous witnesses, including Arin, Amanda, A.A. and E.A.
E.A. testified that McBride began doing things that were “uncomfortable” to her
when she was approximately twelve years old. The first time it happened,
McBride came up to her while she was in the kitchen and put his body up
against her, and she could feel his penis against her. After the first incident,
McBride did something uncomfortable to her nearly every night when she lived
with him. According to E.A., McBride subjected her to vaginal sex, performed
oral sex on her, and forced her to perform oral sex on him. He touched her
breasts and buttocks and tried to put his finger inside her. When asked how
many times she remembered waking up and finding McBride in her room, E.A.
stated “probably over a hundred.” She agreed that during each of these
incidents, he touched her body or sexually assaulted her.
7
A.A. also testified regarding McBride’s behavior toward her when they
lived in the same house. She recalled waking up to find McBride in her room
sitting on the edge of her bed. She remembered McBride touching her hand,
but did not remember other details, despite acknowledging that she was told
McBride took a video of her touching him. She denied having any memory of
the event other than what she had been told.
In addition, the Commonwealth played a jail phone call recording of a
conversation between McBride and his brother where the two discussed
McBride’s crimes. During the call, McBride asked, “my life is over, ain’t it?”
Referring to potential repercussions he might face from other inmates while in
jail, McBride stated: “might as well just let ‘em get me.” McBride told his
brother that he did not deserve his love. McBride remembered that the call
was being recorded and then clarified that everything they spoke of was merely
“alleged” or accusations.
A Kenton County Circuit Court jury convicted him of nineteen counts of
first-degree possession or viewing of matter portraying a sexual performance by
a minor, one count of first-degree possession or viewing of matter portraying a
sexual performance by a minor (victim under the age of twelve), four counts of
first-degree promoting a sexual performance by a minor, two counts of firstdegree sexual abuse, one count of first-degree sexual abuse (victim under the
age of twelve), and one count of third-degree rape. The jury recommended
consecutive sentences for a total sentence of 189 years, which the trial court
capped at 70 years. This appeal followed.
8
ANALYSIS
McBride’s sole argument on appeal is that Detective Wallace was not an
expert in digital forensics under KRE 702 and thus should not have been
permitted to testify about the Cellebrite extraction. McBride properly preserved
this issue through his motion in limine, and we review its admission for an
abuse of discretion, thus determining whether the trial judge's decision was
“arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”
Manery v. Commonwealth, 492 S.W.3d 140, 147 (Ky. 2016) (quoting
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999)).
Lay person and expert testimony are distinguished by whether the
witness providing the testimony relies on personal observation or relies on
specialized knowledge. Pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence (KRE) 701, a
lay witness may provide opinion testimony only if their opinion is (1) based on
their own perception; (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s
testimony or determination of a fact at issue; and (3) not based on scientific,
technical, or other specialized knowledge. KRE 701 is “more inclusionary than
exclusionary when the lay witness’s opinion is rationally based on the
perception of the witness and is helpful to the jury or trial court for a clear
understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a factual
issue.” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 438, 440-41 (Ky. 2004).
Conversely, KRE 702 governs the admission of expert testimony,
providing that
[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
9
issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if:
(1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;
(2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and
methods; and
(3) The witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case.
A witness does not need to be qualified as an expert to provide testimony that
is based on personal perception and not scientific or specialized training.
Here, we must determine whether Detective Wallace’s testimony
regarding Cellebrite constituted lay person testimony under KRE 701, or expert
testimony pursuant to KRE 702. We recently explained Cellebrite and its data
extraction process in Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 723 S.W.3d 676, 686 (Ky.
2025):
Cellebrite is a for profit, digital forensics company that specializes in
the creation and manufacturing of programs that can perform
forensic extractions on digital devices. Members of law enforcement
are not privy to how Cellebrite's proprietary technology works, but
they can be trained to use it. Cellebrite's extraction equipment
allows law enforcement to perform an extraction of all the data that
exists on a device. In essence it creates a “clone” of all the
information on a particular device and uploads it to a computer; all
an officer must do is plug the device into the forensic equipment and
run the program. However, the data that is thereby extracted is not
in a form that is capable of being read or understood by the average
person. Officers must use a different Cellebrite program called
Physical Analyzer to “translate” all the raw data extracted from the
phone into an intelligible format.
To reiterate, Computer Forensic Analyst Trenkamp performed the actual
extraction of data from McBride’s phone using Cellebrite and other technology.
During Trenkamp’s deposition, he explained that generally, he does the
extraction, then gives it “to the investigator because they’re familiar with the
10
case and they know what they’re looking for. I don’t. I don’t know the names
and faces of anybody involved.” After performing the extraction, he gave it to
Detective Wallace to sort through the data. During his trial testimony,
Detective Wallace explained the contents of the Cellebrite report and that the
report contained photos and videos of E.A., A.A., and other undeveloped young
girls.
In a Court of Appeals case, Casey v. Commonwealth, 2024-CA-1454-MR,
2026 WL 1041492, at *2 (Ky. App. Apr. 17, 2026), Agent Oergel used Cellebrite
to extract data from the defendant’s phone into readable reports that were then
provided to investigators. Id. Defendant Casey filed a motion in limine seeking
to exclude the GPS coordinates extracted from the phone, but the trial court
denied his motion. Id. Ultimately, Agent Oergel testified as to how he used
Cellebrite to download information from the phone and received a report of
data after the Cellebrite technology converted the data into a legible format. Id.
at *3.
In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on United States v.
Williams, 83 F.4th 994 (5th Cir. 2023). After defendant Williams’s arrest, police
used Cellebrite to copy the information from his and his alleged victim’s phones,
which extracted messages, videos, emails, and applications used on the phones.
Id. at 995. Williams filed a motion in limine to exclude the results of the search,
which the trial court denied, leading Williams to object to the use of such
testimony without an expert witness. Id. at 995-96. The trial court overruled
his objection. Id. at 996.
11
Williams appealed and argued the trial court erred in admitting the
Cellebrite testimony without an expert witness and a finding of reliability. Id.
In response, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals explained:
We find no error, much less an abuse of discretion. Williams
claims that Cellebrite is a complex technology, ergo, the operation of
Cellebrite requires specialized knowledge, and the introduction of a
Cellebrite report demands qualification of a witness as an expert.
But this ignores the basic realities of life. All the officer did was run
a computer program. He offered no technical understanding of
the machine or software; he did not write the program; and he
did not opine on any application of specialized knowledge.
During trial, the investigator explained that “[a]s an operator,
I purely operate the machine. I am not privy to the programming or
how it extracts data.” Thus, he explicitly disclaimed that he was
offering expert testimony. This is the antithesis of Rule 702's
requirement of “scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge.” Fed. R. Evid. 702(a).[ 5] Rather, the investigator knew no
more than anyone else who runs a program on his computer that he
did not write.
Every circuit that has addressed this question—whether
evidence obtained with Cellebrite technology requires expert
testimony for admission—has answered it in the negative.
In United States v. Chavez-Lopez, the Fourth Circuit concluded that
the sponsoring witness offered only fact testimony, such as “the
actions he took to extract the data—hooking the phones up to a
computer, following a few prompts, and saving data onto an external
drive.” 767 F. App'x 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2019). “At most, [the witness]
offered the opinion that Cellebrite copies data from a cellphone,
which he derived from his personal experience using the
software.” Id. That testimony “didn't require a technical
understanding of Cellebrite, and he made no claims about the
program's effectiveness or reliability.
Id. at 996-97 (emphasis added). Therefore, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
trial court properly ruled that FRE 701 applied, which governs lay witness
5 Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 is functionally identical to KRE 702.
12
testimony, and that no error occurred. 6 Id. Likewise, the Court of Appeals in
Casey reached the same conclusion and held that Agent Oergel’s testimony did
not violate the requirements of KRE 702 because the testimony was properly
aligned with KRE 701. 2026 WL 1041492 at *3.
This analysis applies equally to McBride’s case. Here, Detective Wallace
did not exceed the bounds of a lay witness by testifying as to the contents of
the Cellebrite report. As the Fifth Circuit explained in Williams, “the mere use
and understanding of a Cellebrite extract at trial is insufficient to require an
expert.” 83 F.4th at 996-97. “Operating a Cellebrite device and understanding
its report require knowledge in the realm of a reasonably tech-savvy lay person,
regardless of the investigator’s testimony that he was a ‘certified’ operator and
analyzer. Id. As such, an officer’s plain reading of a Cellebrite report does not
amount to scientific, technical or specialized knowledge that would necessitate
an expert witness pursuant to KRE 702. This is precisely what happened here.
We disagree with McBride’s assertion that Detective Wallace’s
testimony required certification as a traditional expert. 7 Detective Wallace and
6 The Ninth Circuit has also reached similar conclusions, albeit in unpublished
decisions. See United States v. McLeod, 755 F.App’x 670 (9th Cir. 2019) (concluding a trial court did not err in allowing a detective to testify as to his use of Cellebrite and the information he extracted from a cell phone in the course of his investigation, without having met the requirements of Rule 702), and United States v. Seugasala, 702 Fed. App’x. 572, 575 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that officers who follow software prompts from Cellebrite to obtain data from electronic devices did not present testimony based on specialized or scientific knowledge that would necessitate expert testimony).
7 McBride points to the Commonwealth’s disclosure notice naming Detective
Wallace as an expert, and its reliance on six cases to support its contention that Detective Wallace could provide expert testimony: Tucker v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-0411, 2005 WL 2318955 (Ky. Sept. 22, 2025) (allowing officer to testify as an
13
Trenkamp performed two distinct functions in the investigatory process:
Trenkamp did the actual data extraction on the phone, and Detective Wallace
examined and analyzed the report and results to further his investigation,
ultimately leading to the charges in this case. Only Detective Wallace looked at
the Cellebrite reports and gained familiarity with the photos and videos
through his digital investigation. The Cellebrite report displays basic
information regarding the device, extraction, and other data. Importantly, the
report also includes images of the files extracted – in this case, photos and
screenshots of videos. Photos speak for themselves - no active interpretation is
required. This information is easily comprehensible using everyday logic. As
such, a police officer testified at trial regarding data extracted from a cellphone
using Cellebrite or similar software need not be qualified as an expert to do so.
Detective Wallace’s role was central to both the investigation and the
Commonwealth’s case-in-chief, rendering him more than qualified to provide
lay testimony regarding the results of the Cellebrite extraction.
expert as to behaviors of children victims of sex crimes); Allgeier, 915 S.W.2d 745 (holding that an officer did not have to be qualified as an expert to give opinion testimony that the gouge on the victim’s door was not evidence of forcible entry); Perry v. Commonwealth, No. 2011-SC-0478, 2012 WL 6649197 (Ky. Dec. 20, 2012) (concluding that officer’s testimony that residue on the defendant was indicative of drug abuse because such testimony was within the parameters of his training and experience); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d 801 (Ky. 1991) (holding that police testimony that defendant’s drugs were for sale and not personal use was admissible because the officers had years of experience performing drug-related investigations); and Dixon v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 426 (Ky. 2004) (allowing a detective to render opinion testimony that notations on a slip of paper referred to “transactions” and “money amounts” without first holding a Daubert hearing). McBride asserts that each of these cases are distinguishable from his case because none of these cases required highly specialized knowledge. Regardless, our conclusion that Detective Wallace did not need to be qualified as an expert pursuant to KRE 702 renders these references moot.
14
Detective Wallace was trained in using Cellebrite and was certified as a
physical analyzer. 8 In addition to his nine years as a police detective, he was
also a full-time member of the Internet Crimes Against Children Task Force,
serving in that role for three years. Suffice it to say, given his knowledge and
experience, Detective Wallace was certainly a “reasonably tech-savvy lay
person” with the capability to testify as to the findings of the Cellebrite
extraction. He demonstrated a clear familiarity with both data extractions and
report analysis through his law enforcement training and experience. Williams
makes clear that Detective Wallace did not need to be an expert to testify as to
the contents of the Cellebrite extraction, so long as his testimony aligned with
KRE 701’s requirements.
Further, Detective Wallace testified that he has performed countless
extractions since 2022. He noted that, in this case, the phone’s screen was
broken and therefore he relied on Trenkamp’s expertise to perform the
extraction. It was Detective Wallace who notified Trenkamp that some of the
photos and videos were not captured on the original extraction, thus prompting
the use of another extraction tool and then screenshots via Cellebrite.
Detective Wallace noticed that these extra steps needed to be taken, which
affirmed his knowledge of Cellebrite and its functions.
8 As explained in Baldwin, 723 S.W.3d at 686, officers must use the “Physical
Analyzer” program of Cellebrite to translate all the raw data extracted from a device into an intelligible format. Without advanced knowledge of computers and programming, an officer would be unable to view the raw extracted data and know what the device contained without translating it with the Physical Analyzer program. Id.
15
We further note that, as the Commonwealth posits, even if Detective
Wallace’s testimony was absent from the Commonwealth’s case in chief, the
jury nonetheless heard (1) testimony from Arin about what she found on
McBride’s phone; (2) testimony from a law enforcement officer stating that he
recognized the same thing on the phone when he responded to Arin’s 911 call;
(3) testimony from Amanda about who she recognized in the videos Arin sent
her; (4) testimony from E.A. that McBride did “uncomfortable” things to her
over one hundred times (including having sex with her at Arin’s house); (5)
testimony from A.A. that she woke up in the middle of the night to find
McBride sitting on her bed and watching something on his phone; and (6)
McBride’s jail call in which he told his brother that he was sorry and that his
life was over. As such, any alleged error was harmless considering the rest of
the evidence against McBride.
CONCLUSION
Because Detective Wallace’s testimony regarding the results of the
Cellebrite extraction did not require technical or specialized knowledge
necessitating expert qualification, the trial court did not err in admitting his lay
testimony at trial. Therefore, we affirm the Kenton Circuit Court.
All sitting. Lambert, C.J.; Conley, Goodwine, Keller, and Nickell, JJ.,
concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.
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COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Aaron Reed Baker
Assistant Public Defender
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky
Joseph Crawford White
Assistant Attorney General
17