UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JENNIFER LYNN BEATTY,
Plaintiff,
v. Case No. 25-cv-2758-MJS
TODD BLANCHE,
U.S. Attorney General, 1
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jennifer Beatty is a lawyer who worked for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Just shy
of a year into the job—and before the end of her probationary period—the FBI terminated Beatty’s
employment based on what it claimed were conduct and performance issues. Beatty sees it
differently. She says the Bureau discriminatorily fired her because of her age (49 at the time) and
in retaliation for raising concerns about discrimination. She now sues the FBI asserting claims of
age discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. The case is before the Court on the
FBI’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (See ECF No. 15.) For
the reasons explained below, the Court agrees that Beatty fails to plead plausible claims of age
discrimination and hostile work environment, but it finds that her retaliation claim survives. So,
the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the FBI’s motion to dismiss.
1
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Attorney General Blanche is substituted for former Attorney General Bondi.
1
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Court draws the following facts, accepted as true, from Beatty’s complaint. Casey v.
McDonald’s Corp., 880 F.3d 564, 567 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Beatty began working for the Federal Bureau of Investigation in April 2023 as an Assistant
General Counsel in the FBI’s Forensic Science Law Unit (“FSLU”). (ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 22.)
Throughout her employment, Beatty’s first-line supervisor was Audra Bartels, who is reportedly
thirteen years Beatty’s junior. (Id. ¶ 23.) Beatty was allegedly older than many of her colleagues,
as well, including two individuals who Beatty points to as “comparators”: Noreen Ahmed and
Katherine Scott, who were three and four years younger than Beatty, respectively. (Id. ¶ 24.)
Beatty’s complaint chronicles a variety of “differential treatment” she claims to have
suffered during her FBI employment, mostly at the hands of Bartels. For instance, Bartels allegedly
did not offer Beatty the same professional opportunities as others, including by not placing Beatty
on one of several “teams” within FSLU. As Beatty tells it, Bartels assigned Ahmed to lead the
“Giglio Production Team” and Stott to lead the “Discovery Team,” but Beatty was “not assigned
to any of the FSLU teams.” (Compl. ¶ 27.) Bartels also reportedly excluded Beatty from various
meetings and working groups and only permitted her to have “limited contact” with more senior
officials, including when it came to briefing the FBI’s General Counsel. Beatty claims she was
essentially “relegated to a ‘secretarial role’” in meetings. (Id. ¶ 28.) Separately, Beatty claims she
received a less favorable evaluation than Ahmed and Stott during a performance check-in and did
not receive a monetary award that her colleagues received. (Id. ¶ 29.) Beatty further alleges that
Bartels spoke about her in particularly critical terms, including by texting a client that Beatty was
“f***ing brand new” and typing “AM I BEING UNCLEAR???” when referring to Beatty. (Id. ¶¶
30–31.) Beatty says that Bartels’ critical tone carried through to their direct interactions, as well,
2
with Bartels purportedly treating Beatty in an “unduly harsh” manner when she raised various
personal issues with Bartels, including a recent death in her family and marital problems. (Id. ¶
32.) Furthermore, Beatty says that Bartels “attacked [her] lack of flexibility and adaptability” and
told her to do “everything like them”—i.e., her younger colleagues, Ahmed and Stott—including
as to “the proper clothes and shoes to wear.” (Id. ¶¶ 33–34.)
In a meeting on November 2, 2023, Beatty told Bartels that she believed she “was being
treated differently because of her age.” (Compl. ¶ 55.) After that, Beatty says, Bartles subjected
her to even more adverse treatment. The next day, November 3, Bartels reported Beatty as a
possible “insider threat” to the FBI’s Insider Threat Office. (Id. ¶ 57.) Despite the referral, though,
no investigation was ever initiated. (Id.) Also in the wake of the November 2 meeting, Beatty’s
“workload decreased significantly” (id. ¶ 61), and she claims that Bartels began to compile
information about her “alleged performance deficiencies”—including by soliciting her coworkers
for input—with the goal of removing Beatty from the FBI (see id. ¶¶ 58–60). According to the
complaint, Bartels completed a draft recommendation to terminate her employment by December
19, 2023, “thirty-one (31) federal working days from the November 2 meeting.” (Id. ¶ 62.)
In February 2024, Beatty took medical leave for foot surgery. (Compl. SOF ¶ 141.) 2 While
Beatty was on leave, Bartels finalized the necessary documentation to process her termination, and
the FBI then issued Beatty a termination letter on March 11, 2024, citing “performance and
conduct as the reasons for her termination.” (Id. ¶¶ 143, 146–47.) Beatty was still in her
probationary period at the time her employment was terminated. (Id. ¶¶ 19, 144.)
2
Beatty appended a separate statement of facts to her complaint that supplements the complaint itself. Where the Court refers to those paragraphs, it cites them as “Compl. SOF.” For clarity’s sake, the Court reviewed the entirety of Beatty’s complaint and the appended statement of facts in resolving this motion.
3
Following administrative proceedings, Beatty timely filed this lawsuit in August 2025. She
asserts three claims for relief: (1) age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (“ADEA”); (2) unlawful retaliation under the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (“Title VII”); and (3) hostile work environment under the ADEA and Title VII. In response,
the FBI moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 15 (“Mot.”).) The motion is fully briefed
and ripe for decision. (See ECF No. 18 (“Opp’n”); ECF No. 20 (“Reply”).)
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), dismissal is warranted when a complaint
does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[F]acial plausibility” means that the facts pleaded must
allow for a “reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under
Rule 12(b)(6), a court must afford the plaintiff “the benefit of all inferences that can be derived
from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (per curiam)
(quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). But a court need not accept
as true “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations[,]” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751,
756 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted), nor will mere “recitals of the [legal] elements
of a cause of action … suffice” to forestall a motion to dismiss, L. Xia v. Tillerson, 865 F.3d 643,
650 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
Finally, although courts should “afford a liberal reading to a complaint filed by a pro se
plaintiff,” Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 2014), that approach “does not
ordinarily apply to pro se lawyers,” Spence v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 109 F.4th 531,
538 (D.C. Cir. 2024); see also Mann v. Castiel, 681 F.3d 368, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing
4
approvingly the proposition that no extra latitude was owed a pro se lawyer with “formal legal
training”). In keeping with this precedent, and given Beatty’s status as a licensed attorney, the
Court does not apply any added latitude or liberality to its assessment of Beatty’s claims here.
DISCUSSION
The FBI mounts arguments against each of Beatty’s claims. On review of the complaint’s
well-pled allegations, the Court agrees with the Bureau that Beatty’s claims of age discrimination
and hostile work environment (Counts I and III) do not pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6) but finds
that Beatty pleads sufficient facts to state a plausible claim of retaliation (Count II).
I. Age Discrimination
Beatty first asserts a claim of age discrimination under the ADEA. The ADEA makes it
“unlawful for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a). To state a
plausible claim of discriminatory treatment under the ADEA, a plaintiff need only allege “the two
essential elements of a discrimination claim”: “that (i) the plaintiff suffered an adverse
employment action (ii) because of [her] … age[.]” Baloch v. Kempthorne, 550 F.3d 1191, 1196
(D.C. Cir. 2008); Yoder v. Architect of the Capitol, 2025 WL 915611, at *4 (D.D.C. Mar. 26,
2025). In seeking dismissal of Beatty’s age-discrimination claim, the FBI attacks both elements.
It argues that, except for her employment termination, none of the alleged mistreatment being
challenged by Beatty amounts to an adverse action covered by the statute. And it argues that Beatty
fails to plead sufficient facts to establish the plausible inference that any of the alleged
mistreatment, including Beatty’s ultimate employment termination, was based on Beatty’s age.
Because the Court agrees with the Bureau’s second argument, it need not reach the first.
5
As a starting point, because Beatty was in her late forties during her time with the FBI—
and was 49 years old, specifically, when the Bureau terminated her employment—she is covered
by the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (protecting individuals “at least 40 years of age”). And, at
a minimum, Beatty certainly experienced an adverse employment action when she was discharged
from the FBI in March 2024, as the Bureau appropriately acknowledges. The question that
remains, then, is whether Beatty pleads sufficient facts to raise an inference of age-based
discrimination in connection with her employment termination (or any other alleged mistreatment,
for that matter). See, e.g., Yoder, 2025 WL 915611, at *4 (explaining that an ADEA plaintiff must
“present facts that give rise to an inference of discrimination”) (citation modified) (quoting Hill v.
Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 146 F. Supp. 3d 178, 184 (D.D.C. 2015)). “A plaintiff can establish
this inference ‘through either direct evidence of animus’ or ‘by showing that [she] was treated
differently from similarly situated employees.’” Jones v. D.C. Off. of Unified Commc’ns, 2025 WL
2977585, at *3 (D.D.C. Oct. 22, 2025) (alteration in original); Regis v. Noem, 2025 WL 1580808,
at *3–4 (D.D.C. June 4, 2025). Beatty invokes both approaches here. Neither succeeds.
First, Beatty argues that she alleges “direct evidence of animus” that itself suffices to
establish the plausibility of her claim. She points to allegations that Bartels and her second-line
supervisor allegedly “attacked [her] conduct and communication style” and her “lack of flexibility
and adaptability.” (Opp’n at 21, 23 (citing Compl. ¶ 34).) These remarks, Beatty argues, directly
reflect “her supervisors’ age-based animus.” (Id. at 23.) But none of the alleged statements
amounts to direct evidence of discrimination under governing caselaw—i.e., “evidence that, if
believed by the fact finder, proves the particular fact in question without any need for inference[.]”
Oviedo v. WMATA, 299 F. Supp. 3d 50, 59 (D.D.C. 2018), aff’d, 948 F.3d 386 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(quoting Hajjar–Nejad v. George Washington Univ., 37 F. Supp. 3d 90, 125 (D.D.C. 2014)); see
6
also Wilson v. Cox, 753 F.3d 244, 247 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing direct evidence as evidence
“that itself shows … bias in the employment decision”) (citing Ayissi–Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712
F.3d 572, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam)). As a few examples in contrast, courts have found
direct evidence where a hiring manager reportedly told an applicant “you’re old,” as the reason
they could not perform the physical labor of a job, Stone v. Landis Constr. Corp., 442 F. App’x
568, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (per curiam), or when a manager allegedly told an employee on the night
she was fired that “maybe [she was] too old to work,” Robinson v. Red Coats, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 3d
201, 216 (D.D.C. 2014). The allegations here are different. Although one can argue that criticizing
an employee’s lack of “flexibility and adaptability” rings of ageism, that interpretation requires an
inferential step and is not self-evident from the remarks themselves. Thus, Beatty’s allegations are
not direct evidence that can establish the necessary discriminatory link for her claim. 3
Second, invoking a comparator theory, Beatty contends that her complaint creates an
inference of discrimination because she alleges that she was treated less favorably than similarly
situated employees who were younger. Specifically, Beatty focuses on two former FSLU
colleagues as comparators: Ahmed and Stott. (See Opp’n at 23–24 (citing Compl. ¶ 27).) Although
Beatty does assert a variety of alleged disparate treatment that she experienced as compared to
Ahmed and Stott, and although she does assert that both of those former colleagues were more
junior to her in age, her comparator theory comes up short all the same.
3
The same goes for Beatty’s allegations—albeit not ones she highlights in her brief—that Bartels said Beatty should wear different clothes and shoes (see Compl. ¶ 33). See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Sutton Park Ctr. for Nursing & Rehab., 2025 WL 920607, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2025) (“Even accepting Plaintiff's position that she perceived … comments” about how she was dressed “to be ageist, they are ‘not discriminatory because [they are] age-neutral.’” (citing Nielsen v. Pioneer Bank, 2018 WL 4689056, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2018))). In some contexts, one might argue that comments along these lines inferentially show some sort of ageist bias, but the remarks themselves are not discriminatory on their face.
7
To begin with, and as the FBI correctly argues, the age gap between Beatty and her
comparators is not significant enough to allow for an inference of discrimination based on age.
The Supreme Court explained decades ago that no such inference can be drawn when a plaintiff is
treated less favorably than someone “insignificantly younger.” O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin
Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996). Although there is no clearcut boundary between an age
disparity that is “significant” versus “insignificant,” the Court is guided by the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Dunaway v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, which found an age difference
of seven years insufficient when the plaintiff relied solely on comparator evidence in support of
their claim. See 310 F.3d 758, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Other cases in this District have likewise
found comparable age gaps to be insufficient in this context. See, e.g., Steele v. Carter, 192 F.
Supp. 3d 151, 171 (D.D.C. 2016) (“[A]n age difference of six years cannot provide support for an
inference of [age] discrimination.”), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom, Steele v. Mattis, 899
F.3d 943 (D.C. Cir. 2018); see also Clifton v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, 36 F. Supp. 2d 20, 26
(D.D.C. 1999) (finding a three-year age gap inadequate to create a discriminatory inference).
Whatever the ultimate dividing line, Beatty’s allegations do not come close to it because her
proffered comparators—Ahmed and Stott—are only three to four years younger. (Compl. ¶ 24.)
And, as the above caselaw reflects, that gap falls comfortably on the insignificant side of the line.
More, and apart from the lack of a “significant” age disparity, the Court agrees with the
FBI that Beatty separately fails to show that her comparators are similarly situated enough for their
allegedly preferential treatment over Beatty to create a discriminatory inference. At the motion-todismiss stage, a plaintiff does not necessarily have to “include factual allegations showing that the
comparator’s circumstances are nearly identical to the plaintiff’s in all relevant aspects.” Joyner v.
Morrison & Foerster LLP, 140 F.4th 523, 531 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (internal quotation marks omitted).
8
But a complaint that proceeds on a comparator theory—like this one—must contain “allegations
that a comparator was similarly positioned to the plaintiff in at least some relevant respects” and
include enough factual detail to allow a court to “plausibly infer that discrimination caused the
defendant’s differential treatment.” Id. Here, Beatty alleges that Ahmed and Stott shared the same
job title in the FLSU and reported to the same supervisor, Bartels. (Compl. ¶¶ 24, 27.) So far, so
good. But as the FBI emphasizes, Beatty was a probationary employee throughout her time with
the FBI, including when she was discharged, and Beatty does not allege the same about Ahmed or
Stott. This distinction—one between probationary and permanent employees—typically renders
comparators inapt, especially in federal government service. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Reno, 196 F.3d
255, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[A] probationary employee [is] not similarly situated to a permanent
employee[.]”); SaintPreux v. Mayorkas, 2021 WL 3912180, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2021) (similar),
aff’d, 2022 WL 1177328 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 14, 2022); Stephens v. Yellen, 2021 WL 5493024, at *7
(D.D.C. Nov. 23, 2021) (similar). The Court sees no reason to conclude differently here.
For starters, even though the FBI presses this argument specifically (see Mot. at 16-17),
Beatty ignores it (see generally Opp’n). Her failure to respond to that argument is tantamount to a
concession. See, e.g., Dawn J. Bennett Holding, LLC v. FedEx TechConnect, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d
79, 82 (D.D.C. 2016) (“It is well understood in this Circuit that when a plaintiff files an opposition
to a motion to dismiss addressing only certain arguments raised by the defendant, the court may
treat those arguments that the plaintiff failed to address as conceded.”), aff'd, 2017 WL 2373115
(D.C. Cir. Apr. 4, 2017); (see also ECF No. 17 (order warning Beatty about this very risk).) But
concession or not, the point remains that a probationary employee, at least in many workplace
contexts, is differently positioned than a permanent employee, including when it comes to an
employer’s assessment of conduct and performance and, in turn, long-term retention. Beatty’s
9
failure (or inability, perhaps) to allege that Ahmed or Stott were probationary employees like her
during the relevant period undermines her claim that they are apt comparators.
In sum, because Beatty fails to plead facts to show that the FBI took any action against her
because of her age—whether her employment termination or otherwise—the Court will dismiss
Beatty’s age discrimination claim in Count I for failure to state a claim.
II. Retaliation
Through Count II, Beatty asserts a claim of retaliation, seemingly under both Title VII and
the ADEA. “To state a claim for retaliation under Title VII or the ADEA, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that (1) she engaged in statutorily protected activity, (2) she suffered a materially adverse
action by her employer, and (3) the two are causally connected.” Spence, 109 F.4th at 539 (citation
modified); see Tomasello v. Rubin, 167 F.3d 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he test for determining
retaliation under the ADEA and Title VII is identical.”). As the Supreme Court recently clarified,
an employment action is “materially adverse” for retaliation purposes if it “causes ‘significant’
harm.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 357 (2024) (citing Burlington N. &
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006); see also Lewis v. Bessent, 2026 WL 2516785,
at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 26, 2026) (“[T]he adverse-action standard for retaliation claims is now more
demanding than for discrimination claims.”). In seeking dismissal of Beatty’s retaliation claim(s),
the FBI argues that the complaint does not plead any materially adverse action except for Beatty’s
employment termination. And as to her employment termination, the FBI argues that Beatty fails
to plead any causal link between her discharge and any preceding protected activity.
As an initial matter, to the extent Beatty asserts a claim of retaliation under Title VII, that
claim fails because her alleged protected activity simply does not implicate that statute. Title VII
affords protection based on the protected characteristics of “race, color, religion, sex, or national
10
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). By contrast, the protected characteristic of age—which is what
Beatty allegedly complained about here (see Compl. ¶ 55)—is covered by the ADEA, see 29
U.S.C. §§ 623(a), 631(a). Beatty’s retaliation claim therefore arises under the ADEA, not Title
VII. The Court thus dismisses any retaliation claim under Title VII. See Jones, 2025 WL 2977585,
at *5 (employing this same analysis to dismiss claims premised on Title VII).
Turning back to the FBI’s dismissal arguments, the Court agrees that Beatty fails to plead
any materially adverse action other than her termination. For one thing, even though the FBI
squarely pressed this argument (see Mot. at 12-15), Beatty did not address it in her opposition,
responding only that she pled a material adverse action in the form of her “unlawful termination.”
(Opp’n at 29.) Once again, Beatty’s failure to engage with the Bureau’s argument operates as a
concession. Dawn J. Bennett Holding, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 82. In any event, the only other alleged
wrongdoing that comes close to qualifying as “material” under the governing standards is Bartels’
internal referral of Beatty for FBI investigation as a potential insider threat. (Compl. ¶ 57.) That
occurrence certainly sounds like a significant one, at least on its face. But the complaint confirms
that the referral went nowhere: “[t]he referral allegations were so non-threatening that, within a
week or two, an investigation was not initiated.” (Id.) Even assuming this type of investigation
referral can be a materially adverse action in some circumstances, see Leach v. Yellen, 2023 WL
2496840, at *7 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2023) (collecting cases), the Court is hard-pressed to see how the
referral here caused the requisite “significant harm” to qualify as materially adverse, Muldrow,
601 U.S. at 357, when no adverse consequences are alleged to have flowed from the referral;
indeed, Beatty’s complaint confirms that the whole exercise was basically dead on arrival.
That leaves Beatty’s termination-based retaliation claim. On that front, the FBI argues that
Beatty fails to allege any plausible connection between her termination and her November 2
11
protected activity because the complaint reflects that Bartels “treated [Beatty] differently
throughout her tenure … and had expressed dissatisfaction with her performance well before the
relevant meeting.” (Mot. at 15.) This argument fails. There is certainly support for the notion “that
an adverse employment action that was already contemplated before a plaintiff engaged in
protected activity cannot be evidence of retaliation.” See, e.g., Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp.
3d 100, 119 (D.D.C. 2014) (citing Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272 (2001)).
Under that logic, if Beatty’s complaint revealed that Bartels was already planning to terminate
Beatty before the November 2 meeting, the Bureau’s argument might be on stronger footing.
But the complaint basically says the opposite. It asserts that immediately after the
November 2 meeting, Bartels “started a campaign” aimed at pushing Beatty out of the FBI.
(Compl. ¶ 56 (emphasis added).) If anything, the FBI’s arguments are more akin to a summaryjudgment-style theory as to why Beatty cannot show that the Bureau’s apparent performance-based
justifications for her discharge are pretextual. This is not the proper posture for that argument. For
present purposes, Beatty alleges that she engaged in protected activity on November 2, 2023, 4 and
Beatty alleges that Bartels promptly began to collect information to support Beatty’s termination
and then created a written draft recommendation of Beatty’s termination about six weeks later, by
December 19, 2023. (Compl. ¶¶ 57-62.) At the motion-to-dismiss stage, this close temporal
proximity between Beatty’s alleged protected activity and the ensuing adverse action is sufficient
to infer causation. See, e.g., Trant v. Murray, 2021 WL 2366293, at *2 (D.D.C. June 9, 2021) (twomonth gap sufficient to create inference of causation); Perkins v. WCS Constr., LLC, 2018 WL
4
The FBI does not dispute, at least in the present posture, that Beatty sufficiently pleads that she engaged in protected activity based on her alleged comments during the November 2 meeting with Bartels.
12
5792828, at *9 (D.D.C. Nov. 5, 2018) (similar). Thus, Beatty’s termination-based retaliation claim
is sufficiently pled to survive Rule 12(b)(6) and proceed to discovery. 5
III. Hostile Work Environment
Finally, through Count III of her complaint, Beatty alleges a claim for hostile work
environment—once again, seemingly under both Title VII and the ADEA.
Before jumping into the governing legal standards, the Court starts by clarifying the proper
contours of the hostile work environment claim Beatty pursues. First, Beatty’s allegations do not
implicate a claim under Title VII for the same reasons explained above: the underlying protected
characteristic animating her claims is age (and her age-related protected activity), and age is
protected by the ADEA, not Title VII. So, to the extent the complaint can be read to assert a hostile
work environment claim under Title VII, the Court dismisses any such claim. Beyond that,
Beatty’s briefing makes clear that her claim is one for retaliatory hostile work environment, rather
than age-based hostile work environment—i.e., the allegedly improper motive behind the claimed
harassment was Beatty’s protected activity in complaining about age discrimination, not Beatty’s
age itself. (See, e.g., Opp’n at 31 (“Ms. Beatty has pled enough facts to sufficiently state a plausible
claim for hostile work environment in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity.”); id. at 34
(“Ms. Beatty has established a causal temporal connection between Ms. Bartels’ harassment and
when Ms. Beatty engaged in protected activity based upon her age.”).) In simple terms, then,
Beatty’s claim is one for retaliatory hostile work environment under the ADEA.
5
The Bureau’s attempt to focus on the actual date of Beatty’s termination in March 2024—versus the December 2023 date on which Bartels is alleged to have finished a draft recommendation to carry out that termination—misses the mark. The Court is concerned, at least at this juncture, with the timing of when the termination was set in motion, and the well-pled allegations show that date to be no later than December 2023, within a matter of weeks after Beatty allegedly complained to Bartels about age discrimination.
13
To properly plead such a claim, Beatty must allege “she was subjected to discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult that was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of
her employment and create an abusive working environment.” Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d
1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). By contrast, “a few isolated incidents of offensive
conduct do not amount to actionable harassment.” Stewart v. Evans, 275 F.3d 1126, 1134 (D.C.
Cir. 2002). “To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, the court looks to the totality
of the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct, its severity, its
offensiveness, and whether it interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Baloch, 550 F.3d
at 1201 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88 (1998)); see also Menoken
v. Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 5–6 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (“[I]ndividual acts that may not be actionable on
[their] own [can] become actionable due to their cumulative effect.” (first alteration in original)
(citation omitted)). The relevant circumstances, however, generally do not include “‘work-related
actions by supervisors’ … since they cannot ‘be characterized as sufficiently intimidating or
offensive in an ordinary workplace context.’” Lewis v. Yellen, 2021 WL 5416634, at *7 (D.D.C.
Nov. 19, 2021) (quoting Wade v. District of Columbia, 780 F. Supp. 2d 1, 19 (D.D.C. 2011)).
Examples of such “work-related actions” can include a decrease in workload, heightened
management oversight or added scrutiny of assignments, lowered performance evaluations, and
the like. See id; Munro v. LaHood, 839 F. Supp. 2d 354, 366 (D.D.C. 2012). Finally, “[a]
retaliatory hostile work environment claim additionally requires ‘a causal connection between the
harassment and [the] protected activity.’” Dorsey v. D.C. Dep’t of Health, 2026 WL 1831546, at
*5 (D.D.C. June 25, 2026) (second alteration in original) (quoting Graham v. Holder, 657 F. Supp.
2d 210, 216 (D.D.C. 2009)).
14
Applied here, these principles confirm that Beatty fails to plead sufficient facts to state a
plausible claim of retaliatory hostile work environment. She premises her claim on the following
alleged instances of harassment: (1) Bartels referring Beatty for an insider threat investigation in
early November 2023; (2) Bartels reportedly “surveying [Beatty’s] co-workers for complaints”
about Beatty to use in the termination process; (3) Bartels requiring that Beatty “relinquish her
office key prior to departing for foot surgery”; and (4) Bartels allegedly not returning Beatty’s
personal property for more than a year after her termination. (Opp’n at 32-33.) 6 Further, Beatty
asserts that Bartels used what she calls a “workplace slur” against her—reportedly calling her a
“workplace shooter”—in “sworn out-of-court testimony.” (Id. at 37 (citing Compl. ¶ 71).)
These allegations come up short. Many of Beatty’s complaints boil down to “work-related
actions” by Bartels that are not actionable through a hostile work environment claim, including
the added scrutiny of Beatty’s work and performance (whether directly or through other
colleagues) and the request that Beatty relinquish her office key before commencing a leave of
absence. More, several of Beatty’s complaints post-date her employment with the FBI altogether,
including that Bartels allegedly took more than a year to return her personal property after Beatty
was discharged and ostensibly “humiliated” Beatty by requiring her to ask for her property during
Bartels’ administrative deposition. The same holds true for the alleged “workplace shooter”
comment, given that Beatty appears to allege that Bartels made that remark during that same
deposition rather than during Beatty’s employment. Because those interactions all took place after
Beatty’s employment ended, Beatty cannot possibly show that they “alter[ed] the conditions of her
employment and create[d] an abusive working environment,” Brooks, 748 F.3d at 1276 (emphases
added) (citation modified), no matter how offensive Beatty might have construed them to be. That
6
Related to this last point, Beatty says she was “publicly humiliated, ridiculed, and intimidated when she had to request access to her personal property in Ms. Bartels’ deposition in March 2025.” (Opp’n at 35.)
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leaves Bartels allegedly referring Beatty for investigation as an insider threat. And on the
surrounding facts alleged here, the Court simply cannot conclude that this incident created a hostile
work environment, especially given that the referral did not even lead to an investigation, much
less any tangible negative consequences.
In short, because Beatty does not allege sufficient facts to establish a plausible claim of
retaliatory hostile work environment, the Court will dismiss Count III of the complaint.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the FBI’s
motion. Specifically, the Court DISMISSES Beatty’s claims of age discrimination and hostile
work environment in Counts I and III, but Beatty’s retaliation claim in Count II shall proceed.
Dated: September 28, 2026
MATTHEW J. SHARBAUGH
United States Magistrate Judge
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