UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAMES VALE,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25-2663
v.
(EGS)
DOUGLAS COLLINS, Secretary,
U.S. Department of Veterans
Affairs
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff James Vale (“Mr. Vale”) brings this action
against Douglas Collins, Secretary of the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs (“Mr. Collins” or “Defendant”) 1 due to the
alleged miscalculations of Mr. Vale’s back pay award. See
Compl., ECF No. 1. Pending before the Court is Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss. Upon careful consideration of the Motion,
Opposition, and Reply thereto; and the applicable law; and for
the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion
to Dismiss.
I. Background
The following facts are taken from the allegations in the
Complaint, which the Court assumes are true for the purposes of
1 Mr. Vale seems to use “Defendant” interchangeably throughout his Complaint regarding both Mr. Collins and the VA, and therefore the Court will use “Defendant” to encompass both. deciding this motion and construes in Mr. Vale’s favor. See
Baird v. Gotbaum, 792 F.3d 166, 169 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
Mr. Vale was a Supervisory Senior Counsel at the Department
of Veterans Affairs (“VA”)’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals. See
Compl., ECF No. 1 ¶ 21. 2 Mr. Vale was terminated from his
position on September 30, 2016 after being “subjected to
discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his
disability.” Id. ¶ 22.
On January 15, 2017, Mr. Vale filed a formal complaint with
the VA’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office, alleging
discrimination and a hostile work environment based on his
disability. Id. ¶ 9. On February 21, 2017, he filed a timely
hearing request before the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 10.
On February 25, 2019, “Defendant issued a Final Agency
Decision . . . finding . . . that Plaintiff was discriminated
against when the [VA] failed to reasonably accommodate his
disability, but that [Mr. Vale] failed to establish . . . that
he was subjected to constructive discharge or a hostile work
environment.” Id. ¶ 11. The same day, Mr. Vale filed an appeal
with the EEOC Office of Federal Operations (“OFO”). Id. ¶ 12. On
2 When citing electronic filings throughout this opinion, the Court cites to the ECF header page number, not the original page number of the filed document.
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September 17, 2020, the OFO issued a decision finding that Mr.
Vale was discriminated against based on his disability and that
he was constructively discharged. Id. ¶ 13. The OFO ordered
Defendant to determine the appropriate amount of back pay with
interest, leave, and other benefits due to Mr. Vale between the
date of his discharge, September 30, 2016, and “the date of his
reinstatement or his declination of the offer of reinstatement.”
Id. Defendant was also ordered to pay the amount within sixty
(60) days of the date of the determination of the appropriate
amount. Id.
On June 13, 2024, Mr. Vale received a check for $306,591.00
for back pay, but he did not receive an explanation regarding
how the sum was calculated. Id. ¶ 14. On July 25, 2024, Mr. Vale
filed a Petition for Enforcement “due to Defendant’s failure to
comply with the OFO’s September 17, 2020 Order.” Id. ¶ 15. On
October 11, 2024, Defendant filed documentation explaining their
methodology in calculating Mr. Vale’s back pay. Id. ¶ 16.
On November 2, 2024, Mr. Vale “notified the Compliance
Officer that upon review of Defendant’s final calculations of
the back pay award, Defendant failed to properly calculate back
pay.” Id. ¶ 17. Specifically, Mr. Vale alleges that Defendant
underreported his income to the Social Security Administration
between 2016 and 2021, failed to apply the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act taxes deducted from the award to the back pay
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period, and failed to deduct $93,000 for the award as requested
by six TSP-1 forms. Id. ¶ 24. On May 15, 2025, the OFO
determined that the documentation submitted by Defendant was
sufficient to demonstrate that they had taken the “corrective
action(s) ordered in the Commission’s decision.” Id. ¶ 18.
On August 13, 2025, Mr. Vale filed his Complaint. See id.
Defendant filed his Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”) on January 26,
2026, alleging that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to hear the claim, or in the alternative, that Mr. Vale has
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 3 See
Mot., ECF No. 7. Mr. Vale filed his Opposition to the Motion to
Dismiss on March 11, 2026. See Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to
Dismiss & Mem. in Supp. Thereof (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 9. Defendant
filed his reply on April 10, 2026. See Reply in Further Supp. of
Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss (“Reply”), ECF No. 10.
The motion is now ripe and ready for the Court’s
adjudication.
II. Legal Standards
A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
On a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff bears the
3 Because the Court determines that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), it need not reach whether Mr. Vale has stated a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
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burden of establishing that the court has subjectmatter jurisdiction. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992). “The court must address the issue of
jurisdiction as a threshold matter, because absent jurisdiction
the court lacks the authority to decide the case on any other
grounds.” Am. Farm Bureau v. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 91 (D.D.C.
2000). Moreover, because subject-matter jurisdiction relates to
the Court's power to hear the claim, the Court must give the
plaintiff's factual allegations closer scrutiny when resolving a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion than would be required for a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion. Uberoi v. EEOC, 180 F. Supp. 2d 42, 44 (D.D.C. 2001). In
resolving a motion to dismiss for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction, the Court “may consider the complaint
supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the
complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's
resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion
v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted).
III. Analysis
A. The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Mr. Vale requests that pursuant to the Back Pay Act 4, the
Court grant him relief requiring Defendant to recalculate and
4 5 U.S.C. § 5596.
5
adjust his back pay award to address the alleged issues
regarding how it was calculated. 5 See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 5–6.
Defendant argues that the Back Pay Act does not independently
confer jurisdiction on the Court, and because Plaintiff seeks a
monetary award from the United States government, his claim is
subject to the Tucker Act 6, which requires that his claim be
heard in the United States Court of Federal Claims (“Court of
Federal Claims”). See Mot., ECF No. 7 at 6–8. Mr. Vale
disagrees, arguing that “the Tucker Act only applies to claims
based on an express or implied contract with the United States,”
and “there is no express or implied contract between the
parties” here. Opp’n, ECF No. 9 at 7.
The Tucker Act “vests exclusive jurisdiction in the United
States Court of Federal Claims over claims against the United
States for ‘liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort’ for actions seeking more than $10,000.” Smalls
v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 189 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (citing 28
U.S.C. § 1491)). In other words, “[a] claim is subject to the
5 Mr. Vale’s Complaint includes a section entitled “Equitable Relief.” See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6. However, he does not ask the Court to grant any relief but rather states that “the continued employment of the supervisors at issue herein without training in equal employment opportunity law, rules, and regulations, present a clear and present danger to the employees of Defendant and could result in further illegal actions on the part of Defendant.” Therefore, the Court does not consider Mr. Vale’s Complaint to be requesting any equitable relief. 6 Codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a), 1491.
6
Tucker Act and its jurisdictional consequences if, in whole or
in part, it explicitly or ‘in essence’ seeks more than $10,000
in monetary relief from the federal government.” Remmie v.
Mabus, 898 F. Supp. 2d 108, 116 (D.D.C. 2012) (citing Kidwell v.
Dep’t of Army, Bd. for Correction of Mil. Recs., 56 F.3d 279,
284 (D.C. Cir. 1995)); see also Bowens v. Massachusetts, 487
U.S. 879, 906 n.42 (1988) (stating that the Back Pay Act is the
kind of statute that has been “interpreted as mandating
compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained”
and therefore claims pursuant to it are subject to the Tucker
Act (internal citation omitted)). “Where the jurisdiction of the
court turns on whether the complaint seeks monetary relief, the
court must generally limit itself to the four corners of the
complaint.” Roseberry-Andrews v. Wilson, 292 F. Supp. 3d 446,
453 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal citation omitted).
Despite his assertions to the contrary, the test to
determine if the Tucker Act applies to his claim is not whether
Mr. Vale had a “express or implied contract” with the United
States, but rather if his claim is “in essence” seeking monetary
damages from the United States government. Remmie, 56 F.3d at
284. By requesting that the Court grant him relief and require
Defendant to “[r]ecalculate and adjust [his] back pay award,”
see Compl., ECF No. 1 at 6 (Prayer for Relief); Mr. Vale is
seeking a monetary award for damages as a remedy for harm caused
7
by the miscalculation.
Moreover, the Court agrees with Defendant that Johnson v.
Brennan 7 is distinguishable here. In Johnson, the Court
determined that it did have jurisdiction because it was unclear
based on the record before the Court whether the plaintiff was
seeking enforcement of the award he had been granted during the
administrative process, or if he was seeking relief beyond what
was granted. 144 F. Supp. 3d at 129–30. Here, there is no
ambiguity in the record, and it is clear that Mr. Vale’s claim
goes beyond enforcement of the administrative relief he has
already received because he is “seek[ing] to recover the
financial ‘losses’ he experienced by [Defendant’s] ‘improper
calculation.’” Reply, ECF No. 10 at 2–3.
Because the Back Pay Act itself does not confer independent
jurisdiction onto federal district courts to hear claims under
the Back Pay Act, see Lacson v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 726
F.3d 170, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Mr. Vale’s claim pursuant to the
Back Pay Act is subject to the Tucker Act. Cf. Weber v. Hurtgen,
297 F. Supp. 2d 58, 62 (D.D.C. 2003) (explaining that because
the Equal Pay Act does not contain a specific jurisdictional
grant, related claims are subject to the Tucker Act). Moreover,
the Court agrees with Defendant that although Mr. Vale does not
7 144 F. Supp. 3d 121 (D.D.C. 2015).
8
specify the amount of damages he seeks, he cannot argue that he
seeks less than $10,000 in damages, given that he identified at
least $93,000 that Defendant did not contribute to his Thrift
Savings Plan. See Mot., ECF No. 7 at 8 (citing Compl., ECF No. 1
¶ 24). Because he seeks more than $10,000 in damages from the
United States government, his claim must be heard in the Court
of Federal Claims.
Because the Tucker Act applies, the Court of Federal Claims
has exclusive jurisdiction to hear Mr. Vale’s claim, and this
Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS the
Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 7; and DISMISSES this action without
prejudice. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum
Opinion.
SO ORDERED.
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
September 28, 2026
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