Omari Mason v. Kevin Talley

majority opinion

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-7201

OMARI KEISAUN MASON,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

KEVIN TALLEY, Lieutenant; FRANK MACK, Major; LARRY LEABOUGH,

Superintendent; BINNS, Sergeant; MCKELVIN #81, Sergeant; JONES,

Correctional Officer,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virgina, at

Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District Judge. (1:21-cv-01118-LMB-JFA)

Argued: September 9, 2025 Decided: September 28, 2026

Before RICHARDSON, RUSHING, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Rushing wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge

Richardson joined. Judge Benjamin wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in

part.

ARGUED: JD Mireles, Nicholas Field, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,

New York, New York, for Appellant. Brian Peter Ettari, HARMAN CLAYTOR

CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Daniel S.

Harawa, Adam B. Murphy, Federal Appellate Clinic, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY

SCHOOL OF LAW, New York, New York, for Appellant. Leslie A. Winneberger, John USCA4 Appeal: 23-7201 Doc: 78 Filed: 09/28/2026 Pg: 2 of 43

P. Dunnigan, HARMAN CLAYTOR CORRIGAN & WELLMAN, Richmond, Virginia,

for Appellees.

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RUSHING, Circuit Judge:

Omari Keisaun Mason sued officials at Riverside Regional Jail (RRJ) under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his constitutional rights by placing him in

restrictive housing for five months and by shackling him to a telephone on two occasions.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officials. We affirm.

At all relevant times, Mason was an inmate at RRJ. 1 On July 8, 2021, Mason

pleaded guilty to multiple state criminal offenses. For three of those offenses, he was

sentenced to multiple years in prison, with all but one year suspended for each offense.

Mason also had federal charges pending during this time.

On July 14, 2021, Mason was found with a cell phone and suspected drug

paraphernalia in his cell at RRJ. He was charged with possession of contraband and moved

to prehearing detention housing in RRJ’s Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU). 2 On July 19,

Mason was served with a disciplinary hearing notice, which informed him that he was

charged with a rule violation for possession of contraband and that he had a right to a

“Because this appeal follows the award of summary judgment, we recount the facts

below in the light most favorable to [Mason], the non-moving party.” Robinson v.

Williams, 59 F.4th 113, 115 (4th Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The RHU is a specialized housing unit for inmates who, for one reason or another,

cannot be housed in the regular general population at RRJ. Three classes of inmates are

housed in the RHU: those in restricted confinement (often known as ‘administrative

detention’), those in disciplinary detention, and those in pre-hearing detention while

awaiting the resolution of a disciplinary charge.” J.A. 135.

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disciplinary hearing, during which he had the right to call witnesses and present evidence.

On the notice, Mason indicated that he had been advised of and understood his rights and

that he wished to have a hearing. That same day, Mason had his disciplinary hearing, was

found guilty, and was sanctioned with five days of disciplinary detention, beginning on

July 15, 2021. 3 After being advised of the appeals process, Mason chose not to appeal.

On July 20, 2021, Mason was released from disciplinary detention and relocated to

restricted confinement within the RHU pursuant to a determination from RRJ’s Restrictive

Housing Review Committee. 4 The Committee reevaluated Mason’s placement on July 27,

August 10, August 17, August 24, September 8, September 21, October 5, October 19,

November 16, November 23, November 30, and December 21 of 2021.

During the time Mason spent in the RHU, he experienced varying levels of

restrictions and privileges and he incurred twelve infraction charges, at least six of which

Inmates housed in disciplinary detention “are held in lockdown,” which means that

they are “housed in their cells for 23 hours per day, with one hour five days per week in

which the inmate is allowed to move around the housing unit for exercise or to take a

shower” or “to access the Recreation Yard, an outdoor area.” J.A. 135. These inmates “do

not have access to the telephone, except for legal phone calls and emergencies,” “do not

have access to the canteen for items other than hygiene products or personal stationary,”

and “may have restrictions as to the types of property they may possess.” J.A. 135.

The “[c]onditions in restricted confinement can vary based on the security

interests” that caused an inmate to be housed there. J.A. 136. Inmates in the “‘step down

unit’” in restricted confinement “are housed under essentially the same conditions as

inmates in the general population.” J.A. 136. The Committee “meets weekly to review

each inmate housed in restricted confinement in the RHU to consider whether an inmate

can be moved back into the general population, or whether he should be allowed additional

privileges or fewer restrictions.” J.A. 136.

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resulted in sanctions. 5 On August 10, 2021, Mason assaulted another inmate and was

charged with assault, “creating a security disturbance,” and “plotting and planning.” J.A.

157. Mason received a disciplinary hearing notice for those charges, was found guilty at a

disciplinary hearing, and was sanctioned with twenty days of disciplinary detention. On

August 22, Mason threatened to throw urine on an RRJ employee, claimed he had not

received his dinner tray, and lied to an RRJ nurse about whether he had told an employee

that he wanted to kill himself. The next day, he was charged with “[c]reating a security

disturbance,” “[i]nsinuat[ing] [t]hreat or [b]ehavior,” and “[l]ying to staff.” J.A. 151.

Although Mason received a disciplinary notice for these charges and indicated that he

wished to have a hearing, there is no evidence in the record that a hearing occurred. On

September 19, Mason refused to undergo a drug urinalysis test. He was charged with failing

to obey staff instructions, received a disciplinary notice for this charge, and accepted an

informal resolution. On September 21, Mason was charged with destroying RRJ property,

possessing contraband, and “[h]oarding or attempting to hoard medication.” J.A. 204. He

was found guilty of the first charge and sanctioned with seven days’ loss of recreation. On

November 11, Mason twice assaulted another inmate, who sustained “a black eye, swollen

nose and busted lip.” J.A. 202. Mason was charged with assault and entering another

Before Mason was moved to the RHU, he had incurred eight other infraction

charges—not counting the charge that landed him in the RHU on July 14, 2021—including

“[l]oitering, hiding, or being in an unauthorized area”; “[f]ailing to immediately lockdown

when instructed to do so”; “[p]lotting and planning to break the law or [RRJ] rules”;

“[f]ailing to follow the directions of staff thereby causing a security breach”; “[e]ntering

the cell of another inmate with out the permission of an officer”; “[e]scape or attempt to

escape”; “[i]nsinuat[ing] threat or behavior”; and “[a]ssault on staff.” J.A. 173, 175, 177,

179.

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inmate’s cell, received a disciplinary notice for these charges, and indicated that he wished

to have a hearing. Mason was found guilty at a hearing and sanctioned with twenty days

of disciplinary detention. On December 21, 2021, Mason was released from the RHU and

relocated to general population housing.

On or about January 5, 2022, Mason was again charged with possessing contraband.

He was relocated to Housing Unit 1CA in the RHU, where inmates are placed “due to their

past RRJ incidents and violations,” for prehearing detention. J.A. 268. RRJ policy

provides that all inmates in Housing Unit 1CA “are placed in restraints during their

recreation hour and when they are outside their cell.” J.A. 268; see also J.A. 577 (stating

that inmates are either “placed in full restraints or chained to the table anytime they are out

to recreation”).

On January 7, 2022, Mason asked to use the telephone during his recreation hour,

so he was secured to a wall-mounted phone with one hand attached to a chain of some

length that was attached to the phone. He was able to sit, stand, move his feet, and rotate

his body. He could sit with his hands in his lap, hold and dial the phone or return it to the

wall, and raise or lower his arms. Mason remained secured to the telephone for

approximately six and a half hours. RRJ employees monitored Mason periodically during

this period. About four and a half hours after he was secured to the telephone, Mason

stood, turned toward the wall, and urinated on himself.

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On January 12, 2022, 6 Mason was again secured to the telephone during his

recreation period and remained there between two and five hours. At some point, Mason

“passed out [d]ue to dehydration” and received medical attention before returning to his

cell. J.A. 295.

In October 2021, Mason filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Relevant

here, Mason alleged that RRJ officers violated his due process rights by continuing to hold

him in the RHU. He later filed a supplemental complaint alleging that the conditions of

his confinement in the RHU and while shackled to the telephone on January 7 and 12

violated his constitutional rights.

Defendants moved for summary judgment. Their motion included a Roseboro 7

notice notifying Mason of his right to respond and obligation to proffer either affidavits or

sworn statements with his opposition. Mason filed a response containing his sworn

statement. He indicated that he desired to subpoena an RRJ classification officer “to

confirm [Mason’s] sworn statement” and a mental health professional who worked at RRJ

during Mason’s incarceration “to confirm [Mason’s] facts.” J.A. 292, 331.

The district court granted summary judgment before discovery on all of Mason’s

claims except his conditions-of-confinement claim arising from the January 7 and 12

It is not clear from the record whether this incident occurred on January 11 or 12.

We use January 12 because Mason’s medical records state “man down for patient ‘falling

out at the phones’” on January 12. J.A. 446.

Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975).

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incidents and dismissed all Defendants except Sergeant McKelvin and Officer Jones.

Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118, 2023 WL 2619160 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023) (Mason

I). Defendants McKelvin and Jones filed a renewed motion for summary judgment with a

Roseboro notice, and Mason moved to subpoena video footage of the telephone incidents.

The court ordered Defendants to produce any existing surveillance videos of the incidents,

and they produced footage for January 7 but none for the second incident.

The district court subsequently granted Defendants’ renewed motion for summary

judgment on the remaining conditions-of-confinement claim. Mason v. McKelvin, No.

1:21-cv-1118, 2023 WL 6849982 (E.D. Va. Oct. 17, 2023) (Mason II). Mason timely

appealed, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

On appeal, Mason first contends that the district court reversibly erred by granting

summary judgment in Defendants’ favor without affording him discovery. We review the

district court’s decision to grant summary judgment pre-discovery for abuse of discretion.

Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023).

“Generally, summary judgment must be refused where the nonmoving party has not

had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.” Id. (internal

quotation marks omitted). “But a nonmoving party cannot complain that summary

judgment was granted without discovery unless that party attempted to oppose the motion

on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.” Id. (internal quotation marks,

ellipses, and brackets omitted). A district court abuses its discretion by granting summary

judgment when it has “fair notice of potential disputes as to the sufficiency of the summary

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judgment record.’” Id. (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets omitted). In Shaw,

for example, the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment prediscovery where the plaintiff had requested but not yet received video evidence “core” to

plaintiff’s theory, in defendants’ “exclusive control,” and that “would likely bear profound

consequences on the claims in th[e] dispute.” Id. at 129–130.

The district court here did not abuse its discretion. Mason requested video footage

of his restraint to the telephone on January 7 and 12 and also expressed a desire to subpoena

two RRJ employees. The court ordered Defendants to produce “any video evidence that

exists of the alleged [telephone] incidents,” and in response Defendants produced footage

for January 7 but none for any other date. J.A. 357. Although any video of the January 12

incident would have been in RRJ’s exclusive control, it would not profoundly affect

Mason’s claims. Mason asserted that “[v]ideo footage of the incident can verify [his]

claims.” J.A. 601. But, as we will discuss below, even accepting Mason’s version of what

transpired on January 12, the conditions of his confinement on that day do not amount to a

constitutional violation, and even if they did, Defendants would be entitled to qualified

immunity. Cf. Boyle v. Azzari, 107 F.4th 298, 302 (4th Cir. 2024) (finding district court

abused its discretion in an excessive force case when “the record present[ed] a potential

dispute of material fact” because of directly conflicting “accounts of the moments

immediately preceding the use of force, the core issue in every excessive force case”);

Farabee v. Gardella, 131 F.4th 185, 196 (4th Cir. 2025) (noting that “‘premature summary

judgment [i]s particularly disfavored’” when the plaintiff needs evidence to prove “the

defendant’s subjective knowledge” (quoting Shaw, 59 F.4th at 128)). Additionally,

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Mason’s desire to subpoena an RRJ classification officer and a former mental health

professional did not suggest that the summary judgment record was insufficient because

Mason indicated that those employees would merely “confirm” information that he had

already provided and which the district court credited. J.A. 292, 331; see Shaw, 59 F.4th

at 128.

III.

Having concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion, “we proceed to

review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Shaw, 59 F.4th at 129.

Summary judgment is warranted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(a). When making this determination, we view all facts and reasonable inferences

in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Ballengee v. CBS Broad., Inc., 968 F.3d 344,

349 (4th Cir. 2020). A fact is material if it might affect the outcome of the suit, and a

dispute is genuine “when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for

the nonmoving party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Mason contends that Defendants violated his due process rights by keeping him in

restrictive housing for five months and that they subjected him to unconstitutional

conditions of confinement in the RHU generally and when they twice shackled him to a

telephone. We will address his claims in that order.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall

“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const.

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amend. XIV, § 1. To establish a procedural due process violation, “a plaintiff must

(1) identify a protected liberty or property interest and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that

interest without due process of law.” Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 2015).

Mason acknowledges that he received notice and a hearing each time before he was sent to

disciplinary detention. His argument appears to be that Defendants violated the Fourteenth

Amendment by placing him in administrative detention, also known as restricted

confinement, for all periods between July 20, 2021, and December 21, 2021, when he was

not in disciplinary detention. Because we conclude that Mason has not established a

protected liberty interest, we need not consider the sufficiency of the process he received

regarding restricted confinement.

“[T]he Constitution itself does not give rise to a liberty interest in avoiding transfer

to more adverse conditions of confinement,” but “a liberty interest in avoiding particular

conditions of confinement may arise from state policies or regulations.” Wilkinson v.

Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221–222 (2005). Of course, “lawful incarceration brings about the

necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights,” and “[d]iscipline by

prison officials in response to a wide range of misconduct falls within the expected

perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472,

485 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a state-created liberty interest

in avoiding certain confinement conditions implicates due process protection “only if the

denial of such an interest ‘imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in

relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.’” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 249 (quoting Sandin,

515 U.S. at 484).

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“Whether confinement conditions are atypical and substantially harsh in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life is a necessarily fact specific comparative exercise.”

Smith v. Collins, 964 F.3d 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks and ellipses

omitted). In this Court, the analysis turns primarily on three factors: “‘(1) the magnitude

of confinement restrictions; (2) whether the administrative segregation is for an indefinite

period; and (3) whether assignment to administrative segregation had any collateral

consequences on the inmate’s sentence.’” Id. (quoting Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517,

530 (4th Cir. 2015)). “[A]ll factors should be considered ‘together’ when making the

determination.” Cartegena v. Lovell, 103 F.4th 171, 183 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting

Wilkinson, 545 U.S. at 224).

Even assuming that RRJ policy creates a potential liberty interest in avoiding

continued RHU confinement, Mason has not demonstrated that his restrictive detention

constituted “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to the ordinary incidents of

prison life,” which for Mason were the conditions in general population housing. Prieto,

780 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 253 (“[C]onditions dictated

by a prisoner’s conviction and sentence are the conditions constituting the ‘ordinary

incidents of prison life’ for that prisoner.” (citations omitted)).

The first factor weighs in Mason’s favor under the summary judgment standard.

Mason’s conditions varied during his time in the RHU, and there were occasions when he

had a cellmate or had access to other inmates. However, there were also periods during

which he was isolated in his cell for 23 hours per day, had restricted telephone and canteen

access, and could not participate in visitation. In addition, at some point Mason was put

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“behind double-doors and made . . . [to] wear[] [f]ull shackles” during his recreation hours.

J.A. 293.

The second factor weighs strongly in Defendants’ favor. When considering this

factor, we “look[] to the indefiniteness of [the housing assignment], as well as its duration.”

Smith, 964 F.3d at 277.

At RRJ, inmates are placed in restricted confinement in the RHU “primarily to

address security concerns,” and the Committee periodically reviews each inmate housed in

restricted confinement “to consider whether an inmate can be moved back into the general

population, or whether he should be allowed additional privileges or fewer restrictions.”

J.A. 136. Between July and December 2021, the Committee reevaluated Mason’s RHU

placement at least thirteen times. The Committee considered Mason’s rule violations,

safety risk, and mental health. Each periodic review form in the record is signed by

multiple officials and includes a written explanation for the Committee’s

recommendation. 8 Notably, these reviews indicate that Mason’s own misconduct

contributed to his loss of certain privileges and continued RHU placement. In this sense,

he “held the keys to the conditions of his confinement,” because those conditions “could

Mason mischaracterizes the reviews when he asserts that he was kept in the RHU

despite “some reviews not[ing] Mr. Mason’s ‘positive behavior’ or ‘no issues or

concerns.’” Opening Br. 53. The review that notes Mason’s “positive behavior” states

that he “will be removed from double doors due to positive behavior.” J.A. 221. And the

review that notes “no issues or concerns” refers to his “mental health” and recommends

that “with compliant behavior . . . [Mason should] be transitioned to general population.”

J.A. 218. Less than a month after that review, however, Mason twice assaulted another

inmate—which was duly noted in a subsequent review.

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be relaxed as time passed and . . . this was dependent on his own conduct.” Cartagena,

103 F.4th at 183.

Moreover, the duration of Mason’s restrictive detention was briefer than those we

have found indefinite in other cases. At least forty days of Mason’s five months in the

RHU from July 20 to December 21 were spent in disciplinary detention, for which Mason

appears to concede he received due process. Even considering the full five months,

Mason’s confinement in the RHU was briefer than the six-month administrative

confinement period in Beverati v. Smith, 120 F.3d 500, 503–504 (4th Cir. 1997), which we

held not to implicate a protected liberty interest. Mason’s time in the RHU was also far

briefer than the four years and three months of segregation in Smith, 964 F.3d at 278, 281,

where we found a genuine dispute about whether a protected liberty interest existed, and

the “20-year stint in highly restrictive solitary confinement” in Incumaa, 791 F.3d at 531–

532, where we found a protected liberty interest.

The third factor also favors Defendants. There is no evidence that Mason’s RHU

placement had any collateral consequence on the sentences that Mason was serving for

state offenses, such as limiting his ability to earn good-time credits or rendering him

ineligible for parole. See, e.g., Smith, 964 F.3d at 279–280. This is yet another way in

which Mason’s restrictive detention “does not present a dramatic departure from the basic

conditions of [his] sentence.” Sandin, 515 U.S. at 485. On appeal, Mason claims that

“while confined to the RHU, he had no law library access and lost legal documents during

cell shake downs, both of which prevented him from being adequately informed about his

[pending federal] criminal case and ultimately ‘forced [him] to sign a plea agreement’” to

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pending federal charges. Opening Br. 47 (quoting J.A. 298). But Mason fails to explain

how a temporary restriction on law library access or loss of legal documents resulted in his

guilty plea or differed significantly from the ordinary incidents of prison life. And

“conclusory allegations . . . , without more, are insufficient to preclude granting [a]

summary judgment motion.” Wai Man Tom v. Hosp. Ventures LLC, 980 F.3d 1027, 1037

(4th Cir. 2020).

Weighing these three factors together, the evidence cannot support a conclusion that

Mason’s restrictive detention imposed “atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation to

the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Prieto, 780 F.3d at 249 (internal quotation marks

omitted). We therefore conclude that Mason has not demonstrated a protected liberty

interest in avoiding his continued RHU placement. Accordingly, his placement in the RHU

does not implicate due process protections, and we affirm the district court’s summary

judgment ruling on Mason’s Fourteenth Amendment claim.

We turn next to Mason’s two conditions-of-confinement claims, one about

conditions in the RHU and one about being shackled to a telephone on January 7 and 12.

As an initial matter, the district court correctly analyzed these claims under the

Eighth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment,

which forbids infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments,” U.S. Const. amend. VIII,

“applies to claims by prisoners against corrections officials challenging conditions of

confinement,” Porter v. Clarke, 923 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir. 2019). By contrast, the

Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies to conditions-of-confinement claims

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brought by pretrial detainees. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979). A “pretrial

detainee” is a person who has been “charged with a crime” but “has not been adjudged

guilty of any crime.” Id. at 523, 536. After a pretrial detainee is convicted and sentenced,

he is a prisoner whose claims are subject to the Eighth Amendment. Simmons v. Whitaker,

106 F.4th 379, 387 (4th Cir. 2024).

At all relevant times, Mason was a convicted prisoner. On July 8, 2021, Mason was

convicted of three state criminal offenses and received a one-year active sentence of

imprisonment for each. Mason’s conditions-of-confinement claims arise from his

placement in the RHU, which began on July 14, 2021, and ended on December 21, 2021,

and incidents that occurred on January 7 and 12, 2022. Although the record does not

establish whether his state sentences were to be served consecutively or concurrently,

Mason admitted in a letter to the district court, dated December 5, 2022, that he was “at

Riverside Regional Jail finishing [his] state time which is up on [D]ecember[] 27, 2022.”

J.A. 332. Accordingly, the district court did not err in applying the Eighth Amendment to

Mason’s conditions-of-confinement claims.

The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” nor does it

prohibit conditions that are “restrictive and even harsh.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S.

337, 347, 349 (1981); see Cartagena, 103 F.4th at 181. To prevail on an Eighth

Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the

alleged deprivation was “objectively, ‘sufficiently serious’” and (2) that the prison official

acted with “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511

U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298, 302–303 (1991)).

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Under the first, objective element, “only those deprivations denying [a prisoner] ‘the

minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities’ are sufficiently grave” to form the basis of

a constitutional violation. Wilson, 501 U.S. at 298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). In

other words, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement

claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). This determination is not left to “the

subjective views of judges.” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Rather, “[t]o show the requisite extreme deprivation to support [this objective component

of] an Eighth Amendment claim, ‘a prisoner must produce evidence of a serious or

significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions, or

demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the prisoner’s unwilling

exposure to the challenged conditions.’” Jones v. Solomon, 90 F.4th 198, 209 (4th Cir.

2024) (quoting Shakka v. Smith, 71 F.3d 162, 166 (4th Cir. 1995)). Because we conclude

that Mason has not satisfied this objective standard, we need not address the second

element of his claim.

Mason has failed to demonstrate that being housed in the RHU for several months

subjected him to “the deprivation of [a] basic human need [that] was objectively

sufficiently serious” to establish a constitutional violation. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d

1375, 1379 (4th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted).

First, the conditions of Mason’s confinement in the RHU did not pose a “substantial

risk” of serious physical or emotional injury. Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166. We recognized in

Porter v. Clarke that prolonged solitary confinement can create a substantial risk “of

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serious psychological and emotional harm.” 923 F.3d at 361. There, inmates had for years

been confined alone in their small cells for 23 to 24 hours a day, without access to

recreation or “to congregate religious, educational, or social programming.” Id. at 357

(internal quotation marks omitted). The inmates were placed in solitary confinement based

solely on their sentences and were not offered any avenue out of segregation. Id. at 359.

Neither the duration nor conditions of Mason’s detention in the RHU are like the

confinement at issue in Porter. During the five months that Mason spent in the RHU, he

experienced varying levels of restriction. He consistently had recreation hours out of his

cell, and at some points he enjoyed phone privileges, had access to common areas, had a

cellmate, and had the opportunity to interact with—and assault—other inmates. He was

placed in the RHU based on his misconduct in prison. And RRJ policy provided Mason

an avenue out of the RHU; it also provided that good behavior would result in the removal

of certain restrictions within the RHU.

Second, Mason has not “‘produce[d] evidence of a serious or significant physical or

emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.’” Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166

(quoting Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381). This is unsurprising, given that Mason has not shown

he was denied “‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Wilson, 501 U.S. at

298 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347). Mason claims “mental health issues from being in

restricted confinement,” J.A. 296, and that he “see[s] and hear[s] things that[’]s not there,”

a problem he says he didn’t have “before being in [restricted confinement] for so long,”

J.A. 297. But “mere incantation of ‘physical and mental injury’” cannot survive a motion

for summary judgment. Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 n.9. “[A]n inmate must specifically

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describe not only the injury but also its relation to the allegedly unconstitutional condition,”

which Mason has failed to do. Id.

Because he has not demonstrated the “extreme deprivation[] . . . required to make

out a conditions-of-confinement claim,” Mason’s claim based on the conditions in the RHU

fails. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9; see Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166.

Mason also alleged that Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment

by twice shackling him to a telephone for several hours, resulting in him urinating on

himself the first time and losing consciousness the second. He relies on the Supreme

Court’s decision in Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), which he argues stands for the

proposition that shackling a prisoner to a “stationary object” for longer than necessary “to

quell a threat or restore order” violates the Eighth Amendment. Reply Br. 10 (internal

quotation marks omitted).

Contrary to Mason’s argument, the Supreme Court did not hold in Hope that

securing an inmate to a stationary object absent an emergency situation is per se an Eighth

Amendment violation. 9 See Robles v. Prince George’s Cnty., 302 F.3d 262, 269 n.2 (4th

Cir. 2002) (explaining that Hope “involved a . . . length[y] detention under painful and

dangerous conditions amounting to cruel and unusual punishment”). In Hope, prison

guards in Alabama handcuffed an inmate to an outdoor hitching post in June for seven

hours as punishment for disruptive conduct. 536 U.S. at 733–734. Hitching posts are

Our dissenting colleague repeats Mason’s error by declaring this supposed right

“clearly established.” Diss. Op. 40.

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intended to be uncomfortable. Hope was handcuffed “in a standing position” with his arms

“above shoulder height” and was forced to remain in that position for the entire seven

hours. Id. at 733–734 & nn.1–2. The prison guards made Hope remove his shirt, so that

he “remained shirtless all day while the sun burned his skin.” Id. at 734–735. The sun

“heat[ed] the handcuffs” too, causing “substantial pain,” and whenever “he tried moving

his arms to improve his circulation, the handcuffs cut into his wrist, causing pain.” Id. at

734–735 & n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted). During his seven hours on the outdoor

hitching post, guards did not give Hope any “bathroom breaks,” offered him water “only

once or twice,” and “taunted [him] about his thirst.” Id. at 735. The Supreme Court held

that “[t]he use of the hitching post as alleged by Hope ‘unnecessar[ily] and wanton[ly]

inflicted pain,’ and thus was a clear violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 741

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).

Mason was not attached to a hitching post, and his circumstances were vastly

different from those in Hope. As an initial matter, Mason was not shackled to the telephone

as punishment but because he asked to use the phone and, given the threat he posed to the

safety of others at that time, prison regulations required that he be restrained in some

manner when outside his cell. See Whitley, 475 U.S. at 319 (explaining the standard for

“conduct that does not purport to be punishment at all”). He was fully clothed and indoors,

where he was shielded from the sun and the weather. Mason’s handcuffs were secured to

the telephone by a chain of some length, not attached directly to it. A chair and a table

were near the phone, and Mason was able to sit, stand, rotate his body, and move his arms.

At various points he sat down and rested both hands in his lap, dialed and held the telephone

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from a seated position, returned the phone to the wall, rested his elbows on his knees while

sitting, stood and leaned against the wall, stretched his arms above his head, and moved his

arms and the rest of his body in various other positions. While he was secured to the phone

on January 7, Mason opened his boxed lunch and ate it. Although the handcuffs allegedly

cut into his wrists on January 7, Mason does not claim this occurred until roughly four and

a half hours after he had been secured to the telephone, which was approximately two hours

before he was released.

The differences between this case and Hope are significant and material. Given

those differences, Hope does not establish that Mason was subjected to a substantial risk

of serious harm, and we reject Mason’s assertion to the contrary.

Nor does the evidence demonstrate that Mason suffered “a serious or significant

physical or emotional injury” indicative of the “extreme deprivation” that marks an Eighth

Amendment violation. Shakka, 71 F.3d at 166 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Regarding the January 7 incident, Mason avers that he urinated on himself after

being secured without bathroom access for approximately four and a half hours. 10 While

being left to urinate on oneself a single time is humiliating, it is not a serious physical or

emotional injury. See Baker v. Clarke, No. 7:20-cv-204, 2020 WL 3422198, at *2 (W.D.

Va. June 22, 2020) (collecting cases finding no Eighth Amendment violation when denial

The district court found that because the video shows “no liquid visible on the

ground or stains on [Mason’s] clothes,” the video did not support Mason’s claim that he

had urinated on himself. Mason II, 2023 WL 6849982, at *6. Although the court’s

observations are accurate, the video does not foreclose Mason’s version of the facts.

Viewed in the light most favorable to Mason, the low-resolution video does not disprove

his claim because the video quality and Mason’s dark pants could obscure any stain.

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of bathroom access forced an inmate to urinate on himself). Nor did any hygiene concerns

create a substantial risk of such injury here. Mason urinated on himself outside of his cell,

apparently while standing. He could move somewhat away from any liquid on the floor

and was not required to sit in it. Approximately two hours later, he was unsecured from

the phone. Mason’s assertions of “anxiety and psychological pain,” J.A. 610, resulting

from this incident and “injury to [his] wrist,” J.A. 591, are devoid of factual detail sufficient

to support his constitutional claim. See Strickler, 989 F.2d at 1381 n.9; Wai Man Tom, 980

F.3d at 1037; cf. Key v. McKinney, 176 F.3d 1083, 1086 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that 24

hours in handcuffs did not violate the Eighth Amendment). Thus, we agree with the district

court that Mason has not satisfied the objective component of his claim regarding the

January 7 incident.

Moving to January 12, Mason represents that he was secured to the telephone for

somewhere between two and five hours. He requested water, but the officer who agreed

to bring him some never did. Mason asserts that he eventually fainted due to dehydration

and hit his head on the phone, suffering an “emotional injury” and “injury to [his] head,”

and “ever[] since . . . it’s like a certain sound that won’t go away.” J.A. 591, 610. These

facts do not demonstrate that Mason suffered a serious or significant injury. After he

fainted, Mason received medical attention and did not appear to be in medical distress. The

record does not reflect any concerns about a head injury. As the district court observed,

Mason does not claim to have “suffered a concussion” or any other “serious effects from

this incident.” Mason II, 2023 WL 6849982, at *6. His assertion of an unspecified head

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injury does not demonstrate the severity necessary to prove the objective component of his

constitutional claim.

Moreover, although Mason was denied water for somewhere between two and five

hours, the absence of any serious injury demonstrates that the deprivation was not “extreme

enough to satisfy the objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.” Shakka, 71

F.3d at 166. Although there is a risk of dehydration when an inmate is denied water, no

substantial risk of serious harm arose here. Mason had access to water before being secured

to the phone, was indoors with no allegations of notable heat or exertion, and received

fluids and medical attention after he fainted. Furthermore, the evidence indicates that RRJ

staff periodically monitored Mason during the two to five hours he was restrained. Going

without water in such conditions is not cruel and unusual punishment. We therefore affirm

the district court’s summary judgment ruling regarding the January 12 incident as well.

Even if Mason had identified evidence sufficient to support a finding that his

conditions of confinement were unconstitutional, Defendants would be entitled to qualified

immunity at summary judgment because it was not clearly established in 2021 and 2022

that “conditions of [that] caliber . . . crossed the constitutional line.” Jones, 90 F.4th at

213.

“‘Qualified immunity shields government officials from civil damages liability

unless the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at

the time of the challenged conduct.’” Atkinson v. Godfrey, 100 F.4th 498, 504 (4th Cir.

2024) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)). Defendants are entitled to

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immunity “unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the

unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’” District of Columbia

v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (quoting Reichle, 566 U.S. at 664).

“‘Clearly established’ means that, at the time of the officer’s conduct, the law was

‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would understand that what he is doing’ is

unlawful.” Id. at 63 (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). While “a

case directly on point” is not required for a right to be clearly established, “existing

precedent” must have placed the unlawfulness of the official’s conduct “beyond debate.”

White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent.” Wesby, 583 U.S.

at 63. “The precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret

it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.” Id. “This demanding standard

protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Id.

(quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

To determine whether a right was clearly established, we look to decisions “from

the Supreme Court, this Court, or the highest court of the state in which the action arose.”

Jones, 90 F.4th at 207 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the absence of controlling

authority, “a ‘robust consensus’ of persuasive authority may demonstrate the existence of

a rule ‘that every reasonable official would know.’” Garrett v. Clarke, 74 F.4th 579, 584

(4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 63). “And in ‘the rare obvious case,’ general

constitutional standards can clearly establish a right, ‘even though existing precedent does

not address similar circumstances.’” Id. (quoting Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64).

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Beginning with Mason’s detention in the RHU, in 2021 it was not clearly

established that detaining a prisoner under those conditions for five months would violate

the Eighth Amendment. By then it was established that prolonged solitary confinement

can create a substantial risk “of serious psychological and emotional harm.” Porter, 923

F.3d at 361. However, as we previously explained, Mason’s detention in the RHU differed

from the confinement at issue in Porter in meaningful ways. Viewed in the light most

favorable to Mason, Jones, 90 F.4th at 207, he was housed in the RHU for approximately

five months based on his in-prison misconduct; and during that time, he consistently had

access to recreation, experienced varying levels of restriction, and was provided with an

avenue out of the RHU. By contrast, the inmates in Porter were confined alone in cells for

23 to 24 hours a day for years, based solely on their sentences; and during that time, they

were without access to recreation, could not congregate for social, educational, or religious

programming, and were not provided with an avenue out of segregation. Porter, 923 F.3d

at 357, 359. Therefore, Porter did not clearly establish that the conditions of Mason’s

detention at the RHU exposed him to a substantial risk of “serious psychological and

emotional harm.” Id. at 361.

Moreover, Porter would have suggested to a reasonable correctional officer in

Defendants’ position that the Eighth Amendment did not prohibit Mason’s continued

detention in the RHU. In Porter, we held that “a legitimate penological justification can

support prolonged detention of an inmate in segregated . . . confinement, . . . even though

such conditions create an objective risk of serious emotional and psychological harm.” Id.

at 362–363. A legitimate penological justification exists if segregation “is necessary to

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protect the well-being of prison employees [and] inmates.” Id. at 363. As the district court

observed, Mason’s “extensive disciplinary record and history of assaulting both inmates

and jail staff provide[d] a clear penological justification for the conditions of his

confinement in the RHU.” Mason I, 2023 WL 2619160, at *11.

Turning to Mason’s second conditions-of-confinement claim, it was not clearly

established in January 2022 that shackling a prisoner to a stationary object indoors for

several hours without providing him with bathroom access or water was unconstitutional.

Hope, which involved the use of a hitching post as punishment in “dangerous conditions,”

Robles, 302 F.3d at 269 n.2, did not put the constitutional question here “beyond debate,”

Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). As we previously explained,

Hope is significantly and materially different from Mason’s circumstances at RRJ.

In addition to Hope, Mason relies on Robles v. Prince George’s County to argue

that Defendants violated his clearly established rights by shackling him to the telephone

for several hours. In Robles, we held that officers violated a pretrial detainee’s Fourteenth

Amendment right to due process by tying him to a metal pole outdoors in the middle of the

night for approximately 10 to 15 minutes. 302 F.3d at 267, 270. That precedent does not

clearly establish that Defendants violated Mason’s Eighth Amendment right as a convicted

prisoner to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Compare id. at 269 (To prevail on

a Fourteenth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate

that defendants’ “actions amounted to punishment and were not merely ‘an incident of

some other legitimate governmental purpose’ and that the injury resulting from their

actions was more than de minimis.” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538)), with Farmer, 511

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U.S. at 834 (To prevail on an Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, a

plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged deprivation was “objectively, sufficiently

serious” and that defendants acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.”

(internal quotation marks omitted)).

Further, it was not “beyond debate” in January 2022 that depriving a prisoner of

bathroom access or water for several hours while he was restrained indoors violated his

constitutional rights. Pauly, 580 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties

have identified no controlling authority or “robust consensus of persuasive authority”

setting such a standard. Garrett, 74 F.4th at 584 (internal quotation marks omitted). Nor

is this “the rare obvious case” in which general constitutional standards would have notified

“every reasonable official” that such conditions were unlawful. Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted); see Baker, 2020 WL 3422198, at *2 (collecting cases finding that denial

of bathroom access for limited periods of time did not violate the Eighth Amendment);

Jones, 90 F.4th at 202–204, 208 (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified

immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim where

plaintiff was given a cup of water after at least seven hours in a dry cell and remained in

clothing soiled with fecal matter for about 23 hours).

In sum, neither the conditions of Mason’s detention in the RHU nor the conditions

under which he was shackled to the telephone violated a right that was clearly established

at the time. For this reason too, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment

for Defendants on Mason’s conditions-of-confinement claim.

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IV.

The district court’s judgment in Defendants’ favor is affirmed. The court did not

abuse its discretion by granting summary judgment pre-discovery. Mason failed to

demonstrate a protected liberty interest to support his Fourteenth Amendment claim. The

conditions of Mason’s confinement did not impose objectively extreme deprivations

prohibited by the Eighth Amendment, and even if they had, Defendants would be entitled

to qualified immunity because such violations were not clearly established.

AFFIRMED

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DeANDREA GIST BENJAMIN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I agree with and join portions of the majority’s analysis, including Part I and the

sections of Part III regarding Omari Keisaun Mason’s due process claim, Maj. Op. at 10–

15; the proper lens through which to evaluate the conditions-of-confinement claims, Maj.

Op. at 15–16; and Mason’s Eighth Amendment claim relating to his placement in the

restrictive housing unit, Maj. Op. at 17–19. However, I depart from the majority because

I think that Mason presented sufficient evidence that his Eighth Amendment right—here,

his right not to be shackled for prolonged periods of time while denied minimal life

necessities—was violated by Officers Jones and McKelvin during the two January

shackling incidents. Further, that right was clearly established and thus Jones and

McKelvin should not be shielded by qualified immunity. Accordingly, I would have

reversed the district court’s second summary judgment order.

I. The Two January Shackling Incidents 1

On January 7, 2022, Mason was released from his cell for a one-hour recreational

break. Mason wanted to make a phone call, J.A. 294, 2 and Jones handcuffed Mason to the

I provide my own recitation of the facts that bear on my analysis and for additional

context and clarity.

Citations to “J.A.” refer to the joint appendix filed by the parties. The J.A. contains

the record on appeal from the lower court. Page numbers for citations to the J.A. utilize

the “J.A.” numbering at the bottom of the page on each document.

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telephone, January 7 Video, at 00:44:39. 3 Mason was shackled to the telephone for more

than six-and-a-half hours. J.A. 591; see January 7 Video, at 6:29:33. During that time,

Mason was denied requests for water and access to the bathroom while the handcuffs cut

into his wrists. J.A. 610, 612. Mason claimed that he had no choice but to urinate on

himself. J.A. 608.

At first, defendants denied the incident ever happened. See J.A. 59 (“Defendants

deny that Mason was restrained for six hours and thus denied the bathroom as alleged.”).

But after being directed by the district court to submit evidence on this claim, they changed

their position and provided the district court with security footage showing that Mason was,

in fact, shackled to a telephone for over six hours.

Mason was subjected to the same treatment just four days later. Again, Mason was

released for another one-hour recreational break. Mason “begged [McKelvin] not to chain

[him] to the phone and if he do make sure he come back in a hour.” J.A. 602. Still,

McKelvin shackled him to the same telephone and walked away. During the nearly four

hours Mason was shackled, only one officer walked by to do rounds. J.A. 607. Mason

asked that officer for water and “to tell McKelvin to come and get [him].” Id. The officer

did not provide water, and McKelvin never came to get him. Id. About four hours into his

“one-hour recreational period,” Mason passed out and struck his head as he fell to the floor.

J.A. 295, 446. Jail medical staff responded to the scene, placed Mason on a stretcher, and

provided him with medical treatment for dehydration. J.A. 446. It wasn’t until medical

Volume II of the joint appendix contains a video file. It’s cited as “January 7

Video, at [the video’s timestamp].”

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staff arrived that McKelvin reentered the unit. J.A. 607. Rather than check on Mason’s

condition, McKelvin told Mason “not to say nothing about him disappearing on [Mason]

for so long.” Id.

Defendants only produced evidence for the first incident. For the second incident,

they claim they don’t “possess [the] video footage”—despite the two incidents occurring

just a week apart, at the same location, and under identical circumstances. J.A. 580–81.

But medical reports confirm that Mason had a “falling out at the phones.” J.A. 446. They

also indicate that Mason’s skin was dry and had “slight tenting,” and that he was provided

fluids before returning to his unit. Id.

Mason stated that those two days “will forever be days that haunt [him]

psychologically.” J.A. 619. He also explained that “since [he] fell and hit [his] head” he

hears “a certain sound that won’t go away” and has been left with “marks [from] where the

cuffs cut into [his] wrist.” J.A. 610.

II. Procedural History

As the majority recounts, Maj. Op. at 7–8, the district court granted much of the

defendants’ first motion for summary judgment, see Mason v. Talley, No. 1:21-cv-1118-LMB/JFA, 2023 WL 2619160, at *13 (E.D. Va. Mar. 22, 2023) (“Mason I”). But because

the record was not “sufficiently developed with respect to the allegations that plaintiff was

twice left in full restraints for extended periods of time,” the district court denied summary

judgment on that claim and Jones and McKelvin were “directed to produce further briefing

on that issue.” Id. at *1.

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After the district court reviewed briefing on the two shackling incidents, it granted

Jones and McKelvin’s renewed summary judgment motion and dismissed Mason’s case in

full. Mason v. McKelvin, No. 1:21-cv-1118-LMB-JFA, 2023 WL 6849982, at *7 (E.D.

Va. Oct. 17, 2023) (“Mason II”). The district court found there was no evidence that Mason

suffered a sufficiently serious injury to support an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at *6.

And even if there were, “the record does not allow for any inference that defendants were

deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s needs.” Id. The majority affirms the district court’s

ruling on the renewed motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Mason failed to

present evidence either that he was put at substantial risk of serious harm or that he

sustained a sufficiently serious injury to make out an Eighth Amendment claim. Maj. Op.

at 19–23. Further, the majority holds that even if the evidence was sufficient to support an

Eighth Amendment claim, McKelvin and Jones would have been entitled to qualified

immunity because “it was not clearly established in January 2022 that shackling a prisoner

to a stationary object indoors for several hours without providing him with bathroom access

or water was unconstitutional.” Id. at 26. 4

The majority in Part II also addresses whether the district court committed

reversible error by granting Jones and McKelvin’s renewed motion for summary judgment

without granting discovery. Maj. Op. at 8–10. In my view, Mason’s evidence currently in

the record is sufficient to reject Jones and McKelvin’s renewed motion for summary

judgment, and thus the additional evidence sought is not “essential” for Mason’s

opposition. See Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Harrods Ltd.

v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002)). Accordingly, while I

differ from the majority in my analysis of the issue, I would likewise find there was no

abuse of discretion.

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III. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

“We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo.”. Figueroa v.

Butterball, LLC, 164 F.4th 312, 321 (4th Cir. 2026) (citing Emmons v. City of Chesapeake,

982 F.3d 245, 250 (4th Cir. 2020)). “Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no

dispute of material fact and judgment is proper as a matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Emmons, 982 F.3d at 250). A fact is material if it “might affect

the outcome of the suit under the governing law,” and a genuine dispute exists “if the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”

See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A district court must

consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all

reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of that party. United States v. Diebold, Inc.,

369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (per curiam).

B. Jones and McKelvin Violated Mason’s Eighth Amendment Right

“The Constitution ‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’ but neither does it permit

inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (citation omitted) (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981)). So, “the treatment a prisoner receives in

prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the

Eighth Amendment.” Id. (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)). The

Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment includes “ ‘ “[t]he

unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” ’ ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 737 (2002)

(quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)). The Supreme Court has “said that

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‘[a]mong “unnecessary and wonton” inflictions of pain are those that “are totally without

penological justification.” ’ ” Id. (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346).

A prison official violates the Eighth Amendment when two requirements are met.

First, a plaintiff must either show that the confinement conditions inflict an “objectively,

sufficiently serious” harm that “deprive[s] prisoners of ‘the minimal civilized measure of

life’s necessities,’ ” Thorpe v. Clarke, 37 F.4th 926, 933 (4th Cir. 2022) (quoting Farmer,

511 U.S. at 834), “or demonstrate a substantial risk of such serious harm resulting from the

prisoner’s exposure to the challenged conditions,” De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630,

634 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 33–35). Second, the plaintiff must show

that the “officers subjectively acted with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety’

because they knew of but disregarded the inhumane treatment.” Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 933

(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834). A prison official is deliberately indifferent if “the

official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official

must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk

of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.

Here, both requirements are met. Mason’s Eighth Amendment right not to be

shackled to a “stationary object for a period of time that surpasses that necessary to quell a

threat or restore order” was violated. Hope, 536 U.S. at 736. That violation was

exacerbated by the length of the shackling, and the denial of water and bathroom breaks. I

address the objective and subjective requirements in turn.

1. Mason Suffered an Objectively Serious Harm

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Mason has demonstrated that his confinements caused him to suffer objectively

serious harms, where he was deprived of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.

At the very least, the shackling incidents posed a substantial risk that such harm would

occur.

At the outset, defendants offer no penological justification for chaining Mason to a

telephone for over six hours on his one-hour recreational break and then again for over four

hours on another one-hour recreational break. 5 The Supreme Court has recognized “that

‘[a]mong “unnecessary and wonton” inflictions of pain are those that “are totally without

penological justification.” ’ ” Hope, 536 U.S. at 737 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346),

and Jones and McKelvin’s treatment of Mason presents exactly that: an unjustified and

cruel infliction of pain.

Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Mason, he was twice shackled

to a telephone for a total of more than 10 hours without any justification. During the

shackling incidents, he was denied two of “life’s necessities,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347:

water and access to the bathroom. As a result of the lack of water, Mason fainted from

dehydration and hit his head, which caused him to hear “a certain sound that won’t go

away.” J.A. 610. From the restraints, Mason sustained cuts and scarring “where the cuffs

cut into [his] wrist.” Id. And from the denial of bathroom access, Mason was forced to

urinate on himself. J.A. 608. The “deprivation of bathroom breaks . . . create[] a risk of

While the majority states that “Mason was not shackled to the telephone as

punishment but because he asked to use the phone,” Maj. Op. at 20, this does not explain

the length of time Mason spent restrained.

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particular discomfort and humiliation,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 738, which degrade “the dignity

of man,” id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)). As a result of the shackling

incidents, Mason stated that he has sustained psychological pain and anxiety. J.A. 610.

While routine discomfort may be “part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their

offenses,” Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347, Mason’s prolonged shackling goes far beyond

discomfort. Accordingly, the unjustified treatment here “amounts to gratuitous infliction

of ‘wanton and unnecessary’ pain that [Supreme Court] precedent clearly prohibits.”

Hope, 536 U.S. at 738.

The district court concluded otherwise. It found that the video evidence did not

support Mason’s allegations that he urinated on himself because he was “facing away from

the camera, and when he returns to face forward, there is no liquid visible on the ground or

stains on his clothes.” J.A. 632–33. Yet “[a] court may not disregard contrary evidence

just because there is a video that lines up with ‘a governmental officer’s version of events’

or ‘even makes it unlikely that the plaintiff’s account is true.’ ” Alexander v. Connor, 105

F.4th 174, 179 (4th Cir. 2024) (quoting Witt v. W. Va. State Police, Troop 2, 633 F,3d 272,

276 (4th Cir. 2011)). Further, “a court considering a defendant’s summary judgment

motion may discount a plaintiff’s first-hand account ‘only [1] when there is evidence . . . of

undisputed authenticity that [2] shows some material element of the plaintiff’s account to

be blatantly and demonstrably false’ [3] such ‘that no reasonable jury could’ credit the

plaintiff’s version of events.” Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting Harris v. Pittman, 927 F.3d

266, 276 (4th Cir. 2019)); see also Doriety for Est. of Crenshaw v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670,

679 (4th Cir. 2024) (“As the phrase ‘blatantly contradicts’ implies, ‘[t]his standard “is a

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very difficult one to satisfy” ’ and requires that the plaintiff’s version of events be ‘utterly

discredited’ by the video recording.” (alteration in original)). Here, none of those elements

are met. The district court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to the moving party,

rather than the nonmoving party. The video provided by defendants was low resolution;

Mason was wearing dark clothing; and the video actually matches up with what Mason

alleges: that he turned around and urinated on himself. See January 7 Video, at 5:30:53.

More importantly, Mason’s Eighth Amendment rights were not violated solely

because he was denied bathroom access. See Mason II, 2023 WL 6849982, at *6 n.13

(district court opinion citing cases for the proposition that urinating on oneself isn’t enough

to trigger an Eighth Amendment violation); Maj. Op at 21–22 (asserting same). It was the

totality of Mason’s circumstances, including the lack of penological justification, length of

restricted confinement, the fainting from dehydration which resulted in hitting his head,

the sustained scarring on his wrists from the shackles, and the denial of bathroom access.

See Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 362–63 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[A] court considering an

Eighth Amendment challenge . . . must examine the totality of the circumstances.”); see

also Hope, 536 U.S. at 738 (finding the Eighth Amendment violation “obvious” where the

plaintiff, “[d]espite the clear lack of an emergency situation,” had been subjected “to a

substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and the

restricted position of confinement for a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat

of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that

created a risk of particular discomfort and humiliation”).

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Yet even if I were to agree that Mason did not suffer objectively serious harms, the

Eighth Amendment is still implicated when there is “a substantial risk of such serious harm

resulting from the prisoner’s exposure to the challenged conditions.” De’Lonta, 330 F.3d

at 634 (citing Helling, 509 U.S. at 33–35). It requires little inference to conclude that

shackling a person to a stationary object for multiple hours while denying them basic

necessities such as water, bathroom access, and mobility creates a substantial risk of harm.

See Hope, 536 U.S. at 736–37. Mason’s collapse from dehydration and resulting alleged

head injury demonstrate, at minimum, how easily those conditions could have produced

even more severe consequences.

Thus, for the reasons above, I would have held that the objective requirement of the

Eighth Amendment was met.

2. Defendants Can Be Liable for Shackling Mason

The Eighth Amendment also requires a showing that a prison official “subjectively

acted with ‘deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety’ because they knew of but

disregarded the inhumane treatment.” Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 933 (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834). A “state of mind can be inferred from the fact that the risk of harm is obvious.”

Hope, 536 U.S. at 730. To deny Mason life’s basic necessities while shackling him to a

stationary object for a prolonged period presents an obvious risk of harm.

Further, there is no question that Jones and McKelvin knew that Mason was chained

to the phone for hours. After all, they were the ones who shackled and left him there. The

second shackling incident only reinforces that knowledge. Mason explicitly begged

McKelvin not to chain him to the phone for hours, J.A. 602, as had happened to him only

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days before. Yet McKelvin did so anyway. Tellingly, after Mason fainted, McKelvin told

Mason “not to say nothing about him disappearing on [Mason] for so long.” J.A. 607. The

jail’s own use of restraints policy further underscores their underlying knowledge,

providing that restraints should only be used “when the need arises,” and “shall be applied

only for the amount of time that is absolutely necessary.” J.A. 553.

Beyond Jones and McKelvin knowing about this inhumane treatment, they also

disregarded it. Mason stated that during both shackling incidents, his repeated requests for

water, bathroom access, and removal of the chains were denied. See J.A. 601 (“I told

[Jones] I needed to use the restroom once again.”); J.A. 602 (“I told him to take me off the

chains.”); J.A. 605 (explaining that he asked Jones “to be let off,” to which Jones later

responded, “not right now”); J.A. 606 (writing that he was denied both the bathroom and

water “on multiple occasions”).

Accordingly, I would have held that a reasonable jury could have found that Jones

and McKelvin knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to Mason’s health and safety.

C. Jones and McKelvin Are Not Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Qualified immunity may nevertheless shield Jones and McKelvin from liability for

their constitutionally impermissible conduct, see Hope, 536 U.S. at 739, as it protects

officials’ conduct “if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known,’ ” id. (quoting

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).

To be clearly established, “existing precedent must have placed the statutory or

constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011).

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Yet defendants “can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in

novel factual circumstances,” so long as the law provided “fair warning” that their conduct

was unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. So, “[t]here is no requirement that the ‘very

action in question [must have] previously been held unlawful’ for a reasonable official to

have notice that his conduct violated that right.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 236

(4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 739). And importantly, “while the [Supreme]

Court has regularly insisted on highly particularized law in the Fourth Amendment context,

it has not done the same with Eighth Amendment claims.” Thorpe, 37 F.4th at 940

(collecting cases).

Jones and McKelvin violated a clearly established right. Accordingly, they should

not be shielded by qualified immunity. Here, the right not to be shackled “to a hitching

post or similar stationary object for a period of time that surpasses that necessary to quell

a threat or restore order” is clearly established. Hope, 536 U.S. at 736.

In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002), plaintiff-inmate Larry Hope was twice

shackled to a hitching post. Id. at 733. The first time, Hope was handcuffed to a hitching

post for two hours after getting into an argument with another inmate. Id. at 734. During

those two hours, “the handcuffs cut into his wrist” and “his arms were [shackled] above

shoulder height and grew tired.” Id. The second time, after a verbal exchange between

Hope and a guard that “led to a wrestling match,” Hope was handcuffed and shackled to a

hitching post shirtless for seven hours under the sun. Id. at 734–35. During those seven

hours, “he was given water only once or twice and was given no bathroom breaks.” Id. at

735.

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After finding that the Eighth Amendment violation was “obvious,” id. at 738, the

Supreme Court held that the use of the hitching post as alleged by Hope “violated clearly

established law,” id. at 744. The Supreme Court looked to binding precedent in the

Eleventh Circuit, where Hope’s case originated, and concluded these cases provided the

necessary fair warning. See id. at 741–44. The first case was Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d

1291 (5th Cir. 1974), 6 which “squarely held that several of those ‘forms of corporal

punishment run afoul of the Eighth Amendment [and] offend contemporary concepts of

decency, human dignity, and precepts of civilization which we profess to possess.’ ” Hope,

536 U.S. at 742 (alteration in original) (quoting Gates, 501 F.2d at 1306). Among the

forms of punishment in Gates “were ‘handcuffing inmates to the fence and to cells for long

periods of time, . . . and forcing inmates to stand, sit or lie on crates, stumps, or otherwise

maintain awkward positions for prolonged periods.’ ” Id. (quoting Gates, 501 F.2d at

1306). The second case was Ort v. White, 813 F.2d 318 (11th Cir. 1987). While Hope’s

facts are “not identical” to Ort’s, the Supreme Court concluded that Ort’s premise that a

constitutional violation may be present when the denial of water “reached a point of

severity such that the recalcitrant prisoner’s health was at risk” had “clear applicability.”

Hope, 536 U.S. at 743 (citing Ort, 813 F.2d at 324, 326). Accordingly, Hope held that

Gates and Ort were “sufficient to preclude the defense of qualified immunity at the

summary judgment stage.” Id. at 746.

“Cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit before 1981 are

binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit today.” Hope, 536 U.S. at 742 (citing Bonner v.

Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206 (11th Cir. 1981)).

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Just as Gates and Ort provided fair warning to the guards in Hope, Hope provided

fair warning to the guards here that their conduct was unconstitutional. Under Hope,

Mason has a clearly established Eighth Amendment right not to be shackled for prolonged

periods of time while denied minimal life necessities like water and bathroom access.

Further, the facts and “particular conduct” in Hope are sufficiently analogous to the

conduct here. Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

Mason and Hope were each shackled on two separate occasions and for comparable

total durations—over 10 hours for Mason and over nine hours for Hope. Both Hope and

Mason were denied bathroom access for prolonged periods. As a result, Mason stated that

he urinated on himself. Further, both were largely denied access to water: while Hope

received water once or twice during his shackling, Mason received no water at all. And

for both, the prolonged shackling resulted in cuts or marks on their wrists. These factual

parallels are more than sufficient to place the constitutional violation beyond debate.

The majority and the defendants point to various distinctions, such as that Hope was

secured without his shirt on, with the ability to move his arms more freely. Maj. Op. at

19–21; Appellee’s Br. (ECF No. 54) at 67–68. 7 But “for the purpose of providing fair

notice to reasonable officers administering punishment,” Hope, 536 U.S. at 742, such

distinctions are distinctions without a difference. And for me, they certainly do not alter

the conclusion that Jones and McKelvin’s unlawful conduct was clearly established.

Page numbers for citations to ECF documents utilize the page numbers in the

header on each document.

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IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, I would have held that a reasonable jury could have

concluded that Mason’s Eighth Amendment rights were clearly violated by the two

shackling incidents. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Omari Mason v. Kevin Talley

Authorities cited

Opinion · public domain