UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JONATHAN FENWICK,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25 - 3010 (LLA)
FREE2MOVE NORTH AMERICA, INC.,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Jonathan Fenwick brings this action against Free2Move North America, Inc.,
alleging that Free2Move rented him a car it had erroneously reported as stolen, which led to his
arrest and detention. ECF No. 1. Free2Move has moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. For the reasons explained below, the court grants the motion in
part and denies the motion in part.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The following factual allegations drawn from Mr. Fenwick’s complaint, ECF No. 1, are
accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion to dismiss, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In February 2024, Mr. Fenwick rented a vehicle owned by Free2Move, a
car rental company, in the District of Columbia. ECF No. 1 ¶ 6; see ECF No. 11, at 2. While
Mr. Fenwick was driving the car the next day in Baltimore, Maryland, he was pulled over by police
because the headlamps on the car were inoperable. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7-8. The officers looked up the
car’s license plate number and learned that the vehicle had been reported stolen in July 2023 in
Portland, Oregon. Id. ¶ 9. Mr. Fenwick alleges that “an agent or employee” of Free2Move had “erroneously reported” the car as stolen and that Free2Move “never corrected the report or
informed authorities in Portland, Oregon that the vehicle was not, in fact, stolen.” Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
Police officers then conducted a “high-risk vehicle stop with multiple patrol cars and
officers.” Id. ¶ 10. They ordered Mr. Fenwick to exit the car and “placed him under arrest at
gunpoint,” which caused Mr. Fenwick to “experience significant fear for his life and safety.” Id.
Mr. Fenwick repeatedly told the officers that he had rented the car and was unaware that it had
been stolen. Id. ¶ 11. He pointed out the Free2Move logo on the side of the car, offered to show
officers the Free2Move app, and explained the process he had followed to rent the car. Id. ¶ 12.
Officers contacted a phone number for Free2Move that they had obtained from the Portland police,
but the number was not in service. Id. ¶¶ 13-14.
Mr. Fenwick was transported to the Baltimore Central Booking Intake Facility and charged
with unauthorized removal of a motor vehicle. Id. ¶ 15. He was detained for twenty-one hours
before being released on his own recognizance. Id. ¶ 16. While in custody, he was “stripped,
fingerprinted, photographed,” “held in a general population cell with six other individuals,” and
denied a shower. Id. Mr. Fenwick, who is vegan, was also denied a meal in accordance with his
dietary needs and ate only sunflower seeds. Id. Prosecutors dropped all charges against him in
April 2024. Id. ¶ 17.
Mr. Fenwick filed this action against Free2Move in September 2025, alleging that he has
“incurred significant financial losses” and suffered “injuries to his reputation, emotional trauma,
anxiety, mental anguish, [and] insomnia” as a result of his arrest, detention, and months spent
trying to establish his innocence. Id. ¶ 23. In his complaint, he alleges negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).
Id. ¶¶ 24-33. Mr. Fenwick seeks $2 million in compensatory damages and $5 million in punitive
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damages. Id. at 7. In late September 2025, Free2Move moved to dismiss for failure to state a
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 8. Mr. Fenwick filed an
opposition, ECF No. 11, and Free2Move did not file a reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court will dismiss a complaint that
does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Id. In evaluating a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations
in the complaint as true. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also
Atherton v. D.C. Off. of Mayor, 567 F.3d 672, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Although the plausibility
standard does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly,
550 U.S. at 555. Nor will “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” suffice.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (alteration in original) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, a court may consider only the
facts alleged in the complaint and “any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint and matters of which [the court] may take judicial notice.” N. Am. Butterfly Ass’n v.
Wolf, 977 F.3d 1244, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Hurd v. District of
Columbia, 864 F.3d 671, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).
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III. DISCUSSION
The court begins with a choice-of-law analysis before turning to the merits of
Mr. Fenwick’s claims. The court concludes that District of Columbia law governs Mr. Fenwick’s
claims and that Mr. Fenwick sufficiently raises a negligence claim but fails to state a claim for
IIED or NIED.
A. Choice of Law
As a threshold matter, the parties dispute which jurisdiction’s law governs Mr. Fenwick’s
claims. Mr. Fenwick argues that District of Columbia law governs because he resides in the
District and rented the vehicle from Free2Move here. ECF No. 11, at 4-5. Free2Move counters
in a single sentence that Maryland law should apply because Mr. Fenwick’s arrest occurred in
Maryland, so he was injured, “if at all,” in Maryland. ECF No. 8-1, at 3. Free2Move also advances
that the outcome of Mr. Fenwick’s claims is the same under either jurisdiction’s law. Id. at 4 n.1,
5-10. The court concludes that District of Columbia law governs Mr. Fenwick’s claims.
In a diversity action, a federal court applies the choice-of-law rules of the jurisdiction in
which it sits. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). “Under District
of Columbia law, the court must first determine if there is a conflict between the laws of the
relevant jurisdictions.” Young Women’s Christian Ass’n of the Nat’l Cap. Area, Inc. v. Allstate
Ins. Co. of Can., 275 F.3d 1145, 1150 (D.C. Cir. 2002). A “true conflict” exists when “more than
one jurisdiction has a potential interest in having its law applied and[] . . . the law of the competing
jurisdictions is different.” In re APA Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 51-52 (D.C. Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting GEICO v. Fetisoff, 958 F.2d 1137, 1141 (D.C. Cir.
1992)). If no conflict exists, District of Columbia law applies by default. Krukas v. AARP, Inc.,
376 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2019). “If a conflict does exist, courts must employ a ‘modified
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governmental interests analysis which seeks to identify the jurisdiction with the most significant
relationship to the dispute.’” Id. (quoting Washkoviak v. Student Loan Mktg. Ass’n, 900 A.2d 168,
180 (D.C. 2006)). The court must conduct a choice-of-law analysis for each claim. Lopez v.
Council on Am.-Islamic Rels. Action Network, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 2d 222, 235 (D.D.C. 2010).
First, with respect to Mr. Fenwick’s negligence claim, the parties do not identify any
relevant conflict between District of Columbia and Maryland law. See generally ECF
Nos. 8-1, 11. Under both jurisdictions’ laws, negligence claims require showing that the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and that the plaintiff’s injury was
caused by the breach. See Poola v. Howard Univ., 147 A.3d 267, 289 (D.C. 2016); Rowhouses,
Inc. v. Smith, 133 A.3d 1054, 1066 (Md. 2016). It is thus “unnecessary to engage in a conflict of
laws analysis” for the negligence claim, Young Women’s Christian Ass’n, 275 F.3d at 1150, and
District of Columbia law applies by default, see Krukas, 376 F. Supp. 3d at 27. Indeed, Free2Move
relies primarily on District of Columbia law in arguing that Mr. Fenwick’s negligence claim fails.
See ECF No. 8-1, at 4.
As for the IIED and NIED claims, a true conflict does exist. The elements of an IIED claim
are the same under District of Columbia and Maryland law: a plaintiff must show extreme and
outrageous conduct that intentionally or recklessly caused him severe emotional distress. See
Robertson v. District of Columbia, 269 A.3d 1022, 1033 (D.C. 2022); Caldor Inc. v. Bowden, 625
A.2d 959, 963 (Md. 1993). But Maryland permits recovery for severe emotional distress only “if
it results in physical injury,” Wheeling v. Selene Fin. LP, 250 A.3d 197, 219 (Md. 2021) (quoting
Vance v. Vance, 408 A.2d 728, 730 (Md. 1979)), whereas the District of Columbia has “long
recognized that a plaintiff may recover damages for mental suffering unaccompanied by physical
injury,” Parker v. Stein, 557 A.2d 1319, 1322 (D.C. 1989). And with respect to NIED, Maryland
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courts do not “recognize[] a distinct tort for the negligent infliction of mental distress,” Hamilton
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 502 A.2d 1057, 1065 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986), whereas District of
Columbia courts do, see Blackwell v. Planet Fitness Franchising, LLC, 356 A.3d 1251, 1260-62
(D.C. 2026). The court must accordingly decide whether the District of Columbia or Maryland
has the more significant relationship to the parties’ dispute to determine which jurisdiction’s law
applies to Mr. Fenwick’s IIED and NIED claims. See Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 180.
District of Columbia courts consider four factors in determining which jurisdiction has the
more significant relationship to the case: (1) “the place where the injury occurred”; (2) “the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred”; (3) “the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties”; and (4) “the place where the relationship is
centered.” District of Columbia v. Coleman, 667 A.2d 811, 816 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) (A.L.I. 1971)). Here, the alleged injury occurred in
Maryland, where Mr. Fenwick was arrested and detained. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 7-16. The parties
contracted in the District of Columbia, id. ¶ 6, and it is unclear from Mr. Fenwick’s complaint
where the injury-causing conduct—Free2Move’s allegedly false report that the rental car had been
stolen and its failure to correct that report—occurred. Free2Move is incorporated in Delaware and
operates in the District of Columbia, id. ¶ 4, and Mr. Fenwick is a resident of the District of
Columbia, id. ¶ 3. Finally, the parties’ relationship is not clearly centered in either jurisdiction,
although the parties’ “only . . . interaction existed in the District of Columbia,” Hawkins v. Wash.
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2018), where Mr. Fenwick rented the
car owned by Free2Move, ECF No. 1 ¶ 6. On balance, the factors weigh slightly in favor of the
District of Columbia, but even if they were in equipoise between the District of Columbia and
Maryland, the court would still apply District of Columbia law because it is the law of the forum
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state. See Washkoviak, 900 A.2d at 182 (“Alternatively, because we cannot determine from the
pleadings which jurisdiction has a greater interest in the controversy, in ruling on a motion to
dismiss we must apply the law of the forum state, which in this case is the District of Columbia.”).
B. Negligence (Count I)
To state a negligence claim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must show “(1) that
the defendant owed a duty to [him], (2) a breach of that duty, and (3) an injury to [him] that was
proximately caused by the breach.” Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 793
(D.C. 2011) (en banc). 1 Free2Move argues that the parties’ contractual relationship bars
Mr. Fenwick’s negligence claim. ECF No. 8-1, at 4. At this early stage of the proceeding, the
court disagrees.
In seeking dismissal, Free2Move relies on Choharis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
961 A.2d 1080 (D.C. 2008). See ECF No. 8-1, at 4. There, the plaintiff alleged that an insurance
company had, among other things, made negligent and fraudulent misrepresentations about its
policy for short-term housing and the absence of mold in the plaintiff’s insured property.
Choharis, 961 A.2d at 1084-86, 1088-90. The D.C. Court of Appeals held that these
misrepresentations and “any duty with respect thereto related directly” to the company’s
obligations “provided for in the [parties’ insurance] contract.” Id. at 1089. Consequently, any
injuries the plaintiff incurred from the company’s misstatements were likely “compensable under
contract principles,” and the plaintiff could not bring independent tort claims to recover for those
injuries. Id. at 1090.
1
As noted, the same factors apply under Maryland law. See supra p. 5.
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In so holding, the Choharis Court did not foreclose all tort claims that arise in connection
with a contractual relationship. Instead, it explained that “a cause of action that could be
considered a tort independent of contract performance is a viable claim” because, in such a case,
“the injury to the plaintiff [is] ‘an independent injury over and above the mere disappointment of
plaintiff’s hope to receive his contracted-for benefit.’” Id. at 1089 (quoting Tate v. Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co., 253 S.E.2d 775, 777 (Ga. Ct. App. 1979)). Accordingly, a plaintiff can raise a tort claim
when there are (1) “facts separable from the terms of the contract upon which the tort may
independently rest” and (2) “a duty independent of that arising out of the contract itself.” Id.
Free2Move argues that Mr. Fenwick cannot establish Choharis’s second prong because
“[t]here exists no connection between the parties outside the rental contract.” ECF No. 8-1, at 4.
Mr. Fenwick responds that he has plausibly alleged that Free2Move owes him a
“duty . . . flow[ing] from considerations other than the contractual relationship.” ECF No. 11, at 6
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Choharis, 961 A.2d at 1089). Specifically, Mr. Fenwick alleges that
Free2Move “had a duty to properly investigate and report instances of vehicle theft and to correct
the same [because] it had actual or constructive knowledge that its vehicle was not actually
stolen.’” ECF No. 1 ¶ 24; see id. ¶¶ 18-19 (alleging that “Free2Move erroneously reported its
vehicle stolen, knowing full well that the vehicle was in fact not stolen and was being used [by its]
customers,” and that it “never corrected the report”). 2 In essence, Mr. Fenwick alleges that by
2
As Mr. Fenwick recounts, several jurisdictions have embraced his theory of negligence. See ECF No. 11, at 6-8 (first citing Henry v. Hertz Corp., No. 08-CV-483, 2009 WL 10675505, at *5 (D.N.M. Sep. 30, 2009) (holding that a rental car company “has a duty to its customers to ensure that a vehicle that it rents out is not [reported as stolen] before it leaves the lot . . . if it has actual or constructive notice that the vehicle has been reported stolen”); then citing Badr v. City of San Ramon, No. 21-CV-9575, 2022 WL 2341153, at *2-4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2022) (similar); then
(continued on next page)
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taking “an affirmative act” in reporting its car stolen, Free2Move was “under a duty to [its
customers] to exercise [reasonable] care . . . to protect them against an unreasonable risk of
harm . . . arising out of the act.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 302 cmt. a (A.L.I. 1977); see
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 24-25; see also Freyberg v. DCO 2400 14th St., LLC, 304 A.3d 971, 978 (D.C. 2023)
(“[W]here there is an affirmative act which affects the interests of another, there is a duty not to
be negligent with respect to the doing of the act.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).3
At this stage of the proceeding—where Free2Move has yet to produce the contract that it
claims displaces Mr. Fenwick’s negligence claim—Mr. Fenwick has the better argument. Under
District of Columbia law, when the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff, the “parties are charged
with the duty to act with reasonable care under the circumstances.” Wash. Metro. Area Transit
Auth. v. Barksdale-Showell, 965 A.2d 16, 24 (D.C. 2009). It may well be that the parties have
contracted around the duties Mr. Fenwick claims Free2Move owed him, but at the
motion-to-dismiss stage, the court cannot reject Mr. Fenwick’s negligence claim as foreclosed by
a contract that is not before the court. Accordingly, the court concludes that Mr. Fenwick may
proceed with Count I.
citing Bramon v. U-Haul, Inc., 945 S.W.2d 676, 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (similar); and then citing Kalt v. Dollar Rent-a-Car, 422 So. 2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (similar)); see also Firstley v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc., 268 So. 2d 314, 317 (La. Ct. App. 1972) (similar). 3
Other courts have reached similar conclusions in analogous circumstances. See, e.g., Pool v. City of Oakland, 728 P.2d 1163, 1176 (Cal. 1986) (holding that a grocery store can be liable to a customer it erroneously accuses of using counterfeit bills); Johnson v. Supersave Mkts., Inc., 686 P.2d 209, 211-12 (Mont. 1984) (similar), overruled in part on other grounds by Jacobsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 215 P.3d 649, 664 (Mont. 2009); Collins v. City Nat. Bank & Tr. Co. of Danbury, 38 A.2d 582, 583-84 (Conn. 1944) (holding that a bank can be liable to a customer it erroneously reports for writing a bad check); Mouse v. Cent. Sav. & Tr. Co., 167 N.E. 868, 871 (Ohio 1929) (same); Weaver v. Bank of Am. Nat. Tr. & Sav. Ass’n, 380 P.2d 644, 647-49 (Cal. 1963) (same); Woody v. Nat’l Bank of Rocky Mount., 140 S.E. 150, 154-55 (N.C. 1927) (same).
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count II)
To bring an IIED claim under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff must allege “(1) extreme
and outrageous conduct by the defendant that (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) caused the plaintiff
severe emotional distress.” Robertson, 269 A.3d at 1033. “The requirement of outrageousness is
not an easy one to meet.” Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. 1994). “The conduct
alleged must be ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible
bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.’” Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting
Bernstein v. Fernandez, 649 A.2d 1064, 1075 (D.C. 1991)). IIED has been described as “a very
narrow tort with requirements that ‘are rigorous[] and difficult to satisfy.’” Hargraves v. District
of Columbia, 134 F. Supp. 3d 68, 93 (D.D.C. 2015) (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443,
464-65 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)). Free2Move argues that Mr. Fenwick fails to plead extreme
and outrageous conduct or severe emotional distress. ECF No. 8-1, at 4-7. The court agrees.
Mr. Fenwick alleges in his complaint that Free2Move’s “false allegations to law
enforcement that its vehicle was stolen, when it knew that it was not, amounts to extreme and
outrageous conduct.” ECF No. 1 ¶ 27. He argues that “it is hardly far-fetched to imagine that an
average member of the community would find [Free2Move’s] failure to correct its report of a
stolen vehicle and its resulting exposure of innocent customers to arrest, incarceration, and
criminal charges to be outrageous, indecent, and reckless.” ECF No. 11, at 11-12. To be sure,
some courts applying District of Columbia law have held that “false reporting causing police action
is sufficiently outrageous to state a claim for IIED.” Sherrod v. McHugh, 334 F. Supp. 3d 219,
264 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying a motion for summary judgment where the plaintiffs alleged that a
defendant “knowingly filed a false police report[] and then failed to retract that report when given
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an opportunity”); see, e.g., District of Columbia v. Tulin, 994 A.2d 788, 801 (D.C. 2010) (affirming
a jury verdict where the defendant officer made a false statement that the plaintiff had caused a car
accident and directed a subordinate to detain the plaintiff); Pitt v. District of Columbia, 491 F.3d
494, 505-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (affirming a jury verdict where the defendant officer made false
statements and “tampered with evidence in an attempt to link [the plaintiff] to the scene of [a]
crime”); see also Amobi, 755 F.3d at 995-96 (holding that a jury could find extreme and outrageous
conduct where correctional officers had given incriminating reports to a police officer
investigating a prison assault but had withheld exculpatory reports). Indeed, the D.C. Court of
Appeals has held that “[w]hile mistakenly calling the police and informing them that someone is
[committing a criminal act] [may not be] sufficiently outrageous conduct” to support an IIED
claim, “even if those statements are false, . . . intentionally or recklessly doing so may rise to that
level.” Carter v. Hahn, 821 A.2d 890, 895 (D.C. 2003) (second and third alterations in original)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, however, Mr. Fenwick does not allege that Free2Move made false reports to police
about him in particular, cf. Sherrod, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 265-66; Carter, 821 A.2d at 895, or that
the company was involved in directly causing his arrest, cf. Tulin, 994 A.2d at 801. While the
alleged facts are troubling, Free2Move’s allegedly erroneous report to the Portland police that one
of its own vehicles had been stolen is materially different from falsely informing the police that an
individual had committed a crime. Cf. Lyles v. Micenko, 404 F. Supp. 2d 182, 187 (D.D.C. 2005)
(concluding that “initiating a complaint with the police . . . , even if false, is not conduct that rises
to the level of ‘outrageousness’”). The court thus cannot conclude that Free2Move’s alleged initial
report of theft and subsequent failure to correct that report constitute “atrocious[] and utterly
intolerable” conduct. Amobi, 755 F.3d at 995 (quoting Bernstein, 649 A.2d at 1075).
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Mr. Fenwick also fails to plead severe emotional distress. Severe emotional distress
“requires a showing beyond mere ‘mental anguish and stress,’” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. Mann,
150 A.3d 1213, 1261 (D.C. 2016) (quoting Armstrong v. Thompson, 80 A.3d 177, 189
(D.C. 2013)), and must be “so acute . . . that harmful physical consequences [are likely] to result,”
Hargraves, 134 F. Supp. 3d at 93-94 (alterations in original) (quoting Futrell v. Dep’t of Lab. Fed.
Credit Union, 816 A.2d 793, 808 (D.C. 2003)). Mr. Fenwick alleges that he “suffered severe
emotional distress,” “incurred significant financial losses,” and “suffered, and will continue to
suffer, injuries to his reputation, emotional trauma, anxiety, mental anguish, [and] insomnia.” ECF
No. 1 ¶¶ 22-23. These “conclusory assertions of ‘emotional distress[] and mental anguish’ cannot
support an IIED claim.” Chen v. ICS Protective Servs., No. 23-CV-1253, 2024 WL 4103700, at *4
(D.D.C. Sep. 5, 2024) (alteration in original) (quoting Daniels v. District of Columbia, 894 F.
Supp. 2d 61, 68 (D.D.C. 2012)); see G’Sell v. Carven, 724 F. Supp. 2d 101, 110 (D.D.C. 2010)
(dismissing an IIED claim under District of Columbia law where the plaintiffs “alleged only that
they ‘suffered, and will continue to suffer, great fear, emotional trauma and humiliation’” (citation
omitted)).
Mr. Fenwick relies on Chen v. District of Columbia, 256 F.R.D. 267 (D.D.C. 2009), where
the court concluded that the plaintiff had adequately pleaded severe emotional distress after a
violent brush with police. Id. at 273; see ECF No. 11, at 12. But in Chen, the plaintiff alleged that
she had “developed an abiding fear of police officers,” “become scared to venture outside at night,”
and “experienced emotional distress so severe that she . . . had difficulty at work.” 256 F.R.D.
at 273. Mr. Fenwick fails to allege any such emotional consequences here. And while
Mr. Fenwick attempts to distinguish Wood v. Neuman, 979 A.2d 64 (D.C. 2009), see ECF No. 11,
at 12, the plaintiff in Wood alleged even more severe and specific examples of emotional distress
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than Mr. Fenwick has, and still failed to adequately plead IIED, see 979 A.2d at 78 (alleging that
the plaintiff was “constantly crying and almost sleepless, was shaken at her arrest, and was
embarrassed at having been made out to be a ‘pariah’ in the neighborhood” (citation omitted)).
Mr. Fenwick thus fails to satisfy the first and third elements of an IIED claim, and the court
dismisses Count II.
D. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Count III)
Under District of Columbia law, a plaintiff may allege NIED under either a “zone of
physical danger” or “special relationship” theory. Blackwell, 356 A.3d at 1260 (internal quotation
marks omitted); see Agrawal ex rel. A.N. v. Potomac Sch., No. 21-CV-2460, 2022 WL 4245476,
at *4-5 (D.D.C. Sep. 15, 2022). Mr. Fenwick proceeds only under the latter theory. See ECF
No. 1 ¶ 31 (“Free2Move undertook an obligation to [Mr. Fenwick] that implicated his emotional
wellbeing.”); ECF No. 11, at 9-10. The special-relationship test requires a plaintiff to show that
(1) “the defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to the
plaintiff, of a nature that necessarily implicates the plaintiff’s emotional well-being”; (2) “there is
an especially likely risk that the defendant’s negligence would cause serious emotional distress to
the plaintiff”; and (3) “negligent actions or omissions of the defendant in breach of that obligation
have, in fact, caused serious emotional distress to the plaintiff.” Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 810-11.
Mr. Fenwick fails to allege that he had a special relationship with Free2Move or that
Free2Move undertook any obligation implicating his emotional well-being. Mr. Fenwick
contends that Free2Move undertook such an obligation by failing to correct the reported theft
before renting the vehicle to him. ECF No. 1 ¶ 31. But the parties’ business-customer relationship
is far from the kind of special relationship supporting an NIED claim. See Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d
at 813 (“[M]ost cases claiming negligent infliction of emotional distress have arisen—and we think
13
will continue to arise—in the context of doctor-patient relationships.”); Blackwell, 356 A.3d
at 1262 (holding that “the relationship . . . between [the plaintiff] as a customer, and [the
defendant] as the operator of a business that offers exercise facilities to the public, is not the kind
of relationship that can give rise to NIED liability”); cf. Islar v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 217
F. Supp. 3d 261, 268 (D.D.C. 2016) (concluding that under District of Columbia law, an “arm’s
length, supervisor-employee relationship” is not a “special relationship”). Indeed, the D.C. Court
of Appeals has held that the “duty of care owed by [a] business invitor to invitee” does
“not . . . necessarily implicate the emotional well-being of the parties.” Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d
at 812 n.39. Here, Free2Move rented a vehicle to Mr. Fenwick, and “neither the purpose of the
relationship nor [Free2Move’s] undertaking [was] to care for [Mr. Fenwick’s] well-being.” Id.
at 815.
Additionally, for the reasons stated above, see supra pp. 12-13, Mr. Fenwick also fails to
plead emotional distress severe enough to state an NIED claim. The court accordingly dismisses
Count III.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss,
ECF No. 8, is GRANTED as to Counts II and III, but the motion is DENIED as to Count I. It is
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further ORDERED that Defendant shall file an answer to Count I on or before October 13, 2026.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(4)(A).
LOREN L. ALIKHAN
United States District Judge
Date: September 28, 2026
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