Rel: September 25, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026
CR-2025-0235
State of Alabama
v.
Quinard Melton
Appeal from Lee Circuit Court
(CC-24-626)
PER CURIAM.
Quinard Melton was indicted for trafficking oxycodone,
hydrocodone, cannabis, and cocaine, violations of §§ 13A-12-231(3), 13A12-231(3), 13A-12-231(1), and 13A-12-231(2), Ala. Code 1975,
respectively. Melton was also indicted for the unlawful possession of
CR-2025-0235
drug paraphernalia, a violation of § 13A-12-260(c), Ala. Code 1975.
Melton pleaded not guilty on August 20, 2024. (C. 22.) He subsequently
moved to suppress the evidence that was seized pursuant to a search
warrant. The Lee Circuit Court granted Melton's motion. The State now
appeals the trial court's order pursuant to Rule 15.7, Ala. R. Crim. P.,
certifying that the pretrial appeal was not brought for the purpose of
delay and that the trial court's ruling would be fatal to the prosecution if
not reversed.
Facts and Procedural History
On April 5, 2022, Detective Levi Donnelly (the case agent
supervising the "ongoing" narcotics investigation of Melton and the
property at issue), along with other members of the Auburn Police
Department Narcotics Division and the Lee County SWAT team,
conducted a search of 1173 Eagle Circle in Auburn, pursuant to a search
warrant that was issued on April 1, 2022. (R. 17, 51.) During that search,
officers seized "[m]ultiple plastic bags containing a white powdery
substance," "[m]ultiple plastic bags containing marijuana," "THC
edibles," a bottle of hydrocodone pills, a bottle of oxycodone pills, two
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CR-2025-0235
cellular telephones, digital scales, a Glock magazine, boxes of
ammunition, and $3,381.00 in cash. (C. 68.)
On August 2, 2024, Melton was indicted by a Lee County grand jury
for trafficking oxycodone, hydrocodone, cannabis, and cocaine, as well as
for the unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia. (C. 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.)
On October 9, 2024, Melton moved to suppress all items seized during
the search because, he argued, the affidavit on which the search warrant
was issued failed to establish probable cause. (C. 25-28.) Specifically,
Melton argued in his motion and at the suppression hearing held on
January 7, 2025, that the reliability of the confidential informant
referred to in the affidavit had not been established and that the search
warrant was based on "stale" information. (C. 26; R. 7.)
Detective Joshua Gooden's affidavit in support of the application
for the search warrant was admitted as an exhibit at the suppression
hearing by stipulation of the parties. (R. 13.) That affidavit, sworn on
April 1, 2022, states, in pertinent part:
"The Auburn Police Division Narcotics Unit received
information concerning the sale of illegal narcotics, to include
Cocaine, by Quinard Demon Melton, at 1173 Eagle Circle
Auburn, Lee County, Alabama. During the course of this
ongoing investigation, purchases of Cocaine have been made
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CR-2025-0235
from Quinard Demon Melton in Auburn, Lee County,
Alabama.
"During the month of March, members of the Auburn
Police Department Narcotics Unit have met with a
confidential informant, hereinafter referred to as CI. During
this meeting, the CI and CI's vehicle were searched and the
CI was fitted with an electronic transmitting device and
provided with U.S. currency, with pre-recorded serial
numbers to purchase Cocaine. Detectives then followed the
CI to 1173 Eagle Circle in Auburn, Lee County, Alabama.
Detectives monitored the transaction by audio and visual
surveillance. The CI then purchased a quantity of Cocaine
from Quinard Melton, alias. The CI then met with Detective
Donnelly and turned the Cocaine over to detectives' control.
Detectives have utilized CI to make buys of Cocaine from
Quinard Melton, alias, at 1173 Eagle Circle, Auburn, Lee
County, Alabama in the past months also.
"This residence, 1173 Eagle Circle Auburn, Lee County,
Alabama, is a one-story brick/stone dwelling. The dwelling
faces North, and the mailbox has the numeric of 1173, which
is also clearly marked with the numeric of 1173 on the left
side of the house. Melton utilizes a white 1968 Chevrolet
Impala, bearing Alabama license plate 3993BH4."
(C. 64.) In the affidavit, Det. Gooden also detailed his "training,
experience, and participation, in other [drug-trafficking] investigations"
and stated that, based on "this training and experience, [he] reasonably
believe[d] that such items and/or evidence could be stored and/or
contained within the premises/vehicles to be searched." (C. 65.) Det.
Gooden further stated his belief that the facts and information provided
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CR-2025-0235
constituted "probable cause to believe that Quinard Demon Melton is
involved in distribution of controlled substances" and that the
accoutrements of Melton's drug-trafficking operation (including unlawful
controlled substances, drug paraphernalia, firearms, and proceeds) were
"concealed in or upon 1173 Eagle Circle Way," on Melton's person, and
on or in "any other persons and/or vehicles located on the property that
are immediately associated with 1173 Eagle Circle, Auburn, Lee County,
Alabama." (C. 65.) Based on Det. Gooden's affidavit, the magistrate
issued a search warrant on the afternoon of April 1, 2022.
At the suppression hearing, the case agent, Det. Donnelly, testified
that he had supervised the investigation of Melton, that the investigation
had been "ongoing" for "[s]everal months," that he had supervised Det.
Gooden in seeking the search warrant, and that he had participated in
the execution of that warrant. (R. 17-21, 24.) Det. Donnelly testified that
there had been multiple purchases from Melton at the residence for
which the search warrant was sought. (R. 24, 53-54.) Det. Donnelly also
testified that the residence had been under surveillance and that the
drug activity had been independently verified by law-enforcement
officers. (R. 26, 53-54.) Det. Donnelly further testified that the most
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CR-2025-0235
recent controlled buy that was specifically detailed in the affidavit took
place within 10 days of when the affidavit was sworn. (R. 39.) Det.
Donnelly then testified that he knew the exact date of that "buy" but that
the specific date could not be provided without compromising the safety
of the confidential informant. (R. 40, 46.) However, Det. Donnelly
testified that he did not know whether Det. Gooden shared any additional
information outside the affidavit with the issuing magistrate.
Standard of Review
"Because the evidence presented at [Melton's] suppression hearing
was undisputed, we review the trial court's [ruling on Melton's] motion
to suppress de novo." Reynolds v. State, 334 So. 3d 262, 268 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2020).
" ' "Where the evidence before the trial court was undisputed
the ore tenus rule is inapplicable, and the [appellate] Court
will sit in judgment on the evidence de novo, indulging no
presumption in favor of the trial court's application of the law
to those facts." ' State v. Hill, 690 So. 2d 1201, 1203 (Ala.
1996), quoting Stiles v. Brown, 380 So. 2d 792, 794 (Ala. 1980).
' " '[W]hen the trial court improperly applies the law to the
facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's
judgment.' " ' Ex parte Jackson, 886 So. 2d 155, 159 (Ala.
2004), quoting Hill, 690 So. 2d at 1203, quoting in turn Ex
parte Agee, 669 So. 2d 102, 104 (Ala. 1995). A trial court's
ultimate legal conclusion on a motion to suppress based on a
given set of facts is a question of law that is reviewed de novo
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CR-2025-0235
on appeal. See State v. Smith, 785 So. 2d 1169 (Ala. Crim.
App. 2000)."
State v. Hargett, 935 So. 2d 1200, 1203-04 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
Analysis
On appeal, the State argues that the trial court erred when it
granted Melton's motion to suppress because the affidavit supported a
finding of probable cause. We agree with the State that there was
sufficient information in Det. Gooden's affidavit to support the
magistrate's finding of probable cause to issue the search warrant.
Contrary to Melton's arguments below, the confidential informant's
reliability was established in the affidavit, and the information provided
therein was not "stale."
I. Probable Cause
In considering the sufficiency of the affidavit on which the search
warrant was based, we are guided by the following well-established
principles.
" 'The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation." Thus, "[a] search
warrant may only be issued upon a showing of probable cause
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CR-2025-0235
that evidence or instrumentalities of a crime or contraband
will be found in the place to be searched." United States v.
Gettel, 474 F.3d 1081, 1086 (8th Cir. 2007).' "
Callen v. State, 284 So. 3d 177, 209 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017) (quoting Ex
parte Green, 15 So. 3d 489, 492 (Ala. 2008)).
" 'Probable cause must be determined by an
analysis of "the totality of the circumstances."
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983). In determining whether to
issue a search warrant, the issuing magistrate is
to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the veracity and
basis of knowledge of the person supplying the
information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place. Illinois v. Gates; Hyde v. State,
534 So. 2d 1132 (Ala. Cr. App. 1988). Our duty as
a reviewing court is to ensure that the magistrate
had a substantial basis for concluding that
probable cause existed. Illinois v. Gates; McCray
v. State, 501 So. 2d 532 (Ala. Cr. App. 1986); Hyde
v. State.'
"Marks v. State, 575 So. 2d 611, 614-15 (Ala. Crim. App.
1990)."
Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (emphasis added).
" ' "Probable cause to search a residence
exists when 'there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.' Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. [213],
103 S. Ct. [2317] at 2332[, 76 L. Ed.2d 527 (1983)]."
United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080
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CR-2025-0235
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 901, 111 S. Ct.
259 [112 L. Ed. 2d 216] (1990).... [T]here is no
requirement of a "showing that such a belief be
correct or more likely true than false. A 'practical,
nontechnical' probability that incriminating
evidence is involved is all that is required." Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. [730] at 742, 103 S. Ct. [1535]
at 1543 [75 L. Ed.2d 502] [(1983)]. Additionally,
"[w]here a magistrate has found probable cause,
the courts should not invalidate the warrant by
interpreting the affidavit in a hypertechnical
rather than a common sense manner, and should
resolve doubtful or marginal cases according to the
preference to be accorded to warrants." Maddox v.
State, 502 So. 2d 779, 785 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985),
affirmed in part, remanded on other grounds, 502
So. 2d 786 (Ala.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 932 [107 S.
Ct. 404, 93 L. Ed. 2d 357] (1986).'
"Poole v. State, 596 So. 2d 632, 641 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992)."
Callen, 284 So. 3d at 209-10 (emphasis added).
Likewise, "[a] 'neutral and detached magistrate' is permitted to
'draw such reasonable inferences as he will from the material supplied to
him by applicants for a warrant.' " Reynolds v. State, 334 So. 3d 262, 268
(Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240
(1983)) (emphasis added). In addition, "[w]hether the circumstances
recited in an affidavit offered in support of an application for a search
warrant are such that the probable cause that might once have been
demonstrated by them has grown 'stale' is a matter that 'must be
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CR-2025-0235
determined by the circumstances of each case.' " Vinson v. State, 843 So.
2d 229, 233 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001) (quoting Sgro v. United States, 287
U.S. 206 (1932)).
Finally,
" '[w]here the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it
would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause
dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time. However,
where the affidavit properly recites facts indicating activity of
a protracted and continuous nature, a course of conduct, the
passage of time becomes less significant.' "
Vinson, 843 So. 2d at 233 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d
285, 287 (10th Cir. 1972)) (emphasis added).
Here, given the "totality of the circumstances" and allowing for
"reasonable inferences," as well as a "practical, common-sense"
determination, we hold that the affidavit presented a "fair probability"
that controlled substances would be found at the Eagle Circle residence.
See Callen, supra. In short, the issuing magistrate could have reasonably
concluded from Det. Gooden's affidavit that there was a "fair probability"
that cocaine and other evidence of drug trafficking were located at the
residence to be searched.
First, the affidavit clearly stated that law-enforcement officers
began a narcotics investigation into Melton and the residence after
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CR-2025-0235
"receiv[ing] information concerning the sale of illegal narcotics, to include
Cocaine, by Quinard Melton, at 1173 Eagle Circle Auburn, Lee County,
Alabama." (C. 64.) Second, the affidavit made clear that there was an
"ongoing investigation" based on that information and that multiple
"purchases of Cocaine have been made from … Melton." (C. 64 (emphasis
added).) Third, the affidavit specifically stated that "[d]etectives have
utilized [the confidential informant] to make buys of Cocaine from
Quinard Melton, alias, at 1173 Eagle Circle … in the past months" as
part of this "ongoing" investigation. (C. 64.) Fourth, the affidavit stated
that at least one of the multiple controlled buys from Melton at the
specific residence to be searched took place within the 31 days preceding
the swearing of the affidavit, specifically, "[d]uring the month of March."
Fifth, Det. Gooden further stated that -- in light of his training and
experience and based on the "ongoing" investigation of Melton and the
residence at issue, which included multiple cocaine purchases the
confidential informant had made from Melton at that residence during
the "past months," including the specific transaction in March 2022 -- he
believed that Melton was running a drug-trafficking operation at the
residence and that evidence of that operation would be found there.
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CR-2025-0235
To be sure, the affidavit's only specific reference to a clearly defined
time was to the preceding month of March, which included a time span
of up to 31 days. However, that reference must be considered in the
context of the entire affidavit and the totality of the circumstances
presented therein. The March 2022 purchase was not a "single, isolated"
event. See Cochran v. State, 111 So. 3d 148, 162 (Ala. Crim. App. 2012).
The affidavit stated that, "[d]uring the course of this ongoing
investigation," "[d]etectives have utilized [the confidential informant] to
make buys of cocaine from Quinard Melton … at 1173 Eagle Circle,
Auburn, Lee County, Alabama in the past months," including a specific
transaction that was recorded by detectives "[d]uring the month of
March" before the affidavit was sworn on April 1, 2022. (C. 64 (emphasis
added).) "Ongoing" is defined as "being actually in process." MerriamWebster's Collegiate Dictionary 1111 (12th ed. 2026) (emphasis added).
Thus, the magistrate, relying on his "practical, common-sense," could
"reasonably infer" from the description of an "ongoing" investigation that
the multiple buys made in the "past months" referred to the "past
months" most recently preceding the specific March 2022 reference. In
addition, the affidavit stated that law-enforcement officers had "utilized
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CR-2025-0235
CI to make buys … from Quinard Melton … at 1173 Eagle Circle" in
Auburn, Alabama. (C. 64 (emphasis added).) Thus, the recent, multiple
cocaine "buys" were clearly supervised by law-enforcement officers,
which established the reliability of the confidential informant and the
information provided. The buys were all made from Melton and at the
address to be searched, which established a pattern of drug trafficking
by Melton at that location. In other words, the affidavit indicated
" 'protracted and continuous' " drug-activity for which " 'the passage of
time becomes less significant.' " Vinson, 843 So. 2d at 233 (emphasis
added; citation omitted). See also Cochran, 111 So. 3d at 162 (noting that
"[t]he allegations in the affidavit concerned criminal activity that was
continuing in nature over an extended period, not a single, isolated event"
(emphasis added)). Because of the pattern of confirmed drug-trafficking
activity, the passage of time, at most 31 days,1 did not render the reliable
information provided in Det. Gooden's affidavit "stale."
1Although Det. Donnelly testified that the March 2022 buy occurred
within 10 days of the swearing of Det. Gooden's affidavit, Det. Donnelly
did not know if this fact (or any facts to which he testified at the
suppression hearing) was presented by Det. Gooden to the magistrate.
Thus, we consider only the information presented in Det. Gooden's
affidavit in determining whether probable cause existed. See, e.g., Ex
parte Green, 15 So. 3d 489, 495 (Ala. 2008) (recognizing that an affidavit's
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CR-2025-0235
In sum, because multiple, reliable and verified "buys" took place
from Melton at the residence to be searched during an "ongoing"
investigation in the months recently preceding the swearing of the
affidavit, including but not limited to the previous 31 days, it was
reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that there was a "fair
probability" that evidence of drug trafficking, including illegal drugs,
would be found at the residence at the time the search warrant issued on
April 1, 2022. Cf. Ex parte Parker, 858 So. 2d 941, 945-47 (2003) (holding
that, because "the only statement" in the affidavit "that could support a
finding of probable cause" was "false without dispute," the affidavit failed
to establish reliability or provide "any dates to establish recency" and did
not establish "a pattern of cocaine sales" to "support the conclusion that
the cocaine … was still there"); and Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384, 388
(Ala. Crim. App. 1990) (holding that the affidavit was " 'so lacking in
indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable' " because "there was no reference at all in the
"deficiency may be cured by information an affiant supplied to the issuing
authority in addition to the assertions in the affidavit," but not when the
affiant could not recall providing those additional facts to the
magistrate).
14
CR-2025-0235
affidavit as to when the informant saw the narcotics at the appellant's
residence" (emphasis added; citation omitted)). Our conclusion that the
affidavit here was supported by probable cause is further bolstered by the
well-settled principle that this Court will " ' "resolve doubtful or marginal
cases according to the preference to be accorded to warrants." ' " Callen,
284 So. 3d at 209-10 (citations omitted).
Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate properly issued the search
warrant based on probable cause and that the trial court exceeded its
discretion by granting Melton's motion to suppress the evidence seized
during the execution of that warrant.
II. Good Faith
In the alternative, the State also argues, as it did below, that, even
if there were deficiencies in the affidavit, the good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule would preclude suppression of the evidence seized
pursuant to the search warrant. We agree with the State that, had there
been deficiencies in Det. Gooden's affidavit, the good-faith exception
would nonetheless prevent the exclusion of evidence seized during the
search in this case.
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CR-2025-0235
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly "expressed a
strong preference for warrants and declared that 'in a doubtful or
marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where
without one it would fall.' " United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914
(1984) (citation omitted). As the Leon Court explained, "[r]easonable
minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular
affidavit establishes probable cause, and we have thus concluded that the
preference for warrants is most appropriately effectuated by according
'great deference' to a magistrate's determination." Id. Guided by those
principles, the United States Supreme Court established the "good-faith"
exception, which prevents the exclusion of "reliable physical evidence
seized by officers reasonably relying on a warrant issued by a detached
and neutral magistrate." Id. at 913.
This Court has explained:
" ' "The good faith exception provides that when officers
acting in good faith, that is, in objectively reasonable reliance
on a warrant issued by a neutral, detached magistrate,
conduct a search and the warrant is found to be invalid, the
evidence need not be excluded." Rivers v. State, 695 So. 2d
260, 262 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997).
" 'In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405,
82 L. Ed. 2d 677 (1984), … the United States Supreme Court
recognized four circumstances in which the good faith
16
CR-2025-0235
exception was inapplicable: (1) when the magistrate or judge
relies on information in an affidavit that the affiant knew was
false or would have known was false except for his reckless
disregard of the truth; (2) when the magistrate wholly
abandons his judicial role and fails to act in a neutral and
detached manner; (3) when the warrant is based on an
affidavit so lacking an indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4)
when the warrant is so facially deficient that the executing
officer cannot reasonably presume it to be valid.' "
Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (quoting Bailey v. State, 67 So. 3d 145, 149-50
(Ala. Crim. App. 2009)).
The search warrant here was executed by law-enforcement officers
in good faith and in objective reasonable reliance on that warrant. First,
regardless of whether Det. Donnelly should be considered in the affiant's
stead because he assisted Det. Gooden in preparing the affidavit (as
Melton asserted below (R. 15)), the good-faith exception is not rendered
inapplicable based on the affiant's providing "deficient" information.
Rather, the good-faith exception is rendered inapplicable based on the
affiant's submission of "false" information that the affiant either " 'knew
was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth.' " Callen, 284 So. 3d at 208 (emphasis added; citation
omitted). Here, there has never been any allegation that Det. Gooden's
affidavit was based on "false" information or information based on a
17
CR-2025-0235
"reckless disregard of the truth." Id. Second, there has never been any
allegation that the " 'magistrate wholly abandon[ed] his judicial role and
fail[ed] to act in a neutral and detached manner.' " Id. (citation omitted).
Third, for the reasons already stated in Part I of this opinion, we do not
believe that the " 'affidavit [was] so lacking an indicia of probable cause
as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.' " Id.
(citation omitted). Indeed, probable cause was provided in Det. Gooden's
affidavit. However, to the extent that "[r]easonable … minds may differ,"
Leon, 484 U.S. at 914, there was, at a minimum, a "colorable showing of
probable cause" on which law-enforcement officers could have reasonably
relied. Nelms v. State, 568 So. 2d 384, 389 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990)
(quoting United States v. Hove, 848 F. 2d 137, 140 (9th Cir. 1988))
(" '[O]fficers who present a colorable showing of probable cause to a
judicial officer ought to be able to rely on that officer's ruling in executing
the warrant.' "). As we recognized in Berry v. State, 299 So. 3d 336, 350
(Ala. Crim. App. 2020) (plurality opinion), " ' [i]t is well settled that
"[s]uppression of evidence … has always been our last resort, not our first
impulse," and the exclusionary rule is only applicable "where its remedial
objectives are thought most efficaciously served." ' " (Quoting United
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CR-2025-0235
States v. Abdi, 463 F.3d 547, 556 (6th Cir. 2006), quoting in turn Hudson
v. Michigan, 546 U.S. 586 (2006).) Fourth, " 'the warrant is [not] so
facially deficient that the executing officer cannot reasonably presume it
to be valid.' " Callen, 284 So. 2d at 208 (citation omitted).
In sum, "[t]here is no indication in the record that any of the four
cited circumstances that would invalidate the application of the goodfaith exception was present in this case." Id. Accordingly, "in light of the
foregoing, even if there were deficiencies in [Det. Gooden's] affidavit, we
cannot say that the evidence seized as a result of the warrant should have
been suppressed." Bolden v. State, 205 So. 3d 739, 744 (Ala. Crim. App.
2015). Every indication here is that law-enforcement officers reasonably
relied in "good faith" on the search warrant. And, "when an officer acting
with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or
magistrate and acted within its scope … there is no police illegality and
thus nothing to deter." Leon, 468 U.S. at 920-21.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the trial court's order suppressing the evidence
against Melton is reversed, and this cause is remanded to the trial court
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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CR-2025-0235
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Minor, and Anderson, JJ., concur. Cole,
J., concurs in the result.
20