UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
K.A.,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 25 - 2930 (SLS)
v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This case involves the horrific sexual abuse of a minor in the custody and care of the
District of Columbia juvenile justice system. Kelvin Powell, a 60-year-old employee of the
District, groomed and sexually assaulted K.A., a minor girl detained at the District’s Youth
Services Center. After several months, K.A. courageously reported Mr. Powell’s abuse, and he
was criminally charged and sentenced to 20 years of incarceration for his crimes. K.A. then
commenced this lawsuit against Mr. Powell and the District of Columbia under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
and District law. As to the District, K.A. alleges (1) municipal liability; (2) negligence;
(3) negligent retention, training, and supervision; and (4) intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. The District has moved for partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), seeking to dismiss all but K.A.’s simple negligence claim. The District
attempts to distance itself from Mr. Powell’s crimes, arguing that it is not responsible for the sexual
abuse that occurred under its watch. For the reasons that follow, the Court denies the District’s
motion, finding that K.A. has sufficiently alleged her claims at this early stage. This case will
proceed to discovery and then to summary judgment or trial.
BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint.
Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023).
1. The District’s Juvenile Detention Facilities and Staffing Policies
The District of Columbia is responsible for ensuring the safety, protection, and wellbeing
of the children housed in its juvenile detention system—including protecting them against sexual
abuse and assault. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 10, 15, ECF No. 19. Through its Department of Youth and
Rehabilitative Services (DYRS), the District operates the Youth Services Center (YSC), a
detention center that houses girls and boys. Id. ¶ 12. There are generally three categories of YSC
staff: (1) Youth Development Representatives (YDRs), (2) Supervisory Youth Development
Representatives (SYDRs), and (3) control room staff. Id. ¶¶ 20–22.
• YDRs are the main point of contact for detained youth. Id. ¶ 20. Their primary
responsibilities are to ensure the safe, healthy, and orderly detention of children housed at
YSC. Id. They are the equivalent of corrections officers. Id. They provide observation,
supervision, and counseling to young people in YSC housing units. Id.
• SYDRs oversee YDRs. Id. ¶ 21. They have offices in each unit, and they monitor and/or
review video surveillance footage of their unit. Id. YSC’s surveillance system includes
about 150 cameras that record and store footage, including cameras in the girls’ unit, other
housing units, the intake room, hallways, and all rooms where detained young people are
held or gathered. Id. ¶ 67–68.
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• Control room staff primarily monitor security cameras, though they have additional
responsibilities such as managing phone calls, opening and closing doors via switchboard,
tracking visitors, and communicating with staff. Id. ¶ 22.
Historically, the District’s juvenile detention facilities, including YSC, have been plagued
with insufficient staffing and assaults on children housed there. Id. ¶ 16. This culminated in the
Jerry M. litigation, initiated in 1985, where a class of plaintiffs sued the District for Fifth and
Eighth Amendment violations related to their confinement. Id.; see also District of Columbia v.
Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 180–183 (D.C. 1990) (partially summarizing the litigation). The District
resolved this matter through a consent decree, which the D.C. Superior Court supervised for 35
years. Id. ¶¶ 16–18. In part, the consent decree was intended to address the insufficient staffing
levels at YSC. Id. ¶ 17. In 2021, the Parties entered into a settlement agreement to terminate the
consent decree. Id. ¶ 18. As part of this settlement, the District established an Office of
Independent Juvenile Justice Facilities Oversight (OIJJFO) to independently investigate, monitor,
and publicly report on the health and safety of children housed at DYRS facilities. Id. Among other
things, OIJJFO recognized that “appropriate staffing levels are foundational to ensuring the safety
and wellbeing of youth and staff within the District’s juvenile detention facilities.” Id. ¶ 19.
K.A. alleges that throughout the period relevant to this case—between October 2021 and
February 2022—the District was on notice of the minimum staffing levels required to ensure
resident safety at YSC. Id. ¶¶ 23, 25–26. Specifically, YSC required at least two YDRs in all
housing units and in the control room from 6:30 AM to 10:30 PM, and at least one YDR on these
posts from 10:30 PM to 6:30 AM. Id. ¶ 23. The District documented this court-ordered minimum
staffing requirement in the “Youth Services Center Modified Post Analysis and Staffing
Complement,” dated January 6, 2014, and stated that it adhered to these minimum staffing levels.
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Id. In addition, K.A. alleges that the District had longstanding policies or practices of assigning a
female YDR to the girls’ unit, assigning a female YDR to transport detained girls within the
facilities, and not leaving male staff alone on the girls’ unit. Id. ¶ 54. These policies were designed
to prevent sexual abuse in the District’s facilities. Id.
According to K.A., the District disregarded these policies and insufficiently staffed YSC.
Id. ¶¶ 24, 55. K.A. alleges that throughout the relevant period, the District operated the control
room and girls’ housing unit with only one YDR during the AM and PM shifts. Id. ¶ 24.
Additionally, the District “customarily allowed male staff to be left alone in girl[s’] units, for male
staff to not announce themselves when they enter[ed] girl[s’] units, and to allow male staff to
transport girls alone throughout the facility.” Id. ¶ 55.
OIJJFO reports confirm these staffing shortages. Id. ¶¶ 25–27. Between 2021 and 2022,
OIJJFO assessed staffing levels at DYRS’s two detention facilities, including YSC. Id. ¶ 25. The
resulting study—which examined staffing levels between November 2021 and February 2022––
described “acute staffing shortages” impacting both YDRs and SYDRs. Id. For example, as of
December 6, 2021, YSC had 28 YDRs and one SYDR less than the minimum deemed necessary
to meet safety requirements. Id. ¶ 26. According to the OIJJFO study, this was “the fewest number
of staff at YSC since shortly after the YSC Post Analysis was developed in January 2014.” Id.
Furthermore, during OIJJFO’s December 2021 monitoring, many of the housing units were staffed
with only one YDR in violation of DYRS’s policy. Id.
OIJJFO provided DYRS with preliminary findings from its study on December 13, 2021,
and a draft report on January 21, 2022. Id. ¶ 27. On February 4, 2022, the DYRS Director
responded to OIJJFO, claiming that the facilities, including YSC, were now adequately staffed. Id.
¶ 32. Despite the DYRS Director’s claims, the report notes that DYRS staffing numbers at the end
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of January 2022 were similar to the insufficient staffing levels reported in early December 2021.
Id. OIJJFO publicly reported its findings on February 9, 2022. Id. ¶ 27.
2. Abuse of K.A.
K.A., a minor girl, was housed at YSC between October 2021 and June 2022. Id. ¶ 8. When
K.A. arrived at YSC in October 2021, she was identified as being at risk of sexual abuse and
victimization. Id. ¶ 51. For several months of her detention, Kelvin Powell, a 60-year-old male
YDR, repeatedly sexually assaulted her. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 13, 29.
Mr. Powell began grooming K.A. almost immediately. Id. ¶ 29. He started building
intimacy with her by spending one-on-one time and engaging in personal conversations. Id. ¶ 59.
In addition, he openly gave prohibited favors to K.A.—such as bringing outside meals and granting
special privileges—without reprimand from his supervisors. Id. ¶¶ 58–59. In fact, it was customary
for DYRS staff and supervisors to regularly grant these sorts of prohibited favors in violation of
DYRS policy. Id. ¶ 58. Mr. Powell also moved K.A. from her unit to make phone calls in an
individual staff office. Id. ¶¶ 61–63. YSC control room staff assisted Mr. Powell as he gained
access to different parts of YSC alone with K.A. Id. ¶ 64. And he “never announced his presence
on the girl[s’] A100 unit where K.A. was housed, [] was regularly the lone YDR on the girl[s’]
unit, and was regularly the lone YDR escorting K.A. throughout the facility.” Id. ¶ 56.
From December 2021 until February 2022, Mr. Powell repeatedly sexually assaulted K.A.
Id. ¶¶ 60, 65. These assaults occurred “inside of the girl[s’] unit, [K.A.’s] cell, multipurpose
rooms, hallways, and other locations in YSC[.]” Id. ¶ 65. Mr. Powell sexually assaulted K.A. “by
kissing her, groping her breasts and buttocks; standing outside of her cell and directing her to
disrobe and touch herself, forcing her to perform and receive oral sex, penetrating her with his
penis, [and] rubbing his penis against her buttocks.” Id.
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YSC’s cameras captured much of Mr. Powell’s conduct. Id. ¶¶ 69–70. For example,
surveillance footage showed him “repeatedly entering and exiting K.A.’s cell alone; . . . gesturing
for K.A. to go into rooms throughout the YSC, and [] following behind her; . . . making sexual
gestures to K.A.; . . . adjusting his mask as he enter[ed] and exit[ed] these various rooms with K.A;
. . . grabbing the buttock of K.A. as she [was] in hallway decorating a staff office door, and . . .
taking K.A. to various parts of [] YSC alone.” Id. ¶ 69. In addition, surveillance footage showed
that Mr. Powell was the lone staff member on the girls’ unit—which DYRS staffed with only one
YDR during the AM and PM shifts. Id. ¶¶ 24, 69. Yet Mr. Powell’s actions were not reviewed,
corrected, or disciplined by SYDRs. Id. ¶ 57. Furthermore, because the District failed to train them,
control room staff and SYDRs customarily did not monitor or review surveillance cameras to
prevent or identify grooming or sexual assault by YDRs. Id. ¶ 71. In fact, no one viewed or acted
on the footage showing Mr. Powell’s grooming behavior and repeated violations of staffing policy.
Id. ¶ 72.
Many of Mr. Powell’s assaults occurred as OIJJFO staff reported the results of their study
about staffing levels at YSC to DYRS leadership. Id. ¶ 30. Mr. Powell was alone with K.A. and
abused her on December 15, 2021 (two days after DYRS leadership received the preliminary
findings) and January 22, 2022 (the day after DYRS received the draft report). Id. ¶¶ 30, 31.
Mr. Powell also raped K.A. in February 2022 soon after the DYRS Director claimed that YSC was
appropriately staffed. Id. ¶¶ 32, 33.
K.A. was also subjected to sexual misconduct by other DYRS employees. Id. ¶ 73.
Specifically, in February 2022, a female DYRS employee “used her phone to show photos of her
own naked breasts to K.A. and other girls, told them about her sex life and kissed K.A.” Id. This
employee also repeatedly worked while noticeably intoxicated. Id.
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Mr. Powell continued abusing K.A. until she bravely reported him. Id. ¶ 33. In July 2025,
Mr. Powell was convicted on 16 counts related to his sexual abuse of K.A. and sentenced to 20
years’ incarceration. Id. ¶ 3. The judge presiding over Mr. Powell’s sentencing later told K.A.:
“DYRS did not protect you . . . . They did not protect you from the behavior that was going on
right under their nose.” Id. ¶ 4.
As a result of the Defendants’ actions, K.A. “has suffered physical harm, has and will
continue to suffer severe emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and has [and] will be
prevented from obtaining the full enjoyment of life, among other losses” Id. ¶ 77. She will also
incur expenses for medical and psychological services. Id.
3. The District’s Knowledge
K.A. alleges that the District was “on notice” that Mr. Powell “was a sexual predator.” Id.
¶ 34. In support, K.A. contends that Mr. Powell was open about his sexual attraction to young girls
and DYRS detainees. Id. ¶ 35. For example, he often sexualized girls in conversations with other
staff members, making comments such as: “Fifteen and sixteen, pussy big, asshole blown out, I
ain’t got no sympathy for them.”; “I’m an old man. What do I want an old bitch for?”; “Where the
young girls at?”; and “I would like some of that!” Id. ¶ 36.
These comments were not hypothetical. K.A. alleges that Mr. Powell repeatedly engaged
in sexual misconduct before and after he sexually abused her. First, between roughly 2017 through
2019, Powell served on the YSC Abscondence Unit, which travelled in DYRS vehicles to locate,
detain, and transport youth in the community to return them to YSC. Id. ¶ 38. During these trips,
Mr. Powell attempted to recruit D.V., a young woman detained for prostitution in North Carolina,
as a prostitute. Id. ¶ 39. He told other DYRS employees that D.V. was from a specific website
known for advertising sex work. Id. He also spent part of the drive sitting in the back of the
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transport van alone with D.V.—aligning with his known habit of switching positions in the van to
sit closer to detained girls. Id. Second, in the years before K.A.’s assault, during a DYRSsponsored public community event, Mr. Powell openly kissed a formerly detained young woman.
Id. ¶ 40. Third, Mr. Powell sexually assaulted another young girl, A.M, in the video-monitored
YSC intake room: He “touched A.M.’s buttocks, rubbed her thighs, . . . made sexual comments to
her[,] . . . [and] described her as having a ‘grown woman’s body.’” Id. ¶ 41. Mr. Powell then
openly pursued A.M. in the community upon her release from YSC, attempting to lure her into
child sex trafficking. Id. Fourth, DYRS employees frequently saw Mr. Powell with another former
DYRS resident, X.W., with whom he had sexual intercourse. Id. ¶ 42. Mr. Powell also told at least
one DYRS coworker that X.W. had asked him for money for an abortion. Id. Fifth, in August 2018,
Mr. Powell assaulted a detained girl, E.S. Id. ¶ 44. Two DYRS staff members witnessed
Mr. Powell touch E.S.’s “vaginal and thigh areas in the video-monitored YSC intake room.” Id.
Sixth, also in August 2018, Mr. Powell had intercourse with a different detained girl, A.B. Id. ¶ 43.
He approached A.B., who was 17 years old and frequently detained at YSC, directly in front of
the DYRS office building to get her phone number. Id. K.A. alleges that DYRS staff knew that
Mr. Powell was sexually assaulting A.B. and saw Mr. Powell give A.B. his number outside the
DYRS office building. Id. Finally, Mr. Powell was frequently paid to facilitate sex between young
girls and DYRS staff. Id. ¶ 37. In fact, DYRS staff referred to him as “Red Roof Inn” because he
brought girls released from YSC to hotels for sex. Id.
K.A. also alleges that DYRS failed to act on abuse when it was reported. A few weeks after
Mr. Powell assaulted E.S., he approached one of the staff members who witnessed the assault and
showed him a video of him and A.B. having intercourse. Id. ¶ 45. The staff member reported the
video to the staff member who witnessed Mr. Powell assaulting E.S. Id. That second staff member
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then formally reported to DYRS supervisors that they witnessed Mr. Powell assaulting E.S. Id.
¶ 46. However, DYRS never investigated the assault, never conducted interviews of the staff
member or Mr. Powell, and never issued any discipline. Id. A.B. herself also reported to YSC staff
that another staff member in a black shirt had been paying her to have sexual intercourse. Id. ¶ 47.
A small group of staff members on the Abscondence Unit, which included Mr. Powell, were
known to wear black shirts. Id. Despite A.B.’s report, which reached a supervisor, DYRS did not
question these Abscondence Unit staff members. Id. ¶ 48. DYRS also failed to report either of
these abuse incidents to the Child and Family Services Agency or law enforcement officers, as
required by law. Id. ¶ 49.
B. Procedural Background
In June 2025, K.A. initially sued the District of Columbia; Sam Abed, in his official
capacity as DYRS Director; and Kelvin Powell in D.C. Superior Court. See Compl., ECF No. 1-1. The District and Director Abed timely removed the case to this Court on the basis that it raised
federal questions. See Not. of Removal, ECF No. 1. K.A. later amended her Complaint. K.A.’s
Amended Complaint includes seven claims: (1) municipal liability by the District, Am. Compl.
¶¶ 80–84; (2) negligence by the District, id. ¶¶ 85–97; (3) negligent retention, training, and
supervision by the District, id. ¶¶ 98–106; (4) negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress by the District and Mr. Powell, id. ¶¶ 107–128; (5) Fifth Amendment due process
violations, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, by Mr. Powell, id. ¶¶ 129–133; (6) sexual assault by
Mr. Powell, id. ¶¶ 134–138; and (7) false imprisonment by Mr. Powell, id. ¶¶ 139–142.1 The
Amended Complaint no longer lists Director Abed as a Defendant. Id. ¶ 80–142. In addition, the
1
The Amended Complaint technically lists eight counts but erroneously skips “Count V”. See Am. Compl., ¶¶ 80–142.
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Clerk issued an Entry of Default as to Mr. Powell in December 2025. See Entry of Default, ECF
No. 13. The District now moves for partial dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). See Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. (Mot.), ECF No. 20. The motion is fully
briefed. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 21; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 22.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court will dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
When reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts “must construe the complaint ‘in
favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from
the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler
v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). But courts need not accept as true “a legal
conclusion couched as a factual allegation” nor an inference unsupported by the facts set forth in
the complaint. See Trudeau v. FTC, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
DISCUSSION
The District moves to dismiss K.A.’s claims for (1) municipal liability; (2) negligent
retention, training, and supervision; and (3) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional
distress—arguing that each fails to state a claim. The Court disagrees and finds that K.A.’s claims
all survive dismissal at this early stage.
A. Municipal Liability
In certain circumstances, individuals may sue a municipality under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
policies or practices that result in a constitutional violation. See Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs. of
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). To state a Monell claim, a plaintiff must properly allege: (1) “a
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predicate constitutional violation” and (2) “that a custom or policy of the municipality caused the
violation.” Baker v. District of Columbia, 326 F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Generally, an
official custom or policy exists in four circumstances:
when (1) the municipality adopts a policy that itself violates the Constitution; (2) the
unconstitutional action was taken by a policy maker within the government; (3) the
employees’ unconstitutional actions are so consistent that they have become a custom of
the municipality of which the supervising policymaker must have been aware; or (4) the
municipality knew or should have known of a risk of constitutional violations, but showed
deliberate indifference to that risk by failing to act.
Hurd v. District of Columbia, 997 F.3d 332, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (cleaned up). Importantly, local
governments “are not liable for injuries inflicted solely by their employees or agents.” Frederick
Douglass Found., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 82 F.4th 1122, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 2023). This is
because the municipality’s policy or practice must be the “moving force” behind the violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
At the outset, K.A. successfully identifies a predicate constitutional violation. She contends
that as a pretrial detainee, she was entitled to Fifth Amendment protections, including the right to
have detention officials take reasonable measures to protect her safety. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81, 130.
And she alleges that the District deprived her “of her basic human need for safety,” id. ¶ 82, and
subjected her to “glaringly inadequate safety conditions,” id. ¶ 84; see Colbert v. District of
Columbia, 78 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2015) (“A citizen’s liberty interest, protected by substantive
due process, includes a right to be free of damage to bodily integrity and security caused by the
State.”). She has thus carried her burden at this initial step. See Baker v. District of Columbia, 326
F.3d 1302, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (explaining that, at this stage, “[a]ll that is being established . . .
is that there is some constitutional harm suffered by the plaintiff, not whether the municipality is
liable for that harm”).
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What is left, then, is whether K.A. can show that the District maintained a custom or policy
that caused this constitutional violation. K.A. pursues Monell liability “pursuant to the third and
fourth pathways.” Opp’n at 13. Specifically, she alleges “that the District maintained
constitutionally injurious customs, and that the government failed to respond to a need to the point
of deliberate indifference to the risk of constitutional violations.” Id. The Court takes these in turn.
1. Custom
Under the third pathway, a plaintiff can sufficiently allege Monell liability by showing “the
adoption” of a policy “through a knowing failure to act by a policy maker of actions by his
subordinates that are so consistent that they have become ‘custom[.]’” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306
(quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 130 (1988)); see also Singletary v. District
of Columbia, 766 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (explaining that a municipal policymaker is “one
with authority to ‘establish governmental policy’” (quoting Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 481 (1986)). This must be “persistent and widespread,” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.
51, 61 (2011), and “so engrained that it amounted to a ‘standard operating procedure’ of which
municipal policymakers must have been aware.” Hurd, 997 F.3d at 338 (quoting Jett v. Dallas
Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989)). That said, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, there is no
magic number that a plaintiff must meet when identifying examples that amount to a custom. See
Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (clarifying that strict numerical
standards do not control the inquiry, especially when the misconduct is particularly egregious);
Bah v. District of Columbia, No. 23-cv-1248, 2024 WL 983329, at *6 (D.D.C. Mar. 7, 2024)
(explaining that any numerical standard is lower at the motion to dismiss stage). Here, K.A. alleges
two customs: (1) “insufficient staffing and supervision” and (2) “turning a blind eye to sexual
misconduct by DYRS staff.” Opp’n at 13–14. At this early stage, K.A.’s allegations suffice.
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First, K.A. alleges that the District maintained a custom of “failing to adequately staff and
supervise YSC.” Opp’n at 15. As K.A. explains, the District was aware of “[i]nsufficient staffing
levels endangering the detained youth at YSC” as early as the 1985 Jerry M. litigation and the
resulting consent decree. Am. Compl. ¶ 16. And the OIJJFO study in 2021 and 2022 further
highlighted YSC’s staffing shortages and the importance of adequate staffing to the safety and
wellbeing of children detained at YSC. Id. ¶¶ 19, 25, 26. Despite this, K.A. alleges that inadequate
staffing persisted at YSC. For example, the District routinely violated both its rule of assigning
two YDRs to a unit during daytime and its longstanding practice of assigning female YDRs to
monitor the girls’ unit and provide transport. Id. ¶¶ 23–24, 54–56.
The District does not strenuously dispute its awareness of these inadequate staffing levels.
See Reply at 3. Instead, it states that K.A. “fails to flesh out the requisite nexus between YSC
staffing levels and her alleged sexual assault by Defendant Powell.” Id. It argues that K.A. offers
“no non-conclusory allegations, from the OIJJFO Report or elsewhere, that her sexual assault over
a three-month period was a reasonably foreseeable result of staffing levels.” Id. at 4. The District
is correct that a plaintiff must allege “an ‘affirmative link,’ such that a municipal policy was the
‘moving force’ behind the constitutional violation.” Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306 (first quoting City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985); then quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489
U.S. 378, 389 (1989)). In this context, “moving force” is akin to proximate causation. See Smith
v. District of Columbia, 413 F.3d 86, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Put differently, “[t]he policy or custom
must be ‘closely related to the ultimate injury,’ and the court should inquire whether ‘the injury
[would] have been avoided’ in its absence.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 391). Here, the Court finds that K.A. has sufficiently alleged an affirmative link
between YSC staffing policies and her alleged constitutional injury.
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The Amended Complaint explains how adequate staffing levels relate to the safety and
wellbeing of DYRS youth. E.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 17 (discussing efforts “to bring DYRS into
compliance with the Consent Decree, including maintaining minimum staffing necessary to protect
youth from assault”); id. ¶ 19 (quoting OIJJFO’s recognition that “appropriate staffing levels are
foundational to ensuring the safety and wellbeing of youth and staff”); id. ¶ 54 (explaining that the
District’s previous long-standing policy of assigning female YDRs “was to prevent sexual abuse
in their facilities”). Construing all factual inferences in the light most favorable to K.A., she
plausibly articulates why YSC’s chronic understaffing and inadequate supervision allowed
Mr. Powell to groom and sexually assault her. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17, 19, 54. No more is needed
at the motion-to-dismiss stage. Indeed, “the question of whether a policy or custom is the moving
force behind alleged constitutional deprivations is normally a question for the jury.” Barnes v.
District of Columbia, 793 F. Supp. 2d 260, 285 (D.D.C. 2011).
Second, K.A. alleges that the District maintained a custom of turning a blind eye to sexual
misconduct against girls detained at YSC. Opp’n at 16–18. K.A. cites a 2018 incident involving
E.S. where DYRS staff formally reported Mr. Powell’s misconduct to supervisors. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 45, 46. And she describes another formal report around that same time, where DYRS
supervisors learned from A.B. that a member of the Abscondence Unit staff was paying her for
sexual intercourse. Id. ¶ 47. K.A. alleges that the District did not investigate these complaints or
take actions against Mr. Powell. Id. ¶¶ 46, 48. In addition to these formal reports, K.A. also claims
that DYRS staff and supervisors were aware of Mr. Powell’s depravity through informal means.
For example, K.A. cites the comments described above made to his coworkers about his attraction
to young girls, his “Red Roof Inn” nickname, and at least six additional incidents of misconduct
or assault around his time in the Abscondence Unit. See id. ¶¶ 34–50.
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The District counters that K.A.’s allegations are “just not enough” to show a persistent,
engrained, and widespread custom. Reply at 5. At this stage of the litigation, the District is wrong.
The D.C. Circuit has emphasized that the number of incidents alleged by a plaintiff is not
dispositive, particularly when those instances of misconduct are egregious. See Carter, 795 F.2d
at 124. Additionally, “courts unsurprisingly hold plaintiffs to a less demanding standard in terms
of the number of prior comparators at the motion-to-dismiss stage than at summary judgment.”
Bah, 2024 WL 983329, at *6. Here, construing the facts in their totality in K.A.’s favor—as the
Court must—she “raise[s] a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of further
misconduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. In addition to formal complaints that the District ignored,
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 45–47, K.A. cites multiple examples of Mr. Powell’s misconduct of which she
claims the District was aware, id. ¶¶ 34–50, plus security camera footage, id. ¶ 70, and misconduct
by other DYRS employees, id. ¶ 73. The fact that some of these allegations are vaguely dated or
occurred outside YSC may make them insufficient in isolation, but the Amended Complaint must
be “taken as a whole[.]” Bah, 2024 WL 983329, at *7. And read in its entirety, the Amended
Complaint plausibly alleged that the District maintained a custom of turning a blind eye to sexual
misconduct against girls detained at YSC.
2. Deliberate Indifference
K.A. also seeks to establish Monell liability under the fourth pathway, which requires that
she show that the District objectively “knew or should have known of a risk of constitutional
violations but showed ‘deliberate indifference’ to that risk by failing to act.” Hurd, 997 F.3d at 337
(quoting Baker, 326 F.3d at 1306). Deliberate indifference “does not require the [municipality] to
take reasonable care to discover and prevent constitutional violations. It simply means that, faced
with actual or constructive knowledge that its agents will probably violate constitutional rights,
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the [municipality] may not adopt a policy of inaction.” Warren v. D.C., 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir.
2004). In this context, “[a]ctual or constructive notice may be shown by demonstrating ‘[a] pattern
of similar constitutional violations[.]’” Hurd, 997 F.3d at 339 (alteration in original) (quoting
Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). However, such a pattern may not be necessary when a failure to train
results in a “patently obvious” unconstitutional consequence. Connick, 563 U.S. at 64. “The most
common way of establishing deliberate indifference is by demonstrating the municipality’s failure
to train its employees[.]” Harris v. Gov’t of D.C., No. 18-cv-2390, 2019 WL 3605877, at *4
(D.D.C. Aug. 6, 2019). However, courts “have also found deliberate indifference in . . . a
municipality’s failure to respond to repeated complaints about misconduct.” Id. (collecting cases).
As is typical in Monell cases, K.A.’s allegations under the third and fourth pathways
significantly overlap. See Tyson v. District of Columbia, No. 24-cv-1450, 2021 WL 4860685,
at *13 (“Where a plaintiff is alleging deliberate indifference based on a city’s failure to respond to
a pattern of misconduct . . . that analysis overlaps with the consideration of whether policymakers
knowingly ignored a custom under the third [pathway].”); Alexander v. Gov’t of D.C., No. 17-cv1885, 2020 WL 3573462, at *23 (D.D.C. July 1, 2020) (“[T]here is significant overlap in the
allegations supporting municipal liability under the third and fourth Baker prongs.”). K.A. alleges
that the District was deliberately indifferent to the risks of chronic insufficient staffing and
supervision, as well as the risks of failing to respond to its employees’ sexual misconduct. See Am.
Compl. ¶ 74. She contends that the customs identified in the third pathway prove that the District
knew about those risks—risks that she alleges caused the constitutional violations. Opp’n at 19.
Furthermore, she argues that “deliberate indifference is independently shown by specific
institutional failures,” id., such as failing to investigate formal reports against Mr. Powell, Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 46, 48, failing to fulfill DYRS’s mandatory reporting obligations involving abuse, id.
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¶ 49, failing to train staff to monitor surveillance footage, id. ¶ 71, failing to enforce minimum
staffing levels, id. ¶¶ 23–24, and failing to implement its long-standing rule of staffing female
YDRs in the girls’ unit, id. ¶¶ 54–55.
The District broadly makes three arguments in opposition, none of which succeed. First,
the District claims that it had no knowledge of the link between its staffing shortages and the threat
of assault for detained girls. Reply at 7. However, as the Court already discussed, the Amended
Complaint alleges otherwise. K.A. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 16–19, 54, 76. Specifically, K.A. plausibly
alleges that the District knew—based on prior litigation and its own internal reports—that chronic
understaffing and inadequate supervision could lead to abuse yet decided not to fix the issues. Id.
¶¶ 24, 32.
Second, the District repeats its argument that there is no pattern of incidents from which
the Court could infer that the District was aware of Mr. Powell’s prior sexual misconduct.
Mot. at 16–17; Reply at 6–7. The Court has rejected this argument too, explaining that a plaintiff
need not allege some minimum number of incidents to establish a pattern. At the motion to dismiss
stage, K.A. has articulated a sufficient pattern of misconduct to raise a plausible inference that the
District turned a blind eye to what was happening at YSC. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34–50, 70, 73.
Finally, the District argues that any inadequate training related to monitoring YSC’s
surveillance footage was not the “moving force” behind K.A.’s constitutional injuries. Reply at 8–
9. It argues that the conduct actually captured on camera does not reflect Mr. Powell’s “most
egregious conduct” such that improved monitoring of the facility’s surveillance footage would
have stopped him. Id. at 8. The Court disagrees. Even though surveillance footage did not capture
the February 2022 rape, K.A. plausibly pleads that it captured a slew of other actions that
“indicated that Powell was sexually assaulting K.A.,” including Mr. Powell making sexual
17
gestures to K.A., grabbing her buttock, and repeatedly escorting her around the facility alone. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 69–70. Furthermore, K.A. explains that “no one viewed or acted upon” this footage,
presumably because “the District failed to train them” “to monitor or review surveillance cameras
for the actions of YDRs, [or] to prevent or identify grooming or sexual assault of residents.”
Id. ¶¶ 71–72. Thus, the Court draws the inference that adequate training plausibly could have
created a different outcome.
In sum, particularly given the overlap between the third and fourth pathways, the Court
finds that K.A. has carried her burden to proceed with her deliberate indifference claim. See
Alexander, 2020 WL 3573462, at *8 (allowing the plaintiff to proceed on the fourth pathway
because it already sided with the plaintiff as to the third pathway, and “discovery on the two
theories will largely be the same”).
B. Negligent Retention, Training, and Supervision
Next up is K.A.’s claim for negligent retention, training, and supervision. To start, the
District argues that this claim is duplicative of K.A.’s simple negligence claim—which the District
has not moved to dismiss—because it rests on the same facts. Mot. at 17. “Claims are duplicative
when they stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for
which identical relief is available.” DTCC Data Repository (U.S.) LLC v. CFTC, 25 F. Supp. 3d
9, 19 (D.D.C. 2014) (cleaned up). “As a matter of judicial economy, courts should dismiss claims
that are duplicative of other claims.” Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81
(D.D.C. 2010). Here, though, the Court finds it premature to dismiss K.A.’s negligent retention,
training, and supervision claim as duplicative of her simple negligence claim. Though the two
claims are similarly pleaded, “[a]t this stage of the litigation, the Court does not know how the
negligence claim[] against the District . . . will develop and what evidence [K.A.] will seek to offer
18
in support of [it].” Kenley v. District of Columbia, 83 F. Supp. 3d 20, 48 (D.D.C. 2015). If the
claim turns out to be unnecessary or prejudicial, the Court may dismiss it down the road. See
Hackett v. WMATA, 736 F. Supp. 8, 10–11 (D.D.C. 1990) (explaining why alternative and
duplicative negligence claims may be prejudicial). But at this stage, the Court will exercise its
“discretion” to retain it. WMI Liquidating Tr. v. FDIC, 110 F. Supp. 3d 44, 59 (D.D.C. 2015).2
Proceeding to the substance of the claim, K.A. pleads sufficient facts to survive the
District’s motion. Under District of Columbia law, “[t]he elements of negligent training,
supervision, [] and retention are substantially similar: A plaintiff must show that ‘an employer
knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent
manner,’ and that ‘the employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge,’ did not
adequately train, supervise, [] or retain the employee.” Jackson v. District of Columbia, No. 25-cv-00889, 2026 WL 890452, at *12 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 2026) (first quoting Thorp v. District of
Columbia, 319 F. Supp. 3d 1, 21 (D.D.C. 2018) (negligent supervision and retention); then citing
Lin v. District of Columbia, 47 F.4th 828, 845–46 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (negligent supervision and
negligent training)). These claims require “proof that the employer breached a duty to [the]
plaintiff to use reasonable care in the supervision or retention of an employee which proximately
caused harm to [the] plaintiff.” Phelan v. City of Mount Rainier, 805 A.2d 930, 940 (D.C. 2002);
2
In urging otherwise, the District relies on inapposite cases. See Leach v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 128 F. Supp. 3d 146, 156 (D.D.C. 2015) (employment discrimination case where Title VII offered the exclusive remedy); Brown v. Child.’s Nat’l Med. Ctr., 773 F. Supp. 2d 125, 138–39 (D.D.C. 2011) (same); Jograj v. Enter. Servs., LLC, 270 F. Supp. 3d 10, 24–25 (D.D.C. 2017) (plaintiffs conceded that common law negligence claims were identical to already-dismissed claims); Order Granting Def.’s Partial Mot. to Dismiss, Laghrib v. District of Columbia, No. 2025-CAB-007588 (D.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 2026) (Superior Court dismissed negligent supervision and failure to train claim without considering whether simple negligence claim was duplicative); see Order Granting Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss, Mason v. District of Columbia, No. 2025-CAB-001964 (D.C. Super. Ct. Jul. 31, 2025) (plaintiff pleaded two overwhelmingly similar negligence claims).
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see also Clark v. Comput. Sci. Corp., 958 F. Supp. 2d 208, 214 (D.D.C. 2013) (explaining that
negligent training, supervision, and retention requires a showing of common-law negligence).
The District argues (1) that K.A. has not adequately shown that the District owed her a
duty, and (2) that it lacked actual or constructive notice of Mr. Powell’s wrongdoing. Mot. at 17–
19. The Court disagrees. First, K.A. has clearly and plausibly pleaded that the District owed her a
duty as a minor detained in a DYRS facility. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 9, 15. The District appears to
concede as much in their reply—lamenting only that this duty is duplicative of the duty pleaded
for K.A.’s simple negligence claim. See Reply at 10–11. Second, K.A. has plausibly alleged that
the District had actual or constructive notice of Mr. Powell’s extensive misconduct. As already
discussed, K.A. relies on multiple formal and informal reports of Mr. Powell’s misconduct, of
which she contends that District policymakers knew or should have known. See, e.g., Am. Compl.
¶¶ 24, 34–50, 69, 70. At the motion to dismiss stage, these allegations suffice to show actual or
constructive notice. As a result, K.A. may proceed with her negligent retention, training, and
supervision claim.3
C. Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, the Court turns to K.A.’s claims for intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress. Both claims survive the District’s motion to dismiss.
1. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
“[To] succeed on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendant which (2) intentionally or
recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Duncan v. Child.’s Nat’l Med. Ctr.,
3
While the District does not contest that K.A. sufficiently pleaded that it breached its duty to her, she has cleared this requirement as well. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶¶ 24, 26, 28, 71, 74.
20
702 A.2d 207, 211 (D.C. 1997) (quoting Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312 (D.C. 1994)).
The District does not appear to dispute that K.A. has adequately pleaded such a claim, arguing
instead that K.A.’s claim “is proper only against Defendant Powell.” Mot. 20. But an employer
may be vicariously liable for its employee’s actions under the doctrine of respondeat superior if
“(1) the employee’s acts must have taken place within the scope of his employment or
(2) arguably, he must have used his apparent authority or have been aided by his agency
relationship in accomplishing them.” Doe v. Sipper, 821 F. Supp. 2d 384, 387 (D.D.C. 2011).
K.A.’s claim survives under the second theory.4
a. Scope of Employment
District of Columbia law, which governs here, “generally adheres to the analytical
framework of the scope of employment inquiry set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency
§ 228(1)-(2)[.]” Trump v. Carroll, 292 A.3d 220, 228 (D.C. 2023). Specifically, an employee’s
conduct is “within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to
perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated,
at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master, and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant
against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master.” Rest. (2d) of Agency § 228(1).
However, “[c]onduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind
from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time or space limits, or too little actuated by a
4
The District argues that the Court should not entertain the second aided-in-agency theory because K.A. did not plead it in her Amended Complaint. Reply at 14. This vastly overstates what is required at the pleading stage. K.A. pleaded a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against both the District and Mr. Powell. The District has moved to dismiss, arguing that only Mr. Powell may be held liable for that claim. And K.A. advances the aided-in-agency argument as one path of holding the District vicariously liable for Mr. Powell’s conduct. Rule 8 does not require a plaintiff to plead such an argument in her complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
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purpose to serve the master.” Rest. (2d) of Agency § 228(2); see also Trump, 292 A.3d at 229
(clarifying how the District of Columbia applies the standard).
Here, K.A. has not satisfied this test. On the third requirement, she offers no nonconclusory allegations as to how Mr. Powell’s conduct was intended to serve the District. To the
contrary, Mr. Powell’s grooming and sexual assaults “appear[] to have been done solely for the
accomplishment of [his] independent, malicious, mischievous and selfish purposes.” Boykin v.
District of Columbia, 484 A.2d 560, 562 (D.C. 1984). Granted, the District of Columbia “does not
subscribe to the blanket proposition that sexual assaults never come within the scope of
employment[.]” Doe, 821 F. Supp. 2d at 388; see also Brown v. Argenbright Sec., Inc., 782 A.2d
752, 758 (D.C. 2001) (explaining that “[w]hile it is probable that the vast majority of sexual
assaults arise from purely personal motives, it is nevertheless possible” that an employee’s sexual
assault may be actuated by a purpose to serve the master). But Mr. Powell’s actions do not
plausibly fit within the narrow category of cases where an employee commits sexual assault to
serve his employer. For example, in Brown, the D.C. Court of Appeals held that a jury could find
that a security guard was acting within the scope of his employment when he touched an alleged
shoplifter in a sexually inappropriate manner while conducting a physical search. Id. at 758–59.
The Court reasoned in part that the security guard initiated the search only “after he had reason to
believe that his employer’s interests had been affected[.]” Id. Here, K.A. does not adequately allege
that Mr. Powell was protecting the District’s interests when he sexually assaulted her. K.A.’s sole
claim that Mr. Powell’s “conduct was actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve his employer,”
Am. Compl. ¶ 112, is exactly the sort of conclusory allegation that is “not entitled to the
assumption of truth,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. The Amended Complaint lacks any “direct and
circumstantial evidence of [Mr. Powell’s] state of mind” that would allow a factfinder “to make
22
inferences about whether the employee was in fact responding to an employment-related
circumstance, despite the tortious conduct appearing as if it were personally motivated.” Trump,
292 A.3d at 235. Therefore, K.A. may not proceed with her claims under the scope-of-employment
theory.
b. Aided-in-Agency
Though a closer call, K.A. can proceed with her intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim against the District under the aided-in-agency doctrine, which is rooted in Restatement
(Second) of Agency § 219(2)(d). Though the District of Columbia has “not expressly adopted”
this provision in assessing common-law claims, Buie v. District of Columbia, No. 16-cv-1920,
2023 WL 6142139, at *16 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2023), the District does not dispute its applicability
here, Reply at 14–15. So the Court will assume without deciding that K.A. may rely on this theory.
See Doe, 821 F. Supp. at 391 (D.D.C. 2011) (applying Section 219(2)(d) “[g]iven the preliminary
posture of the case, the parties’ positions, and the lack of direct briefing”).
Section 219(2)(d) states that “[a] master is not subject to liability for the torts of his servants
acting outside the scope of their employment, unless . . . the servant purported to act or to speak
on behalf of the principal and there was reliance upon apparent authority, or he was aided in
accomplishing the tort by the existence of the agency relation.” The Restatement commentary
“suggests that this exception embraces a narrower concept that holds the employer liable only if
the tort was accomplished by an instrumentality, or through conduct associated with the agency
status.” Gary v. Long, 59 F.3d 1391, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted) (discussing
Restatement § 219 cmt. e). For example, “a telegraph company may be held liable for a tort
committed by a telegraph operator who sends a false telegraph message, as may the undisclosed
principal of a store whose manager cheats a customer.” Id. But, a plaintiff cannot prevail if she
23
does not reasonably believe that the employee “was acting within the color of his authority or that
his actions were somehow condoned[.]” Buie, 2023 WL 6142139, at *17.
K.A.’s claim narrowly clears this threshold. The Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges
both that Mr. Powell was able to groom and sexually assault K.A. because of his role as a YDR
and that K.A. reasonably relied on that apparent authority. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50–64. Buie v.
District of Columbia, 273 F. Supp. 3d 65 (D.D.C. 2017), is illustrative. In that case, a plaintiff sued
the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department after a police officer sexually assaulted
her. Id. at 66. The court denied the District’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff had
sufficiently alleged vicarious liability under Section 219(2)(d). Id. at 68. The Buie court pointed to
multiple facts “plausibly suggesting that [the officer] was purporting to act on behalf of the MPD,”
including that the officer was armed, wearing his full police uniform, drove his official police
vehicle, and used his credentials to access the garage, elevator, and his office. Id. at 69.; see also
Sipper, 821 F.Supp. 2d at 393 (declining to dismiss a claim that a company executive used the
instrumentalities of his position to rape an employee). Similarly, here, Mr. Powell relied on his
authority and access as a YDR to groom and sexually assault K.A. It is certainly plausible that
K.A., a minor, understood Mr. Powell to be acting within his authority as a YDR on behalf of
DYRS.
The Court recognizes the District’s concern that allowing K.A.’s claim to proceed would
make employers vicariously liable for “every plaintiff harmed by every workplace tort.”
Reply at 15. This concern is overblown, particularly at this early stage of the litigation. The District
will have an opportunity at summary judgment or trial to make its case. But construing the facts
in K.A.’s favor, she has plausibly pleaded vicarious liability under the aided-in-agency doctrine.
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2. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress
In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff may show negligent infliction of emotional distress
under two theories: the “special relationship” theory and the “zone of physical danger” theory. See
Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic, 22 A.3d 789, 810–11 (D.C. 2011) (en banc); Jiggetts v.
Cipullo, 774 F. Supp. 3d 168, 207 n.17 (D.D.C. 2025). The Court addresses these in turn.
To succeed on the “special relationship” theory, a plaintiff must show that:
(1) the defendant has a relationship with the plaintiff, or has undertaken an obligation to
the plaintiff, of a nature that necessarily implicates the plaintiff’s emotional well-being,
(2) there is an especially likely risk that the defendant’s negligence would cause serious
emotional distress to the plaintiff, and (3) negligent actions or omissions of the defendant
in breach of that obligation have, in fact, caused serious emotional distress to the plaintiff.
Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 810–11. Here, the District argues that K.A. offers nothing but legal
conclusions to support her claim. Reply at 14 (citing Am. Compl. ¶ 114). And it contends that
there is no special relationship between YDRs and the children in their care because “courts have
been reluctant to recognize a special relationship between correctional officers and persons in
custody[.]” Mot. at 21 (citing Lesesne v. District of Columbia, 146 F. Supp. 3d 190, 196 (D.D.C.
2015)). The Court disagrees. K.A. does more than plead legal conclusions. She alleges that she
was “wholly dependent” on the District for her safety, Am. Compl. ¶ 114, and that the District
“exercised exclusive control over [her] environment, movement, and well-being,” such that she
“was unable to protect herself from harm,” id. ¶ 115. And she argues that the District has
“responsibility for children incarcerated under its authority” and “bears absolute, non-delegable
legal responsibility and the highest duty of care, under District of Columbia law, to ensure the
safety, protection, and the wellbeing of vulnerable children who are housed within its facilities,
including specific duties to protect against sexual abuse and assault.” Id. ¶ 9. These allegations
raise a plausible inference that the District had a special relationship with K.A. and other children
25
detained at YSC. Furthermore, Lesesne is not dispositive for two reasons. First, Lesesne involved
an adult plaintiff detained at the Department of Corrections, so it may apply with less force to
minors detained at YSC. 146 F. Supp. 3d at 196 (acknowledging that the D.C. Court of Appeals
has explicitly “mentioned appointed guardians and counsel for children . . . as caretakers whose
activities have the potential to implicate emotional well-being”) (citing Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d
at 814). Second Lesesne was decided at summary judgment, 146 F. Supp at 196, whereas K.A. has
not yet had the benefit of discovery. Accordingly, K.A. has done enough to proceed to discovery.
Turning to the “zone of danger” theory, a plaintiff must prove that she (1) “was in the zone
of physical danger, which was (2) created by the defendant’s negligence, (3) the plaintiff feared
for [her] own safety, and (4) the emotional distress so caused was serious and verifiable.” Rice v.
District of Columbia, 774 F. Supp. 2d 25, 33 (D.D.C. 2011). In addition, “the plaintiff’s presence
in the zone of danger be contemporaneous with her fear for her own safety.” Jones v. Howard
Univ., Inc., 589 A.2d 419, 423 (D.C. 1991). Here, too, K.A.’s claim survives. The District devotes
only a handful of sentences to this argument, Mot. at 21–22; Reply at 14, which do not move the
needle. K.A. has adequately alleged (1) that she was in the physical zone of danger by virtue of
being detained at YSC and having her movements controlled by YDRs, see, e.g., Am. Compl.
¶¶ 22, 110, 118; see also Nagy v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 79 F. Supp. 3d 114, 121 (D.D.C. 2015)
(plaintiff beaten by corrections officers in prison satisfied the zone of physical danger test); (2) that
her physical danger was linked to the District’s alleged negligence; (3) that she experienced a
contemporaneous fear for her physical safety while in detention given Mr. Powell’s repeated
sexual assault; and (4) that she “suffered physical harm, has and will continue to suffer severe
emotional distress, humiliation and embarrassment, and has [and] will be prevented from obtaining
the full enjoyment of life, among other losses,” Am. Compl. ¶ 77. These allegations are “serious
26
and verifiable” at this stage of the litigation. See Whittaker v. Ct. Servs. & Offender Supervision
Agency for D.C., 401 F. Supp. 3d 170, 187 (D.D.C. 2019) (declining to dismiss allegations that
plaintiff “experience[d] extreme emotional distress and harm”).
Thus, K.A. sufficiently states a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under
both the “special relationship” and “zone of physical danger” theories.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies the District’s Partial Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 20. A separate order will issue.
SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN
United States District Judge
Date: September 28, 2026
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