UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DAVID NNADIOTU AMADIOHA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25 - 3273 (LLA)
MARCO A. RUBIO,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff David Nnadiotu Amadioha brings this action against Defendant Marco A. Rubio,
in his official capacity as Secretary of State, alleging that the Secretary unlawfully denied his
application for a U.S. passport. Mr. Amadioha brings claims under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551, et seq., the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the
Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19-45, id. at 9-10. Before the
court is the Secretary’s motion to dismiss the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 11. For the reasons explained below, the court denies the
Secretary’s motion.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The court draws the following facts, accepted as true, from Mr. Amadioha’s complaint.
Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). Mr. Amadioha
was born in Atlanta, Georgia on June 30, 1988. ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. The State of Georgia issued him
a “Certificate of Live Birth” the following month under the name David Nnadiotu Amadioha. Id. ¶¶ 8-9; see ECF No. 1-2, at 2. 1 One year later, Mr. Amadioha’s mother successfully applied for a
U.S. passport on his behalf. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. That same year, Mr. Amadioha and his mother
moved to Nigeria to reunite with his father. Id. ¶ 11.
The Amadioha family then changed their surname to “Hmadioha” and used that name in
all subsequent identity documents. Id. Mr. Amadioha did not learn of his U.S. citizenship until
he was around eighteen years old, in approximately 2006, at which time his parents explained that
he had been born in the United States and gave him his Georgia birth certificate. Id. ¶ 13. At some
point, Mr. Amadioha relocated to Belgium but, due to “clerical errors,” his Belgian identity
documents list Nigeria as his place of birth and 1989 as his birth year. Id. ¶ 12.
In 2019, Mr. Amadioha applied for a new U.S. passport at the U.S. Embassy in Lagos,
Nigeria. Id. ¶ 14. The Embassy denied his application due to the discrepancy between the surname
on his Georgia birth certificate and the surname on his Nigerian and Belgian identity documents.
Id.; see ECF No. 1-2, at 6 (concluding that Mr. Amadioha “ha[d] not satisfactorily established [his]
identity”). In its denial letter, the Embassy explained that Mr. Amadioha had submitted
“insufficient [evidence] to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [he was] entitled to a
U.S. passport.” ECF No. 1-2, at 6.
In October 2022, Mr. Amadioha filed a second passport application at the U.S. Embassy
in Brussels, Belgium. ECF No. 1 ¶ 15. One year later, that Embassy requested that Mr. Amadioha
“provide secondary evidence of birth in the United States” in addition to the Georgia birth
certificate that he had originally submitted. ECF No. 1-2, at 4; see 22 C.F.R. § 51.42(b) (listing
documents that may help establish the birth of someone unable to submit a birth certificate that
1
When citing ECF No. 1-2, the court refers to the CM/ECF-generated numbers at the top of each page rather than any internal pagination.
2
meets the regulatory requirements). Mr. Amadioha provided his Nigerian and Belgian identity
documents, “corroborative evidence of the 1989 [U.S.] passport issuance,” photographs, and a
“Certificate of Individuality” from the Nigerian Embassy in Brussels, ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 15-16, which
confirmed that “David Nnadiotu Amadioha” and “David Nnadiotu Hmadioha” are “the same
person,” ECF No. 1-2, at 8. The U.S. Embassy denied Mr. Amadioha’s second passport
application in February 2023. ECF No. 1 ¶ 17. In its denial letter, the Embassy stated: “Although
you have submitted additional documentation, the evidence received is not sufficient to establish
your [U.S.] citizenship.” ECF No. 1-2, at 4.
In September 2025, Mr. Amadioha filed this action, alleging that the Secretary’s denial of
his passport application violated the APA and the Fifth Amendment and seeking relief under the
Declaratory Judgment Act. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 30, 38, 44. In February 2026, the Secretary filed a
motion to dismiss Mr. Amadioha’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for
failure to state a claim. ECF No. 11. The motion is fully briefed. ECF Nos. 11, 12, 16.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. In
evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations in the
complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Atherton
v. D.C. Off. of the Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility standard
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and conclusions, and
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a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Nor will “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the
facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.
Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Hurd v. District of
Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Secretary argues that the court should dismiss each of Mr. Amadioha’s three counts.
First, the Secretary asserts that Mr. Amadioha fails to state a claim under the APA because the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1101, et seq., supplies an adequate
alternative remedy that displaces relief under the APA. ECF No. 11, at 5-9; see 5 U.S.C. § 704
(providing judicial review of administrative action only where “there is no other adequate remedy
in a court”). Second, he contends that Mr. Amadioha fails to state a due process claim because he
received sufficient process. ECF No. 11, at 10-11. Finally, the Secretary maintains that
Mr. Amadioha fails to state a claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act because that statute does
not confer an independent basis for jurisdiction. Id. at 11. The court addresses each argument in
turn.
A. Administrative Procedure Act (Count I)
The Secretary argues that Mr. Amadioha’s APA claim fails because a person “adversely
affected . . . by agency action” may seek judicial review only where there is “no other adequate
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remedy,” 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, and, here, 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b) and (c) provide an alternative
mechanism for a person outside of the territorial United States to obtain review of his passport
denial. ECF No. 11, at 5-9. Mr. Amadioha responds that the recourse available under
Sections 1503(b) and (c) is inadequate and thus does not displace his claim under the APA. ECF
No. 11, at 6-10. The court agrees with Mr. Amadioha and will deny the Secretary’s motion to
dismiss Count I.
Section 704 restricts APA claims to “final agency action for which there is no other
adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. This limit “makes it clear that Congress did not
intend the general grant of review in the APA to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency
action.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 903 (1988). At the same time, courts should
avoid reading Section 704 “to defeat the central purpose of providing a broad spectrum of judicial
review of agency action.” Id. Accordingly, ‘[w]hen considering whether an alternative remedy is
‘adequate’ and therefore preclusive of APA review, [courts] look for ‘clear and convincing
evidence’ of ‘legislative intent’ to create a special, alternative remedy and thereby bar APA
review.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 846 F.3d 1235, 1244
(D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Garcia v. Vilsack, 563 F.3d 519, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
“Because [S]ection 704 requires only an adequate alternative, ‘[the D.C. Circuit] has held
that the alternative remedy need not provide relief identical to the relief under the APA,’” so long
as it offers “relief of ‘the same genre.’” Id. at 1245 (quoting Garcia, 563 F.3d at 522); see El Rio
Santa Cruz Neighborhood Health Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 396 F.3d 1265, 1272
(D.C. Cir. 2005). That said, “doubtful and limited relief . . . is not an adequate substitute for
review” under the APA. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 901; see Zeevi v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 832 F. Supp.
3d 67, 73-74 (D.D.C. 2026). Nor is relief that requires a plaintiff to undergo a “process [that] can
5
be arduous, expensive, and long.” U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 578 U.S. 590, 601
(2016).
To determine whether Sections 1503(b) and (c) of the INA preclude APA review of the
denial of Mr. Amadioha’s passport application, the court begins by outlining the processes for
seeking review of a passport denial under the INA. Section 1503 permits an individual denied “a
right or privilege as a national of the United States” on the basis that he “is not a national of the
United States” to seek review of that denial. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). But the process for seeking
review differs substantially depending on whether individual is in the United States or not. A
putative citizen “within the United States” may “institute an action” in federal district court
“against the head of such department or independent agency for a judgment declaring him to be a
national of the United States.” Id. In contrast, a putative citizen outside the United States, like
Mr. Amadioha, must first submit an “application to a diplomatic or consular officer of the United
States in the foreign country in which he is residing” in order to request “a certificate of identity.”
Id. § 1503(b). If the putative citizen successfully obtains a certificate of identity, he must then
travel to a port of entry and apply for admission to the United States. Id. § 1503(c). 2 While
applying for admission, the putative citizen is “subject to all the provisions of [the INA] relating
to the conduct of proceedings involving [noncitizens] seeking admission to the United States,” id.,
including immigration detention, see id. § 1225. If the Attorney General determines that the
putative citizen is not a U.S. citizen and thereby “not entitled to admission,” the individual’s only
available option for judicial review is to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the
2
The consular officer’s denial of a certificate of identity is appealable only to the Secretary. 8 U.S.C. § 1503(b).
6
Attorney General’s denial of admission. Id. § 1503(c). 3 But if the putative citizen is admitted to
the United States, he may then institute an action under Section 1503(a) for judicial review of the
denial of his passport. See id.
The Secretary contends that Sections 1503(b) and (c) provide an adequate remedy and
thereby displace Mr. Amadioha’s APA claim, relying primarily on Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643
(D.C. Cir. 2017), and Hinojosa v. Horn, 896 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2018). ECF No. 11, at 5-9. The
court finds Xia inapt and Hinojosa unpersuasive. In Xia, plaintiffs who resided in the United
States, but outside the District of Columbia, brought suit in this district challenging the revocation
of their passports under the APA, the Fifth Amendment, and Section 1503. 865 F.3d at 646-48,
655-56. The D.C. Circuit held that “the District of Columbia [wa]s the wrong venue for [the
plaintiffs’] section 1503 action,” id. at 656, and remanded “for further consideration of the APA
claims, or for transfer of those claims together with the section 1503 claims to the correct venue,”
id. at 658. The Secretary relies on the D.C. Circuit’s offhand comment that “section 1503 provides
plaintiffs an adequate avenue to assert . . . citizenship claims.” ECF No. 11, at 6 (alteration in
original) (quoting Xia, 865 F.3d at 655). That remark is dicta, but it is also irrelevant because the
plaintiffs were already in the United States and proceeding under Section 1503(a), not
Sections 1503(b) and (c). Xia, 865 F.3d at 655; see ECF No. 11, at 7. Accordingly, neither the
D.C. Circuit nor the district court in Xia had the opportunity to address whether the process under
Sections 1503(b) and (c)—the process applicable to those, like Mr. Amadioha, who are putative
3
It appears that the Attorney General’s authority under Section 1503(c) may have been transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 451(b)(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2196. See 6 U.S.C. § 271(b). For clarity and consistency with earlier cases, the court will refer to the relevant decision-maker as the “Attorney General.”
7
citizens outside the United States—was adequate. See generally Xia, 865 F.3d 643; cf. Xia v.
Kerry, 73 F. Supp. 3d 33, 45-46 (D.D.C. 2014) (holding in the alternative that the plaintiff “likely
would be precluded from [an APA] claim” because Section 1503(a) “permits citizens to have an
Article III court adjudge their citizenship status de novo if it is questioned”). This court thus
concludes that the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Xia “sheds no light on whether [Sections] 1503(b)
and (c) provide adequate relief for persons outside the United States.” Zeevi, 832 F. Supp. 3d
at 77; see Chacoty v. Pompeo, 392 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7-8 (D.D.C. 2019) (same).
In Hinojosa, meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the mechanism under
Sections 1503(b) and (c) “provides a direct and guaranteed path to judicial review.” 896 F.3d
at 312. The Fifth Circuit reasoned that any remedy under the APA would be “duplicative” because
Sections 1503(b) and (c) provide a putative citizen “two bases for reaching the courts to remedy
their claims”—either filing a habeas petition if denied admission or instituting an action under
Section 1503(a) if admitted. Id. And although the Fifth Circuit recognized that a plaintiff “might
not receive judicial review under the statute” if the Secretary denies a certificate of identity, the
Fifth Circuit deemed this risk insufficient to render the remedy inadequate. Id. The Secretary
contends that the court should adopt as persuasive the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning. See ECF No. 11,
at 7-8. The court is not persuaded.
To begin, relief under Sections 1503(b) and (c) is “doubtful and limited,” Bowen, 487 U.S.
at 901, not “guaranteed,” Hinojosa, 896 F.3d at 312, as the Secretary suggests, see ECF No. 11,
at 7-8. A plaintiff like Mr. Amadioha would first need to obtain a certificate of identity from a
consular officer; if the consular officer were to deny his request for a certificate, the plaintiff’s
only recourse would lie with the Secretary. See supra n.2. If the Secretary were to affirm the
denial, then the plaintiff would reach a “dead end[]” without any possibility of judicial review of
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the denial of his passport application. Zeevi, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 75. 4 Even if the plaintiff were to
obtain a certificate of identity, he would still need to seek admission into the United States at a
port of entry. See 8 U.S.C. § 1503(c). If the Attorney General were to deny him admission, his
only recourse would be to file a petition for habeas corpus, which does afford judicial review, but
only of the Attorney General’s determination regarding admissibility, not of the underlying
passport denial. See id. This process provides no guarantee that Mr. Amadioha will obtain review
of his underlying passport denial; rather, there are several “dead ends” that each may independently
foreclose him from seeking review of the denial of his passport application. See Sackett, 566 U.S.
at 128 (noting that [t]he remedy for denial of action that might be sought from one agency does
not ordinarily provide an ‘adequate remedy’ for action already taken by another agency”); see also
Zeevi, 832 F. Supp. 3d at 75 (rejecting the government’s adequacy argument because a plaintiff
“stuck in one of [Sections 1503(b) and (c)’s] cul-de-sacs” only obtains review “of a different
agency’s denial of another application —whether for a certificate of identity or for admission into
the United States”); Gonzalez Boisson v. Pompeo, 459 F. Supp. 3d 7, 17 (D.D.C. 2020)
(concluding that “[Section] 1503(b) and (c) offer [a plaintiff] only ‘doubtful and limited relief’ that
might well never result in a determination of the underlying legal question: is [he] a citizen?”
(quoting Garcia, 563 F.3d at 522)).
4
The Secretary suggests that a plaintiff may sometimes be able to sue under the APA after the Secretary has affirmed the denial of a certificate of identity. ECF No. 11, at 7 & n.3; ECF No. 16, at 2 & n.1; see Hinojosa, 896 F.3d at 312 (observing that a plaintiff whose certificate of identity is “denied by the Secretary . . . would be entitled to relief under the APA”). This suggestion is hard to square with the Secretary’s position that Sections 1503(b) and (c) wholly preclude APA review. But to the extent that the Secretary suggests that the denial of a certificate of identity is final agency action reviewable under the APA—and even assuming that position were correct— Sections 1503(b) and (c) would still bear hallmarks of inadequacy because the judicial review in question would not be of the challenged agency action (the passport denial), nor would it reduce the risks and expense associated with proceeding under the INA.
9
Separately, the road to relief under Sections 1503(b) and (c) is too “arduous, long, and
expensive” to displace APA review. See Hawkes, 578 U.S. at 601. Even if Mr. Amadioha were
to successfully obtain a certificate of identity, he would have to travel to a port of entry and seek
admission—a costly, long, and arduous endeavor. What is more, the Secretary admits that
Mr. Amadioha risks detention if he presents at a port of entry for admission. See ECF No. 11, at 9
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225). The costs and risks of pursuing a citizenship determination under
Sections 1503(b) and (c) are independently sufficient to render them inadequate for purposes of
displacing the APA. As the Supreme Court explained sixty years ago, “nothing in the statutory
language, in the legislative history, or in [the Court’s] prior decisions” indicates that, “despite the
liberal provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, Congress intended that a native of this
country living abroad must travel thousands of miles, be arrested, and go to jail in order to attack
an administrative finding that he is not a citizen of the United States.” Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367,
375 (1962), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); cf. Abbott
Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 153 (1967) (explaining that plaintiffs need not “risk serious
criminal and civil penalties” to have the opportunity to appeal an agency decision), abrogated on
other grounds by Califano, 430 U.S. 99.
Rather than responding to the uncertain nature and arduous process of obtaining relief
under Sections 1503(b) and (c), the Secretary primarily takes issue with Mr. Amadioha’s and other
courts’ reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rusk. See ECF No. 11, at 9; ECF No. 16, at 3.
The court would reach the same conclusion whether it treated Rusk as controlling or merely
persuasive. But, at a minimum, the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rusk bolsters the court’s
conclusion that Sections 1503(b) and (c) are an inadequate alternative remedy. In Rusk, the
government had argued that the INA “provide[s] the exclusive procedure under which” a person
10
in Mr. Amadioha’s shoes may “attack the administrative determination that he [i]s not a citizen.”
369 U.S. at 370. The Court explained that the INA’s use of the permissive “may” throughout
Section 1503 indicated that Congress did not intend for its remedies to be exclusive. Id. at 375
(quoting 5 U.S.C. § 1503(b), (c)). It concluded that Congress enacted the review mechanism under
Sections 1503(b) and (c) not to “foreclose lawsuits by claimants . . . who do not try to gain entry
to the United States before prevailing in their claims of citizenship,” but rather to “cut off”
individuals who sought “to gain fraudulent entry [in]to the United States” under an earlier statutory
scheme. Id. at 379. The Court also noted that the INA’s procedures for a person seeking entry to
the United States “would culminate in litigation not against the Secretary of State whose
determination is [] being attacked [under the APA], but against the Attorney General.” Id. at 375;
see Sackett, 566 U.S. at 127. Although the Secretary is correct that the Court in Rusk did not
expressly assess whether Sections 1503(b) and (c) of the INA displaced Section 704 of the APA,
see ECF No. 16, at 3, the Court applied the same test, asking whether Congress had provided “clear
and convincing evidence” of its intent to render “the broadly remedial provisions of the
[APA] . . . unavailable to review administrative decisions under the [INA],” Rusk, 369 U.S.
at 379-80; see Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in Wash., 846 F.3d at 1244 (instructing courts to “look
for ‘clear and convincing evidence’ of ‘legislative intent’ to create a special, alternative remedy
and thereby bar APA review” under Section 704 (quoting Garcia, F.3d at 523)). Rusk thus bolsters
this court’s conclusion that the Secretary has failed to provide “clear and convincing evidence” of
legislative intent for Sections 1503(b) and (c) to foreclose APA review.
The Secretary further seeks to distinguish Rusk on the basis that the plaintiff there had been
indicted and “face[d] certain arrest” if he were to return to the United States. ECF No. 11, at 9;
see ECF No. 16, at 3; see also Hinojosa, 896 F.3d at 313-14 (distinguishing Rusk because “the
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path to judicial review for the Plaintiffs is far less treacherous [than in Rusk] because neither has
been criminally indicted and thus does not risk incarceration upon arrival”). The Fifth Circuit’s
factual distinction is non-responsive to this court’s conclusions about Congress’s intent. Although
the plaintiff in Rusk faced more certain and more severe penalties than Mr. Amadioha might, the
risk of civil immigration detention, along with the costly and lengthy journey that Mr. Amadioha
must make to the United States to present himself at a port of entry, suffice to establish that the
review process under Sections 1503(b) and (c) is too “arduous, long, and expensive,” Hawkes, 578
U.S. at 601, to displace APA review. In sum, the procedure under Sections 1503(b) and (c) for
individuals outside the United States to seek review of a passport denial is not an adequate
alternative judicial remedy under the APA. Because the Secretary raises no other arguments
challenging Mr. Amadioha’s APA claim, the court will deny the motion to dismiss Count I.
B. Procedural Due Process (Count II)
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that “[n]o person shall
be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V.
“‘The fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard’ at ‘a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.’” Alaska Commc’ns Sys. Holdings, Inc. v. Nat’l Lab. Rels. Bd.,
6 F.4th 1291, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970)). When
evaluating a procedural due process claim, the court must “first determine whether constitutional
safeguards apply at all, i.e., whether a private party has a property or liberty interest that triggers
Fifth Amendment due process protection.” Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 982
F.2d 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1993). If so, the court evaluates whether the deprivation of that interest
occurred without sufficient process. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976); see
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Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (explaining that the process due is “flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands”).
The freedom to travel internationally is an “aspect of the ‘liberty’ protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” so the government may regulate passports only “within
the bounds of due process.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Califano v. Gautier
Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6 (1978)). The Secretary does not dispute that the Fifth Amendment
requires the government to provide a citizen with some process before denying him a passport.
See generally ECF Nos. 11, 16. Instead, the Secretary argues that Mr. Amadioha “fails to identify
any process he was due that the Department failed to provide.” ECF No. 11, at 10. The court
disagrees.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the D.C. Circuit has articulated precisely what process is
due before the denial of a passport. In Haig, the Supreme Court held that the process afforded to
the petitioner before the revocation of his passport—“a statement of reasons and an opportunity
for a prompt postrevocation hearing”—was constitutionally sufficient, but the Court expressly
reserved the question whether those procedures were constitutionally required. Id. at 310 & n.62.
Here, Mr. Amadioha contends that the Secretary “failed to provide a reasoned explanation” for the
February 2023 denial of his passport application or to “provide [him] with an opportunity to
contest or clarify [the agency’s] concerns before the decision became final.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 36; see
id. ¶¶ 37-38. Although Mr. Amadioha disclaims any entitlement to a “trial-type hearing” or
“administrative appeal mechanism,” he argues that the Secretary was required to provide a
“meaningful statement of reasons adequate to permit a meaningful response.” ECF No. 12, at 11.
The Secretary responds that, because Mr. Amadioha “submitted multiple passport
applications and was permitted to submit additional information in support of his application”
13
before it was denied, he was afforded a sufficient opportunity “to address the agency’s concerns
before . . . a decision on his passport application was issued.” ECF No. 16, at 5 (citation omitted);
see ECF No. 11, at 10. But that is non-responsive to Mr. Amadioha’s argument, which is that the
ultimate denial letter failed to explain “the adverse inference” that the agency drew “or what
evidence would satisfy the agency.” ECF No. 12, at 13; see ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 27, 36-38. According
to Mr. Amadioha, the letter’s bare-bones statement of reasons “make[s] rebuttal practically
impossible.” ECF No. 12, at 14. The Secretary points to no case or other authority suggesting
otherwise.
“Few decisions of this Court speak to the precise point at which notice becomes
constitutionally deficient.” Dodson v. U.S. Capitol Police, 633 F. Supp. 3d 235, 269
(D.D.C. 2022). But a survey of due process claims in similar contexts indicates that Mr. Amadioha
has at least plausibly alleged that the notice he received was too cursory to afford a meaningful
opportunity to respond by filing a new application with adequate documentation. See 22 C.F.R.
§ 51.65(b) (requiring an applicant who seeks an adjudication of his entitlement to a passport to
submit a new application). For example, in Sabra ex rel. Baby M v. Pompeo, 453 F. Supp. 3d 291
(D.D.C. 2020), the plaintiff parents sought a passport for their baby on the basis that the baby
needed “urgent medical treatment in the United States.” Id. at 298. But the parents “did not
provide any travel plans” for the baby’s “urgent medical care,” nor did they provide “written
medical records to substantiate Baby M’s medical condition.” Id. Accordingly, the Embassy did
not excuse the baby’s lack of attendance at the passport interview, which is required by regulation,
22 C.F.R. § 51.28(a)(1), and the parents declined the Embassy’s offer that they reapply and bring
the baby to the passport interview, Sabra, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 298. Additionally, the Embassy
requested evidence of the baby’s maternity given the “advanced age” of the purported mother and
14
then, “[d]ue to the indicia of fraud and inconsistencies in the submissions,” the Embassy extended
the deadline for the plaintiffs to provide additional evidence. Sabra, 453 F. Supp. 3d at 298. On
that record, the court concluded that the government had satisfied its procedural due process
requirements because it provided the parents with both a written notification communicating the
deficiencies in the application and the opportunity to cure those deficiencies. Id. at 317-18.
In Gonzalez Boisson, the court concluded that the government’s passport revocation letter
was sufficient because it stated the legal basis for the revocation and “substantiated the allegation
that Gonzalez Boisson’s passport was obtained illegally, fraudulently, or erroneously by citing
specific documents demonstrating that [a] signed statement in support of [the plaintiff]’s passport
application contained false information.” 459 F. Supp. 3d at 18. And in Abdulla v. Cucinnelli,
840 F. App’x 827 (6th Cir. 2020), the Sixth Circuit declined to find a due process violation where
an agency “explained why it found the existing evidence insufficient and what types of evidence
[the plaintiff] needed to submit” and, in its final decision, “listed each piece of additional evidence
and explained piece-by-piece why that evidence failed to meet [the plaintiff’s] burden of showing
eligibility.” Id. at 840.
Cases like Sabra, Gonzalez Boisson, and Abdulla demonstrate why Mr. Amadioha has
sufficiently alleged a procedural due process claim sufficient to withstand the Secretary’s motion
to dismiss. While the Embassy’s February 2023 letter denying Mr. Amadioha’s passport
application indicates the basis for the denial—that the information Mr. Amadioha provided under
22 C.F.R. § 51.45 was “not sufficient to establish [his U.S.] citizenship”—the letter lacks factual
specificity about why the documentation was insufficient and what additional documentation
Mr. Amadioha could provide to satisfy the regulatory standard. ECF No. 1-2, at 4.
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To be sure, some bases for denial may be so straightforward that merely citing the relevant
statute or regulation provides constitutionally sufficient notice. See, e.g., Whitfield v. U.S. Sec’y
of State, 853 F. App’x 327, 330 (11th Cir. 2021) (per curiam) (concluding that the plaintiff received
adequate process in the denial of his passport renewal application when (1) the application form
expressly stated that “‘failure to provide the information requested on this form . . . could result in
the denial of your application,’” (2) “the Secretary informed [the plaintiff] of the deficiency” of
his application “and advised him of the steps necessary to amend the application,” and (3) “the
Secretary specified the statutory and regulatory basis for the denial” (first alteration in original)).
But where the relevant agency fails to engage with the purported deficiencies in an application—
or provides a bare-bones statement that is tantamount to providing no explanation at all—a plaintiff
may sufficiently allege a procedural due process claim. See Carmichael v. Pompeo, 486 F. Supp.
3d 360, 373-74 (D.D.C. 2020) (concluding that two plaintiffs had alleged a procedural due process
claim when they failed to provide a Social Security number for religious reasons, but the
Secretary’s denial provided only the opportunity to submit the requested information and failed to
engage with the request for a religious accommodation), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed as moot
in part sub nom. Carmichael v. Blinken, No. 23-5111, 2024 WL 2768384 (D.C. Cir. May 30,
2024); see also Ass’n of Cmty. Orgs. for Reform Now v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 463 F.
Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that an agency’s notices failed to comply with due
process because the notices listed a single phrase as the basis for denial and referred the plaintiffs
to a “vague and nonindividualized” explanatory guide).
At bottom, procedural due process requires the government to provide an individual “the
opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Matthews, 424 U.S.
at 333 (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Mr. Amadioha has plausibly
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alleged that the Secretary’s denial was so cursory that it deprived him the minimal information
necessary to prepare a meaningful response. Accordingly, the court will deny the Secretary’s
motion to dismiss Count II. 5
C. Declaratory Judgment Act (Count III)
Mr. Amadioha seeks “[a] declaration” from this court that he is a United States citizen by
birth under 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a) and the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and a
declaration that the Secretary’s February 2023 denial of his passport was unlawful. ECF No. 1
¶¶ 41-42, 44. The Secretary argues only that the Declaratory Judgment Act “does not provide an
independent cause of action,” meaning that the court would need to dismiss Count III if it
dismissed Counts I and II. ECF No. 11, at 11. In light of the court’s conclusions that
Mr. Amadioha has stated claims under the APA and the Fifth Amendment, and because the
Secretary makes no other arguments seeking dismissal of the Declaratory Judgment Act count at
this juncture, the court will deny the Secretary’s motion to dismiss Count III.
5
The Secretary also argues that Mr. Amadioha fails to state a substantive due process claim. ECF No. 11, at 9-11. But Mr. Amadioha’s complaint and opposition brief both make clear that Mr. Amadioha intends only to bring a procedural due process claim. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36-37; see also ECF No. 12, at 10-14.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 11, is DENIED. It is further ORDERED that Defendant shall file an answer to
Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. 1, on or before October 13, 2026. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
SO ORDERED.
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge
Date: September 28, 2026
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