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FOR PUBLICATION
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
No. 25-10843
KANDACE KAY EDWARDS,
on behalf of herself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RANDOLPH COUNTY SHERIFF,
RANDOLPH COUNTY CIRCUIT CLERK,
MAGISTRATE OF THE RANDOLPH COUNTY
DISTRICT COURT,
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE OF THE RANDOLPH
COUNTY DISTRICT COURT,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00321-WKW-SMD
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-10843
Before NEWSOM, KIDD, and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
KIDD, Circuit Judge:
Kandace Edwards, a young mother and former military servicemember, was arrested in Randolph County, Alabama. At the
time, Randolph County allowed arrestees to be immediately released from jail only if they could pay a predetermined bail amount
tied to the charged crime. This meant that someone like Edwards,
who could not afford the predetermined bail amount, could wait
for days or weeks before receiving a hearing to determine whether
she would be released.
After Edwards was arrested, she filed a class action alleging
that Randolph County’s bail practices unconstitutionally discriminated against indigent individuals. While this case was pending in
the district court, Randolph County issued a new, more permissive
bail policy. Randolph County moved to dismiss the case based, in
part, on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court
granted the motion, concluding that the action was largely moot.
But our caselaw is clear that a defendant cannot circumvent
a lawsuit simply by terminating the allegedly wrongful conduct—
which is exactly what Randolph County attempted to do in this
case. We therefore reverse the district court’s mootness dismissal
and conclude that the class may proceed with facial and as-applied
challenges to Randolph County’s prior bail practices, as well as asapplied challenges to the current bail practices. We take no position
as to the merits of those claims. But our precedent precludes the
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25-10843 Opinion of the Court 3
class from pursuing facial challenges to Randolph County’s current
bail policy, so we affirm the dismissal of those claims.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Randolph County’s Former Bail System
Prior to September 2017, a person arrested in Randolph
County, Alabama, would be eligible to be released from jail after
paying a predetermined bail amount. The predetermined amounts
were listed on a “bail schedule”—a document that paired a charged
offense with an amount of money the person would have to post.
The county’s district judge and clerk of court implemented the bail
schedule.
Although the bail schedule provided “that a bail amount
may be increased or reduced ‘on a case by case basis,’” Randolph
County officials “d[id] not deviate from [it]” “in practice.” Those
who could afford to post bail were immediately released, while
those who could not post bail remained in jail until their initial appearance before either the county’s magistrate or district judge.
The initial appearance had to occur no later than three days after
an arrest.
Despite the initial-appearance requirement, Randolph
County’s “general practice [was] to refuse to determine an arrestee’s conditions of release at the initial appearance.” Instead, the
court deferred release determinations until a preliminary hearing,
which could occur up to four weeks from the date of arrest.
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B. Kandace Edwards’s Arrest and the Filing of the Instant Case
On May 17, 2017, Kandace Edwards, the named plaintiff in
this case, was arrested under the original bail system for forging a
$75 check. Edwards served in the Army National Guard, and at the
time of her arrest, she was 29 years old, a mother of two young
children, and seven-and-a-half months pregnant. She was charged
with possession of a forged instrument in the second degree and
told that she would be released from jail prior to a June 6 court date
only if she could post the $7,500 bond specified in the bail schedule.
But Edwards had fallen on hard times, was dealing with mental
health concerns, and was unable to “afford to buy her release from
jail.”
The day following her arrest, Edwards, acting on behalf of
herself and similarly situated pretrial detainees, filed a class action
complaint in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming four Randolph County officials. The complaint alleged that Randolph County’s bail practices violated detainees’ rights to (1) due process and equal protection by imposing
a wealth-based detention system without considering alternative
conditions to release, (2) due process by failing to provide “an individualized release hearing with adequate procedural safeguards,”
and (3) due process by failing to provide “a sufficiently prompt release hearing.”
Along with the initial complaint, Edwards moved for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”), a preliminary injunction, and
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class certification. The district court granted the TRO and Edwards
was released from jail the same day.
C. Changes to Randolph County’s Bail System and Defendants’
Motions to Dismiss
In September 2017, while the parties were litigating the preliminary injunction in federal court, Randolph County’s sole district judge issued a “Standing Order Regarding Pre-Trial Appearance, Establishment of Bonds in Advance of Initial Appearance,
and Individualized Determinations of the Necessity and Ability to
Post Bond.” We will refer to this document as the “2017 Standing
Order.” In short, the 2017 Standing Order adopted a new bail schedule that lowered the secured bail amounts for many offenses and
standardized the procedures for determining the conditions of pretrial release. It also “supersede[d] any previous policies or procedures that were in place regarding the posting of bail and” specified
that “any such previous procedures [were] no longer [to] be enforced.”
The same day the 2017 Standing Order was issued, Defendants moved to dismiss Edwards’s federal complaint as moot, asserting that Randolph County had terminated the challenged practices.
The district court below denied this request because it was reasonably likely that Defendants would “revert to their earlier challenged conduct if their motion . . . [wa]s granted.”
The district court certified the following class under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2): “all state-court arrestees
who are or who will be jailed in Randolph County who are unable
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to pay the secured money bail amount required for their release.”
Shortly after class certification, Plaintiffs amended their complaint,
substituting a defendant and adding a fourth claim challenging the
bail practices under the Sixth Amendment.
While this case was proceeding in district court, our Court
was considering a similar case in a different Alabama county. See
Schultz v. Alabama, 42 F.4th 1298 (11th Cir. 2022). The parties took
note of this fact, and the district court granted their motions to stay
the case pending resolution of Schultz. Schultz subsequently held
that a county’s mid-litigation bail-policy change jurisdictionally
limited the intervenor plaintiff, who had been detained under a previous system, to challenging only the facial constitutionality of the
operative policy. Id. at 1318–22. Schultz then determined that the
plaintiff’s facial equal-protection and due-process claims to the existing policy failed on the merits. Id. at 1322–35.
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Schultz, see Hester v. Gentry, 143 S. Ct. 2610 (2023), the district court lifted the stay
in this case and Defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6).
The district court granted Defendants’ motions.
Relying on Schultz, the district court concluded that it was
“required to jurisdictionally limit,” in part, Plaintiffs’ challenge. It,
therefore, dismissed as moot the following: (1) “all as-applied and
facial challenges [to] Randolph County’s bail system that existed
prior to” the 2017 Standing Order; (2) “all as-applied challenges, eiUSCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 7 of 29
25-10843 Opinion of the Court 7
ther as applied to . . . Edwards or the class, against the 2017 Standing . . . Order”; and (3) “any and all pattern, practice, policy, or procedure claims to the bail system that do not directly target the facial
terms of the” 2017 Standing Order. The district court then concluded that any facial constitutional challenges to the 2017 Standing
Order that remained in the complaint failed to state a plausible
claim for relief.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo questions of Article III justiciability.
Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2015). “When evaluating a district court’s conclusions on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion [to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction], we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error.” Zinni v. ER Sols., Inc., 692 F.3d 1162, 1166 (11th Cir.
2012) (citation omitted). We also review de novo the grant of a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Baker v.
City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1276 (11th Cir. 2023).
III. DISCUSSION
Our discussion proceeds in two parts. We begin by explaining why the district court erroneously dismissed a majority of
Plaintiffs’ action as moot. We then outline why, to the extent they
seek to do so in the operative complaint, Plaintiffs cannot maintain
facial challenges to the 2017 Standing Order.
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A. Randolph County’s Mid-Litigation Bail-Policy Change Does
Not Moot Plaintiffs’ Action
Article III of the Constitution limits the jurisdiction of the
federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. CONST. art. III,
§ 2. Two crucial and “closely related” justiciability principles are at
play in this appeal—standing and mootness. Cambridge Christian
Sch., Inc. v. Fla. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 115 F.4th 1266, 1280 (11th
Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 607 (2025).
To establish Article III standing, “[a] plaintiff must have
(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant[s], and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,
578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). “Standing is determined at the time
the . . . complaint is filed.” Arcia v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 772 F.3d 1335,
1340 (11th Cir. 2014).
But, “[w]hen events subsequent to the commencement of a
lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the
plaintiff meaningful relief,” the question then becomes whether a
case must be dismissed as moot. Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v.
Fla. Dep’t of Health and Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir.
2000). “[I]f a suit is moot, it cannot present an Article III case or
controversy and the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction
to entertain it.” Coral Springs St. Sys., Inc. v. City of Sunrise, 371 F.3d
1320, 1328 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities,
225 F.3d at 1217 (“Any decision on the merits of a moot case or
issue would be an impermissible advisory opinion.”).
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25-10843 Opinion of the Court 9
The district court relied on Schultz to conclude that, because
Edwards was not detained under the 2017 Standing Order and
could not bring an as-applied challenge to that order, justiciability
principles required Edwards to be limited to challenging the facial
constitutionality of the 2017 Standing Order (Randolph County’s
current bail policy). And because Edwards was so limited as the
named plaintiff, the entire class was so limited.
On appeal, the parties disagree as to whether Schultz’s jurisdictional holding applies to this case. For reasons we will explain
below, we conclude that Schultz does not apply to the facts of this
case. Rather, we conclude that the voluntary-cessation doctrine
saves all of Plaintiffs’ claims from mootness.
1. Schultz’s Jurisdictional Holding Is Inapplicable to
This Case
In Schultz, a group of arrestees filed a class action complaint
challenging the constitutionality of the bail system in Cullman
County, Alabama. 42 F.4th at 1310. Bradley Hester intervened in
the case after filing. Id. While the case was pending, but after Hester was released from jail, Cullman County issued a standing order
setting a new bail schedule and revising the bail procedures. Id. at
1306, 1308, 1310. Just sixteen days later, the district court held an
evidentiary hearing and granted Hester a preliminary injunction.
Id. at 1310–11. The court issued two written orders concluding that
the bail system “unconstitutionally discriminated against the indigent by absolutely depriving them of immediate pretrial release
and by denying them procedural due process at their bail hearings”
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and specifying the steps Cullman County would have to take to
make its bail system constitutionally compliant. Id.
On appeal, Schultz reasoned that Hester could not pursue an
as-applied challenge to the existing standing order because he could
not “trace his injury to the current operative bail system.” Id. at
1319 (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058–59 (5th Cir. 1978)
(en banc), and Walker v. City of Calhoun, 901 F.3d 1245, 1267 n.13
(11th Cir. 2018)). Schultz emphasized that the limited factual development on the county’s implementation of the standing order was
problematic to an as-applied challenge, which “necessarily requires
the development of a factual record for the court to consider.” Id.
(citation omitted). It explained that the facts of Hester’s case
“[we]re tied to the now-defunct bail scheme,” so allowing him to
pursue “an as-applied challenge to the new bail scheme, given the
record before [it], would violate core justiciability principles.” Id.
Schultz ultimately concluded that, because Hester possessed Article
III standing when he became a party, the case was not moot as to
his facial challenge to the existing standing bail order. Id. at
1320–22.
The district court construed Schultz to “[stand] for the proposition that when there is a new standing bail order that purports
to be the real bail policy of a county . . . court[s] must approach the
case singularly from the new standing bail order’s explicit language
without probing into any other policies, patterns, practices, or procedures that are alleged and from which a developed record may
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or may not confirm.” (citation modified.). In other words, the district court viewed Schultz as mandating that, when there is a midlitigation policy change, “constitutional challenges to a bail detention program—regardless of the nature of those challenges—are
limited to facial constitutional challenges to the operative standing
bail order.” (citation modified.).
We find no indication that Schultz intended to introduce
such a broad jurisdictional rule. Additionally, Plaintiffs point us to
two key factors that distinguish Schultz from the instant case.
a. Class Certification
Plaintiffs first note that Schultz did not involve a certified
class, which exists in this case. The district court rejected this distinction because Edwards “did not suffer an injury under the 2017
Standing . . . Order,” and the class members “[step] into [her]
shoes . . . and ha[ve] standing to bring only those claims that belonged to [her].” The district court’s conclusions merge the distinct
doctrines of standing and mootness, and Defendants perpetuate
this confusion in their arguments on appeal.
Notably, prior to class certification, a “district court must determine that at least one named class representative has Article III
standing to raise each class subclaim.” Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v.
Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2000). “This individual injury
requirement is not met by alleging that injury has been suffered by
other, unidentified members of the class to which the plaintiff belongs and which he purports to represent.” Griffin v. Dugger,
823 F.2d 1476, 1483 (11th Cir. 1987) (citation modified).
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There is no dispute that, at the time of filing the initial complaint, Edwards had the requisite standing to pursue a challenge to
Randolph County’s pre-September 2017 bail policy. See Arcia,
772 F.3d at 1340. Edwards suffered an injury in the form of her pretrial detention, she could trace that injury to Defendants, and a judicial determination that those practices were unconstitutional
could redress her injury. See Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 338. Randolph
County’s mid-litigation issuance of the 2017 Standing Order requires us to ask whether Edwards’s claims have become moot, not
whether she lacked standing to bring this case altogether. See Cook,
792 F.3d at 1299 n.3 (“Because standing is measured at the time a
lawsuit is filed, subsequent changes in the law are properly considered under mootness doctrine.” (citation modified)); see also L.E. ex
rel. Cavorley v. Scamihorn, No. 23-11741, 2026 WL 2249000, at *4
(11th Cir. Aug. 5, 2026) (explaining that “[p]ost-filing events might
well bear on mootness—but not standing”).
Defendants insist that all class members are “locked in” to
Edwards’s standing “for all time,” so they cannot pursue any claims
that Edwards herself cannot maintain. Not so.
When a class is certified, it “acquire[s] a legal status separate
from the interest asserted by” the named plaintiff. Sosna v. Iowa,
419 U.S. 393, 399 (1975). That certification “significantly affects the
mootness determination,” as a live “controversy may exist . . . between a named defendant and a member of the class represented . . . even though the claim of the named plaintiff has become
moot.” Id. at 399, 402; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 13 of 29
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(1975) (explaining that, because “[p]retrial detention is by nature
temporary,” such an action “belongs . . . to that narrow class of
cases in which the termination of a class representative’s claim does
not moot the claims of the unnamed members of the class”); cf. Bd.
of Sch. Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128, 129–30 (1975) (holding that a
case was moot where the named plaintiffs lacked a stake in the outcome and the case was never properly certified as a class action).
We recognize that the cases providing this proposition often
address a named plaintiff’s change in status rather than an alteration or repeal of the challenged law. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 752–53, 755–56 (1976) (holding that the
named plaintiff’s ineligibility for seniority status did not moot the
certified class’s challenges to a trucking company’s employment
policies); Sosna, 419 U.S. at 397–402 (holding that the named plaintiff’s satisfaction of Iowa’s one-year residency rule for filing for divorce by the time the case was before the U.S. Supreme Court did
not moot the claims brought by the certified class); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 333 n.2 (1972) (noting that the named plaintiff’s
satisfaction of a voting residency requirement did not moot the certified class’s case). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court’s reasoning
underlying those cases applies with equal force to this case.
Whether due to a change in circumstances or a change in the law,
a controversy that is “no longer live as to” the named plaintiff may
“[remain] very much alive for the class of persons she has been certified to represent.” Sosna, 419 U.S. at 401.
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We also note that the class certified in this case does not differentiate between those detained before and after the 2017 Standing Order’s implementation, despite the certification order post-dating the policy change. Accordingly, the fact that Edwards herself
was not detained under the 2017 Standing Order does not automatically doom the as-applied challenges of her fellow class members.
Cf. Stein v. Buccaneers Ltd. P’ship, 772 F.3d 698, 707 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“The relation-back doctrine allows a named plaintiff whose individual claims are moot to represent class members not because the
named plaintiff has moved to certify a class[,] but because the
named plaintiff will adequately present the class claims[,] and unless the named plaintiff is allowed to do so the class claims will be
capable of repetition, yet evading review.”).
b. Procedural Posture
Plaintiffs also correctly note that Schultz resolved an appeal
from the grant of a preliminary injunction, which further distinguishes it from the instant case. See Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1306, 1311.
Notably, in reaching its jurisdictional holding, Schultz emphasized
the “minimal findings of fact concerning” Cullman County’s bail
practices and that its conclusions were based on “the undisputed
background below.” Id. at 1322 n.5. In Schultz, however, the district
court held a two-day evidentiary hearing at which the parties were
able to litigate the issues presented in the request for injunctive relief. See id. at 1310; see also id. at 1344 (Rosenbaum, J., dissenting in USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 15 of 29
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part). It was therefore clear that the parties had at least some opportunity to develop a factual record as to the implementation of
Cullman County’s operative bail policy.
Indeed, many cases resolving mootness issues arise from
more developed records. See, e.g., Keohane v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr. Sec’y,
952 F.3d 1257, 1263, 1268–70 (11th Cir. 2020) (finding that a change
in policy mooted a constitutional challenge on appeal from a bench
trial); Troiano v. Supervisor of Elections, 382 F.3d 1276, 1278, 1283–86
(11th Cir. 2004) (remarking, on appeal from a summary judgment
order, that “all of the available evidence (and it [was] considerable)—and the square finding of fact by the district court—suggest[ed]” mootness); Cambridge Christian, 115 F.4th at 1279–81,
1283–86 (finding certain claims moot following a change in law that
occurred while the appeal of a summary judgment order was pending with this Court).
By contrast, the record in this case was not fully developed
as to how the 2017 Standing Order has been implemented in practice. The district court took judicial notice of the 2017 Standing Order’s existence and language, Fed. R. Evid. 201, but it never answered a key question—whether the implementation of the 2017
Standing Order actually terminated the conduct challenged by
Plaintiffs. While a district court “may consider extrinsic evidence”
in resolving factual challenges to subject matter jurisdiction, Carmichael v. Kellogg, Brown & Root Servs., Inc., 572 F.3d 1271, 1279
(11th Cir. 2009), it may not rely solely on Defendants’ bare assertion that the complained-of bail practices have come to an end. Cf. USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 16 of 29
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United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994) (explaining
“that a court may take judicial notice of a document filed in another
court not for the truth of the matters asserted in the other litigation, but rather to establish the fact of such litigation and related
filings” (citation modified)).
In summary, we conclude that Schultz does not mandate
that Plaintiffs be limited to pursuing only facial challenges to the
2017 Standing Order. Accordingly, the district court erred in relying on Schultz to reach its jurisdictional determination.
2. The Voluntary-Cessation Doctrine is the Proper
Vehicle for Determining Whether Plaintiffs’
Claims Are Moot
We must still determine whether Randolph County’s midlitigation issuance of the 2017 Standing Order affected the justiciability of the instant case.
“Mootness can occur due to a change in circumstances,
or . . . a change in the law.” Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328. Importantly, however, defendants cannot “automatically moot a case
by the simple expedient of suspending [their] challenged conduct
after [they are] sued.” FBI v. Fikre, 144 S. Ct. 771, 777 (2024) (citation
modified). Indeed, “[t]he doctrine of voluntary cessation provides
an important exception to the general rule that a case is mooted by
the end of the offending behavior.” Troiano, 382 F.3d at 1282. “The
basis for th[is] . . . exception is the commonsense concern that a defendant might willingly change its behavior in the hope of avoiding USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 17 of 29
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a lawsuit but then, having done so, return to its old ways.” Keohane,
952 F.3d at 1267 (citation modified).
Notably, “the voluntary cessation exception . . . does not apply where subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Flanigan’s Enters., Inc. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d
1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (citation modified), abrogated
on other grounds by Uzuegbunam v. Preczewski, 141 S. Ct. 792 (2021).
“The heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged
conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with
the party asserting mootness.” Cambridge Christian, 115 F.4th at
1284 (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC),
Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000)).
Government defendants, who are “given considerably more
leeway . . . in the presumption that they are unlikely to resume illegal activities,” Coral Springs, 371 F.3d at 1328–29, can generally
meet their burden by rescinding the challenged law or policy, Keohane, 952 F.3d at 1268. And “once the repeal of a policy has
caused . . . jurisdiction to be questioned,” the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to “[show] a reasonable expectation—or . . . a substantial
likelihood—that the government defendant will reverse course and
reenact the repealed rule.” Id. (citation modified).
Sitting en banc, our Court outlined “three broad factors” to
guide this inquiry. Flanigan’s, 868 F.3d at 1257. First, a court should
“ask whether the change in conduct resulted from substantial deliberation or is merely an attempt to manipulate . . . jurisdiction.” USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 18 of 29
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Id. In answering this question, it should “examine the timing of the
repeal, the procedures used in enacting it, and any explanations independent of [the] litigation which may have motivated it.” Id. Second, a court should “ask whether the government’s decision to terminate the challenged conduct was unambiguous.” Id. (citation
modified). This requires an inquiry into “whether the actions that
have been taken to allegedly moot the case reflect a rejection of the
challenged conduct that is both permanent and complete.” Id.
Third, a court should ask “whether the government has consistently maintained its commitment to the new policy or legislative
scheme.” Id.
In Walker v. City of Calhoun, we applied this analysis to another case presenting a constitutional challenge to a bail system.
There, the plaintiff brought a class action challenging the city’s secured-money bail system as unconstitutionally discriminatory.
901 F.3d at 1251–52. After the suit was filed and the plaintiff was
released from jail, the city issued a new standing bail order “alter[ing] the prevailing bail policy.” Id. at 1252. The district court entered a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiff but did not
make any factual findings as to the county’s implementation of its
new bail procedures. Id. at 1252–54; see also Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1322
n.5 (noting that the district court in Walker “did not make factual
findings on the new bail procedures”). On appeal from the preliminary-injunction order, the plaintiff argued that the city’s original
bail policy was “plainly unconstitutional,” and the district court had
the “equitable discretion” to cure constitutional violations that
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arose prior to the implementation of the new bail system. Walker,
901 F.3d at 1269. Our Court agreed. Id. at 1270–71.
Walker first noted that the city was “unnecessarily secretive”
in adopting the standing bail order, as it refused to explain its process, and the abandonment of the original bail policy was “not unambiguous” because a single judge order changed it rather than a
legislative act. Id. at 1271. Walker further found that we “[could not]
say that this judge might not revert to the original policy, given
[this] lack of transparency surrounding the issuance of the” new
order. Id. Walker noted, however, that it was unclear “whether the
government . . . consistently maintained its commitment to the
new policy or legislative scheme” because enforcement of the
standing order was enjoined only two months after its issuance. Id.
Plaintiffs contend that Walker governs this case, and we
agree. Schultz does not purport to overrule or undermine Walker.
Rather, Schultz relied considerably on Walker to support its jurisdictional conclusion. See Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1321–22 (finding that
Walker supported its jurisdictional analysis because our Court “addressed the facial constitutionality of the city’s new bail policy instead of determining that the plaintiff lacked standing” and “the
‘reasonable expectation’ factors for mootness” in each case “ha[d]
key factual similarities”). To the extent that the holdings of these
two cases conflict, Walker governs our analysis because it is “the
earliest precedent that reached a binding decision on the issue.”
Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Bd. of Educ., 110 F.4th 1318, 1326 (11th
Cir. 2024) (citation modified), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2701 (2025). USCA11 Case: 25-10843 Document: 103-1 Date Filed: 09/28/2026 Page: 20 of 29
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Walker leads us to conclude that Defendants cannot circumvent this lawsuit by voluntarily enacting a new bail policy. Indeed,
the district court recognized the applicability of the voluntary-cessation doctrine when rejecting Defendants’ motion to dismiss filed
pre-Schultz. In that previous order, the district court walked
through the Flanigan’s factors and found that Defendants were reasonably likely to “revert to their earlier challenged conduct” if
Plaintiffs’ complaint were dismissed. The court noted, among
other things, that (1) the 2017 Standing Order was issued the very
same day Defendants moved to dismiss the case as moot; (2) the
2017 Standing Order was unilaterally issued by Randolph County’s
single district judge; (3) Defendants did not provide a clear reason
for the order’s implementation other than the fact that it “obviate[d] the need for a preliminary injunction”; and (4) Defendants
failed to admit to any wrongdoing with their previous bail practices.
All these facts remain true. Indeed, the district court noted
in its instant dismissal order that “[b]ut for” its (mistaken) view of
“Schultz’s directive . . . [it] would be inclined to revisit . . . the voluntary-cessation doctrine,” and potentially “permit challenges to
the pre-[2017] Standing . . . Order system that seek an injunction
preventing Defendants from returning to that system.” And despite
that Plaintiffs pointed out the district court’s previous mootness
findings in its briefing on appeal, Defendants do not meaningfully
contest these determinations before our Court.
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As such, we conclude that, at this stage, it is not “absolutely
clear that [Defendants’] allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.” See Flanigan’s, 868 F.3d at 1255 (citation modified); see also Fikre, 144 S. Ct. at 779 (classifying a mootness determination as “provisional” because “[a]s the case unfolds,
the complaint’s allegations will be tested rather than taken as true,
and different facts may emerge that may call for a different conclusion”). And we find that Plaintiffs’ alleged constitutional injuries
can still be favorably redressed by some form of relief—such as an
injunction preventing Defendants from reverting to their previous
bail policy. See Cambridge Christian, 115 F.4th at 1283.
Plaintiffs may therefore proceed with their facial and as-applied claims against the Randolph County officials as they relate to
the original bail schedule. Plaintiffs seek redress for, among other
things, injuries to their constitutional rights of due process and
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment for Randolph
County’s pre-2017-Standing-Order practice of holding those who
could not afford bail until their preliminary hearing in county
court.
We hold that this case is not moot and we reverse the district
court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ challenges on that jurisdictional basis.
B. Plaintiffs Cannot Maintain Plausible Facial Challenges to the
2017 Standing Order
Although we conclude that the district court erroneously
dismissed many of Plaintiffs’ claims on mootness grounds, we still
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22 Opinion of the Court 25-10843
must determine whether, to the extent the operative complaint
seeks to do so, any class member can maintain a plausible facial
challenge to the 2017 Standing Order.
Generally, “[t]o survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id. Ordinarily, at this stage, courts are limited to considering “the pleadings and any exhibits attached to it.” Baker, 67 F.4th
at 1276. But a court may consider material outside of the complaint, if it is material “of which [it] may take judicial notice,” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), such as
information that “can be accurately and readily determined from
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” Fed. R.
Evid. 201(b)(2). The 2017 Standing Order is such a document.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs appear to concede that Schultz
forecloses their facial equal-protection and substantive-due-process
challenges to the 2017 Standing Order. See Schultz, 42 F.4th at
1322–32. And if they do not concede the issue, we find that they
have abandoned their claims because they fail to adequately brief
any challenges to the dismissal of those claims. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). But Plaintiffs have preserved their remaining facial challenges.
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Plaintiffs maintain that they can allege plausible facial procedural-due-process and Sixth-Amendment challenges to the 2017
Standing Order. But Plaintiffs have a steep hill to climb because “[a]
facial challenge . . . is . . . the most difficult challenge to mount successfully.” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). Indeed,
they “must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the [2017 Standing Order] would be valid.” Id. We conclude
that they cannot do so here.
1. Procedural Due Process
Plaintiffs argue “that Randolph County’s bail system does
not provide adequate procedural safeguards.” Specifically, they contend that the 2017 Standing Order does not provide arrestees with
either “constitutionally adequate notice” of their initial appearance
hearing or “a meaningful opportunity to be heard” at said hearing.
“Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of
the . . . Fourteenth Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
332 (1976). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful
manner.” Id. at 333 (citation modified). In conducting a due-process
inquiry, “[w]e first ask whether there exists a liberty or property
interest of which a person has been deprived, and if so we ask
whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally
sufficient.” Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011).
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“In the pretrial detention context, procedural due process requires that the procedures used be ‘adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some persons charged with crimes,’
whether or not they might be insufficient in some other circumstances.” Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1332 (alteration omitted) (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751). “Answering that question requires two separate inquiries: First, does preventive detention serve a legitimate
state objective? And, second, are the procedural safeguards adequate to authorize the pretrial detention?” Id. (citation modified).
There is “no question about the first inquiry,” as “states
maintain not only a legitimate, but a ‘compelling interest in assuring the presence at trial of persons charged with crime.’” Id. (quoting Rainwater, 572 F.2d at 1056). We therefore turn to our consideration of whether the 2017 Standing Order’s “procedural safeguards” are sufficient to pass facial constitutional muster.
In relevant part, the 2017 Standing Order provides that any
arrestee who can post the scheduled bail typically is entitled to release after booking is completed. Anyone unable to post the bond
is “entitled to a judicial determination of the conditions of their
release . . . no later than 72 hours after arrest.” Before the initial appearance before a judge, arrestees “complete an affidavit of substantial hardship” detailing their financial situations. At the initial
appearance, the presiding judge must determine whether pretrial
release is appropriate, and if so, what conditions should be imposed.
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When making a detention decision, Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 7.2(a) instructs judges to consider fourteen listed
factors. The Rule 7.2(a) factors include the defendant’s background, reputation, criminal history, ties to the community, employment status, and financial condition. In accordance with the
Rule 7.2(a) factors, the 2017 Standing Order states that a judge “will
consider a defendant’s ability to post a bond in determining [a] defendant’s conditions of release.” The judge will also “consider the
defendant’s affidavit of substantial hardship and may elicit testimony about the defendant’s financial condition.” If, after considering these factors, the judge “determines that there is no less onerous condition for securing the defendant’s appearance or protecting the public,” the judge shall “make a written finding as to why
the posting of a bond is reasonably necessary to assure the defendant’s presence at trial in such a case.”
While Schultz does not inform our jurisdictional inquiry, see
supra Part III.A, it does guide our merits analysis of this constitutional challenge because the Schultz panel upheld bail procedures
that were materially identical to those included in the 2017 Standing Order. See Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1333 (explaining that “there is
nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of flight risk or
danger to the community” (quoting Salerno, 481 U.S. at 751)).
We recognize that in Schultz, the arrestees were presented
both an affidavit of substantial hardship and a “Release Questionnaire,” which the panel determined collectively “provide[d] pretrial
detainees notice of the hearing to take place and g[ave] them an
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26 Opinion of the Court 25-10843
opportunity to present information relevant to the bail determination.” Id. By contrast, the 2017 Standing Order requires only that
arrestees receive the affidavit of substantial hardship—which does
not notify an arrestee of any upcoming hearing or outline the factors that will be considered in determining whether pretrial release
is warranted. But, nothing in the 2017 Standing Order precludes
Randolph County from using the release questionnaire in its bail
proceedings, and the questionnaire is made publicly available by
the Alabama Administrative Office of Courts. 1
We also acknowledge that the 2017 Standing Order does not
mandate that the presiding judge elicit financial information from
the arrestee or dictate what specific findings the judge must make
by written order upon completion of the hearing, as was the case
in Schultz. See id. Nevertheless, the 2017 Standing Order requires
commencement of a hearing within seventy-two hours following
an arrest, at which time the presiding judge may consider several
factors that relate to an arrestee’s ability to post bail. Comparable
judicial hearings “[are] treated as the most extensive form of process that can be required.” Walker, 901 F.3d at 1268. And from the
face of the 2017 Standing Order, we are not left with the impression
“that [the judge] ‘automatically’ impose[s] monetary bail conditions on indigent arrestees.” See Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1335.
1 See Release Questionnaire, AOC E-Forms, https://eforms.alacourt.gov/media/dilbkp0j/release-questionnaire.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP7L-HMRL]; see
also Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2).
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Perhaps most importantly, if an arrestee is unhappy with the
outcome of the bail decision, the arrestee may move to “modify
the conditions of release.” Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4(b). “[I]ndigent arrestees are entitled to the aid of counsel in the filing of that motion,” which “may be granted upon a showing of mere ‘good
cause.’” Schultz, 42 F.4th at 1334 (quoting Ala. R. Crim. P. 7.4(b)).
For these reasons, we find that, on its face, the 2017 Standing
Order’s procedures are “adequate to authorize the pretrial detention of at least some persons charged with crimes.” Salerno,
481 U.S. at 751 (citation modified).
2. Sixth Amendment
“Once the adversary judicial process has been initiated, the
Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to have counsel
present at all critical stages of the criminal proceedings.” Montejo v.
Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (citation modified). “Critical
stages are ‘trial-like confrontations’ between the State and the accused.” Mills v. Hamm, 102 F.4th 1245, 1249 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting
Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 n.16 (2008)).
Plaintiffs contend that Randolph County’s failure to provide
the assistance of counsel for indigent arrestees at the initial appearance—when the court determines the conditions of release—violates the Sixth Amendment. We have not determined whether a
state initial appearance is a “critical stage” at which the Sixth
Amendment requires the right to counsel. Cf. United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1473–74 (11th Cir. 1992) (concluding
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28 Opinion of the Court 25-10843
judge” was not “a critical proceeding” because it “is largely administrative” and “[a] defendant in seeking bail is not required to reveal
the facts of his case”), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994). And we decline to do so here.
Even if we assume that the state initial appearance is a critical hearing, Plaintiffs nevertheless would be unable to mount a
Sixth Amendment facial challenge to the 2017 Standing Order. The
reason is simple: While the 2017 Standing Order does not directly
contemplate the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants,
it also does not explicitly forbid the presence of counsel at the initial
appearance. As such, the 2017 Standing Order would not be unconstitutionally applied in every potential scenario, such as when an
arrestee independently obtains counsel for the initial appearance or
if the court were to appoint counsel sua sponte. See Salerno,
481 U.S. at 745.
In short, “[t]he fact that the [2017 Standing Order] might operate unconstitutionally under some conceivable set of circumstances is insufficient to render it wholly invalid.” See id. As such,
we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s challenges to
the facial constitutionality of the 2017 Standing Order.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court’s dismissal order is AFFIRMED IN PART
and VACATED IN PART. We REVERSE the dismissal of any
claims the district court resolved on mootness grounds. But we
AFFIRM the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ facial challenges to the 2017
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Standing Order. This case is REMANDED to the district court for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.