[Cite as State v. Brown, 2026-Ohio-3796.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
TRUMBULL COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2026-T-0030
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas
FELIX O. BROWN, JR.,
Trial Court No. 1995 CR 00127
Defendant-Appellant.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: September 28, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed
Dennis Watkins, Trumbull County Prosecutor, and Charles L. Morrow, Assistant Prosecutor, Administration Building, Fourth Floor, 160 High Street, N.W., Warren, OH 44481 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
Felix O. Brown, Jr., pro se, PID# A312-676, Grafton Correctional Institution, 2500 South Avon Belden Road, Grafton, OH 44044 (Defendant-Appellant).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Felix O. Brown, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas, denying his motion for leave to file a motion for a new
trial. Mr. Brown contends he is entitled to a new trial. We affirm the trial court.
{¶2} The following facts, which are, at the least, indirectly important to this court’s
resolution of the underlying matter, are taken from this court’s affirmance of Mr. Brown’s
original appeal, released in March 2000.
On February 24, 1995, appellant placed a 911 call reporting
that he and his fiancée had been robbed and his fiancée had
been shot in the head. Captain Charles Wilson, Patrolman
Mike Wilson, and Patrolman George Kanicledis responded to
the call and proceeded to apartment 278 in the Cedars of
Eastwood complex in Niles, Ohio. When they arrived at the
scene, appellant yelled from inside the apartment that he
needed help and told the officers to kick in the door. Captain
Wilson kicked in the door and found appellant attempting to
give mouth-to-mouth resuscitation to Monica Brandon. The
officers pulled appellant off Monica and paramedics rushed
her to the hospital, where she died shortly thereafter.
Appellant told the officers that someone named James had
robbed them and that two shots had been fired. After Captain
Wilson found a .380 caliber gun and a .380 caliber spent shell
casing on the bed, Patrolman Wilson told appellant that he
would have to go to the police station because he was a
material witness. Patrolman Wilson read the Miranda
warnings to appellant in the hallway of his apartment and took
him to the Niles Police Department. Detective Dixon also
responded to the 911 call and collected the evidence that the
other officers had found.
When Patrolmen Wilson and Kanicledis arrived at the police
station, they re-read the Miranda warnings to appellant, and
Patrolman Wilson told him that he would have to take a
paraffin test to determine if he had fired a gun. Appellant
responded that the test would be positive because he had
fired his gun the day before. After Detective Dixon returned
from appellant’s apartment, he read appellant his Miranda
rights for a third time, notified appellant that he was under
arrest, and asked appellant if he wanted to make a statement.
Appellant gave a statement recorded by Detective Dixon
claiming that Monica had accidentally shot herself during an
argument. According to appellant’s statement, Monica
became jealous because she suspected that appellant was
involved with another woman. As she stated, “I love you. I love
you and no one else is going to have you,” she picked up the
gun and appellant grabbed her hand with the gun in it. The
gun fired into the air, and when the gun fired a second time,
the slide split appellant’s right hand and the bullet hit Monica
in the head. After appellant gave his statement, he signed a
waiver of rights form.
On March 16, 1995, appellant was indicted by the Trumbull
County Grand Jury on one count of murder with a firearm
specification and one count of having weapons while under
disability. On June 16, 1995, appellant filed a motion to
suppress evidence, which was denied by the trial court. In
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September of 1995, appellant was tried before a jury, which
returned a verdict of guilty on both counts in the indictment.
State v. Brown, 2000 WL 522339, *1 (11th Dist. Mar. 31, 2000).
{¶3} Mr. Brown was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of 18 years to life. Mr.
Brown appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio. The Court declined
jurisdiction to accept the appeal. State v. Brown, 89 Ohio St.3d 1455 (2000).
{¶4} Mr. Brown filed various post-conviction motions which were denied by the
trial court and affirmed by this court. See State v. Brown, 2012-Ohio-4465 (11th Dist.),
appeal not accepted, 2013-Ohio-902; State v. Brown, 2017-Ohio-4241 (11th Dist.),
appeal not accepted, 2018-Ohio-365; State v. Brown, 2024-Ohio-792 (11th Dist.), appeal
not accepted, 2024-Ohio-2927.
{¶5} In February 2026, Mr. Brown sought leave to file a motion for new trial based
upon alleged newly discovered material evidence. In his motion, Mr. Brown claimed that
the evidence could have been used to attack the credibility of or impeach the (then)
Summit County Coroner, Dr. William Cox, who performed the autopsy of the victim. The
alleged new materials included a March 12, 1997 “Report and Recommendation in the
Matter of William A. Cox, M.D.” prepared by the State Medical Board of Ohio (“Board”).
The report related to Dr. Cox’s use of the Summit County Coroner’s Office for his private
medical practice.
{¶6} The record indicates the investigation began months after the autopsy of
the victim (in February 1995) and after Mr. Brown’s trial (commencing in late September
1995). Specifically, the information attached to Mr. Brown’s motion for leave
demonstrates that Dr. Cox was notified on August 14, 1996, that the Board “intended to
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determine whether to discipline his certificate to practice medicine and surgery in the
State of Ohio” for matters occurring on or about March 1996.
{¶7} Mr. Brown maintained the Trumbull County Prosecutor’s Office (“TCPO”)
was aware that Dr. Cox allegedly misused the Summit County Coroner’s Office to perform
autopsies. Specifically, Mr. Brown claimed that the TCPO “knew on or about April 30,
1995” that Dr. Cox could not use the Summit County Coroner’s Office for private practice.
The motion did not indicate how TCPO was aware of the alleged misfeasance or how the
allegations could have impacted Dr. Cox’s findings and conclusions relating to the
February 1995 autopsy of the victim.
{¶8} Mr. Brown also asserted, in the underlying motion, that Dr. Cox perjured
himself when he testified he left “SUMA” (sic) rather than testifying that he was terminated
because of a merger. Again, Mr. Brown’s filing did not indicate how this alleged perjury
somehow undermined Dr. Cox’s professional testimony regarding the autopsy.
{¶9} The trial court rejected Mr. Brown’s contentions and, in March 2026, denied
his motion. This appeal follows. He assigns the following errors:
[1.] The trial court erred as a matter of law – in violation of
appellant’s right to due process under the Fifth, Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States and Article I;
Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution – in overruling appellant’s
motion for leave to file a motion for a new trial instanter by
determining that defendant failed to show through clear and
convincing evidence that he was unavoidably prevented from
moving for a new trial within the time specified in Crim.R.
33(B); where, therein, appellant presented prima facie
evidence that the State’s suppressed the evidence –
Brady/Napue material – involving Dr. William Cox’s private
practice medicine, in which appellant’s new trial is based. (Sic
throughout).
[2.] The trial court erred as a matter of law – in violation of
appellant’s right to due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and
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Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution
and Article I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution, – in
overruling appellant’s motion for leave to file a motion for a
new trial instanter by determining that defendant failed to
show through clear and convincing evidence that he was
unavoidably prevented from moving for a new trial within the
time specified in Crim.R. 33(B); where, therein, appellant
presented prima facie evidence that the State’s suppressed
the evidence – Brady/Napue material – Dr. William Cox’s
termination from SUMMA, in which appellant’s new trial
motion is based. (Sic throughout).
{¶10} The alleged errors, as they present similar substantive issues, shall be
addressed together.
{¶11} Under Crim.R. 33, a defendant seeking a new trial
must establish that the new evidence: “(1) discloses a strong
probability that it will change the result if a new trial is granted,
(2) has been discovered since the trial, (3) is such as could
not in the exercise of due diligence have been discovered
before the trial, (4) is material to the issues, (5) is not merely
cumulative to former evidence, and (6) does not merely
impeach or contradict the former evidence.”
State v. Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, ¶ 38 (plurality opinion), quoting State v. Petro, 148 Ohio
St. 505 (1947), syllabus. When the motion is filed more than 120 days after the trial ended,
the defendant is further required to show “‘by clear and convincing proof that [he] was
unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the evidence upon which he must
rely,’ Crim.R. 33(B); see also State v. Parker, . . . 2008-Ohio-5178, . . . ¶ 16 (2d Dist.),
quoting State v. Walden, 19 Ohio App.3d 141, 145-146 (10th Dist. 1984) . . . .” Grad at ¶
38.
{¶12} In State v. Vinson, 2017-Ohio-5641, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.) (plurality opinion), this
court pointed out three options that are available to the trial court when a criminal
defendant files a motion for leave for new trial. Initially, if the trial court determines the
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documents in support of the motion on their face do not demonstrate the movant was
unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence, it may either overrule the motion
or hold a hearing. See State v. McConnell, 2007-Ohio-1181, ¶ 19 (2d Dist.). Second,
where a trial court concludes the documents submitted clearly and convincingly show that
the defendant was unavoidably prevented from discovering the evidence, the court must
grant the motion for leave and allow the motion for new trial to be filed. See Crim.R. 33(B).
Finally, if the trial court determines the documents on their face “support [the defendant’s]
claim that he was unavoidably prevented from timely discovering the evidence, the trial
court must hold a hearing to determine whether there . . . is clear and convincing proof of
unavoidable delay.” (Citation omitted.) State v. York, 2000 WL 192433, *2 (2d Dist. Feb.
18, 2000).
{¶13} Mr. Brown argues that the State engaged in violations of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) as well as Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
{¶14} “A defendant seeking to assert a Brady claim . . . is not required to show
that he could not have discovered suppressed evidence by exercising reasonable
diligence.” State v. Bethel, 2022-Ohio-783, ¶ 25. Rather, a defendant “may satisfy the
‘unavoidably prevented’ requirement contained in Crim.R. 33(B) . . . by establishing that
the prosecution suppressed the evidence on which the defendant would rely in seeking a
new trial.” State v. McNeal, 2022-Ohio-2703, ¶ 2, 17, citing Bethel at ¶ 25, 59.
{¶15} “‘There are three components of a . . . Brady violation: The evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because it is
impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either willfully or
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inadvertently; and prejudice must have ensued.’” State v. Bell, 2022-Ohio-2335, ¶ 10
(11th Dist.), quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-282 (1999).
Favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error
results from its suppression by the government, if there is a
reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed
to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
A different result is reasonably probable when the
government’s evidentiary suppression undermines
confidence in the outcome of the trial. Bagley at 678.
State v. Little, 2025-Ohio-130, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.).
{¶16} Further, if not directly similar to the Brady prejudice prong, in the context of
Napue, 360 U.S. 264, “a new trial is warranted so long as the false testimony may have
had an effect on the outcome of the trial—that is, if it in any reasonable likelihood could
have affected the judgment of the jury.” (Cleaned up.) Glossip v. Oklahoma, 604 U.S.
226, 246 (2025). This is comparable to the harmless-error standard, requiring “the
beneficiary of the constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error
complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Cleaned up.) Id.; accord Bagley
at 679, fn. 9.
{¶17} We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for leave to file a motion for a
new trial under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Grad, 2024-Ohio-5710, at ¶ 47, citing
State v. Hatton, 2022-Ohio-3991, ¶ 29. An abuse of discretion is the trial court’s “‘failure
to exercise sound, reasonable, and legal decision-making.’” State v. Beechler, 2010-Ohio-1900, ¶ 62 (2d Dist.), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Ed. 2004).
{¶18} Mr. Brown’s argument under his first assignment of error rests upon the idea
that information related to Dr. Cox’s use of the coroner’s office for private, professional
work would have undermined the credibility of his testimony regarding the victim’s
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autopsy. We fail to see the nexus between the allegations of professional misconduct and
the conclusions rendered by Dr. Cox regarding the autopsy.
{¶19} Dr. Cox testified that, as of the time of trial, in late September 1995, he had
been involved in approximately 12,000 cases regarding rulings “on the manner and cause
of death.” He testified he received a referral on autopsy of the victim in this matter in
February 1995. He performed the autopsy and testified to his findings and conclusions.
In particular, the doctor testified the victim experienced “a contact gunshot wound of the
left side of the head. And what I mean by contact, is that the end of the muzzle was placed
against the skin, that is contact . . . .” The doctor further explained the basis of his
conclusion and testified he “did not agree with the accidental theory.” Dr. Cox stated:
The reason I did not agree with [the “accidental-theory”], is
that first of all, we were dealing with a contact gunshot wound
to the left side of the head. In addition to that, I became aware
of the fact that Mr. Brown had sustained a laceration,
basically, in the web of his skin between his thumb and
second finger . . . at the time of the discharge of the weapon.
Now, what that was due to is that when the .380 is discharged,
the slide comes back, it has a small grip to it . . . . Secondly,
the grip is such a nature that it is very small. My hand would
totally occupy that grip. It would be most difficult for anyone to
have their hand on that grip at the same time with their finger
on the trigger. If you will, when you take a look at the fact that
it is a contact gunshot wound, it was my opinion, within a
reasonable degree of medical certainty, that this was not an
accidental death, rather, this was a homicide.
{¶20} Dr. Cox also testified, without objection, to his personal experience with a
similar firearm. He observed:
I have a Walter PPKS, which is a .380 and, on occasion, I try
to maintain current with it, which means that I will practice with
it. The last time that I practiced, I committed the cardinal sin, I
wasn’t paying any attention. I had my hand too far up on the
grip and I received the same injury. I got a laceration between
the web of my thumb and my second finger. It only has to
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happen once and then you get reminded very quickly that you
can’t do that with the .380. That is how I know.
{¶21} Accordingly, Dr. Cox testified that he had personal experience with the
wound Mr. Brown suffered on his hand during the incident.
{¶22} The foregoing testimony was not challenged.
{¶23} On cross-examination, Dr. Cox testified he did not have a formal contract
with Trumbull County to do autopsies but had been doing cases for Trumbull County for
“many years.” The doctor, upon questioning, stated that a fee arrangement had been
reached for his autopsies in November 1993. Dr. Cox expressly testified, however, that
he would use the Summit County Coroner facilities to privately generate income.
{¶24} Considering the final point, it would appear that Dr. Cox’s use of the Summit
County facilities, the subject of Mr. Browns first argument, was before the jury. Moreover,
the subject of the Board’s inquiry was likely a function, inter alia, of the doctor’s admission
to the actions at Mr. Brown’s trial. We therefore cannot see how Mr. Brown was
unavoidably prevented from inquiring into Dr. Cox’s alleged professional issues with the
Board. More importantly, given Dr. Cox’s testimony and experience, there is no basis to
conclude his alleged professional issues had any impact upon the jury’s verdict. Mr.
Brown did not establish prejudice such that a cognizable Brady or Napue claim might
survive.
{¶25} Further, Mr. Brown claims that, at trial, Dr. Cox perjured himself by stating
he was an associate pathologist with SUMMA, but “left” SUMMA to work full time at the
Summit County Coroner’s Officer. Mr. Brown asserts the doctor was terminated from
SUMMA and therefore provided perjured testimony of which the State was aware.
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{¶26} Dr. Cox’s testimony that he “left” his previous position is not inconsistent
with the possibility he was terminated. If he was terminated, he still “left” the same. Most
importantly, Mr. Brown offers no basis how this point, even if it is valid, impacted the
doctor’s substantive conclusions regarding the autopsy report. We discern no prejudice
on this point.
{¶27} In Brown, 2000 WL 522339, this court addressed the manifest weight of the
evidence. This court highlighted Dr. Cox’s testimony, which was a subject of the jury’s
evaluation. Specifically, this court noted that Mr. Brown initially advised police he and the
victim were robbed and a “robber shot” the victim. Id at *9. Mr. Brown then changed his
story, telling investigators that he and the victim engaged in a physical encounter during
which the victim “accidentally shot herself during the struggle for the gun.” Id.
{¶28} This court then pointed out that Dr. Cox testified “he did not believe that [the
victim’s] death was accidental because he learned that appellant had a slide cut on his
hand and [the victim], who was right-handed, died as a result of a contact gunshot wound
to the left side of her head. Id.
{¶29} Dr. Cox testified to his autopsy conclusions regarding the victim’s cause of
death. He also testified to his belief, given the surrounding factual circumstances, that the
victim’s death was no accident. He buttressed his belief and opinion by reference to
qualitative facts (the dominant hand of the victim and the injuries to Mr. Brown) relating
to the incident.
{¶30} It is unclear how Dr. Cox’s professional issues (both the investigation or his
alleged termination at SUMMA) could or would have impacted his testimony, especially
where his testimony was subject to cross-examination and the jury’s role as factfinder.
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Dr. Cox was not alleged to be unqualified, and he was, without objection, qualified as an
expert. His alleged misuse of a public facility or his alleged fabrication regarding his
“leaving” SUMMA did not impact the scientific/forensic veracity of his testimony.
{¶31} Finally, we point out that the trial court determined that the evidence could
not be used at trial because, “it would not be admissible as impeachment evidence” under
Evid.R. 608(B). Evid.R. 608(B) provides:
Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose
of attacking or supporting the witness’s character for
truthfulness, other than conviction of crime as provided
in Evid.R. 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They
may, however, in the discretion of the court, if clearly probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on crossexamination of the witness (1) concerning the witness’s
character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning
the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another
witness as to which character the witness being crossexamined has testified.
{¶32} Under the circumstances, we need not address the merits of this point
because we conclude that the evidence advanced in the motion would not have affected
the substantive or material impact of Dr. Cox’s scientific testimony. In other words, even
if the evidence was available, we discern no prejudice.
{¶33} We accordingly conclude that Mr. Brown’s assignments of error are without
merit.
{¶34} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
ROBERT J. PATTON, J.,
concur.
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JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s assignments of error
are without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the
Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Costs to be taxed against appellant.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs
JUDGE ROBERT J. PATTON,
concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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