Rel: September 25, 2026
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
SPECIAL TERM, 2026
CL-2026-0314
Lacey Dawn McCutcheon
v.
Zachary McCutcheon
Appeal from Shelby Circuit Court
(DR-23-900727)
EDWARDS, Judge.
On December 14, 2023, Lacey Dawn McCutcheon ("the wife") filed
in the Shelby Circuit Court ("the trial court") a complaint seeking a
divorce from Zachary McCutcheon ("the husband"). The husband filed
an answer to the wife's complaint on January 1, 2024. The record CL-2026-0314
indicates that the trial court conducted a trial on the wife's complaint
over two days on October 4, 2024, and October 8, 2024. On May 13, 2025,
the trial court entered a judgment ("the May 2025 judgment") divorcing
the parties and, among other things, awarding each party the personal
property in his or her possession; each party was also made responsible
for any debt in his or her sole name. The May 2025 judgment further
awarded the husband his automobile and made him responsible for its
associated debt. No other automobiles were specifically addressed in the
May 2025 judgment. The trial court concluded the May 2025 judgment
by denying all other requested relief.
On May 27, 2025, the wife filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. App.,
postjudgment motion requesting, in relevant part, that the trial court
amend the May 2025 judgment to address certain specified personal
property, including the parties' "RV Camper" ("the camper"). The
husband filed a postjudgment motion on June 10, 2025, in which he also
requested that the trial court amend the May 2025 judgment to
specifically include the debt associated with the camper in its division of
the marital debts. On September 16, 2025, more than 90 days after the
filing of the husband's postjudgment motion, see Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ.
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P. (providing that a postjudgment motion is denied by operation of law if
not ruled upon before the expiration of the 90-day period following the
filing of that motion), the trial court entered an order ("the September
2025 order") purporting to amend the May 2025 judgment by, in relevant
part, dividing specific personal property other than the camper between
the parties. The trial court's September 2025 order also denied all other
requested relief.
On October 6, 2025, the wife timely filed in the trial court a notice
of appeal directed at the May 2025 judgment, as purportedly amended by
the September 2025 order. The wife's appeal was assigned appeal
number CL-2025-0851. This court, on the wife's motion, dismissed that
appeal on October 22, 2025. The certificate of judgment in appeal
number CL-2025-0851 was issued on November 10, 2025.
On March 31, 2026, the wife filed in the trial court a motion
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., arguing that the trial court's
September 2025 order was void because, she asserted, the trial court had
lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on the parties' postjudgment
motions. The trial court denied the wife's Rule 60(b)(4) motion on April
10, 2026. The wife appeals.
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Initially, we note that the husband asserts that the trial court's
May 2025 judgment is not a final judgment because, he says, it did not
specifically address the camper in its division of the marital estate.
However,
"[t]he husband's argument assumes that a judgment in
a divorce proceeding is not final if the judgment does not
dispose of all the parties' jointly owned property. This
assumption is not correct. A final judgment of divorce does
not necessarily have to dispose of all the parties' jointly owned
property. See Fitts v. Stokes, 841 So. 2d 229 (Ala. 2002);
Garrett v. Garrett, 521 So. 2d 1337 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988); and
Hammock v. Hammock, 867 So. 2d 355 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003).
Rather, when a final judgment of divorce does not reference a
specific asset, liability, or piece of personal or real property,
jointly owned by the parties, the property remains unaffected
by the judgment, and the ownership, along with the benefits
and burdens thereof, remains as it was before the entry of the
divorce judgment. Radiola v. Radiola, 380 So. 2d 817 (Ala.
1980); Miller v. Miller, 391 So. 2d 119 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980);
and McGuire v. Horton, 586 So. 2d 9 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991)."
Clements v. Clements, 990 So. 2d 383, 395-96 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).
Accordingly, the fact that the trial court's May 2025 judgment does not
specifically address the disposition of the parties' camper does not render
the May 2025 judgment nonfinal. Instead, the ownership of the camper
remains unaffected by the May 2025 judgment, and the camper is
therefore owned by the party or parties who owned it before the entry of
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that judgment. Any debt associated with the camper is similarly
unaffected by the May 2025 judgment.
On appeal, the wife argues that the trial court should have granted
her Rule 60(b)(4) motion because, she asserts, the last filed postjudgment
motion was denied by operation of law on September 8, 2025, 90 days
after its filing, pursuant to Rule 59.1. Thus, the wife argues, the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to enter the September 2025 order amending the
May 2025 judgment. We agree.
"Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P., provides that a motion under
Rule 59[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] to alter, amend, or vacate a
judgment must be ruled on within 90 days or else it is
automatically denied. 'If a trial court does not rule on a postjudgment motion within 90 days, it loses jurisdiction to rule
on the motion.' Ex parte Caterpillar, Inc., 708 So. 2d 142, 143
(Ala. 1997); see also Ex parte Chamblee, 899 So. 2d 244, 247
(Ala. 2004) (same)."
Jackson v. Jackson, 308 So. 3d 524, 528 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020). In
addition,
"[a] judgment that has been rendered void by operation
of Rule 59.1[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] may be set aside on a motion
filed with the trial court under Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P.
See Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 233 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
In the event a trial court refuses to vacate a void judgment
upon proper motion, an aggrieved party may appeal that
denial. See Weaver v. Weaver, 4 So. 3d 1171, 1172 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2008)."
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Sibley v. Sibley, 90 So. 3d 191, 193 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012).
We observe that
"[t]he standard of review on appeal from the denial of
relief under Rule 60(b)(4)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is not whether
there has been an abuse of discretion. When the grant or
denial of relief turns on the validity of the judgment, as under
Rule 60(b)(4), discretion has no place. If the judgment is valid,
it must stand; if it is void, it must be set aside. A judgment is
void only if the court rendering it lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter or of the parties, or if it acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process."
Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins. Corp., 590 So. 2d 209,
212 (Ala. 1991). Further,
"[s]ubsection (4) of Rule 60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] permits relief
from a final judgment when that judgment is void. It is
important to note that a judgment is not void simply because
it is erroneous, because Rule 60(b) is not intended as a
substitute for appeal. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cantley,
717 So. 2d 751 (Ala. 1998). A judgment is void under Rule
60(b)(4) only if the court that rendered the judgment lacked
subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, or if it acted
in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. Osborn v.
Roche, 813 So. 2d 811 (Ala. 2001). A Rule 60(b) motion does
not bring the underlying judgment up for review but presents
only the question of the propriety of the judgment denying the
Rule 60(b) motion. Sanders v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of
Alabama, Inc., 368 So. 2d 8 (Ala. 1979)."
Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 235-36 (Ala. Civ. App. 2002).
The wife's Rule 59 postjudgment motion was filed on May 27, 2025,
and the husband's Rule 59 postjudgment motion was filed on June 10,
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2025. The trial court's order purporting to grant certain relief requested
in the parties' postjudgment motions was entered on September 16, 2025,
112 days after the wife filed her postjudgment motion and 98 days after
the husband filed his postjudgment motion. Thus, the September 2025
order was entered beyond the 90-day period that the trial court had to
rule on the parties' postjudgment motions, and, as the wife correctly
argued in her Rule 60(b)(4) motion before the trial court, the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to rule on the parties' postjudgment motions;
therefore, the September 2025 order is void. Sibley, 90 So. 3d at 193.1
Having determined that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule
on the parties' postjudgment motions, we conclude that the wife's Rule
60(b)(4) motion is due to be granted. Accordingly, we reverse the trial
court's order denying the wife's Rule 60(b)(4) motion to vacate the
September 2025 order, and we remand the case with instructions that
the trial court vacate that void order.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.
1The record does not indicate that the parties expressly consented
to extend the time for the trial court to rule on the parties' postjudgment
motions. See Rule 59.1, Ala. R. Civ. P.
7