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Poulios v. Fraser
ROBERT S. POULIOS v. LOREEN FRASER ET AL.
(AC 48517)
Suarez, Westbrook and Wilson, Js.
Syllabus
The plaintiff appealed from, inter alia, the trial court’s judgment of possession for the defendants on his second summary process action, in which he had alleged that the lease agreement between the parties previously had terminated, and the defendants had become tenants at sufferance. He claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly rendered judgment for the defendants when it had denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff’s notice to quit based on lapse of time was lawfully and timely served and that it had jurisdiction over the case. Held:
The trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the summary process action, as the notice to quit, based on lapse of time, was not valid, the lease having been terminated by service of the notice to quit in the first summary process action, and, thus, there could be no cause of action based on lapse of time without the existence of a lease agreement; accordingly, this court vacated the judgment and remanded the case with direction to dismiss the underlying summary process action.
Argued January 22—officially released September 29, 2026
Procedural History
Summary process action, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Tolland, Housing Session at Rockville, where the court, Schibley, J., denied the
plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment and denied the
defendants’ motion to dismiss; thereafter, the case was
tried to the court, Schibley, J.; judgment of possession
for the defendants, from which the plaintiff appealed to
this court; subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended
appeal. Vacated; judgment directed.
Maria K. Tougas, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Opinion
WILSON, J. In this summary process action, the plaintiff, Robert S. Poulios, brings this amended appeal from
the trial court’s February 25, 2025 judgment of possession in favor of the defendants, Loreen Fraser, Keith
Luginbuhl and Cory Luginbuhl, and the court’s order of
Poulios v. Fraser
February 21, 2025 denying the plaintiff’s motion for a
default judgment. On appeal, the plaintiff claims that
the court (1) abused its discretion in denying his motion for a default judgment, which motion was based on the
defendants’ repeated failure to comply with court orders
and the defendants’ failure to appear at trial on the
scheduled trial date; (2) improperly determined that he
failed to sustain his burden of proof of establishing the necessary elements for judgment of possession based on
lapse of time; (3) improperly rendered judgment in favor
of the defendants when the defendants failed to allege or raise any special defenses to defeat a judgment of possession in favor of the plaintiff on the basis of lapse of time; and (4) improperly rendered judgment in favor of the
defendants when it had denied the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, finding that the notices to quit based on lapse of time were lawfully and timely served and that it had
jurisdiction over the case. We conclude that the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and therefore
vacate the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as gleaned from the record, and
procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. This is the second summary process action commenced by the plaintiff against the defendants for premises located at 167 East Main Street, Vernon (premises).
The previous summary process action, which the plaintiff
filed as a self-represented party on March 11, 2024, was
based upon an alleged nonpayment of rent due and payable on February 1, 2024. In the previous action, the
defendants admitted that they withheld payment of rent
but asserted that no rent was due under Connecticut law
as a result of the conditions of the premises. The case was tried to the court, Schibley, J., on September 20, 2024,
and, on October 15, 2024, the court rendered judgment
of possession in favor of the defendants.
The court held that the summary process action
“fail[ed] for two distinct and independent reasons. First, the plaintiff [was] unable to meet his burden of proving that the defendants failed to pay rent on February
Poulios v. Fraser
1, 2024, because—consistent with the plaintiff’s own
theory of the case—no rent was due and owing on that
date. . . . [The court further held that] no lease was in effect at the time of the alleged nonpayment. At the
expiration of the term set forth in the parties’ initial
lease at the end of 2020, the defendants became month
to month tenants. The defendants’ refusal to accept the
increased rent subsequently required by the [plaintiff] in the letter dated May 29, 2023, resulted in termination
of the lease agreement between the parties on June 30,
2023, and a tenancy at sufferance thereafter . . . [and]
payments after that date were, as the plaintiff testified himself at trial, for mere use and occupancy.” (Citation
omitted.) During the hearing, the plaintiff, consistent
with his complaint, acknowledged that the lease agreement between the parties had terminated and, thereafter,
the defendants became tenants at sufferance. The second reason the court held that the plaintiff’s summary
process action failed was because “the defendants [had]
succeeded in proving by a fair preponderance of the
evidence, that the plaintiff had failed to comply with
his duty to maintain the premises as required by General
Statutes § 47a-7 (a) and that, as a result, the defendants’ obligation to pay rent on that date was also suspended
by operation of law.” The plaintiff did not appeal the
court’s October 15, 2024 judgment.
On October 29, 2024, the plaintiff commenced a second
summary process action, which is the subject of the present appeal. That action pertains to the same premises.
The underlying notice to quit and complaint are based
upon a single count alleging lapse of time pursuant to
General Statutes § 47a-23 (a) (1) (A). The plaintiff alleged that he entered into a lease agreement to rent the premises for the original rental amount of $1350 monthly and
that the lease terminated by its own terms on December
31, 2020. The plaintiff further alleged that, on or about May 29, 2023, he sent to the defendants a notice of rental increase to $1500 monthly, effective July 1, 2023, and
that the defendants failed to respond to the notice of
rental increase and failed to pay the amount of $1500
Poulios v. Fraser
commencing on July 1, 2023, as required. The plaintiff
expressly alleged that, after June 30, 2023, the defendants had no legal right to possession of the premises
and became tenants at sufferance. The plaintiff further
alleged that any rights the defendants may have had to
occupy the premises terminated by lapse of time.
Following the court’s denial of the defendants’ motion
to dismiss, which motion was related to service of the
notice to quit, the case proceeded to trial on February
25, 2025.1 On February 25, 2025, the court rendered
judgment of possession in favor of the defendants. The
court held that “[l]apse of time . . . is not a legally sufficient ground to terminate a tenancy at sufferance. . . . [A] notice to quit based on lapse of time must be served
within a lease period and provide a termination date at
the end of the lease period.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court concluded that
the notice to quit in the summary process action was
served on October 17, 2024, when no lease agreement
was in effect. The plaintiff has appealed that judgment.2 Additional facts and procedural history will be provided
as necessary.
Because the plaintiff’s fourth claim implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we address that claim first.3 The following additional procedural history is
relevant to resolution of this claim. As previously noted,
1
The court’s memorandum of decision incorrectly states that the case proceeded to trial on February 21, 2025. The record reflects that the case was scheduled for trial on February 21, 2025, but was continued to February 25, 2025, on which date evidence commenced. This misstatement is not relevant to the claims raised in this amended appeal.
2
The defendants did not file a brief. On August 12, 2025, this court ordered that the appeal shall be considered on the basis of the plaintiff’s brief and appendix, the record, and oral argument of the plaintiff’s counsel.
3
Because we must address claims challenging subject matter jurisdiction first; Townsend v. Commissioner of Correction, 226 Conn. App. 313, 326, 317 A.3d 1147 (2024); we address the plaintiff’s claims in a different order than they appear in the plaintiff’s principal appellate brief. Moreover, in light of our conclusion that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying action, it is not necessary for us to reach the merits of the plaintiff’s remaining three claims.
Poulios v. Fraser
the plaintiff, on March 11, 2024, in the first summary
process action, filed a valid notice to quit for nonpayment of rent. After a trial on the merits in that action, the court, on October 15, 2024, found in favor of the
defendants, concluding that the plaintiff was unable to
meet his burden of proving that the defendants failed to
pay rent on February 1, 2024, because no rent was due
and owing on that date. The court found that “no lease
was in effect at the time of the alleged nonpayment . . . [because] the defendants’ refusal to accept the increased rent subsequently required by the [plaintiff] in the letter dated May 29, 2023, resulted in termination of the lease
agreement between the parties on June 30, 2023, and a
tenancy at sufferance thereafter.” (Emphasis added.)
After the court rendered judgment in favor of the
defendants on the first summary process action, the
plaintiff, on October 29, 2024, served a notice to quit on the defendants based on lapse of time in the underlying
summary process action. Prior to the commencement of
trial on the merits of the underlying summary process
action, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.4 The defendants claimed that
they were never served the notice to quit and, therefore, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them. The
issue of subject matter jurisdiction was never raised by
the defendants in their motion to dismiss or by the court. After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the court
concluded that service of the notice to quit comported
with the requirements of § 47a-23 (c) and consequently
denied the motion to dismiss.
In his fourth claim, the plaintiff argues that, “if the
court was going to decide that lapse of time was not a
proper ground for this eviction proceeding [which is what the court concluded], this also implicates whether the
court had acquired proper subject matter jurisdiction
over the case.” The plaintiff further argues that the
4
The defendants filed what is titled as an “Objection to Summary Process Action” for lack of proper service of process. The court construed the objection as a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.
Poulios v. Fraser
issue of subject matter jurisdiction should have been
addressed by the court during the evidentiary proceedings that were held in conjunction with the defendants’
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The
plaintiff argues that the court could have sua sponte
raised the issue of whether lapse of time was a proper
ground for the notice to quit. The plaintiff further
argues that the court held an entire evidentiary hearing on the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denied the
motion and never raised a concern regarding the notice
to quit based on lapse of time. The plaintiff claims that the denial of the motion to dismiss is res judicata5 on
the issue of whether the notices to quit were proper and
that, “by determining that the notices to quit based on
lapse of time were proper, the court should not have then held that the summary process complaint, based on the
same ground, was improper.” The plaintiff argues that
the trial court improperly rendered judgment in favor
of the defendants. We agree that the trial court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction and that the judgment in
favor of the defendants should be vacated.6
We begin by noting the applicable standard of review.
“A notice to quit is a condition precedent to a summary
5
The plaintiff’s claim of “[r]es judicata with respect to a jurisdictional issue does not itself . . . constitute a jurisdictional issue. . . . Res judicata does not provide the basis for a judgment of dismissal; it is a special defense that is considered after any jurisdictional thresholds are passed.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Labbe v. Pension Commission, 229 Conn. 801, 816, 643 A.2d 1268 (1994); see also Geremia v. Geremia, 159 Conn. App. 751, 772 n.15, 125 A.3d 549 (2015) (“claim of res judicata does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction of court”).
6
The defendants did not raise a claim related to subject matter jurisdiction in their motion to dismiss, and the trial court did not address this distinct issue of subject matter jurisdiction in its ruling on that motion. This, however, does not prohibit this court from considering the plaintiff’s claim, raised and briefed on appeal, that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. “Our Supreme Court has long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter jurisdiction at any time. . . . The subject matter jurisdiction requirement may not be waived by any party, and also may be raised
Poulios v. Fraser
process action and, if defective, deprives the court of
subject matter jurisdiction. . . . We have long held that because [a] determination regarding a trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is plenary. . . . Moreover, [i]t is a fundamental rule that a court may raise and review the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction at any time. . . . Furthermore, [s]ummary
process is a special statutory procedure designed to provide an expeditious remedy. . . . It enable[s] landlords to obtain possession of leased premises without suffering the delay, loss and expense to which, under the common-law
actions, they might be subjected by tenants wrongfully
holding over their terms. . . . Summary process statutes
secure a prompt hearing and final determination. . . .
Therefore, the statutes relating to summary process must
be narrowly construed and strictly followed.” (Citations
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bristol v.
Ocean State Job Lot Stores of Connecticut, Inc., 284
Conn. 1, 5–6, 931 A.2d 837 (2007).
Summary process actions are governed by § 47a-23
(a), which provides in relevant part: “When the owner
or lessor . . . desires to obtain possession or occupancy of any land or building, any apartment in any building,
[or] any dwelling unit . . . and (1) when a rental agreement or lease of such property, whether in writing or by
parol, terminates for any of the following reasons: (A) By lapse of time; (B) by reason of any expressed stipulation therein; (C) violation of the rental agreement or lease or of any rules or regulations adopted in accordance with
section 47a-9 or 21-70; (D) nonpayment of rent within
the grace period provided for residential property in
section 47a-15a or 21-83, except this subparagraph shall
not apply if the owner or lessor’s online rental payment
system prevents such payment of rent within the grace
period provided for residential property in section 47a15a or 21-83 . . . such owner or lessor . . . shall give notice by a party, or by the court sua sponte, at any stage of the proceedings, including on appeal.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Haydusky’s Appeal from Probate, 220 Conn. App. 267, 276, 297 A.3d 1072 (2023).
Poulios v. Fraser
to each lessee or occupant to quit possession or occupancy of such land, building, apartment or dwelling unit . . . .” “Service of a valid notice to quit, which terminates the
lease and creates a tenancy at sufferance . . . is a condition precedent to a summary process action under § 47a-23
that implicates the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction over that action.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!, LLC,
133 Conn. App. 1, 21, 33 A.3d 848 (2012).
The plaintiff claims that, once the court determined
that lapse of time was not a proper ground for the underlying eviction proceeding, it should have dismissed the
summary process action because he could not as a matter
of law and fact state a cause of action that should have
been heard by the court. The plaintiff effectively challenges whether the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to a defective notice to quit.
“ ‘[Summary process] is preceded by giving the statutorily required notice to quit possession to the tenant. . . . Service of a notice to quit possession is typically a landlord’s unequivocal act notifying the tenant of the termination of the lease. The lease is neither voided nor
rescinded until the landlord performs this act and, upon
service of a notice to quit possession, a [leasehold] is
converted to a tenancy at sufferance.’ . . . Housing
Authority v. Hird, 13 Conn. App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d
377, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988).”
Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!, LLC, supra,
133 Conn. App. 22.
In the present case, the plaintiff served a valid notice
to quit and complaint in the first summary process action for nonpayment of rent against the defendants on March
8, 2024. Service of the notice to quit in the first action terminated the lease and created a tenancy at sufferance. See id., 21. When it rendered judgment in favor of the
defendants, the court found that no lease was in effect at the time of the alleged nonpayment of rent because the
defendants’ refusal to accept the increased rent resulted
Poulios v. Fraser
in a termination of the lease agreement between the parties and a tenancy at sufferance thereafter.
We must therefore consider what effect the first notice
to quit had on the lease agreement during the pendency
of the second summary process action in the trial court
and whether the second notice to quit based on the rental agreement could survive during that period.
Sproviero v. J.M. Scott Associates, Inc., 108 Conn.
App. 454, 948 A.2d 379, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 906,
957 A.2d 873 (2008), is instructive to our analysis of
this issue. This court has noted that, in Sproviero, “the landlord served a notice to quit on the tenants, and, after completion of a trial, the court found in favor of the tenants. . . . The landlord sought, under the terms of the
rental agreement, reimbursement for costs incurred for
maintaining the septic system during the pendency of the
legal action. . . . This court determined that the landlord could not recoup those costs because [u]pon service of the notice to quit possession, the plaintiffs’ fixed tenancy was converted to a tenancy at sufferance, and the plaintiffs
temporarily were relieved of their obligation[s] [under
the rental agreement]. Accordingly, the lease was not
in effect during the pendency of [the] litigation . . . .” (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast &
Things!!!, LLC, supra, 133 Conn. App. 22–23.
In Vidiaki, LLC, this court, considering the legal sufficiency of a notice to quit, stated: “In addition, although not binding on this court, it is helpful to analyze Superior Court decisions that have dealt with this specific issue. Several courts have dismissed actions based on a second
notice to quit when the first notice to quit was valid and terminated the lease. Those trial courts have followed
the line of reasoning that if ‘the first notice to quit was a nullity, then it is of no effect and the second notice to quit is effective. If, on the other hand, the first notice to quit was effective at least for the purpose of terminating the rental agreement, then the second notice to quit [cannot] effectively be based [on violations of a lease or rental
Poulios v. Fraser
agreement], as there would have been no contractual
rental agreement in effect at the time.’ Sammy Redd &
Associates v. May, Superior Court, judicial district of
Hartford-New Britain at Hartford, Housing Session,
Docket No. SPH-95376, (January 21, 1998) (22 Conn.
L. Rptr. 107). Likewise, ‘[s]ince an action brought for
lapse of time requires a landlord to prove the existence
of an agreement, the service of the first notice to quit, if valid, would terminate any existing rental agreement and
therefore render the notice to quit on which the present
action is based invalid and deprive the court of subject
matter jurisdiction.’ Gifford v. Fore, Superior Court,
judicial district of New Britain, Housing Session, Docket No. 053590, (March 18, 2010) (49 Conn. L. Rptr. 741).”
Vidiaki, LLC v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!, LLC, supra,
133 Conn. App. 23; see also Edgewood Properties, LLC
v. Dynamic Multimedia, LLC, 226 Conn. App. 583, 596,
319 A.3d 123 (“cause of action based on lapse of time
depends on the existence of a lease or rental agreement
between the parties codifying an allotted time frame . . . [and] when a contractual rental agreement is no longer
in place, such an agreement can no longer be violated”
(internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 350
Conn. 905, 323 A.2d 344 (2024).
In Vidiaki, LLC, this court further explained: “As made
clear by Sproviero, a rental agreement is terminated
when a valid notice to quit is served. The notice to quit terminates the lease, and the lease is no longer effective throughout the pendency of the trial court action. . . .
Furthermore, we agree with the Superior Court decisions
that indicate that if the first notice to quit is technically valid and terminates the rental agreement, a second
notice to quit based on terms in the rental agreement
cannot survive a motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. Common sense dictates that when a
contractual rental agreement is no longer in place, such
an agreement can no longer be violated.” Vidiaki, LLC
v. Just Breakfast & Things!!!, LLC, supra, 133 Conn.
App. 23–24. After applying that same reasoning to the
facts of the present case, we agree with the plaintiff
Poulios v. Fraser
that, because the first notice to quit terminated the
lease agreement between the parties, there could be no
cause of action based on lapse of time when the second
notice to quit was served and during the pendency of the
underlying litigation. Because the notice to quit, based
on lapse of time, was not valid, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the action.
The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded with
direction to render judgment dismissing the summary
process action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.