United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 24-1098
LUTHER C. PARENTE; ERIC L. STEWART,
Plaintiffs, Appellees,
v.
NELSON LEFEBVRE, in the official capacity as Warden of the
Department of Corrections Intake Service Center; MICHELLE
GARRIEPY, in the official capacity as Registered Nurse for the
Rhode Island Department of Corrections; JENNIFER MAGEAU, in the
official capacity as Registered Nurse for the Rhode Island
Department of Corrections; NANCY RUOTOLO HULL, in the official
capacity as Registered Nurse for the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections; RHODE ISLAND DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants, Appellants,
ASHBEL T. WALL, individually; MATTHEW KETTLE, individually and
in the official capacity as Warden of the Department of
Corrections, Anthony P. Travisano Intake Service Center;
JENNIFER CLARKE, individually and in the official capacity as
Medical Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections;
SIMON MELNICK, individually and in the official capacity as
Corrections Physician of the Department of Corrections; TEJ
BANSAL, individually and in the official capacity as Corrections Physician of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections; MARTIN J. BAUERMEISTER, individually and in the official capacity as
Psychiatrist of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections; FRED
H. VOHR, individually; PATRICIA ANNE COYNE-FAGUE, in the
official capacity as Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections; WAYNE J. SALISBURY, JR., in the official capacity
as Acting Director of the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections; NELSON LEFEBVRE, in the individual capacity;
MICHELLE GARRIEPY, in the individual capacity; JENNIFER MAGEAU,
in the individual capacity; NANCY RUOTOLO HULL, in the
individual capacity,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. Mary S. McElroy, District Judge]
Before
Gelpí and Rikelman, Circuit Judges
Katzmann,* Judge
James J. Arguin, Special Assistant Attorney General, Office
of the Attorney General of Rhode Island, for appellants.
Chloe A. Davis, with whom Richard A. Sinapi and Sinapi Law
Associates, Ltd. were on brief, for appellees.
September 25, 2026
* Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting
by designation.
KATZMANN, Judge. We return to this appeal, informed by
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's answer to our certified question,
to decide an issue of federal constitutional law: whether Rhode
Island's legislature, through the State Tort Claims Act, waived
Eleventh Amendment immunity for discrimination claims brought
under the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act of 1990 ("RICRA"). See
Parente v. Lefebvre, 122 F.4th 457, 465 (1st Cir. 2024)
("Parente II"); Parente v. Lefebvre, 358 A.3d 933, 934 (R.I. 2026)
("Parente III").
Plaintiffs-Appellees Luther C. Parente ("Parente") and
Eric L. Stewart ("Stewart"), individuals incarcerated in a Rhode
Island state prison, sued the Rhode Island Department of
Corrections and its staff (collectively, "RIDOC") for failing to
properly treat their preexisting medical conditions. They allege
various federal and state constitutional, statutory, and common
law bases for relief, including, as relevant to this appeal, a
claim brought under RICRA. RIDOC moved for summary judgment on
the RICRA claim on Eleventh Amendment grounds. The district court
denied RIDOC's motion, holding that discrimination claims under
RICRA are subject to the general waiver of Eleventh Amendment
immunity under Rhode Island's State Tort Claims Act. Parente v.
Wall, 708 F. Supp. 3d 192, 210–12 (D.R.I. 2023) ("Parente I").
- 3 -RIDOC appeals that decision,1 and Parente and Stewart counter that
the Rhode Island Supreme Court's ruling in Laird v. Chrysler Corp.,
460 A.2d 425 (R.I. 1983), establishes that RICRA claims are subject
to this general waiver.
We previously certified to the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, as a matter of state law, the question of whether
discrimination claims under RICRA are "actions of tort" under the
State Tort Claims Act. Parente II, 122 F.4th at 465. The Rhode
Island Supreme Court answered in the affirmative. Parente III,
358 A.3d at 934. Turning now to the question of federal law, we
hold that Rhode Island waived immunity to suit in federal court
for RICRA discrimination claims.
I. BACKGROUND
We recount only the facts and procedural history
necessary to understand the court's disposition of this appeal.
For greater detail, consult Parente I, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 197-99.
A. Parente and Stewart's Allegations
Parente and Stewart entered RIDOC's custody with
preexisting foot and ankle injuries, which required ongoing
treatment.2 Parente injured his ankles after jumping from a
1 Individual-capacity defendants are not parties to this
appeal.
2 In addition to their physical injuries, Parente and Stewart
had long histories of psychiatric conditions.
- 4 -building during his arrest, and Stewart sprained his ankle about
a month before his arrest. Both received treatment at non-RIDOC
hospitals. Medical staff diagnosed Parente with a fracture of his
right heel and additional fractures in his left heel and ankle.
Parente alleges that he could not walk on his own, and his hospital
discharge papers recommended use of crutches or a wheelchair, ice,
elevation of his foot, and medication for pain. Stewart's hospital
discharge papers instructed him to ice, elevate, and not put weight
on his injured foot, and he alleges that he was using crutches and
an air cast in the weeks before his arrest.
Parente and Stewart sued RIDOC in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Rhode Island on February 10, 2016, and twice
amended their complaint. In the operative Second Amended
Complaint, they allege that RIDOC's medical and correctional staff
failed to meet their medical needs and denied them access to a
wheelchair, crutches, cold packs, elevation pillows, supportive
footwear, bottom bunks, lower-tier cells, and use of an elevator.
As relevant to this appeal, Parente and Stewart brought a claim
under RICRA, R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 42-112-1, 42-112-2,3 alleging that
3RICRA provides, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons within
the state, regardless of race, color, religion, sex, disability, age, or country of ancestral origin, have . . . the same
rights . . . to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property." R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-112-1(a) (2026). The statute does not expressly state whether Rhode Island is immune from suit.
- 5 -RIDOC's corrections and medical staff "discriminated against" them
and caused them to "suffer harm" by "depriv[ing] them of their
rights under the RICRA," including their "rights to reasonable
accommodations." In its answer, RIDOC denied Parente and Stewart's
allegations and asserted that it was immune from liability under
RICRA pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
B. District Court Proceedings
On February 23, 2023, the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment. With respect to Parente and Stewart's RICRA
claim, RIDOC sought summary judgment on sovereign immunity
grounds. See Parente I, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 210–11. The district
court denied in part RIDOC's motion, holding that Rhode Island's
general waiver of sovereign immunity for "all actions of tort" in
the State Tort Claims Act applies to RICRA claims. Id. at 211–12
(quoting Laird, 460 A.2d at 427 (referencing R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1(a))). The State Tort Claims Act provides that:
The state of Rhode Island and any political
subdivision thereof, including all cities and
towns, shall . . . hereby be liable in all
actions of tort in the same manner as a private
individual or corporation; provided, however,
that any recovery in any such action shall not
exceed the monetary limitations thereof set
forth in this chapter.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1(a) (2026).4
4 The statute caps damages at $100,000. R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-2 (2026).
- 6 -The district court compared an action under RICRA to an
action for damages under the since-amended Civil Rights Act of
1968, which "sound[ed] basically in tort." Parente I, 708
F. Supp. 3d at 211 (quoting Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 195
(1974)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1974), repealed and amended by
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 8(2),
102 Stat. 1619, 1625. The district court concluded that "Rhode
Island's general waiver of sovereign immunity statute requires us
to find that immunity has been waived" because "an action brought
under RICRA sounds in tort." Parente I, 708 F. Supp. 3d at 212.
C. Appellate Proceedings and Certified Question
RIDOC timely appealed the district court's decision. As
mentioned, we certified the question of whether RICRA
discrimination claims are "actions of tort" under the State Tort
Claims Act to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, which answered in
the affirmative. Parente II, 122 F.4th at 465; Parente III, 358
A.3d at 934. At our direction, the parties submitted supplemental
briefs regarding the effect of Parente III on our resolution of
this appeal.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
We have jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine
to review the district court's denial of immunity under the
Eleventh Amendment. Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108,
- 7 -123 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993)).5
The denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity is a question
of federal constitutional law, which we review de novo. See
Redondo Constr. Corp. v. P.R. Highway & Transp. Auth., 357 F.3d
124, 126 (1st Cir. 2004); Parente II, 122 F.4th at 462–63. As a
general matter, "whether federal rights are waived is a federal
question on which a state court determination does not bind a
federal court." Della Grotta v. Rhode Island, 781 F.2d 343, 347
(1st Cir. 1986), abrogated on other grounds by Will v. Mich. Dep't
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989). However, to the extent that
answering a federal question requires federal courts to interpret
state law, federal courts are "bound by the [state] Supreme Court's
interpretation of state law." Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S.
133, 138 (2010); see also GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v. Schrader,
958 F.3d 93, 95 (1st Cir. 2020) ("[A] federal court is 'duty-bound
5 While a district court decision generally must be "final"
to be appealed, 28 U.S.C. § 1291, certain non-final orders are
immediately appealable because such orders "finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too
independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. at 142–43 (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949)). Orders denying Eleventh Amendment immunity "purport to be conclusive determinations that [a state] ha[s] no right not to be sued in
federal court," and thus are subject to collateral review. Id. at 145–47.
- 8 -to accept controlling state law' as set forth by a state's highest
court . . . ." (quoting Sanders v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 843 F.3d 37,
47 (1st Cir. 2016))). "The question of waiver is one of state
legislative intent," and "legislative intent is a matter of state
law, on which the highest court of a state speaks with finality."
Della Grotta, 781 F.2d at 347.
III. DISCUSSION
With the benefit of the Rhode Island Supreme Court's
answer to the certified question before us, we return to the
question of federal constitutional law that we previously
reserved: whether the State Tort Claims Act, as interpreted by the
Rhode Island Supreme Court, waives Eleventh Amendment immunity for
RICRA discrimination claims "by the most express language or by
such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no
room for any other reasonable construction." Edelman v. Jordan,
415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974) (alteration in original) (quoting Murray
v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)); see also
Parente II, 122 F.4th at 463 (reserving question). For the reasons
that follow, we hold that it does.
"The Eleventh Amendment generally bars suits against
states and state officials" in federal court. Doe v. Shibinette,
16 F.4th 894, 903 (1st Cir. 2021). Passed in response to the U.S.
Supreme Court's "short-lived decision in Chisholm v. Georgia"
holding a state liable to suit by a citizen of another state,
- 9 -Edelman, 415 U.S. at 662 (citing Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419 (1793)), the Eleventh Amendment provides that:
"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. Const. amend.
XI. Although not explicitly stated in the text, the Amendment has
consistently been interpreted to bar suits brought by a state's
own citizens. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of
Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 618 (2002) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134
U.S. 1 (1890)). This interpretation stems from an understanding
that states, as sovereign entities, enjoyed immunity from suit
before ratification of the U.S. Constitution and retain immunity
under our current constitutional structure, subject to certain
limitations. See PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 594 U.S.
482, 499 (2021). In other words, the principle that states are
immune from private suit in federal court "enforce[s] an important
constitutional limitation on the power of the federal courts."
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 284 (2011) (citing Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984), superseded on
other grounds by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367).
A state "may choose to waive its immunity in federal
court," although the test for finding such a waiver "'is a
stringent one.'" Id. (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
- 10 -Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675 (1999)). When
evaluating whether a state's legislature has waived Eleventh
Amendment immunity by statute, "we will find waiver only where
stated 'by the most express language or by such overwhelming
implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other
reasonable construction.'" Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (alteration
in original) (quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171). We can also find
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a matter of federal law
if a state's highest court has expressly held that the state
statute at issue includes such a waiver. See Della Grotta, 781
F.2d at 347 ("Where the highest court of a state has construed a
state statute as intending to waive the state's immunity to suit
in federal court, the state's intent is just as clear as if the
waiver were made explicit in the state statute.").
The Rhode Island Supreme Court in Laird interpreted the
State Tort Claims Act, which includes the waiver of immunity at
issue, to abrogate sovereign immunity in both state and federal
court for the State and its political subdivisions based on the
statute's "sweeping language." 460 A.2d at 428–29. In Della
Grotta, we held as a matter of federal law that Rhode Island had
waived Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court because
"the determination by the Rhode Island Supreme Court in
Laird . . . is dispositive of this issue." 781 F.2d at 347.
- 11 -In resolving the reserved question of whether Rhode
Island waived Eleventh Amendment immunity for Parente and
Stewart's RICRA claim, we are guided by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court's holding that discrimination "claims brought under RICRA
sound in tort and thus fall within the waiver of immunity contained
in the [State Tort Claims Act]." Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939
(emphasis added). The court reiterated that the State Tort Claims
Act is "a blanket waiver of sovereign immunity" that applies
"unambiguously and without restriction" to all actions of tort,
id. at 937 (quoting Laird, 460 A.2d at 429–430), and explained
that Parente and Stewart's RICRA claim "is analogous to a
negligence or medical malpractice claim, both of which
traditionally sound in tort," id. at 938.6
In sum, Rhode Island’s highest court construed the State
Tort Claims Act to (1) manifest the state legislature’s intention
to broadly and "without restriction" waive sovereign immunity in
federal courts for "all actions of tort," Laird, 460 A.2d at 430,
and (2) include RICRA discrimination claims as "actions of tort"
within the waiver of immunity, Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939.
Reading in tandem the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation
The Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that "whether a
6
RICRA claim is tortious is a claim-specific determination, subject to the definition outlined in Preserve." Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939 (referencing Pres. at Boulder Hills, LLC v. Kenyon, 312 A.3d 475 (R.I. 2024)).
- 12 -of state law in Laird and Parente III, we determine that there is
"no room for any other reasonable construction" than the conclusion
that Rhode Island has waived immunity against suit in federal court
for Parente and Stewart's RICRA claim. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673
(quoting Murray, 213 U.S. at 171).
RIDOC’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive.
First, RIDOC argues that the State Supreme Court has not
"authoritatively declared the legislature's true intent" with
respect to the State's waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity from
RICRA claims in particular. See Della Grotta, 781 F.2d at 347.
That argument is premised on the fact that the Rhode Island Supreme
Court in Parente III noted that we had not certified the question
of legislative intent. See 358 A.3d at 939 n.5.
But to do so was not necessary. We certified only the
question of whether RICRA discrimination claims are actions of
tort because the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Laird already
"declared the [state] legislature's true intent" to waive Eleventh
Amendment immunity for all actions of tort in enacting the State
Tort Claims Act. Della Grotta, 781 F.2d at 347; see also Laird,
460 A.2d at 430 (holding that the "broad language" of the State
Tort Claims Act "manifests, by 'overwhelming implication,' a
legislative intent to place the State in the same position as any
other private litigant and thus amenable to suit in either state
or federal court"). Because the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
- 13 -now held that these claims sound in tort as a matter of state law,
Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939, they fall within the scope of the
waiver of sovereign immunity identified in Laird.7 See Della
Grotta, 781 F.2d at 347. RIDOC provides no persuasive case law to
support its position that the legislature's intent to waive
sovereign immunity, established in Laird, is legally insufficient
to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity for discrimination claims
under RICRA.8
7 The Rhode Island Supreme Court's decisions in Parente III
and Laird thus distinguish our case from Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607 (2d Cir. 1986). There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded that a state statute construed by the
Connecticut Supreme Court as waiving immunity "'in the civil
actions specified'" did not waive immunity to suit in federal court because the state court had discussed only "what types of suit
could be brought rather than stating where they may be
brought . . . ." Id. at 611 (emphasis in original) (quoting Duguay v. Hopkins, 464 A.2d 45, 50 (1983)). In contrast, the Rhode Island Supreme Court here has addressed both the type of suit covered by the waiver, see Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939, and where they may be brought, see Laird, 460 A.2d at 430.
8 RIDOC initially argued that the State Tort Claims Act's
waiver of immunity did not apply to RICRA discrimination claims because RICRA requires proof of intentional discrimination, such that it is analogous to an intentional tort rather than a
negligence-based tort, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court has not interpreted the waiver to render the State vicariously liable for intentional torts committed by state employees. See Pride Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. R.I. Motor Vehicle Dealer's License Comm'n, 721 F. Supp. 17, 23 (D.R.I. 1989). As previously noted, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held Parente and Stewart's RICRA claim to be "analogous to a negligence or medical malpractice claim," not to an intentional tort. Parente III, 358 A.3d at 938. Following the decision in Parente III, RIDOC does not pursue its argument that RICRA is analogous to an intentional tort.
- 14 -Second, RIDOC makes a timing-based argument that the
State Tort Claims Act should not be read as intending to waive
tort claims created by a subsequent statute. This argument fails
to persuade because Laird does not suggest that the state
legislature's intent was limited to then-existing torts. 460 A.2d
at 430.9
RIDOC's timing argument is premised in part on the Rhode
Island Supreme Court's citation in Parente III to a definition of
"tort" adopted in Preserve, 312 A.3d at 475, a case decided several
decades after RICRA's enactment in 1990. See Parente III, 358
A.3d at 938. However, far from establishing a novel interpretation
of the meaning of a tort, Preserve reiterated the well-established
common law principle that "[a] tort encompasses injury to the
person and to property--it is 'a civil wrong . . . for which the
law will provide a remedy in the form of an action for damages.'"
Preserve, 312 A.3d at 483 (quoting 74 Am. Jur. 2d Torts § 1
(February 2024 Update)).
Moreover, the Rhode Island Supreme Court explained that
"by the time that the [Rhode Island legislature] enacted RICRA,
9In an analogous context, the Fourth Circuit held that a 1974
Maryland statute, construed by the Maryland Supreme Court in 2009 as a waiver of immunity to suit in federal court, authorized the plaintiff to proceed on her claim under the later-enacted Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. Lee-Thomas v. Prince George's Cnty. Pub. Schs., 666 F.3d 244, 252–53 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 973 A.2d 233, 242 (Md. 2009) (discussing legislative history of waiver provision)).
- 15 -federal caselaw interpreted discrimination as a tort."
Parente III, 358 A.3d at 937 (first citing Goodman v. Lukens Steel
Co., 482 U.S. 656, 661-62 (1987); and then citing Perez-Serrano v.
DeLeon-Velez, 868 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1989)). The court further
"endorse[d] the reasoning of the late Judge Selya who wrote, 'it
is reasonable to presume that the RICRA's drafters, who modeled
the statute after [42 U.S.C. §] 1981, must have been aware of the
precedents interpreting the federal statute . . . .'" Id.
(quoting Rathbun v. Autozone, Inc., 361 F.3d 62, 67 (1st Cir.
2004)). Thus, the Rhode Island Supreme Court's interpretation of
RICRA was based on "the backdrop of existing law" at the time of
the statute's enactment. Parker Drilling Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v.
Newton, 587 U.S. 601, 611 (2019) (quoting McQuiggin v. Perkins,
569 U.S. 383, 398 n.3 (2013)). Its citation to a recent definition
of "tort" in Preserve does not imply that its interpretation fails
to reflect the legislature's intent in enacting RICRA.10
10 Laird itself was decided prior to the enactment of RICRA
and therefore may also be considered part of the "backdrop of
existing law" that guides interpretation of the statute. Parker Drilling, 587 U.S. at 611 (quoting Perkins, 569 U.S. at 398 n.3). While Laird recognized "two limitations on the breadth of the State Tort Claims Act," these limitations did not relate to the scope of the word "tort." Laird, 460 A.2d at 429-30 (first citing Calhoun v. City of Providence, 390 A.2d 350, 356–57 (R.I. 1978)
(recognizing state immunity for tortious acts of judges and
prosecutors); and then citing Andrade v. Rhode Island, 448 A.2d 1293, 1295 (R.I. 1982) (excluding prejudgment interest from the amount that could be recovered from the State)).
- 16 -Third, RIDOC unpersuasively contends that another
"reasonable construction" of the State Tort Claims Act is that it
only waives the State's sovereign immunity for RICRA claims filed
in state court. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673; see also R.I. Dep't
of Env't Mgmt. v. United States, 304 F.3d 31, 47 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that "the existence of a provision merely allowing
Rhode Island to sue or be sued in its own courts . . . [is]
insufficient to waive the state's immunity from suit in a federal
forum" (emphasis in original)). In doing so, RIDOC analogizes to
other statutorily-created causes of action, including claims
brought under the Rhode Island Privacy Act and Fair Employment
Practices Act ("RIFEPA") and the Rhode Island Right to Privacy Act
("Privacy Act"), both of which contain venue selection clauses
that specify particular state court forums for suits under the
acts. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-5-29 (2026) (RIFEPA) ("Judicial
proceeding shall be initiated by the filing of a petition in the
superior court . . . ."); § 9-1-28.1(b) (2026) (Privacy Act)
(describing "proceedings for redress in either the superior court
or district court of this state"). Neither RICRA nor the State
Tort Claims Act contains such a venue selection clause.11 Indeed,
11 RIDOC further argues that RIFEPA's venue selection
provision applies to RICRA because the two statutes should be
construed together. See Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2007), abrogated by statute, 2009 R.I. Pub. Laws Ch. 388
§ 1. This argument is unpersuasive because any relation between
- 17 -the Rhode Island Supreme Court has already held that the waiver of
sovereign immunity in the State Tort Claims Act extends to suits
against the State in federal court. See Laird, 460 A.2d at 430.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has now made clear that RICRA
discrimination claims are "actions of tort" under the State Tort Claims
Act "and thus fall within the waiver of immunity contained in the [State
Tort Claims Act]." Parente III, 358 A.3d at 939. We therefore conclude
that the only "reasonable construction" of state law, as interpreted
by the Rhode Island Supreme Court, is that Rhode Island's legislature
intended RICRA discrimination claims to fall within the existing waiver
of Eleventh Amendment immunity contained in the State Tort Claims Act.12
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673. Accordingly, we hold that Rhode Island may
be sued in federal court for discrimination claims under RICRA and
affirm the district court's denial of RIDOC's motion for summary
judgment on Parente and Stewart's RICRA claim.
It is so ordered.
the two statutes is limited to the context of employment
discrimination, and the RICRA claims at issue here are not
employment discrimination claims. See id. There is therefore no basis for applying RIFEPA's venue selection clause to interpretation of the waiver of sovereign immunity here.
12The remedies Parente and Stewart seek for their RICRA claim
include compensatory and punitive damages, a declaratory judgment, preliminary and permanent injunctions, and attorney's fees and
costs. Whether the State Tort Claims Act waives immunity for that relief has not been raised before us and we do not consider it. See United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020)
(describing the principle of party presentation).
- 18 -