Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

majority opinion

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Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

PATRICIA PETRAGLIA v. COMMISSIONER

OF MOTOR VEHICLES

(AC 48540)

Alvord, Moll and Keller, Js.*

Syllabus

The plaintiff appealed from the Superior Court’s judgment dismissing her administrative appeal from the defendant’s decision to suspend her motor vehicle operator’s license and to require the installation of an ignition interlock device in her vehicle pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b). She claimed that there was not substantial evidence on the whole record that she had, in fact, been operating her motor vehicle while under the influence of any intoxicating substance in violation of statute (§ 14-227a) because the chemical tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect any alcohol or drugs in her system. Held:

The Superior Court properly applied the significantly deferential standard of review applicable to administrative appeals involving license suspensions in determining that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that the defendant’s decision was clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record.

Argued March 24—officially released September 29, 2026

Procedural History

Appeal from the decision of the defendant suspending the plaintiff’s motor vehicle operator’s license and

requiring the installation of an ignition interlock device, brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of New Britain and tried to the court, Taylor, J.; judgment

dismissing the appeal, from which the plaintiff appealed

to this court. Affirmed.

Conrad Ost Seifert, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Deanna S. Levine, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, was William Tong, attorney general,

for the appellee (defendant).

Opinion

KELLER, J. The plaintiff, Patricia Petraglia, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her

The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

appeal from the administrative decision of the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles (commissioner) suspending her motor vehicle operator’s license. Pursuant to

General Statutes § 14-227b,1 the plaintiff’s license was

suspended for forty-five days and she was required to

install and maintain an ignition interlock device in her

vehicle for six months. In this appeal, we must decide

whether the trial court properly applied the correct legal standard in upholding the commissioner’s decision that

the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that the chemical

tests to which she voluntarily submitted did not detect

any alcohol or drugs in her system. The plaintiff claims

that her “rights were prejudiced because there was not

‘substantial evidence on the whole record’ ” that she

was, in fact, operating her motor vehicle while under

the influence of any intoxicating substance. We affirm

the judgment of the court.

A review of the record reveals the following. On March

4, 2024, the plaintiff was arrested and charged with

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug or both in violation of

General Statutes § 14-227a.2 Following the plaintiff’s

arrest, Officer Sebastian Obando and Sergeant George

Caponera, both of the New Canaan Police Department,

prepared reports that included the following information. On March 4, 2024, at approximately 4:57 p.m.,

Obando was dispatched to the plaintiff’s residence in New Canaan to attempt to locate the driver of a vehicle that

was reported to have been involved in a possible evading

Although § 14-227b has been amended by the legislature since the events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2024, No. 24-40, § 54; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

Although § 14-227a has been amended by the legislature since the events underlying this appeal; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-110, § 49; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

motor vehicle accident in Darien.3 While traveling to

the plaintiff’s residence, Obando was informed by the

desk officer about the color, make, model, and registration number of the vehicle in question and he further

learned that a separate complaint of erratic driving had

been made with respect to that vehicle. Specifically, the vehicle had been observed swerving off the road, almost

striking a tree, and then taking a dangerous right turn,

nearly causing a collision.

When Obando arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, he

observed that the vehicle in question was parked in the

driveway and that there was a female, who later was identified as the plaintiff, seated in the driver’s seat. Obando pulled his patrol vehicle into the driveway and parked

behind the plaintiff’s vehicle. As Obando was exiting his patrol vehicle, the plaintiff opened her driver’s side door and Obando announced his presence as he approached

her. The plaintiff explained that she had been at Quest

Diagnostics in Darien. Obando observed “numerous prescription bottles in [the plaintiff’s] vehicle. Some of

the prescription bottles were in [the plaintiff’s] center console and some were in her bag which was on her lap.”

When Obando asked the plaintiff for her motor vehicle

operator’s license, “she began to fumble her belongings.” She also was “being very slow with her movements,” and

she dropped her bag, causing its contents, including

loose pills, to fall out and scatter both inside and outside of her vehicle. When Obando asked the plaintiff if she

had been involved “in any motor vehicle accident,” the

plaintiff said no. Obando observed, however, that there

was damage to the passenger side front bumper of the

plaintiff’s vehicle. Obando did not smell any alcohol on

the plaintiff’s breath, but it was “clear” to him that she “was impaired.”

The report came from the Darien Police Department. “The essence of the offense of evading responsibility is the failure of the driver to stop and render aid.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Williams, 137 Conn. App. 250, 251, 47 A.3d 914, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 921, 54 A.3d 182 (2012).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

At this point, Caponera arrived on the scene. Caponera

“spoke with [the plaintiff] and advised her about the

incident in Darien.” The plaintiff appeared to Caponera

“to be disoriented and was not able to answer questions

clearly.” She “denied drinking any alcoholic beverages,

but admitted she took prescription medication earlier in

the day.” Caponera and Obando decided to conduct standardized field sobriety tests (sobriety tests) “to determine if [the plaintiff] was impaired and unsafe to drive.” The plaintiff exited her vehicle at Caponera’s request, and

Obando “had [her] come to the rear end of her vehicle,”

which she did without any reported incident or difficulty. Obando then asked the plaintiff whether she had

any head or eye injuries and she responded no. Caponera

asked the plaintiff if she was diabetic, and she responded no. Obando then administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus test (HGN test)4 and was “unable to observe any

nystagmus however [the plaintiff] repeatedly moved her

head after being told not to numerous times.” He then

“The [HGN] test measures the extent to which a person’s eyes jerk as they follow an object moving from one side of the person’s field of vision to the other. The test is premised on the understanding that, whereas everyone’s eyes exhibit some jerking while turning to the side, when the subject is intoxicated the onset of the jerking occurs after fewer degrees of turning, and the jerking at more extreme angles becomes more distinct.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.4, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).

“To administer the test, the officer positions a stimulus approximately twelve to eighteen inches away from and slightly above the subject’s eyes. The stimulus, usually a pen or the officer’s finger, is then moved slowly from the midline of the nose to maximum deviation, the farthest lateral point to which the eyes can move to either side. The officer observes the subject’s eyes as [the subject tracks the stimulus. The officer] looks for six clues, three for each eye, to determine whether the subject passes or fails the test. The officer looks for (1) the inability of each eye to track movement smoothly, (2) pronounced nystagmus at maximum deviation and (3) the onset of nystagmus at an angle less than forty-five degrees in relation to the center point. A finding of four clues indicates failure of the test and is a sign of intoxication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Balbi, 89 Conn. App. 567, 571, 874 A.2d 288, cert. denied, 275 Conn. 919, 883 A.2d 1246 (2005).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

administered the walk and turn test,5 and the plaintiff

“lost balance, did not walk heel to toe, stepped off line and turned incorrectly.” Finally, he administered the

one leg stand test,6 during which the plaintiff “was swaying, hopping and continuously putting her foot down.”

Obando “terminated the test due to [the plaintiff] being

unable to keep her balance and for her safety.”

After Obando completed the sobriety tests, Caponera

decided to “retest [the plaintiff] in the HGN and [walk

and turn tests] to determine if she was under the influence of her prescription medications.” In readministering the

HGN test, Caponera “noticed [the plaintiff’s] pupil size

to be equal, but her pupils were pin point.”7 He “observed a lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes,” “a slight bounce

of each eye,” and “at maximum deviation [he] would see a

slight bouncing of each eye.” At Caponera’s request, the

plaintiff also performed the walk and turn test a second

time “but did not touch heel to toe on any step. In fact, she took wide strides, and did not count out loud. She

did not appear to have good balance as her steps appeared random and in a non-linear manner.”

In addition, Caponera performed two Advanced Roadside Impaired Driving Enforcement (ARIDE) tests8—the

“The walk and turn test requires the subject to walk heel to toe along a straight line for nine paces, pivot, and then walk back heel to toe along the line for another nine paces. The subject is required to count each pace aloud from one to nine.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.5, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).

“The one leg stand test requires the subject to stand on one leg with the other leg extended in the air for [a set time period], while counting aloud . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Colon, 232 Conn. App. 122, 126 n.6, 335 A.3d 848, cert. denied, 353 Conn. 902, 341 A.3d 959 (2025).

“Pinpoint pupils occur when the pupils shrink to a small size. This can be due to various conditions and medications, such as prescription opioids, hypertension medications, and eye inflammation.” B. Weaver, Seven Causes of Pinpoint Pupils, (last modified June 3, 2024), available at https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/321209 (last visited September 16, 2026).

General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (A) provides in relevant part: “ ‘[A]dvanced roadside impaired driving enforcement’ means a program

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

lack of convergence and the modified Romberg tests.

During the lack of convergence test, the plaintiff’s “eyes failed to converge the first time at the bridge of her nose, but the second time came closer.”9 The plaintiff passed a portion of the modified Romberg test, which Caponera

administered “to see if she had suffered any loss of coordination,” but she “failed to do the test properly” because she kept her head at the resting position.10 “Ultimately

based on the totality of circumstances [Caponera] advised [the plaintiff] that she failed the tests” and summoned

a female officer to the scene to “search and arrest [the

plaintiff]” for illegal operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of § 14-227a.11

The plaintiff then was transported to the New Canaan

Police Department for booking. A National Crime Information Center (NCIC) check was conducted, “which

developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration with the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Technical Advisory Panel, which focuses on impaired driving enforcement education for police officers . . . .”

ARIDE was intended “to bridge the gap in training between the [sobriety tests] and the Drug Evaluation and Classification program. ARIDE includes a set of three tests: (a) the lack of convergence eye test; (b) the finger to nose coordination test; and (c) the modified Romberg balance test. ARIDE is additional training for more experienced officers conducting [sobriety test] investigations to help detect drug impairment.” State v. Langshaw, Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2025 WL 2124394, *1 n.2 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2025).

In his report, Caponera explained that, when he administered this test, he “had [the plaintiff] stand with her feet together and hands at her side. [He] held up [a pen] and advised her to follow it with her eyes only. [He] then moved the pen clockwise in a circle, in front of her face for two rotations. [He] then brought the pen to the bridge of her nose to see if her eyes would meet in the center. [He] returned the pen to the starting position and back to center.”

In his report, Caponera explained that, before administering this test, he “instructed [the plaintiff] to stand with her feet together and hands at her side. [He] then advised her to close her eyes, tilt her head back and approximate [thirty] seconds before opening her eyes, returning to resting position and stating she was done. [He] demonstrated how to perform the head tilt with eyes closed.”

The record does not reflect whether or how the criminal charges against the plaintiff were disposed.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

yielded no hits or wants.”12 At Obando’s request, the

plaintiff provided one breath sample, which tested negative for alcohol, and one urine sample, which was sent

to the Department of Emergency Services and Public

Protection Division of Scientific Services for testing. The plaintiff also iterated that she had last taken prescription medication earlier in the day, specifically at noon, and

further advised that she had not eaten anything since

the morning hours.13

During the booking procedure, Obando listed “all the

prescription bottles that were on [the plaintiff] during the time of the incident” as follows: “Ciprofloxacin

500mg, Omeprazole 20mg, Potassium 10MEQ, Hydralazine 25mg, Oxycodone 5mg, Acetaminophen 500mg,

Phospha 250 tablet, Valacyclovir 1GM tablet, Mycophenolic [acid] 180mg and Carvedilol 12.5mg.” He also

documented that “[t]here were duplicate prescription

bottles . . . and numerous tablets in her bag that were

not properly stored in a prescription bottle.” The plaintiff “completed the booking process without incident,”

although there “were moments that [she] was dozing off

and had to be seated.” Caponera asked the plaintiff if she needed medical attention and she stated no.

Thereafter, on March 7, 2024, Obando prepared an

A-44 form14 for submission to the Department of Motor

Vehicles (department) pursuant to § 14-227b (c). In the

“INVESTIGATION INFORMATION” section of that

“The NCIC database is maintained by the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and aggregates criminal justice information from a variety of sources. Some files in the database contain information about individual persons and are known as person files. Other files contain records regarding stolen property. Law enforcement agencies routinely check NCIC records to obtain information concerning persons in custody or under investigation.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bey, 240 Conn. App. 505, 506 n.1, ___ A.3d ___ (2026).

The plaintiff had been read her notice of rights at 5:43 p.m.

“The A-44 form is used by the police to report an arrest related to operating a motor vehicle under the influence and the results of any sobriety tests administered or the refusal to submit to such tests.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crandlemire v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 117 Conn. App. 832, 835 n.2, 982 A.2d 212 (2009).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

form, Obando checked the box that indicated that the

plaintiff did not “have any physical injury or illness

which would prevent . . . her from performing any part

of the [sobriety tests].” With respect to the “WALKTURN” test, Obando checked the boxes for “Loses Balance,” “No Heel to Toe,” “Steps off Line,” and “Turns

Incorrectly.” With respect to the “ONE LEG STAND”

test, Obando checked the boxes for “Sways While Balancing,” “Hopping,” and “Puts Foot Down.” With respect

to the HGN test, Obando checked the box for “Other

(Explain)” and noted “Unable to perform.” Finally, with

respect to “PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST,” Obando

checked the boxes for “STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS” and “OTHER (EXPLAIN)” and noted the

“[c]omplainant observed erratic operating of vehicle.

Vehicle was involved in evading motor vehicle accident

in Darien prior to arriving at vehicle [owner’s] residence. Numerous prescription bottles in vehicle.”

In the “POST ARREST INTERVIEW” section of the

form, Obando checked the boxes that indicate that the

plaintiff was not injured but that she was ill and noted

that her illness was “[d]ue to drugs taking.” The form

reflects that the plaintiff “take[s] medication” and states “[n]umerous” to describe “what type.” Further, the form

indicates that the plaintiff “last [took] this medication” at 12 p.m. and was not in need of any more. The form also reflects that the plaintiff had “last eat[en]” at 9 a.m.15 All of the questions related to “drinking” are marked “N/A.”

Finally, in the “CHEMICAL ALCOHOL TEST DATA”

section of the form, the “breath” and “urine” tests are

identified as the “TEST[S] SELECTED BY OFFICER.”

We note that the form also reflects that the plaintiff had not “taken any drugs” and that the follow-up question, “If so, what kind and how much?” is left unanswered. Given the plaintiff’s admission that she had taken medication at 12 p.m., we presume that this apparent inconsistency is either a scrivener’s error or that it reflects an attempt to distinguish between the prescribed medication the plaintiff admitted to taking and other drugs she denied having consumed.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

The result of the chemical breath test was “0.00.” The

result of the chemical urine test was “[u]nknown.”

Thereafter, the plaintiff was notified in writing by the

commissioner that her operator’s license was to be suspended for a period of forty-five days and that she would be required to install and maintain an ignition interlock device in her vehicle for six months. In that March 11,

2024 notice, the plaintiff also was advised that she had

the right to request an administrative hearing to determine whether her operator’s license should be suspended

pursuant to § 14-227b and that if she did not do so within seven days, the suspension would automatically go into

effect. See General Statutes § 14-227b (e) and (i) (1).

The plaintiff requested a hearing and her case was

presented, on behalf of the commissioner, by one of its

attorney “presenters,” Attorney Thomas Donohue, in an

administrative per se hearing held on April 17, 2024.16

By that time, the results of the plaintiff’s chemical urine test, which revealed “[n]o [d]rugs [d]etected,” had been

received.

At the hearing, Donohue submitted into evidence one

nineteen page exhibit that included the A-44 form; see

footnote 14 of this opinion; a breath test receipt, police case/incident reports, a criminal appearance bond, an

advisement of rights form signed by the plaintiff, the

uniform arrest report, and a toxicology report dated

“In most [administrative] per se hearings, the [department] Hearing Officer plays the role of prosecutor and judge.” S. Tomeo & J. Sills, 21 Connecticut Practice Series: Connecticut DUI Law (2025) § 4:5, pp. 139–40. However, “[t]he . . . [department] employs individuals referred to as ‘Presenters’ to screen all A-44 Reports received by the department. If the Presenter feels that a case or report is lacking evidence, he or she may then subpoena additional testimonial or documentary evidence. In such cases, the Presenter will . . . ‘present’ the case on behalf of the [department], much like a prosecutor would in criminal court. Presenter cases tend to be more adversarial with the hearing officer’s role more judge-like. Since this remains a fact finding hearing, the hearing officer is still permitted to ask questions of the witnesses and lawyers as well as subpoena additional evidence.” Id., § 4:6, p. 140.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

March 27, 2024.17 Donohue also presented testimony

from Obando, whom he had subpoenaed.18 The plaintiff,

who was represented by counsel, submitted into evidence

a copy of a motion to dismiss, with exhibits, that she

had filed prior to the hearing. The motion to dismiss

was predicated on the plaintiff’s claim that there was

no physical or empirical evidence that the plaintiff “was taking any drugs that would impair her ability to operate a motor vehicle . . . .” Her exhibits included copies of the A-44 form, the breath test receipt, the toxicology report and the uniform arrest report. The plaintiff also

testified on her own behalf.

At the beginning of the hearing, after the hearing

officer had sworn in the commissioner’s witnesses; see

footnote 18 of this opinion; but before the hearing began, the hearing officer considered and denied the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. In opposing that motion, Donohue

argued that “[c]ounsel said there is no physical evidence. I’m going to disagree with that. I will agree that there’s no chemical evidence. The drug test[s] for 150 drugs, but there can be other drugs.”

Thereafter, during his direct examination, Obando

testified that once he made contact with the plaintiff,

he advised her that he had been dispatched to her home

because she was suspected of evading a motor vehicle

accident in Darien and, although she denied knowing

anything about an accident, he observed “fresh damage” on her passenger front bumper, “which matched

The toxicology report includes a section entitled “Limitations,” which states in relevant part that “[a]nalytical methods used allow for the detection of numerous drugs/metabolites, but are limited. For questions about whether or not a specific drug or drug metabolite would have been detected in this analysis, please contact the Toxicology Unit at [the telephone number listed thereon].

“Analytes reported as ‘not detected,’ ‘negative,’ or similar verbiage may mean that such analytes were either not detected or were below the method’s reportable limit.”

Donohue also had subpoenaed Caponera and Lieutenant Marc DeFelice, but neither testified at the hearing. Although Caponera did not testify at the hearing, his written report had been submitted into evidence by the commissioner and the plaintiff.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

up with” where the Darien Police Department said the

damage should be. With respect to the plaintiff herself,

Obando observed that “[s]he was a bit slow in her reaction in her speech with [him]” and that there were “a lot of

prescription bottles all over her center console [and] in her lap . . . .” He described her movement as “very slow, a little lethargic, just not really having full capabilities of her . . . movements” and recounted that, at one point, as she was searching for her driver’s license, the bag on her lap “fell over and tons of prescription bottles fell out, [and] empty pills fell out as well.”19

Obando explained that he was attempting to gather

as much information as he could in order to determine

whether the plaintiff was “intoxicated, was she under

the influence of drugs.” He testified that, in addition to the “[driving under the influence (DUI)] option [training] in the [police] academy,” he attended a week long DUI

school in Waterford and that he had advanced ARIDE

training, which “helps you detect if someone is impaired

. . . under drugs instead of alcohol . . . .”20 He stated that, once Caponera arrived at the plaintiff’s residence, they

decided to conduct field sobriety tests. They first asked the plaintiff “[is she] diabetic, [does she] have any head injuries? Any recent injuries . . . that wouldn’t allow

[her] to perform the test such as . . . ankle, legs, hips, anything of that sort” and the plaintiff said no. They

“asked her numerous questions . . . and she didn’t raise

any flags to us . . . .” Therefore, they proceeded with

the tests and Obando testified that the plaintiff “didn’t perform to standard.”21 Obando further testified that,

As stated previously in this opinion, Obando had documented in his report that “[t]here were duplicate prescription bottles in [the plaintiff’s] bag and numerous tablets in her bag that were not properly stored in a prescription bottle.”

Obando testified that it was Caponera who conducted the ARIDE testing, which is consistent with the police report.

Obando testified during cross-examination that he had no special training “as it relates to physical limitations of elderly people performing these tests” and did not agree that “someone who’s elderly, older, infirm, maybe has physical limitations, would be unable to perform” some of these tests. He explained that, “if that was the case, they would

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

“based [on] the totality of circumstances with the Darien call, the [subsequent] traffic complaint, and just, you

know, what I observed with prescription bottles and my

observation of her in and of itself, we believed that there was probable cause to arrest her for DUI,” and they did

so. Obando confirmed that the chemical breath test the

plaintiff took resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and

that she also submitted a urine sample that showed “no

drugs detected.”

During his cross-examination, Obando reiterated that,

before administering the sobriety tests, he and Caponera “asked [the plaintiff] the basic questions that we

ask anyone else, if they’re diabetic, if they’ve had any

recent injuries that they would be unable to perform these tests,” and she gave no indication that she did. With

respect to the chemical breath and urine tests, Obando

acknowledged, again, that the plaintiff’s breath test

resulted in “[z]ero across the board” and that the urine

test revealed “no drugs detected.” Thereafter, he agreed

that, on the basis of the chemical breath test results, the plaintiff was not suffering from alcohol impairment.

Obando did not agree, however, that the plaintiff was

not impaired by drugs. As grounds for his disagreement, he referenced his “observation” of the plaintiff and explained that he is trained to detect whether someone

is “taking drugs” “based off of their eyes, based off of

their movements.” Nonetheless, he admitted that he was

not qualified to determine by sight exactly what drugs

people are taking, that “people can take drugs all the

time that do not impair their ability to operate a motor

vehicle” and that not every person who loses control of

their vehicle and gets into an accident is impaired. Even so, he iterated what he had written in his report, namely, that the plaintiff “did say that she did consume some of

put an age limit as to when . . . someone of the age can . . . perform the test.” Apart from the fruitless questioning of Obando by the plaintiff’s counsel, no evidence was introduced at the hearing to indicate that, after reaching a certain age, a person would have difficulty performing any of the tests performed on the plaintiff, and the plaintiff did not raise this as an issue on appeal to the trial court.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

her prescription drugs at twelve o’clock and has not eaten since.” Obando did not know what specific medication the

plaintiff had taken, let alone whether that medication

was intoxicating in nature and would have impaired her

ability to operate her vehicle. Indeed, Obando admitted

that he did not ask the plaintiff what prescription medication she had taken at noon. He acknowledged that his

report is silent in this regard and he confirmed that, had he asked the plaintiff what medication she had taken,

this information would have been included in his report

because he was “trying to prove [that] she was impaired.”

The seventy-one year old plaintiff testified that she

was not using any prescription drugs that would impair

her ability to operate a motor vehicle and that she had a handicapped placard on the console of her vehicle when

Obando first approached her.22 She testified that Obando

did not ask her whether she “had physical limitations”

before they administered the sobriety tests but that,

once “they started to do the walking exercises, [and]

they asked [her] to put one . . . foot in front of the other and walk [in] a straight line . . . [she] explained to them that [she has] a lot of pain and that [she] had sciatica and damage in [her] lower body.” She further testified that

“the reason why I don’t walk properly is because I’ve

had two kidney transplants and I developed a condition

called . . . calcineurin-inhibitor pain syndrome, and it’s a rare condition that happens posttransplant that is very painful and it affects mostly the lower body. So . . . it feels as if you’re walking on broken bones sometimes,

and that is the condition that I have; that’s the reason

for the handicapped placard.”

During cross-examination, the plaintiff explained

that, with respect to the accident that prompted the

investigation, she “thought that [she] had struck a curb

and basically kind of chastised [herself] and kept going

to [her] appointment.” She further explained that when

the officers asked her about an accident, she thought they 22

Obando testified that a handicapped placard “was not something that I observed.”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

meant a collision with “someone” and that “later when

the Darien police came to New Canaan, I told them, they

said you hit more than a curb, and I apologize[d] because I thought that I had just hit the curb.” When Donohue

asked whether the plaintiff recalled Obando asking her,

“if you had any injuries or illnesses that would hinder

the performance of the test,” as reflected on the A-44

form, she testified that she did not. Finally, when asked if she was “upset that night being arrested,” the plaintiff responded “[a]bsolutely. I have never in my whole life

had any type of arrest or, you know, any type of contact

like this. I was frightened . . . .”23

During his closing argument, Donohue argued that

“[t]he real issue” for the hearing officer to decide was

whether there was substantial evidence that the plaintiff was in fact operating a motor vehicle while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, and that was, in fact, the only issue the plaintiff’s counsel addressed in his closing argument. On this point, Donohue argued that “the state admits she blows zeros. And

I actually followed up to check, it’s a 150; so, it’s a lot of drugs they test for. Because I thought if it’s ten or

something—but again I’m straightforward. They test

for 150. They said approximately 150 the [state Forensic

Science Laboratory] told me, because I didn’t know. . . . So, no drugs detected of those 150.”24 Donohue also

emphasized that “two ARIDE trained officers” were

involved in the investigation and that the hearing officer should consider what they observed when reviewing the

evidence.

The plaintiff’s counsel argued, in response, that there

“has to be substantial evidence to indicate that [the plain23

The plaintiff’s driving history as of May 10, 2024, reflected only the April 18, 2024 per se license suspension.

Although the toxicology report identified “[l]imitations” with respect to the “numerous drugs/metabolites” that would be detected; see footnote 17 of this opinion; no documentary or testimonial evidence was presented at the hearing that the plaintiff’s urine sample was tested for “approximately 150” drugs as Donohue argued. See, e.g., State v.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

tiff] was impaired” and there was not. He emphasized

the evidence regarding the negative chemical breath

and urine tests, the plaintiff’s physical condition and

“lower body syndrome,” and Obando’s admissions that

(1) taking medication does not necessarily mean that it

will impair one’s ability to operate a motor vehicle and

(2) he did not know, or even ask, what medication the

plaintiff had taken at noon that day as support for this

conclusion.

In a one page decision dated April 19, 2024, the hearing officer found that the requirements of § 14-227b

were satisfied and ordered that the plaintiff’s license

or operating privilege be suspended for forty-five days

and that an ignition interlock device be installed and

maintained for six months. In reaching this conclusion,

the hearing officer made the following findings of fact

and conclusions of law:

“1. The [plaintiff] was placed under arrest.

“2. The [plaintiff] is not the holder of a commercial

driver’s license.

“3. [The plaintiff] was operating the motor vehicle.

“4. The police officer had probable cause to arrest the

[plaintiff] for a violation specified in [§ 14-227b].

“5. [The plaintiff] was operating a motor vehicle under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.”

The hearing officer also made the following subordinate

findings. “There is sufficient evidence that the [plaintiff] was operating a motor vehicle under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug or both.

“[Obando] gave sworn testimony that once he walked up

to the motor vehicle, he observed that the [plaintiff] had numerous prescription bottles in plain sight, the bottles were in her purse, in her lap and on the center console.

[Obando] testified that the [plaintiff’s] movements were

Stepherson, 237 Conn. App. 65, 81 n.9, 350 A.3d 1174 (2026) (representations of counsel are not evidence).

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

very slow and that she did not know that she was in an

accident. Further, [Obando] terminated the [sobriety

tests] due to the [plaintiff] being unable to keep her balance and for her safety.

“[Caponera] stated in the police report that he conducted the [HGN test] and he noticed her pupil size was

equal, but pinpoint. [Caponera] observed a lack of smooth pursuit, slight bounce of each eye as they would track

the stimulus and at maximum deviation there was slight

bounce of each eye as well.” The hearing officer made no

mention of the negative chemical breath and urine test

results. On April 25, 2024, the plaintiff filed a petition for reconsideration with the Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles Petition Review Committee, which was summarily denied without comment on May 6, 2024.

Pursuant to General Statutes § 4-183,25 the plaintiff

appealed to the Superior Court from the decision of

the commissioner, claiming that the decision should be

reversed because the hearing officer’s “findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions . . . [are] clearly erroneous in light of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence produced at the hearing . . . .” Specifically, the plaintiff claimed there was insufficient evidence to support the

hearing officer’s finding that she was “under the influence of intoxicating liquor and/or drugs at the time of

operation.” She posited that, “[w]ith such reliable and

substantial evidence of a 0.00 reading on the chemical

breath test and ‘No Drugs Detected’ on the chemical urine test, it is impossible to establish impairment without

additional substantial evidence of impairment” and that

her due process rights under the fourteenth amendment

to the United States constitution had been violated.

In a memorandum of decision, the court, Taylor, J.,

noted that the sole basis of the plaintiff’s appeal was the hearing officer’s finding that the plaintiff was “operating 25

General Statutes § 4-183 provides in relevant part: “(a) A person who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within the agency and who is aggrieved by a final decision may appeal to the Superior Court as provided in this section. . . .”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.”26 See General Statutes § 14-227b

(g) (3) (C). The court explained in its recitation of the facts, derived from the evidence in the record, that “[t]he plaintiff’s breath and urine samples were negative for

alcohol or any of the drugs that are tested for in these

circumstances.” (Emphasis added.) It then recounted

much of the information that was included in the police

report, including the officer’s observations with respect to the plaintiff’s slow movement, the “numerous prescription bottles in the plaintiff’s vehicle,” her admission that she had taken “her prescription medication at noon

that date,” and the damage to her vehicle. The court also listed the names of the prescribed medications, just as

Obando had done in his report.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that “the

fact that [she] tested negative for alcohol and for drugs meant that she had not been operating under the influence” because “there was no evidence to show that the

tests for drugs was capable of excluding all drugs.” Ultimately, the court concluded that, “[b]ecause there is

substantial evidence in the record supporting the hearing officer’s conclusion that [Obando] had probable cause to

arrest the plaintiff for operating a motor vehicle under

the influence of alcohol/drugs and that the record did

contain sufficient evidence to support a finding that

the plaintiff was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol while

operating a motor vehicle,” the plaintiff could not prevail and it dismissed her appeal. This appeal followed.

Additional facts and procedural history will be set forth as necessary.

Before we address the plaintiff’s claim that there was

not substantial evidence in the record to support the

finding that she was operating her motor vehicle while

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug,

we set forth our standard of review and the general legal principles that are germane to our analysis. “[J]udicial

We note that the court referenced “§ 14-227b (g) (3) (3)” in doing so, which plainly is a scrivener’s error.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

review of the commissioner’s action is governed by the

Uniform Administrative Procedure Act [General Statutes §§ 4-166 through 4-189], and the scope of that review is very restricted. . . . [R]eview of an administrative

agency decision requires a court to determine whether

there is substantial evidence in the administrative record to support the agency’s findings of basic fact and whether the conclusions drawn from those facts are reasonable. . . . Neither this court nor the trial court may retry the case or substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the weight of the evidence or questions of fact. . . . Our ultimate duty is to determine, in view of all of the evidence, whether the agency, in issuing its order, acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) Murphy v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,

254 Conn. 333, 343, 757 A.2d 561 (2000).

“In an administrative appeal, the plaintiff bears the

burden of proving that the commissioner’s decision to

suspend a motor vehicle operating privilege was clearly

erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence on the whole record. . . . Substantial

evidence exists if the administrative record affords a

substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue

can be reasonably inferred. . . . The evidence must be

substantial enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought

to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury. . . . [I]f the administrative record provides substantial evidence

upon which the hearing officer could reasonably have

based [her] finding . . . the decision must be upheld. . . . The obvious corollary to the substantial evidence rule

is that a court may not affirm a decision if the evidence in the record does not support it.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Fernschild v. Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles, 177 Conn. App. 472, 476–77, 172 A.3d 864

(2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 997, 175 A.3d 564 (2018).

The “so-called substantial evidence rule is similar to the sufficiency of the evidence standard applied in judicial

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

review of jury verdicts, and evidence is sufficient to

sustain an agency finding if it affords a substantial basis of fact from which the fact in issue can be reasonably

inferred. . . . [I]t imposes an important limitation on the power of the courts to overturn a decision of an administrative agency . . . and [provides] a more restrictive

standard of review than standards embodying review of

weight of the evidence or clearly erroneous action. . . . The United States Supreme Court, in defining substantial evidence . . . has said that it is something less than the weight of the evidence, and [that] the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence

does not prevent an administrative agency’s finding

from being supported by substantial evidence. . . . [T]he credibility of witnesses and the determination of factual issues are matters within the province of the administrative agency. . . . As with any administrative appeal, our role is not to reexamine the evidence presented to the

[hearing officer] or to substitute our judgment for the

agency’s expertise, but, rather, to determine whether

there was substantial evidence to support its conclusions.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting Council, 313 Conn. 669, 689–90, 99 A.3d 1038 (2014). “In determining whether an administrative finding is supported by

substantial evidence, a court must defer to the [hearing

officer’s] . . . right to believe or disbelieve the evidence presented by any witness, even an expert, in whole or in

part.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bancroft v.

Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 48 Conn. App. 391,

405–406, 710 A.2d 807, cert. denied, 245 Conn. 917,

717 A.2d 234 (1998).

Moreover, “[a]lthough proceedings before administrative agencies . . . are informal and are conducted without regard to the strict rules of evidence, the hearing must be conducted so as not to violate the fundamental rules of

natural justice.” Id., 407–408. Our Supreme Court has

explained that “[f]undamentals of natural justice require that there must be due notice of the hearing, and at the

hearing no one may be deprived of the right to produce

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

relevant evidence or to cross-examine witnesses produced

by his adversary . . . . Put differently, [d]ue process of law requires that the parties involved have an opportunity to know the facts on which the commission is asked to act

. . . and to offer rebuttal evidence.” (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Grimes v. Conservation Commission, 243 Conn. 266, 274, 703 A.2d 101

(1997). “In an administrative action . . . the agency need only produce probative and reliable evidence to ensure

that the proceedings are fundamentally fair.” (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) O’Rourke v. Commissioner

of Motor Vehicles, 33 Conn. App. 501, 508, 636 A.2d

409, cert. denied, 229 Conn. 909, 642 A.2d 1205 (1994).

“Section 14-227b, commonly referred to as the implied

consent statute, governs license suspension hearings.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mata v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 221 Conn. App. 25, 35, 299

A.3d 1262 (2023). Section 14-227b (b) (1) provides in

relevant part that “[a] police officer who has placed a

person under arrest for a violation of section 14-227a

. . . may request that such person submit to a blood,

breath or urine test at the option of the police officer . . . after such person has been [inter alia] . . . (D) informed that such person’s license or operating privilege may be

suspended in accordance with the provisions of this section if (i) such person refuses to submit to such test . . . (ii) such person submits to such test and the results of

such test indicate that such person has an elevated blood alcohol content, or (iii) the officer concludes, through

investigation, that such person was operating a motor

vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.”

Section 14-227b (d) provides in relevant part that, “[i]f a police officer who has placed a person under arrest for a violation of section 14-227a . . . obtains results from a test administered under subsection (b) of this section

that indicate that the person does not have an elevated

blood alcohol content, such officer shall: (1) Advise such person that such person’s license or operating privilege

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

may be suspended in accordance with the provisions of

this section if such police officer concludes, through

investigation, that such person was operating a motor

vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or

any drug, or both; and (2) Submit a report to the commissioner in accordance with the procedure set forth in

subsection (c) of this section and, if such report contains the results of a blood, breath or urine test that does not show an elevated blood alcohol content, such report shall conform to the requirements in subsection (c) of this section for reports that contain results showing an elevated blood alcohol content.27 In any report submitted under

this subdivision, the officer shall document (A) the basis for the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to arrest such person for a violation of section 14-227a . . . and (B) whether the officer concluded, through investigation, that the person was operating a motor vehicle

under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug,

or both. . . .” (Footnote added.)

Section 14-227b (e) provides in relevant part that,

“upon receipt of a report submitted under subsection

. . . (d) of this section, the commissioner may suspend

any operator’s license” and that “[a]ny person whose

operator’s license . . . has been suspended in accordance with this subdivision shall automatically be entitled to

a hearing before the commissioner . . . .”

Section 14-227b (g) (3) provides that the hearing shall

be limited to the determination of the following issues:

“(A) Did the police officer have probable cause to arrest the person for operating a motor vehicle while under the

General Statutes § 14-227b (c) provides in relevant part that “[t]he police officer shall prepare a report of the incident not later than six business days after such arrest and thereafter, shall mail or otherwise transmit in accordance with this subsection the report and a copy of the results of any chemical test to the Department of Motor Vehicles. The report shall contain such information as prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles and shall be subscribed and sworn to under penalty of false statement as provided in section 53a-157b by the arresting officer. . . . The report shall set forth the grounds for the officer’s belief that there was probable cause to arrest such person for a violation of section 14-227a . . . .”

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both;

(B) was such person placed under arrest; (C) was such

person operating a motor vehicle under the influence

of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both; and (D) was

such person operating the motor vehicle.”

Finally, § 14-227b (g) (5) provides that, “[i]n a hearing based on a report submitted under subsection (d) of this

section, evidence of operation under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both shall be admissible. Such evidence may include, but need not be limited to, (A) the police officer’s observations of intoxication, as documented in a report submitted to the commissioner

under subsection (d) of this section; (B) the results of

any chemical test administered under this section or a

toxicology report certified by the Division of Scientific Services within the Department of Emergency Services

and Public Protection; (C) hospital or medical records

obtained in accordance with subsection (j) of this section or by the consent of the operator; (D) the results of any tests conducted by, or the report of, an officer trained

in advanced roadside impaired driving enforcement; or

(E) reports of drug recognition experts.”28

In the present case, the administrative record reveals

that Obando requested that the plaintiff submit to both

chemical breath and urine tests and that the plaintiff

consented. See General Statutes § 14-227b (b) (1). After

obtaining the results of the plaintiff’s breath test, which

A “ ‘drug recognition expert’ ” is “a person certified by the International Association of Chiefs of Police as having met all requirements of the International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program.” General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (C). Drug recognition experts are qualified to conduct “drug influence evaluation[s],” which are evaluations “developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and the International Association of Chiefs of Police” that “determine the level of a person’s impairment from the use of drugs and the drug category causing such impairment.” General Statutes § 14-227a (a) (B); see also D. Evans, 1 Drug Testing Law, Technology & Practice (2026) § 4:59 (drug recognition experts “are trained to review vital signs and other physical and mental data to determine if a subject is under the influence of a drug and what kind of drug”). No evidence from a drug recognition expert was produced by either party during the administrative hearing.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

revealed that she did not have an elevated blood alcohol

content, Obando prepared and submitted to the commissioner an A-44 form in accordance with § 14-227b (d).

Upon receipt of the A-44 form, the commissioner issued

a notice that the plaintiff’s operator’s license was suspended, and the plaintiff requested a hearing to contest

the suspension. See General Statutes § 14-227b (e).

At the hearing, the evidence that the commissioner

produced that was relevant to the issue of whether the

plaintiff was under the influence of “intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both” when she was operating her motor

vehicle included (1) the observations of Obando and Caponera, two ARIDE trained officers, that she was “slow

with her movements,” “disoriented and was not able to

answer questions clearly,” unable to follow directions,

and fumbling her belongings; (2) the plaintiff’s failure

to recall the accident she had been in; (3) the results of the chemical breath and urine tests to which the plaintiff submitted at Obando’s request; and (4) the results of the field sobriety and ARIDE testing the officers administered. See General Statutes § 14-227b (g) (5).

Moreover, a recurring observation, made in both the

documentary and testimonial evidence, was that the

plaintiff had several prescription bottles in her vehicle and in her bag. Indeed, both Obando’s police report and

the A-44 form specifically reference “numerous prescription bottles,” and Obando testified that, when the bag

on the plaintiff’s lap “fell over . . . tons of prescription bottles fell out” and he also observed in her bag duplicate prescription bottles and numerous tablets not stored in

bottles. He further testified that, “what [he] observed

with prescription bottles,” in addition to the traffic

complaints and what he observed of the plaintiff “in and

of itself,” informed his determination that there was

probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.

Another point of emphasis was the plaintiff’s admission that she had taken some prescription medication

that day. Caponera noted in his report that she “denied

drinking any alcoholic beverages, but admitted she took

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

prescription medication earlier in the day.” Likewise,

Obando noted in his report that, “[d]uring the booking

process, [the plaintiff] did state she last took her prescription pills at noon and had not eaten since the morning

hours.” Obando also noted on the A-44 form that the

plaintiff “take[s] medication” and that she last took it

at 12 p.m. Finally, Obando testified, almost verbatim

from his report, that the plaintiff “did say that she did consume some of her prescription drugs at twelve o’clock

and has not eaten since.”

Indeed, Caponera stated in his report that he decided

to readminister two of the field sobriety tests Obando

had already administered specifically “to determine if

[the plaintiff] was under the influence of her prescription medications.” He also performed two ARIDE tests, which

are tests geared toward “detecting drug impairment.”

State v. Langshaw, Docket No. CR-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 2025

WL 2124394, *6 (Conn. Super. July 23, 2025). Obando

testified that he was attempting to determine whether

the plaintiff was “intoxicated, was she under the influence of drugs,” and he agreed that, on the basis of the

results of the plaintiff’s chemical breath test, she was not suffering from alcohol impairment. Even so, the results

of the plaintiff’s chemical urine test, as reflected in the toxicology report, revealed “[n]o [d]rugs [d]etected.”

Placing great emphasis on the chemical urine test

results, the plaintiff claims that this evidence was not

sufficient to support the hearing officer’s conclusion that she “was operating a motor vehicle under the influence

of intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both.” Although

she acknowledges that “behavioral evidence in certain

situations [can] constitute sufficient and substantial

evidence of a finding of intoxication” and that, in fact, § 14-227b “clearly permits it even when, for example,

the chemical or urine tests are exculpatory”; see General Statutes § 14-227b (d) (1) and (g) (5); she argues that,

“in this particular case and on the whole record, the

hearing officer’s ‘findings, inferences’ and conclusion

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

were clearly erroneous in view of the highly ‘reliable,

probative’ and forensic evidence.”29

The commissioner claims in response that “[t]he record

in this case, including the observed behavior of the plaintiff, supports the reasonable inference that the plaintiff was under the influence of ‘any drug.’ ” The commissioner argues, inter alia, that the plaintiff “admitted that she consumed prescription medication at noon on the day of

her arrest and that she was ill due to the medications. . . . She had ten prescription medication bottles in her vehicle at the time of her arrest, and there were loose pills in her bag.” (Citations omitted.) Moreover, the commissioner

emphasizes that those ten prescription bottles “included

ciprofloxacin 500mg, hydralazine 25mg, oxycodone 5mg,

valacyclovir 1GM tablet, mycophenolic [acid] 180mg,

and carvedilol 12.5mg . . . .” Finally, with respect to the toxicology report, the commissioner points out that it

“was not exhaustive. Rather, the toxicology report specifically identified its limitations, explaining: ‘Analytical methods used allow for the detection of numerous drugs/

metabolites, but are limited . . . . Analytes reported as “not detected,” “negative,” or similar verbiage may mean

that such analyses were either not detected or were below the method’s reportable limit.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) 29

The plaintiff also argues as support for her claim on appeal that the HGN test results were exculpatory and that the hearing officer gave improper weight to the evidence concerning her performance on those tests. In fact, she argues that the hearing officer “should have opined that the HGN test observations did not support a finding that [she] was under the influence of alcohol or drugs” because the A-44 form merely indicates that she was “unable to perform” the test, not that she demonstrated nystagmus or lack of smooth pursuit. As the commissioner points out in his brief, however, and our review of the record confirms, the plaintiff did not advance this argument during the administrative hearing or before the trial court. Our review of the record also reveals that Obando testified before the hearing officer that the plaintiff “didn’t perform to standard” on any of the sobriety tests. Moreover, Caponera’s report indicates that after he readministered the HGN and walk and turn tests and administered the ARIDE tests, he advised the plaintiff that she had “failed” them. Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the conclusion that the HGN test results were inculpatory and the plaintiff’s belated argument that the hearing officer should have found to the contrary lacks merit.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

Thus, the commissioner maintains that the chemical

urine test results did not “definitively establish that

[the plaintiff] was not under the influence of a drug at

the time she operated her vehicle.”

Although we agree with the plaintiff that the chemical

breath and urine test evidence does offer support for a

conclusion that she was not impaired by alcohol or drugs

while operating her motor vehicle, it is neither dispositive nor can it be considered in a vacuum. Indeed, as the plaintiff herself acknowledges, § 14-227b allows for

the suspension of a motor vehicle operator’s license in a situation where chemical test results are negative but a

police officer concludes, nonetheless, that a driver was

operating a motor vehicle while “under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug, or both . . . .” See General Statutes § 14-227b (d) (1) and (g) (5). In this case, the toxicology report itself specifies that there are limitations to the testing performed and, thus, leaves room for a finding that, notwithstanding the negative results, the plaintiff was under the influence of a “drug/metabolite”

that either was not detectable or was “below the method’s reportable limit.” Indeed, no evidence was produced by

either party as to the type of medication the plaintiff

indicated she had ingested earlier in the afternoon, and

there was no indication that any of the medications on the list Obando made of the identifiable prescription drugs

found in the plaintiff’s vehicle would have been detected in the chemical testing. Moreover, there is no evidence

as to the nature of the loose pills Obando observed in the plaintiff’s vehicle. Finally, and although not raised by

either party, we are compelled to note that there may

be an issue with an insufficient temporal nexus between

the time of the ingestion of any drug and the time of the testing. This lack of information renders untenable any

conclusion that the chemical urine test results could be

considered conclusive in favor of the plaintiff.

To this end, we further note that the toxicology report

expressly invites “questions about whether or not a specific drug or drug metabolite would have been detected in

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

this analysis” by contacting “the Toxicology Unit” at a

phone number listed thereon. Although the investigating

officers compiled a detailed list of ten different prescription medications the plaintiff had in her vehicle at the

time of her arrest and the plaintiff admitted that she

had, in fact, consumed prescription medication earlier

in the day, there is no evidence as to whether pertinent

questions to inform the chemical urine test results were

asked, such as what drug did the plaintiff ingest earlier that day, or whether any or all of the ten listed prescribed medications “would have been detected in [the] analysis.” At the very least, if the record reflected that the invited question had been asked and the answer was that all of the ten medications would have been detected and they were

not, the hearing officer may have weighed the results

reflected in the toxicology report differently.

Even without the toxicology report, however weighed,

the record reflects that the hearing officer had evidence before her, which she expressly credited, as to the observations and conclusions of Obando and Caponera with

respect to the numerous prescription bottles and loose

pills that were in the plaintiff’s vehicle and purse, her slow movements, her lack of recall with respect to the

accident, the report about her erratic driving, her inability to follow directions and her subpar performance on

the sobriety tests and ARIDE tests. Based on that evidence, she concluded that the plaintiff was operating her vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

or any drug, or both. Nevertheless, the plaintiff argues

that there are several innocent explanations for what

the officers observed and that reasonably support the

conclusion that the plaintiff was not impaired, including (1) the chemical breath and urine test results, (2) the plaintiff’s age, (3) the plaintiff’s testimony regarding

her health issues and physical limitations vis-à-vis the

sobriety tests and ARIDE tests, (4) the fact that she

had been at Quest Laboratories, and (5) the fact that she had not eaten since 9 a.m. We must defer to the hearing

officer’s assessment of the credibility and reliability of the evidence, however, and the plaintiff presented only

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

her own testimony as evidence, which the hearing officer

was not obligated to accept as persuasive. See Bancroft

v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, supra, 48 Conn.

App. 405–406. We note, for example, that the record

does not reflect that the plaintiff submitted any reports from a physician regarding the health issues and physical limitations about which she testified. See, e.g., Ludwig

v. Salinas, Docket No. CV-XX-XXXXXXX-S, 1999 WL

329945, *2 (Conn. Super. May 14, 1999) (report from

physician describing plaintiff’s medical condition was

entered into evidence at suspension hearing). Although

she was under no obligation to do so, any such report

may have bolstered her testimony and credibility before

the hearing officer. See FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut

Siting Council, supra, 313 Conn. 689 (“[t]he credibility

of witnesses and the determination of factual issues

are matters within the province of the administrative

agency” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Moreover, one cannot overlook the fact that on two

occasions that afternoon, prior to her arrest, the plaintiff had been observed as incapable of operating her vehicle

in a manner consistent with that of a careful and prudent driver. She stated that she thought she had struck

a curb, although her vehicle sustained front end damage, and she left the scene. Moreover, the plaintiff later swerved and almost struck a tree, then took an unsafe

right turn and almost caused a collision, her pupils were constricted, she failed at least five sobriety tests, lost her balance, had trouble following simple directions

and admitted to having taken prescription medication

earlier in the day, hours after she had eaten anything.

This substantial circumstantial evidence supported the

hearing officer’s findings.

Indeed, this court previously has explained that “[a]

driver operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of a drug is one whose mental, physical or nervous

processes have become so affected that [she] lacked to

an appreciable degree the ability to function properly in the operation of [her] vehicle. . . . Typical indicia of the

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

inability to function as a driver because of the intoxicating effect of drugs or alcohol include whether a defendant smells of the drug, has slurred speech, fumbles in retrieving paperwork, has glassy and bloodshot eyes, admits

that [she] has, while driving, been using drugs or fails

sobriety tests. . . . Most importantly, the main indicia of intoxication relates to the ability to operate the vehicle without committing traffic violations.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Adams v. Commissioner of Motor

Vehicles, 182 Conn. App. 165, 179, 189 A.3d 629, cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 940, 195 A.3d 1134 (2018). And our

Supreme Court has stated, “the possibility of drawing

two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not

prevent an administrative agency’s finding from being

supported by substantial evidence.” (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) FairwindCT, Inc. v. Connecticut Siting

Council, supra, 313 Conn. 689.

We conclude, therefore, that the observations of

Obando and Caponera in their reports, the A-44 form

and the testimony of Obando provide reliable, probative

and substantial evidence that the plaintiff was operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, as the hearing officer found. The trial court properly applied the significantly deferential standard of review applicable to administrative

appeals involving license suspensions in determining that the plaintiff did not meet her burden of proving that the commissioner’s decision was clearly erroneous in view

of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on

the whole record.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

Petraglia v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

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