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State v. Layaw
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL LAYAW
(AC 48031)
Cradle, C. J., and Clark and Westbrook, Js.*
Syllabus
Convicted, following a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, the defendant appealed. The defendant claimed that the evidence presented by the state at trial was insufficient to prove that he had been operating the motor vehicle, an essential element of the statute (§ 14-227a (a) (1)). Held:
When viewed in light of the reasonable inferences that the jury was entitled to make, there was sufficient evidence to support its finding that the operation element of § 14-227a (a) (1) was satisfied, despite the defendant’s claim that he did not sniff heroin until he stopped at the red light at which he was detained, as the defendant’s medical records included the defendant’s admission to medical personnel that he had snorted the drug while he was driving his vehicle, the defendant was found unconscious in the driver’s seat of his vehicle, and the vehicle was stopped at a traffic light while in a lane of traffic.
Argued June 4—officially released September 29, 2026
Procedural History
Two part substitute information charging the defendant, in the first part, with the crime of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of drugs, and, in the
second part, with previously having been convicted of
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor or drugs, brought to the Superior
Court in the judicial district of Hartford, geographical
area number fourteen, where the first part of the information was tried to the jury before Davis, J.; verdict of
guilty; thereafter, the defendant was presented to the
court, Davis, J., on a plea of guilty to the second part
of the information; judgment of guilty in accordance
with the verdict and the plea, from which the defendant
appealed to this court. Affirmed.
Gary A. Mastronardi, for the appellant (defendant).
Maxwell S. Ficker, certified legal intern, with whom
were Ronald G. Weller, senior assistant state’s attorney,
*
The listing of judges reflects their seniority status on this court as of the date of oral argument.
State v. Layaw
and, on the brief, John P. Doyle, state’s attorney, and
Kassie Rose Defala, assistant state’s attorney, for the
appellee (state).
Opinion
WESTBROOK, J. The defendant, Michael Layaw,
appeals from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a jury trial, of operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of any drug in violation of General
Statutes § 14-227a (a) (1).1 The defendant claims on
appeal that the evidence presented by the state was insufficient to prove that he was operating a motor vehicle, an
essential element of the offense. We disagree and affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following
facts. On April 24, 2021, emergency medical technicians (EMTs) for the Ambulance Service of Manchester,
responded to a 911 call made around 3:01 p.m. reporting
an unresponsive driver located at 234 Tolland Turnpike
in Manchester. The EMTs arrived on scene around 3:16
p.m. The defendant’s vehicle was stopped in the roadway at a traffic light near the intersection of Tolland
Turnpike and Parker Street. The EMTs immediately
began providing aid to the defendant, who was the only
occupant in the vehicle and was seated in the driver’s
seat. As the EMTs treated the defendant, they noted
that he was not breathing well and was likely suffering
from agonal respiration,2 which tends to be present in
individuals suffering from an overdose. As a result, the
1
General Statutes § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part: “No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both . . . .”
Although § 14-227a has been amended since the events at issue; see, e.g., Public Acts 2025, No. 25-159, § 13; those amendments have no bearing on the merits of this appeal. In the interest of simplicity, we refer to the current revision of the statute.
2
At trial, one of the EMTs explained that agonal respiration is “intermittent snorting that occurs . . . at . . . various increments. It is not . . .
State v. Layaw
EMTs, believing that the defendant was suffering from
an overdose, administered Narcan, which is a drug that
blocks the central nervous system’s absorption of opiates. After the EMTs administered Narcan, they saw an
immediate improvement in the defendant. The defendant
was then moved into an ambulance, at which point his
care transitioned to the Manchester Fire Department.
Nicolas Caisse, a firefighter-paramedic for the Manchester Fire Department, was called to respond to a potential opiate overdose and arrived at the scene around
3:18 p.m. Caisse noted that the defendant was pale,
unresponsive and apneic,3 with pinpoint pupils and a
strong carotid pulse. Caisse documented his findings in
a “run form,”4 including recording in the “[n]arrative”
section of the form that the defendant “initially denied
any and all illicit substance abuse but eventually stated
he’d bought a bundle of heroin in Hartford earlier [that
day] and had snorted one bag of heroin.”5
Officer Kevin Jackson was one of the last emergency
responders to arrive at the scene. At the time Jackson
arrived, the defendant’s vehicle was still located on
the roadway, obstructing traffic. Jackson observed the
defendant being loaded into the back of the ambulance
and noted that the defendant’s “skin was pale . . . [a]nd
his pupils were pinpoint.” Jackson, who was trained to
recognize the signs of an overdose, concluded on the
basis of his training that the defendant had suffered
from an overdose. Jackson did not observe anyone else
with the defendant or in the defendant’s vehicle, nor
did he observe any signs of drug use within the vehicle.
actual productive breathing. It is something that you tend to find when someone is unresponsive and not able to breathe on their own.”
3
Caisse testified at trial that “ ‘[a]pneic’ means without breath or breath [not conducive] to continued life.”
4
Caisse described the “run form” as “a patient care report generated by a contact.”
5
The court admitted the run form at trial as a full exhibit over the hearsay objection of defense counsel, concluding that it qualified as a recorded recollection. See Conn. Code. Evid. § 8-3 (6). The defendant does not challenge the admission of the run form in this appeal.
State v. Layaw
Jackson followed the ambulance to Manchester Memorial Hospital, where he located the defendant in the
emergency room. During the defendant’s conversation
with hospital staff, he reported that “he was in his car
driving when he sniffed heroin . . . .”6 (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, “he report[ed] [that] he required Narcan”
and denied using any other illicit substances. The defendant also admitted to Jackson at the hospital that “he had
snorted a bag of heroin while stopped at the red light,”
but when Jackson later informed the defendant that he
would be applying for an arrest warrant, the defendant
told Jackson that “he was not driving,” but that “he was
stopped.” (Emphasis added.) Approximately one hour
after the 911 call was made, the defendant’s urine tested
negative for opiates.7
On March 31, 2022, the defendant was arrested and
charged with one count of illegal operation of a motor
vehicle while under the influence of drugs in violation of
§ 14-227a (a) (1). The defendant pleaded not guilty and
elected a jury trial. The court, Davis, J., conducted the
trial over two days, from April 17 to 18, 2024.
At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, defense counsel
moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the state
6
The defendant’s statement was memorialized in the medical records that were prepared by the physician’s assistant who treated him at the emergency room and were admitted at trial, with some redactions not relevant here, as a full exhibit by agreement of the parties.
7
The state called an expert witness at trial who testified that Manchester Memorial Hospital’s urine based drug screening tests had a cut off of 300 nanograms per milliliter for opiates, meaning that any opiates present in amounts less than 300 nanograms per milliliter would return a negative drug screen result. She further explained that “opiates . . . ingested intranasally . . . pass through your lungs and into your small intestine into your stomach. And then, it would be metabolized by your liver and then liver into your kidneys. Once it reaches that point for your bloodstream . . . it would be eliminated in the urine from your kidneys.” The expert opined that, in the present case, “[i]t is . . . possible that the time of collection was not long enough for the body to process . . . the drug . . . from the blood into the urine.” The defendant’s medical expert also opined that urine screens “are not perfect. They’re a very good screening test, but they are not confirmatory . . . [and] they have false positives and false negatives.”
State v. Layaw
had failed to meet its evidentiary burden with respect to
all elements of the crime charged.8 With respect to the
element of operation of a motor vehicle, defense counsel
argued that the state had proffered “no evidence to prove
[that the defendant] was operating his motor vehicle.”
In particular, defense counsel noted that there was no
evidence presented that the defendant’s vehicle was
running at the time he was found or that the keys to the
vehicle were in the ignition. The prosecutor responded
that the jury was permitted to make reasonable inferences
regarding the element of operation from other facts in
evidence, such as the defendant having been found in the
driver’s seat of a vehicle that was stopped in the roadway
at a traffic light. The prosecutor also directed the court’s attention to the defendant’s medical records that had
been admitted as a full exhibit and that memorialized the
defendant’s statements that he had used heroin and had
done so while driving. The court denied the motion for
a judgment of acquittal, determining that a reasonable
fact finder could find each element of the crime charged
proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the basis of the
evidence admitted.
The jury subsequently found the defendant guilty
of illegally operating a motor vehicle while under the
influence of drugs in violation of § 14-227a (a) (1).9 On
June 20, 2024, the court sentenced the defendant to
three years of incarceration, execution suspended after
8
As set forth by our Supreme Court, “the essential elements of § 14-227a are that the defendant (1) operated (2) a motor vehicle, (3) while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or both.” State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 251, 288 A.3d 995 (2023). In the present appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with respect to the element of operation. We limit our discussion accordingly.
9
On April 18, 2024, following the guilty verdict, the defendant pleaded guilty to a part B information that charged him, pursuant to § 14-227a (g), with being a third time offender on the basis of two prior convictions in 2019 of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence.
General Statutes § 14-227a (g) (3) provides in relevant part that a person convicted as a third time offender must, inter alia, “be imprisoned not more than three years, one year of which may not be suspended or reduced in any manner . . . .”
State v. Layaw
twenty months, followed by two years of probation. This
appeal followed.
The defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the state
presented insufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably
determine that the defendant was operating a motor
vehicle, an essential element of § 14-227a (a) (1). Specifically, he argues that, to obtain a conviction, the state had to prove not only that he used an intoxicating drug, but
that any operation of his motor vehicle occurred while
he was under the influence of that drug. The defendant
further argues that no evidence was admitted from which
a jury could reasonably conclude that he was under the
influence of drugs prior to his stopping at the intersection. According to the defendant, at most, the evidence
demonstrated that he ingested heroin only after he had
stopped his vehicle, at which point he suffered an overdose that rendered him unconscious and unable to operate
his vehicle. In short, the defendant argues that no reasonable view of the evidence could support a conclusion
that the defendant engaged in the process of operating
his motor vehicle while drug impaired. We disagree.
Our standard of review is well settled. “In reviewing
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction we apply a [two part] test. First, we construe
the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
verdict. Second, we determine whether [on] the facts so
construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [jury] reasonably could have concluded that
the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt. . . .
“We note that the jury must find every element proven
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to find the defendant
guilty of the charged offense, [but] each of the basic and
inferred facts underlying those conclusions need not be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . If it is reasonable
and logical for the jury to conclude that a basic fact or an inferred fact is true, the jury is permitted to consider the fact proven and may consider it in combination with other
proven facts in determining whether the cumulative
State v. Layaw
effect of all the evidence proves the defendant guilty of
all the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Dixon, 353 Conn. 382, 417, 342 A.3d 161 (2025). “In
considering the evidence introduced in a case, [j]uries are
not required to leave common sense at the courtroom door
. . . nor are they expected to lay aside matters of common
knowledge or their own observations and experience of
the affairs of life, but, [to] the contrary, to apply them
to the facts in hand, to the end that their action may
be intelligent and their conclusions correct.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sparks, 39 Conn.
App. 502, 517, 664 A.2d 1185 (1995); accord State v.
Wilson, 118 Conn. App. 556, 562, 984 A.2d 114 (2009).
Furthermore, “[i]n evaluating evidence, the [jury] is not
required to accept as dispositive those inferences that
are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The
[jury] may draw whatever inferences from the evidence
or facts established by the evidence it deems to be reasonable and logical.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Dixon, supra, 417.
“[I]t does not diminish the probative force of the evidence that it consists, in whole or in part, of evidence
that is circumstantial rather than direct.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. “[O]ur Supreme Court
has observed that [t]here is no distinction between direct
and circumstantial evidence [so] far as probative force
is concerned . . . . In fact, circumstantial evidence may
be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct
evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.
Sienkiewicz, 162 Conn. App. 407, 410, 131 A.3d 1222,
cert. denied, 320 Conn. 924, 134 A.3d 621 (2016). “It
is not one fact, but the cumulative impact of a multitude of facts [that] establishes guilt in a case involving
substantial circumstantial evidence.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn.
417. “[I]n determining whether the evidence supports
a particular inference, we ask whether that inference
is so unreasonable as to be unjustifiable. . . . [A]n inference need not be compelled by the evidence; rather, the
State v. Layaw
evidence need only be reasonably susceptible of such an
inference.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State
v. Glasper, 81 Conn. App. 367, 371, 840 A.2d 48, cert.
denied, 268 Conn. 913, 845 A.2d 415 (2004).
“[P]roof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof
beyond all possible doubt . . . nor does proof beyond a
reasonable doubt require acceptance of every hypothesis
of innocence posed by the defendant that, had it been
found credible by the [jury], would have resulted in an
acquittal. . . . On appeal, we do not ask whether there is
a reasonable view of the evidence that would support a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,
whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that
supports the [jury’s] verdict of guilty.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn.
418.
As previously noted, § 14-227a (a) (1) provides in relevant part that “[a] person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of . . . any
. . . drug . . . if such person operates a motor vehicle . . . while under the influence of . . . any drug . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The statute does not define the term “operates”
or otherwise provide what constitutes the operation of a
motor vehicle. The same or similar term is also not defined
elsewhere in our criminal statutes. See State v. Vega, 44
Conn. App. 499, 503, 691 A.2d 22 (it is appropriate for
courts to look to unrelated statutes for meaning of undefined words and phrases because “where the legislature
uses the same phrase it intends the same meaning”), cert.
denied, 240 Conn. 930, 693 A.2d 302 (1997). Because
no statutory definition of operation exists, our courts
generally have determined what constitutes the operation of a motor vehicle on a case-by-case basis. See State
v. Cyr, 291 Conn. 49, 56, 967 A.2d 32 (2009) (“[b]ecause
the statute and its predecessors did not define the term
‘operate,’ and the legislative history of the statute is
unilluminating, that task [is] left to the courts”).
As our Supreme Court explained in Cyr, the definition
of operation that courts have most often relied upon “has
State v. Layaw
its origins in State v. Swift, 125 Conn. 399, 403, 6 A.2d
359 (1939), an appeal in which this court approved the
following jury instruction explaining what it meant to
operate a vehicle: ‘A person operates a motor vehicle
within the meaning of [the] statute, when in the vehicle
he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will
set in motion the motive power of the vehicle.’ ” State
v. Cyr, supra, 291 Conn. 56–57.
“Adoption of that definition established, and subsequent cases confirmed, that the term operating encompasses a broader range of conduct than does [the term]
driving. . . . After a number of decisions made clear that
sitting at the steering wheel of a nonmoving vehicle with
the engine running constituted operation . . . the question arose whether the definition could be satisfied when
a defendant had been seated in a vehicle that neither was
in motion nor had its motor running.” (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)
Id., 57.
Our Supreme Court answered that question in the
affirmative in State v. Haight, 279 Conn. 546, 552,
903 A.2d 217 (2006), a case in which the defendant was
found sleeping in the driver’s seat of a legally parked car
with the motor off but with the key in the ignition and
the headlights turned on. Id., 547. The court reiterated
that “[n]othing in our definition of ‘operation’ requires
the vehicle to be in motion or its motor to be running.”
Id., 552. The court, relying in part on cases from other
jurisdictions construing similar statutes,10 concluded
10
In reaching its decision in Haight, our Supreme Court cited as instructive a number of out-of-state cases. See State v. Haight, supra, 279 Conn. 553 (“other jurisdictions have concluded that a motorist who is found sleeping or unconscious in a stationary vehicle with the motor not running violates the applicable prohibition on operating or being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs”). Although in Haight, and in the cases it relied on, the keys were found in the ignitions of the vehicles, the court did not hold or suggest that evidence of a key in the ignition of a vehicle would be necessary to establish the element of operation in all cases. See id., 553–55.
State v. Layaw
that, under the facts before it, the element of operation
was established in part due to the fact that the defendant
was in the car and was in a position to continue to control
its movements. Id., 552–55.
We have previously held that a defendant who had
been found unconscious in the driver’s seat of an idling
vehicle located in a parking lot operated the motor vehicle
despite not having moved the vehicle. State v. Ducatt, 22
Conn. App. 88, 89, 93, 575 A.2d 708, cert. denied, 217
Conn. 804, 584 A.2d 472 (1990). In Ducatt, this court
concluded that, because the defendant was under the
influence of an intoxicating substance, was inside the
vehicle, and was “in a position to control its movements,”
he must have manipulated the machinery of the motor
or other machinery manipulable from the driver’s position that affected or could have affected the vehicle’s
movement. Id., 93.
Whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
determine that the defendant operated his vehicle was
also at issue in State v. Smith, 179 Conn. App. 734,
746–47, 181 A.3d 118, cert. denied, 328 Conn. 927, 182
A.3d 637 (2018). In that case, a state police trooper came
upon the defendant’s vehicle stopped in the travel lane
of the road. Id., 739. After approaching and engaging
with the defendant, who was in the driver’s seat and
who told the trooper that he was “ ‘just stopped’ ” and
was trying to use his cell phone; id., 739; the trooper
arrested the defendant for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence. Id., 741. At trial, the defendant testified that his vehicle had become inoperable
due to a mechanical problem and that he had then gone
to a bar with a friend who later dropped him back off at
his vehicle to call roadside assistance. Id., 749–50. On
appeal, the defendant relied on his testimony and the
fact that the trooper had never observed his vehicle in
motion to claim that there was insufficient evidence of
operation. Id., 750. This court determined that there was
ample evidence to support a finding that he had operated the vehicle just prior to the point in time when he
State v. Layaw
was arrested, including his own statement provided to
the police following his arrest. Id., 751. He had told the
police in his statement that he had been “attempting to
make a phone call and had pulled over for safety. A [s]tate
[t]rooper then pulled in behind my car and came up to the
passenger side of my car and asked for my paperwork.”
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. This court stated
that the jury, “exercising common sense in its evaluation
of the evidence, reasonably could have found that, when
the defendant provided this explanation to the police
to explain what had occurred when the police found his
automobile obstructing traffic, he admitted that he had
‘pulled over for safety’ just prior to [the trooper’s] arrival on the scene.” Id. This court concluded that, in light of
all the evidence presented and viewed in its entirety, the
“jury reasonably could have interpreted the evidence of
the defendant’s candid explanation [of his actions] . . .
as evidence of an implicit admission by the defendant
that he [was operating] his automobile . . . .” Id., 752.
Finally, we reemphasize that the operation of a motor
vehicle may be inferred through circumstantial evidence
as well as direct evidence. State v. Englehart, 158 Conn.
117, 119–20, 124, 256 A.2d 231 (1969) (finding no error
when jury concluded, on purely circumstantial evidence,
that defendant operated motor vehicle while under influence of alcohol); State v. King, 204 Conn. App. 1, 16, 251
A.3d 79 (2021) (“[t]here is no requirement that the fact
of operation be established by direct evidence” (internal
quotation marks omitted)), aff’d, 346 Conn 238, 288
A.3d 995 (2023). In Englehart, the defendant’s vehicle
was found in the center of the road, meaning that, “in
order to get to the spot where it was found, the car had
to be driven, towed or pushed there.” State v. Englehart,
supra, 122. The Supreme Court held that, “[s]ince the
car was found to be in good operating condition and since
there were no facts indicating that it had been towed or
pushed, there was no reasonable basis for an inference
that it had not been operated by someone.” Id. Put differently, the jury was free to infer that the defendant was
operating the motor vehicle in order for it to be found
State v. Layaw
at that location. See also State v. Teti, 50 Conn. App.
34, 41–42, 716 A.2d 931 (“[i]n viewing evidence which
could yield contrary inferences, the jury is not barred
from drawing those inferences consistent with guilt and
is not required to draw only those inferences consistent
with innocence” (internal quotation marks omitted)),
cert. denied, 247 Conn. 921, 722 A.2d 812 (1998).
In the present case, the jury was presented with evidence that the defendant admitted that “he was in his
car driving when he sniffed heroin . . . .” (Emphasis
added.) The defendant’s medical records from Manchester Memorial Hospital were admitted into evidence during Jackson’s testimony without objection. The medical
records contained the defendant’s admission, stating:
“He reports he was in his car driving when he sniffed
heroin . . . .” (Emphasis added.) This admission was read
into evidence by Jackson without objection. Jackson
also testified that, after he told the defendant about his
intent to arrest him, the defendant stated that he was
not driving but that he was, instead, stopped at the red
light. As the trier of fact, however, the jury was entitled
to believe and credit the defendant’s admission that he
ingested heroin while he was driving his vehicle. Like in
Smith, the defendant’s candid explanation of his actions
leading up to his being found unconscious and at the
wheel of his vehicle was an admission by the defendant
that he was operating his vehicle and, together with the
other evidence presented to the jury concerning where
the vehicle was found and where the defendant was seated
within the vehicle, constitutes sufficient evidence to
uphold the jury’s verdict.11 See State v. Smith, supra,
179 Conn. App. 751.
Although the courts in Haight and Ducatt found that
there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find that a
11
As previously noted, the defendant changed his story and recanted the admission once he was told that the police would be seeking a warrant and stated that he did not sniff heroin until he had stopped the vehicle at the red light. Although the jury was free to make that inference, it also was free to reach the more logical conclusion, particularly in light of his admission to the contrary, that he had driven the vehicle while
State v. Layaw
defendant operated a legally parked, stationary vehicle,
partially on the basis of direct evidence that the key was
in the ignition, their analyses nevertheless support the
conclusion that a defendant may be found to have operated a vehicle if it is stationary and located on a public
road in a lane of traffic. See State v. Haight, supra, 279
Conn. 553; State v. Ducatt, supra, 22 Conn. App. 92–93.
A jury reasonably could look to the location where the
vehicle and the defendant were found, together with all
other relevant evidence, to infer that the defendant was
drug impaired while in a position to control the movements of the vehicle and that the vehicle could be set in
motion, becoming a danger to the defendant and others
around him.12 See State v. King, 346 Conn. 238, 269–70,
288 A.3d 995 (2023).
In order for the defendant to have been found at the
stoplight at 234 Tolland Turnpike, he must have first
entered his motor vehicle and engaged with the functions
of the vehicle allowing for motion, which is consistent
with a finding of operation under the definition set forth
by our Supreme Court in Swift. See State v. Swift, supra,
125 Conn. 403. Together with his admission that he had
ingested heroin while driving, a jury reasonably could
infer that the defendant had driven his vehicle onto a
public road and ingested heroin while driving the vehicle.
Such an inference is particularly reasonable because the
defendant was found in the driver’s seat of the vehicle
stopped at a traffic light in a lane of traffic.
Following the defendant’s decision to engage with
the functions of his vehicle, the defendant continued
operating the vehicle up to, and including, the moment
snorting the heroin and eventually passed out at the traffic light. See State v. Dixon, supra, 353 Conn. 417 (jury is not required to accept as dispositive inferences consistent with defendant’s innocence).
12
We note that there was no evidence presented from which the jury reasonably could have inferred that the vehicle had become inoperable after the defendant drove it. In fact, the evidence supports the inference that he was driving and the vehicle stopped under his control, not as a result of a mechanical defect.
State v. Layaw
when he stopped at the traffic light.13 Given the totality
of the evidence before the jury, it reasonably could have
inferred that the defendant had operated the vehicle
while impaired.
In sum, on the basis of the defendant’s admission that
he snorted heroin while driving, viewed in light of the
reasonable inferences that the jury was entitled to make
on the basis of the location in which he and his vehicle
were found, the jury was free to infer that the defendant had operated the vehicle while impaired. Having
construed the evidence in the light most favorable to
sustaining the verdict, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support the operation element and,
thus, the judgment of conviction.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
13
The defendant attempts to make much of the fact that, although Jackson entered the defendant’s vehicle, he was unable to testify about whether the defendant’s vehicle was running or whether a key was in the ignition or nearby. The absence of such direct evidence, however, did not preclude the jury from making reasonable inferences on the basis of circumstantial evidence to reach its verdict.