UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FANTA KOUDOUKARA,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 24 - 1900 (SLS)
v.
Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
EMBASSY OF MALI,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Fanta Koudoukara filed this lawsuit against the Embassy of Mali alleging that the Embassy
unlawfully fired her after she refused to have sex with the Ambassador of Mali and reported his
harassment. The Embassy never appeared to defend itself. In June 2026, the Court granted default
judgment to Ms. Koudoukara on some of her claims but declined to award damages because she
did not provide enough information for the Court to assess damages. The Court then gave
Ms. Koudoukara an opportunity to submit additional evidence in support of her damages claim.
After Ms. Koudoukara did not provide the requested information, the Court dismissed the case.
Now, Ms. Koudoukara moves for reconsideration of the Court’s Order dismissing this case without
awarding damages. For the reasons set forth below, and in light of Ms. Koudoukara’s submission
of additional evidence, the Court grants her motion and awards $155,509.27 in damages.
BACKGROUND
On June 3, 2026, the Court partially granted Ms. Koudoukara’s Motion for Default
Judgment, ECF No. 14, finding the Embassy liable on Ms. Koudoukara’s claims under Title VII
and the DC Human Rights Act. See Mem. Op., ECF No. 20; Order Granting in Part and Denying
in Part Mot. Default J, ECF No. 21. Although the motion sought damages in the form of back pay, front pay, emotional distress damages, and punitive damages, see Pl.’s Mem. Supp. Default J. at
15, ECF No. 14-1, the Court declined to award damages at that stage because Ms. Koudoukara
had not met her burden to “prove her damages to a reasonable certainty.” See Mem. Op. at 13
(cleaned up). Because it could not determine damages, the Court also declined to award attorney
fees. See id. at 15 n.6.
To obtain the necessary information to make the required “independent determination of
the sum to be awarded,” Walker v. Innovative Concept Sols. Int’l, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 52, 54 (D.D.C.
2013) (cleaned up), the Court directed Ms. Koudoukara to “file [] supplemental submissions in
support of her claimed damages[.]” Mem. Op. at 5. But her first Supplemental Memorandum and
accompanying affidavit failed to support her claimed damages, providing only a single month’s
pay stub, written in French without translation. See Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Default J., ECF No.
22. (June 22 Suppl. Mem.) So the Court tried again, directing Ms. Koudoukara to furnish specific
“further evidence in support of her claim of damages.” Min. Order (June 24, 2026). This time, the
Court went further:
Such evidence should include (but is not limited to): (1) proof of job searches and
mitigation of damages, (2) translations of the Plaintiff’s pay stub into English,
(3) affidavits or other evidence explaining each line of the Plaintiff’s pay stub and
why it was earned (e.g. overtime), and (4) evidence of the costs incurred by the
Plaintiff for treatment by a therapist that resulted from the Defendant’s conduct.
Id. After requesting—and receiving—two extensions of time (one nunc pro tunc),
Ms. Koudoukara ultimately produced three pieces of evidence: (1) she re-submitted her July 2023
pay stub, this time with a translation, see Ex. A to Pl.’s Mot. Extension Time, ECF No. 24-1;
(2) she documented her “attempts at mitigation” through records of 75 job applications submitted
to various employers from 2024 to 2025, see Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Default J., ECF No. 25
(Aug. 7 Suppl. Mem.); Ex. A to Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Default J., ECF No. 25-1; and (3) she
submitted additional job application receipts from 2025 to 2026, accompanied by an unsigned
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letter from Rannett Wallace-Gibson, an employment service specialist at Equus Workforce
Solutions, stating that Ms. Koudoukara “ha[d] been actively involved in job search and other
activities since August 2023,” see Pl.’s Notice Suppl. Production, ECF No. 26; Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Notice
Suppl. Production, ECF No. 26-1.
Because these submissions once again failed to comply with the Court’s Orders—including
its requirement that Ms. Koudoukara submit four specific categories of evidence—the Court
concluded that it lacked a sufficient basis to determine her damages and directed the termination
of this case without awarding damages. Min. Order (Aug. 11, 2026). Ms. Koudoukara moved for
reconsideration of that Order, arguing that she had in fact “complied with the Court’s Orders for
the 4-types of documents requested[.]” Pl.’s Mot. Recons. at 6, ECF No. 27. But as this Court
noted, Ms. Koudoukara had not submitted the evidence requested by this Court’s Orders. See Min.
Order (Aug. 31, 2026). Across her submissions, she failed to submit any evidence of costs incurred
for treatment by a therapist, ignored the Court’s request for an explanation of her pay stub, and
provided contradictory affidavits regarding her monthly salary. Id. Despite these defects, though,
the Court permitted Ms. Koudoukara to submit a supplemental memorandum regarding her
damages, which she has now done. See Pl.’s Suppl. Mem. Supp. Default J., ECF No. 28 (Sept. 14
Suppl. Mem.).
DISCUSSION
In general, a district court may revise any order if “the moving party has demonstrated
(1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the discovery of new evidence not previously available;
or (3) a clear error in the first order.” United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer & Co.,
502 F. Supp. 3d 91, 95 (D.D.C. 2020) (cleaned up). Here, there has been no intervening change of
law or newly discovered evidence. And in light of Ms. Koudoukara’s noncompliance with the
Court’s repeated requests for evidence of her damages, there was no clear error in the Court’s
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August 11, 2026, Order. But “[e]ven where none of these three factors is present, ‘the Court may
nevertheless elect to grant a motion for reconsideration if there are other good reasons for doing
so.’” Id. (quoting Cobell v. Norton, 355 F. Supp. 2d 531, 540 (D.D.C. 2005)). For instance, as
Ms. Koudoukara points out, a judgment may be amended or altered under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) to avoid “manifest injustice.” Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 1996) (internal quotation omitted). Given the nature of Ms. Koudoukara’s claims and her
belated submissions, the Court elects to reconsider its Order to avoid manifest injustice.
To award damages arising from default judgment, the Court must “make an independent
determination of the sum to be awarded unless the amount of damages is certain.” Walker, 6
F. Supp. 3d at 54 (cleaned up). And Ms. Koudoukara must “prove [her] damages to a reasonable
certainty.” Guerra, 2025 WL 2709631, at *1 (cleaned up). She seeks the following damages for
her Title VII and DCHRA claims: (1) $211,833.12 in lost wages (“back pay” and “front pay”),
(2) $700,000 in emotional distress damages (arising from her DCHRA claims only, see June 22
Suppl. Mem. at 2), (3) $1,000,000 in punitive damages, (4) $605 in costs, and (5) $31,662.75 in
attorney fees. See Proposed Order at 1, ECF No. 14-2. Having reviewed the latest submissions, the
Court awards $73,241.52 in lost wages, $50,000 in emotional distress damages, $0 in punitive
damages, $605 in costs, and $31,662.75 in attorney fees, totaling $155,509.27.
A. Lost Wages
First, Ms. Koudoukara seeks lost wages. She divides her request into two separate
categories, “back pay” and “front pay,” totaling $123,000.12. Setting aside the back pay–front pay
distinction, though, she essentially requests six years of compensation at her prior salary, dating
from July 2023 (when she was terminated) to July 2029 (three years from the date of her most
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recent affidavit). See Aff. Pl. Fanta Koudoukara. ¶ 20 (June 22 Koudoukara Aff.), Ex. A to June
22 Suppl. Mem., ECF No. 22-1.
“Title VII subjects claimants to a ‘statutory duty to minimize damages,’ and claimants must
‘use reasonable diligence in finding other suitable employment[.]’” Jean-Baptiste v. D.C., 958
F. Supp. 2d 37, 44 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC., 458 U.S. 219, 231 (1982)).
And the D.C. Court of Appeals has interpreted the DCHRA to include an identical duty to mitigate.
See Ottenberg’s Bakers, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 917 A.2d 1094, 1105–06; (D.C. 2007)
(per curiam) (citing Title VII caselaw to describe the plaintiff’s duty to mitigate damages under
the DCHRA). Thus, the Court has repeatedly requested evidence of Ms. Koudoukara’s efforts to
mitigate her damages. See, e.g., Min. Order (June 24, 2026) (directing Ms. Koudoukara “to provide
further evidence in support of her claim of damages” including “proof of job searches and
mitigation of damages”); Min. Order (Aug. 11, 2026) (same). In response, she has submitted email
receipts from various job applications submitted from July 2024 to August 2026. See Ex. A to
Aug. 7 Suppl. Mem.; Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Notice Suppl. Production. And she has furnished an unsigned
letter from Rannett Wallace-Gibson, an employment service specialist at Equus Workforce
Solutions, stating that she “has been actively involved in job search and other activities since
August 2023[.]” Ex. 1 to Pl.’s Notice Suppl. Production at 70.
On this record, the Court cannot award Ms. Koudoukara six years of lost wages. For
starters, the unsigned letter from Ms. Wallace-Gibson, without corroboration, cannot serve as
evidence of mitigation. What is left, then, are receipts of job application submissions reflecting
that Ms. Koudoukara began applying to jobs in July 2024—approximately one year after her July
2023 termination. And there is nothing in the record supporting an award of damages for three
years in the future. In light of Ms. Koudoukara’s documented, though belated, efforts to seek
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employment, the Court will award her two year’s wages at the monthly rate of $3,051.73
represented in her most recent submission, see Aff. Pl. Fanta Koudoukara. ¶ 20, Ex. 2 to Sept. 14
Suppl. Mem., ECF No. 28-2, totaling $73,241.52 in lost wages.
B. Emotional Distress
Ms. Koudoukara also seeks $700,000 in emotional distress damages arising from her
DCHRA claims. She previously represented that she has seen a therapist, see June 22 Koudoukara
Aff. ¶ 22, but she has submitted no additional evidence of her damages beyond her own prior
affidavits. See Sept. 14 Suppl. Mem. 2–3. And in her affidavit, she attests:
I have been scarred from the experiences at work. I have had sleepless night and
nightmares that the Ambassador is stalking me or pressuring me to have sex. These
experiences have affected my day to day interactions especially with men. I have
been feeling less confident in my daily tasks and try to minimize my
communications with friends and family. The workplace behavior has affected my
self confidence. As a result, I have also had a strained relationship with my friends
and family since my termination, including not wanting to meet or gather for social
functions. My self confidence has been ruined by the Ambassador. I frequently cry
myself to sleep.
June 22 Koudoukara Aff. ¶ 21.
Under D.C. law, “[w]hile damages are not required to be proven with mathematical
certainty,” Zoerb v. Barton Protective Servs., 851 A.2d 465, 471 (D.C. 2004) (cleaned up),
“plaintiffs must provide some reasonable basis upon which to estimate damages,” President,
Directors of Georgetown Coll. v. Wheeler, 75 A.3d 280, 293 (D.C. 2013) (cleaned up); see also
Democracy Partners, LLC v. O’Keefe, No. 25-7080, 2026 WL 2451656, at *14 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
21, 2026) (Wilkins, J., concurring in part) (same). “While plaintiffs are not required to offer expert
testimony to support a damages award, the weight of the evidence must support the damages
given.” Jean-Baptiste, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (citing Jefferson v. Milvets Sys., Tech., Inc., 986
F. Supp. 6, 8 (D.D.C. 1997)). And courts have remitted awards of emotional distress damages
when plaintiffs have failed to furnish evidence corroborating their testimony. See, e.g., Jean6
Baptiste, 931 F. Supp. 2d at 20 (remitting a $3.5 million award of emotional distress damages to
$350,000); Liberatore v. CVS New York, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 2d 114, 121 (D.D.C. 2001) (remitting
a $1.1 million award of emotional distress damages to $200,000); Spence v. Bd. of Educ. of
Christina Sch. Dist., 806 F.2d 1198, 1201 (3d Cir. 1986) (affirming remittur of a $22,060 award
of emotional distress damages). An independent survey undertaken by Judge Ricardo Urbina in
1997 concluded that “in discrimination and retaliation cases the range of jury awards is generally
between $10,000 and $150,000.” Nyman v. FDIC, 967 F. Supp. 1562, 1571 (D.D.C. 1997).
Considering this authority and Ms. Koudoukara’s submissions, the Court declines to award
$700,000 in emotional distress damages. The Court does not minimize Ms. Koudoukara’s
suffering. Sexual harassment remains widespread and is a scourge on workplaces across our
country. Victims suffer enduring psychological harm. But Ms. Koudoukara has not established an
entitlement to the award that she seeks. Considering this record—including the generality of
Ms. Koudoukara’s affidavits and the absence of other evidence—and having compared the facts
alleged by Ms. Koudoukara with those adjudicated by other courts, the Court concludes that an
award of $50,000 in emotional distress damages is appropriate.
C. Punitive Damages
Next, Ms. Koudoukara seeks $1,000,000 in punitive damages arising from her Title VII
and DCHRA claims. But as stated in the Court’s Memorandum Opinion, a foreign state cannot be
held liable for punitive damages under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. See Mem. Op. at 14;
28 U.S.C. § 1606 (“[A] foreign state except for an agency or instrumentality thereof shall not be
liable for punitive damages[.]”). Therefore, the Court cannot award punitive damages.
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D. Costs
Ms. Koudoukara also seeks to recover $605 in costs. She represents that these costs were
incurred in serving copies of the Complaint and other documents to the Embassy of Mali by mail
($200) and filing the Complaint ($405). June 22 Koudoukara Aff. ¶ 21; Dhali Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 3 to
Mot. Default J., ECF No. 14-5. Finding these costs reasonable, the Court will award $605 in
damages. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1); see also D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1403.16(f) (allowing courts
to grant any relief it deems appropriate, including, the relief provided in . . . [Section] 2-1403.13(a),
to a person who brings a cause of action pursuant to” the DCHRA); D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E) (providing for the “payment of reasonable attorney fees and costs”).
E. Attorney Fees
Finally, Ms. Koudoukara seeks attorney fees. Because she has prevailed on her Title VII
and DCHRA claims, she may recover reasonable attorney fees. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k)
(allowing the “prevailing party” in a Title VII case to recover “a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . as
part of the costs”); D.C. Code Ann. § 2-1403.13(a)(1)(E) (same as to the DCHRA). “The basic
formula for calculating an attorney fee award” is to “multiply the number of hours reasonably
expended in litigation by a reasonable hourly rate or lodestar.” DL v. District of Columbia, 924
F.3d 585, 588 (D.C. Cir. 2019). A reasonable rate is the rate “prevailing in the community for
similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” Blum v.
Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 n.11 (1984). And “the relevant community is the one in which the
district court sits.” Donnell v. United States, 682 F.2d 240, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Court may
also consider “a matrix showing the average hourly price tag of comparable lawyers.” Id. at 589,
591. For instance, the D.C. Circuit has endorsed the use of the Laffey matrix, which was compiled
in the 1980s “by inquiring into the billing rates of firms in Washington, D.C., which were engaged
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in active litigation practice in the federal courts.” Id. at 589 (cleaned up) (characterizing Save Our
Cumberland Mountains, Inc. v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516, 1521 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
Here, Ms. Koudoukara’s counsel graduated law school in 2001, Dhali Decl. ¶ 4, an
experience level for which the Laffey Matrix in effect between June 2024 and June 2025 provided
an hourly rate of $1,141. See Ex. 2 to Mot. Default J., ECF No. 14-4; accord Laffey Matrix,
http://www.laffeymatrix.com (last visited Sept. 22, 2026). And counsel represents that he
expended 27.75 hours during this litigation. See Ex. A to Mot. Default J., ECF No. 14-5. Deeming
the quantity of hours reasonable and applying the Laffey Matrix’s hourly rate, the Court will award
attorney fees in the amount of $31,662.75.
CONCLUSION
For the above-stated reasons, the Court GRANTS the Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration, ECF No. 27, and awards damages to the Plaintiff in the amount of $155,509.27.
SO ORDERED.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: September 25, 2026
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