[Cite as Wisdom v. Oscar's Towing & Recovery, 2026-Ohio-3837.]
IN THE OHIO COURT OF APPEALS
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STARK COUNTY, OHIO
YALANDA WISDOM, Case No. 2026CA00129
Plaintiff - Appellant Opinion & Judgment Entry
-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
of Stark County, Case No. 2026CV00774
OSCAR'S TOWING & RECOVERY,
Judgment: Affirmed
Defendant - Appellee
Date of Judgment: September 28, 2026
BEFORE: Andrew J. King, Robert G. Montgomery, and David M. Gormley, Judges
APPEARANCES: Yalanda Wisdom briefed the case on her own behalf as PlaintiffAppellant; Adam M. Runkle and Frank A. Lucas (Starkey & Runkle, LLC), Hartville, Ohio, for Defendant-Appellee.
Gormley, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff Yalanda Wisdom appeals the trial court’s judgment dismissing her
complaint against defendant Oscar’s Towing & Recovery. The towing company, which had
towed Wisdom’s vehicle at the direction of a law-enforcement agency, kept that vehicle for
several months waiting for Wisdom to pay accrued towing and storage fees. Because Wisdom
failed to allege in her complaint a claim against Oscar’s Towing that would relieve her of the
obligation to pay those fees, we affirm the trial court’s judgment dismissing Wisdom’s
complaint.
The Key Facts
{¶2} In October 2025, Wisdom’s vehicle, which she was driving when she allegedly
committed a traffic offense, was towed by Oscar’s Towing at the direction of a lawenforcement agency. In December 2025, the Canton Municipal Court issued an order allowing the vehicle to be released. Oscar’s Towing, though, refused to release the vehicle to
Wisdom until she paid any accrued towing and storage fees.
{¶3} Wisdom filed a complaint seeking damages from Oscar’s Towing’s for refusing
to return her vehicle. Wisdom attached to her complaint a copy of the vehicle-release order
issued by the Canton Municipal Court. Wisdom filed, as well, a motion requesting the
immediate release of the vehicle. The trial court promptly denied that motion, finding that
the Canton Municipal Court, in addressing a similar request that Wisdom had filed there, had
determined that any release order did not relieve Wisdom of her obligation to pay the towing
company’s fees.
{¶4} Oscar’s Towing then filed in the trial court a motion to dismiss Wisdom’s
complaint for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The trial court
granted the motion and dismissed Wisdom’s complaint with prejudice. Wisdom now
appeals.
Deficiencies in Wisdom’s Appellate Brief
{¶5} We begin by addressing several shortcomings in Wisdom’s appellate brief and
in the presentation of the issues that she asks us to review.
{¶6} In several key ways, Wisdom had failed to comply with Appellate Rule 16. Her
brief does not contain: a table of contents with page references (App.R. 16(A)(1)); a table of
cases, statutes, and other authorities cited, along with references to the pages of the brief where
those authorities are cited (App.R. 16(A)(2)); a statement of the assignments of error, together
with reference to the place in the record where each alleged error is reflected (App.R.
16(A)(3)); a statement of the issues presented for review, along with references to the
assignments of error to which each issue relates (App.R. 16(A)(4)); a statement of facts relevant to the assignments of error, together with appropriate references to the record
(App.R. 16(A)(6)); and an argument containing appellant’s contentions with respect to each
assignment of error and the reasons in support of those contentions, along with citations to
the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record on which the appellant relies (App.R.
16(A)(7)).
{¶7} This court “may disregard an assignment of error presented for review if the
party raising it fails to identify in the record the error on which the assignment of error is based
or fails to argue the assignment separately in the brief.” App.R. 12(A)(2). We understand
that Wisdom has filed this appeal without the assistance of legal counsel, but the Supreme
Court of Ohio has “repeatedly declared that ‘pro se litigants . . . must follow the same
procedures as litigants represented by counsel.’” State ex rel. Neil v. French, 2018-Ohio-2692, ¶
10, quoting State ex rel. Gessner v. Vore, 2009-Ohio-4150, ¶ 5. Non-attorney litigants who
choose to represent themselves in court are also “‘presumed to have knowledge of the law
and legal procedures and . . . are held to the same standard as litigants who are represented
by counsel.’” State ex rel. Fuller v. Mengel, 2003-Ohio-6448, ¶ 10, quoting Sabouri v. Ohio Dept.
of Job & Family Servs., 145 Ohio App.3d 651, 654 (10th Dist. 2001).
{¶8} Wisdom tells us that she has been unable to afford an attorney to assist her in
the trial court and now here. Without the assistance of counsel, Wisdom has attempted to
present her arguments to the court in a manner that conforms with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Although the deficiencies in Wisdom’s brief could reasonably justify the dismissal
of her appeal, we find that Wisdom has provided enough information to allow us to discern
the assignments of error that she intends to present. In the “interests of justice and finality,
we elect to review the appeal.” Foster v. Stuff, 2025-Ohio-5584, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.). Wisdom Has Failed to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted
{¶9} Wisdom appeals the trial court’s judgment granting the towing company’s
motion to dismiss her complaint. The trial court found that Wisdom’s complaint failed to
state any claims upon which relief could be granted.
{¶10} Notably, of course, Ohio is a notice-pleading state, and so “a plaintiff is not
required to prove his or her case at the pleading stage.” York v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, 60
Ohio St.3d 143, 144–145 (1991). Civil Rule 8(A) requires only “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the party is entitled to relief.”
{¶11} When considering, under Civil Rule 12(B)(6), a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a trial court determines whether, based on the
allegations in the pleading, the plaintiff can prove any set of facts entitling him to recovery.
O’Brien v. Univ. Community Tenants Union, Inc., 42 Ohio St.2d 242, 245 (1975). All factual
allegations in the pleading must be taken as true, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn
in favor of the nonmoving party. Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192 (1988).
Unsupported conclusions in a pleading, however, are not considered true and are not
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. Armatas v. Haws, 2018-Ohio-1371, ¶ 17 (5th Dist.)
citing State ex rel. Hickman v. Capots, 45 Ohio St.3d 324 (1989). We review anew a trial court’s
decision granting a motion to dismiss and give no deference to that judgment. Armatas v.
Aultman Hospital, 2022-Ohio-4376, ¶ 11 (5th Dist.).
{¶12} “[C]ourts cannot rely on evidence or allegations outside the complaint to
determine a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion.” State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207
(1997). A court may, however, consider material incorporated within the complaint as part of that pleading without the need to convert the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion into a summaryjudgment motion. Midgett v. Sheldon, 2021-Ohio-3096, ¶ 10 (5th Dist.).
{¶13} Because Wisdom’s appellate brief does not comply with the Rules of Appellate
Procedure by setting forth assignments of error for our review, we have on our own, from the
narrative argument in Wisdom’s appellate brief, identified the following assignments of error.
{¶14} We first note that Wisdom’s appellate brief relies on facts that are not in the
record. “[T]his Court does not have discretion and must disregard facts, arguments, or
evidence presented in the appellate brief when those facts, arguments, or evidence were not
presented to the trial court.” State v. McRae, 2026-Ohio-2631, ¶ 14 (5th Dist.). “[A] reviewing
court cannot add matter to the record before it that was not a part of the trial court’s
proceedings” and then “decide the appeal on the basis of the new matter.” State v. Hooks, 92
Ohio St.3d 83, 83 (2001). We will, therefore, disregard any facts in Wisdom’s appellate brief
that are not drawn from the trial-court record. McRae at ¶ 14.
Wisdom Failed to Plead a Violation of an Ohio Administrative Rule or Statute
{¶15} Wisdom first argues that Oscar’s Towing has charged a daily storage fee that
exceeds what is permitted under Ohio law. Wisdom alleged in her complaint that the towing
company charged a daily rate of $40, which exceeds, she says, a $22 daily rate prescribed by
the Ohio Administrative Code.
{¶16} Wisdom acknowledged in her complaint that her vehicle was towed by the
towing company at the direction of a law-enforcement agency after she allegedly committed
a traffic offense that is not at issue here. Wisdom relies on the maximum fees for towing and
storage that are set forth in Ohio Administrative Code 4901:2-24-03. That rule applies to
charges by either towing services or storage facilities for the removal of vehicles under R.C. 4513.60 and R.C. 4513.601. The statutes referred to in the rule govern the removal and
storage of vehicles that have been left on private property. See R.C. 4513.60 and R.C.
4513.601.
{¶17} Because Wisdom’s vehicle was not towed under the circumstances described
in R.C. 4513.60 and R.C. 4513.601, the fees set forth in Ohio Administrative Code 4901:2-24-03 do not apply. Oscar’s Towing cannot be found to have violated a rule that does not
apply to the towed-from-a-public-roadway circumstance described in Wisdom’s complaint.
{¶18} Wisdom’s argument that she is entitled to damages under R.C. 4513.611 does
not fare any better. That statute provides for civil actions against towing services and storage
facilities for specified violations. In her complaint, Wisdom alleged that Oscar’s Towing
refused to release her vehicle and demanded illegal fees, thereby committing what she
describes as a “major violation” under R.C. 4513.611(A)(2).
{¶19} “Major violations” listed in the statute include failing to give notification that
an owner may trigger the immediate release of a vehicle by paying a fee of “not more than
one-half of the fee for the removal of the vehicle,” as well as failing to release a vehicle upon
receiving this payment. R.C. 4513.611(A)(2)(a) and (b). Other “major violations” include
refusing to allow a vehicle owner to reclaim a vehicle upon the payment of applicable fees
established by the Public Utilities Commission, refusing to allow a vehicle owner to retrieve
personal items from a vehicle, failing to provide notice to the appropriate law-enforcement
agency within two hours of removing a vehicle, failing to send notice to the owner that the
vehicle has been towed, and failing to display the certificate number from the towing
company’s certificate of public convenience and necessity. R.C. 4513.611(A)(2)(c)–(g).
{¶20} Wisdom did not allege that she paid any fees to Oscar’s Towing and instead
argued that she is not responsible for paying the fees. And Wisdom did not allege in her
complaint any of the other violations in R.C. 4513.611(A)(2). It is not a violation of that
statute for Oscar’s Towing to refuse to release Wisdom’s vehicle until she pays the towing
and storage fees.
{¶21} Because Wisdom failed to plead a violation of Ohio Administrative Code
4901:2-24-03 or R.C. 4513.611, her complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted for excessive fees or for a “major violation.”
Wisdom Failed to State a Claim for Relief Based on a Violation of the Municipal Court’s
Order
{¶22} Wisdom next argues that Oscar’s Towing has continued to charge a daily
storage fee in violation of an order issued by the Canton Municipal Court in her underlying
traffic case. Wisdom alleged in her complaint that the towing company’s refusal to comply
with the court’s order has caused monetary damage to her.
{¶23} The judge who presided over Wisdom’s traffic case issued a “Judgment Entry
(Relief from Vehicle Penalty)” in December 2025. That entry ordered that Wisdom’s vehicle
and license plates be released to her, but it said nothing about the payment of any towing and
storage fees.
{¶24} The municipal court’s vehicle-release order could not, in fact, address the issue
that Wisdom raises here because a trial court in a criminal or traffic case has no authority to
deprive a third party, such as a towing company, of the possession of personal property in
which that party has asserted an interest. State v. White, 2018-Ohio-2573, ¶ 15 (2d Dist.). See
also Wacksman v. Harrell, 174 Ohio St. 338, 342 (1963) (“it is axiomatic that one may not be
deprived of property in his possession in a proceeding to which he is not a party”). Oscar’s Towing had no opportunity to assert its rights in Wisdom’s municipal-court case because that
towing company was not a party to that case.
{¶25} In a situation where a law-enforcement agency directs a third party to tow a
vehicle in connection with a criminal or traffic charge, the remedy for an owner seeking to
recover the vehicle lies not in the criminal or traffic case but rather in an appropriate civil
proceeding. White at ¶ 15, citing State v. Labriola, 1983 Ohio App. LEXIS 14407, *6 (9th Dist.
Feb. 9, 1983). Although Wisdom sought relief through a civil proceeding, she wrongly relies
on the municipal court’s traffic-case judgment entry as the basis for her claim that Oscar’s
Towing has refused to comply with that court’s vehicle-release order.
{¶26} Because the municipal-court order does not govern the fee-related dispute
between Wisdom and the towing company, Wisdom’s complaint alleging a violation of that
order does not state a claim upon which any relief could be granted.
Wisdom Failed to State a Claim for Conversion
{¶27} Wisdom also argues that Oscar’s Towing has wrongly converted her property
by demanding the full payment of fees that she cannot afford. We construe this argument as
one that assigns error to the trial court’s decision to dismiss Wisdom’s conversion claim.
{¶28} Conversion is defined as “the wrongful exercise of dominion over property to
the exclusion of the rights of the owner” or the act of “withholding it from his possession
under a claim inconsistent with his rights.” Joyce v. General Motors Corp., 49 Ohio St.3d 93, 96
(1990). Courts generally find that the following three elements must be established to prove
a claim for conversion: “(1) a defendant’s exercise of dominion or control; (2) over a plaintiff's
property; and (3) in a manner inconsistent with the plaintiff’s rights of ownership.” Heflin v. Ossman, 2005-Ohio-6876, ¶ 20 (5th Dist.), citing Cozmyk Ent., Inc. v. Hoy, 1997 Ohio App.
LEXIS 2864, *12 (10th Dist. June 30, 1997).
{¶29} Wisdom contends that a law-enforcement agency acted under the authority
provided in R.C. 4513.61 when it ordered her vehicle to be towed. The circumstances of the
underlying offense and why the law-enforcement agency caused Wisdom’s car to be towed
are not in the record before this court. Even if we assume that the law-enforcement agency
acted under the authority of R.C. 4513.61 in arranging for the removal of Wisdom’s vehicle
by a towing service, that statute provides that the vehicle owner “is responsible for payment
of any expenses or charges incurred in its removal and storage.” R.C. 4513.61(C)(2).
{¶30} Wisdom admits that she has not paid the towing and storage fees, and we agree
with the trial court that her failure to do so defeats any claim for conversion. Although
Oscar’s Towing is exercising control over Wisdom’s vehicle, that control cannot be described
as inconsistent with Wisdom’s right of ownership where she has failed to pay the fees that she
is required by law to pay.
{¶31} For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County
is affirmed. Costs are to be paid by Appellant Yalanda Wisdom.
By: Gormley, J.;
King, P.J. and
Montgomery, J. concur.