DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring v. Katharine Blackwell, No. 6, September Term, 2026. Opinion by Gould, J.
PREMISES LIABILITY – INVITEE – OWNER-CREATED HAZARD
Under Maryland law, the knowledge element of an invitee’s premises liability claim is satisfied when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a dangerous condition. When creating that condition is a foreseeable consequence of performing an assigned task, whether the owner took reasonable steps to prevent an accident or warn of the danger is a jury question unless the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion. Circuit Court for Montgomery County
Case No.: C-15-CV-23-003262
Argued: September 4, 2026
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND
No. 6
September Term, 2026
DARCARS TOYOTA
OF SILVER SPRING
v.
KATHARINE BLACKWELL
Fader, C.J.,
Watts,
Booth,
Biran,
Gould,
Eaves,
Killough,
JJ.
Opinion by Gould, J.
Filed: September 25, 2026
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal
Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State
Government Article) this document is authentic.
2026.09.25
13:19:33 -04'00'
Gregory Hilton, Clerk
Respondent Katharine Blackwell slipped and fell on the floor that an employee of
Petitioner DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring had just mopped. After mopping, the
employee went to get a wet-floor sign, but Ms. Blackwell fell before he returned. In the
suit that followed, the circuit court granted summary judgment to DARCARS on both of
Ms. Blackwell’s negligence-based claims, concluding that DARCARS had insufficient
time after the floor became wet to post the sign before Ms. Blackwell fell. The Appellate
Court of Maryland reversed the circuit court’s judgment as to Ms. Blackwell’s premises
liability claim. Because the summary judgment record could support a jury finding that
DARCARS failed to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the hazard, we affirm the
Appellate Court’s judgment.
I
A
Ms. Blackwell regularly took her car to DARCARS’s service department for oil
changes. On the morning of the accident, she checked in at the service desk and sat in the
customer lounge to wait. From her seat, she did not see the service desk.
While she waited, Kwok Bong, a service advisor, noticed footprints on the floor
near the service desk and asked his coworker, lot attendant Pedro Fernandez, to clean them.
Mr. Fernandez mopped the floor in front of the service desk while Mr. Bong watched. Mr.
Fernandez did not put out a wet-floor sign before or during mopping. When he finished, he
left the wet floor to get a sign, which, according to him, was kept about a minute away.
Before Mr. Fernandez returned with the sign, Mr. Bong called Ms. Blackwell to the
service desk because her car was ready. As she walked toward the desk, she slipped on the wet floor and fell. She had not seen anyone mopping, and there was no warning sign. Mr.
Bong heard her scream and saw his manager help her up.
B
Ms. Blackwell filed a two-count complaint against DARCARS in the Circuit Court
for Montgomery County. Count one alleged negligence under a premises liability theory,
and count two alleged negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision. After
discovery, DARCARS moved for summary judgment on both claims. It argued that Mr.
Fernandez was still cleaning when Ms. Blackwell fell and that, under Rehn v. Westfield
America, 153 Md. App. 586 (2003), there was not enough time to warn her of the hazard.
Ms. Blackwell responded that notice was not at issue because DARCARS created the
hazard, and that whether DARCARS acted reasonably was a question for the jury. The
circuit court granted DARCARS’s motion on both counts, concluding that although
DARCARS had notice of the wet floor, there was no genuine dispute that it lacked
sufficient time to put up the sign.
C
In an unreported opinion, the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed in part and
affirmed in part, concluding that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment for
DARCARS on the negligent hiring and supervision claim but erred in granting summary
judgment on the premises liability claim. Blackwell v. DARCARS Toyota of Silver Spring,
No. 1322, Sept. Term 2024, 2026 WL 332363 (Md. App. Ct. Feb. 5, 2026). We granted
DARCARS’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the circuit court properly
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granted summary judgment on the premises liability claim. DARCARS Toyota of Silver
Spring v. Blackwell, 494 Md. 175 (2026).
II
A court may grant summary judgment only if there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(f). A fact is material if it could “affect the outcome of the case.” Adventist Healthcare,
Inc. v. Behram, 488 Md. 410, 431 (2024). We review the grant of summary judgment
without deference, viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
and construing any reasonable inferences against the moving party. Id. at 431-32.
III
A
A property owner’s duty to a person who enters its property depends on that person’s
status, that is, whether the person is a trespasser, bare licensee, licensee by invitation, or
invitee. Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Wallace, 492 Md. 349, 358 (2025). Of those four
classifications, an invitee, such as a business customer, is owed the highest duty. Id. at 359.
An owner is liable to an invitee for physical harm caused by the property’s condition
if the owner:
(1) knows about or would have discovered, by exercising reasonable care, a
condition that poses an unreasonable risk of harm to the invitee; (2) should
expect that the invitee will not discover the dangerous condition or will fail
to protect herself against it; and (3) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect
the invitee against the danger.
Id. at 360 (quoting Deering Woods Condominium Ass’n v. Spoon, 377 Md. 250, 263 (2003)
(in turn quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343 (1965))). An invitee may therefore
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expect the owner to use reasonable care to learn of the condition of the premises and, if an
unsafe condition is found, to make it reasonably safe or warn of it. Rawls v. Hochschild,
Kohn & Co., 207 Md. 113, 117-18 (1955). That said, the owner is not an insurer of the
invitee’s safety, and no presumption of negligence arises merely because the invitee was
injured on the premises. Giant Food, Inc. v. Mitchell, 334 Md. 633, 636 (1994); Moulden
v. Greenbelt Consumer Servs., Inc., 239 Md. 229, 232 (1965).
The first element—the knowledge requirement—often becomes an issue when
someone other than the owner creates the hazardous condition. An owner has no duty to
conduct continuous inspections or remove every hazard as soon as it appears. Spoon, 377
Md. at 270 (quoting Lexington Mkt. Auth. v. Zappala, 233 Md. 444, 446 (1964)). When the
owner did not know of a hazard, the invitee must show that the hazard existed long enough
for the owner, exercising reasonable care, to discover and remedy it. See Moulden, 239 Md.
at 232-33; Rehn, 153 Md. App. at 593.
Notice is not an issue—and thus the knowledge element of a premises liability claim
is satisfied—when an owner’s employee knowingly creates a hazard, whether intentionally
or by accident. See Keene v. Arlan’s Dept. Store of Balt., Inc., 35 Md. App. 250, 256 (1977).
When an employee creates a hazard as a foreseeable consequence of an assigned task, the
owner can generally decide in advance how to protect its invitees from the anticipated
hazard. Whether the owner took reasonable steps depends on the circumstances, and unless
the evidence permits only one reasonable conclusion, the jury must decide that question.
See Chalmers v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 172 Md. 552, 558-59 (1937).
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B
Viewed in the light most favorable to Ms. Blackwell, the evidence could permit a
jury to find that DARCARS did not act reasonably under the circumstances. Mr. Fernandez
mopped the floor in front of the service desk, where customers could be expected to walk.
He did not post a sign before or while mopping, and after mopping, he left the wet floor
unattended while he retrieved a warning sign. Mr. Bong, who had requested that the floor
be mopped and had watched it being mopped, then called Ms. Blackwell to that area
without warning her. From this evidence, a jury could find that a reasonable owner would
either have posted a sign before mopping or warned Ms. Blackwell as she approached the
service desk.
C
DARCARS’s reliance on Rehn for the proposition that it breached no duty to Ms.
Blackwell because it lacked sufficient time after mopping the floor to post a caution sign
is misplaced. In Rehn, a restaurant customer spilled drinks in a mall food court and reported
the spill to the restaurant’s employee at the counter. 153 Md. App. at 589-90. That employee
immediately called out to a coworker to notify the mall’s property manager. Id. at 590.
Meanwhile, another customer slipped on the spill. Id. at 590, 595. Because there was no
evidence that the employee had enough time after learning of the spill to clean it up or warn
customers, the restaurant was entitled to summary judgment. Id. at 594-96. For that same
reason, the court rejected the argument that the employee should have put out a wet-floor
sign or guarded the spill: She had no time to do so. Id. at 595-96. The court tied its holding
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to “a temporary, non-recurring hazard created by a third party just outside” the restaurant’s
premises. Id. at 598.
Rehn is not applicable here. The restaurant employee in Rehn had no opportunity to
protect the restaurant’s customers until she learned of a hazard that already existed. But the
DARCARS employee who was assigned to mop the floor was in a different position. The
wet-floor hazard did not exist until he mopped that area, so a jury could reasonably
conclude that other steps were available to prevent customers, such as Ms. Blackwell, from
slipping and falling.
IV
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment
to DARCARS on the premises liability claim.
JUDGMENT OF THE APPELLATE
COURT OF MARYLAND
AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY
PETITIONER.
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