IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana
T.M., FILED
Appellant-Respondent Sep 29 2026, 9:58 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
v. and Tax Court
State of Indiana,
Appellee-Petitioner
September 29, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
26A-JV-645
Appeal from the Gibson Circuit Court
The Honorable Jeffrey Meade, Judge
Juvenile Court Cause Nos.
26C01-2504-JD-79
26C01-2506-JD-132
Opinion by Judge DeBoer
Judges Foley and Felix concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 1 of 9
DeBoer, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] T.M. appeals his placement in the Department of Correction (DOC) following
his delinquency adjudications, arguing it was not the least restrictive option
available. We find that the juvenile court erroneously concluded it could not
grant wardship to the person with whom T.M. lived in the months before the
dispositional hearing. We thus reverse and remand for further proceedings.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On April 18, 2025, sixteen-year-old T.M. strangled his brother while they were
arguing. When T.M.’s stepfather intervened, T.M. hit him repeatedly on the
head. Consequently, on April 21 the State initiated a delinquency action under
Cause 26C01-2504-JD-79, alleging T.M.’s actions, if committed by an adult,
1
would constitute one count of Level 6 felony strangulation and two counts of
2
Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. At a review hearing on May 9, T.M.
advised the juvenile court he was scheduled to enter Hoosier Youth Academy
3
(the Academy) in July. The court dismissed the case at the State’s request.
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c) (2020).
2
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) (2021).
3
In order for T.M. to attend the Academy, he couldn’t have pending charges.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 2 of 9 [3] In June, T.M., who had been drinking alcohol, shoved his sister during an
argument, prompting the State to file a second delinquency action under Cause
26C01-2506-JD-132. This petition alleged T.M. committed acts constituting
4
domestic battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony, and
5
minor consumption of alcohol, a Class C misdemeanor. At a hearing on June
18, T.M again informed the juvenile court he would start the Academy in July,
and for a second time, the State agreed to dismiss the case pending no negative
reports. The case was ultimately dismissed on July 17.
[4] On August 11, the State filed a motion to reopen both cases because T.M. ran
away from the Academy. At T.M.’s September 12 hearing, he told the juvenile
court that since leaving the Academy, he (1) participated in Life in Motion, a
health and wellness clinic for mental illness; (2) was hospitalized at St.
Vincent’s, resulting in a referral to Options, a residential mental health facility;
and (3) was expelled from Gibson Southern High School, but was completing
his schoolwork at home. He also informed the court that he had changed
medications and was active in counseling and therapy. T.M. admitted the
allegations, and the court entered true findings on all counts and set the cases
for disposition on October 24.
4
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1), (b)(3) (2021).
5
Ind. Code § 7.1-5-7-7(a)(2) (2014).
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 3 of 9 [5] At disposition, T.M. provided various updates, including that he was working
at Rural King and living with Magen Coates, his friend’s mother, and her
family. With Coates, T.M. was completing “coping skills work and workbooks
on emotional regulation,” as well as catching up on schoolwork that he missed
due to his expulsion. Transcript at 45. Probation Officer Tara Kilps testified
about T.M.’s current living situation and expulsion from school, as well as his
hospitalization and participation in mental health services and other therapy.
Kilps recommended T.M. be placed in Transitions, a facility in Indianapolis
offering treatment for substance abuse and mental health issues. The State
requested the juvenile court continue the matter for Kilps to pursue T.M.’s
placement at Transitions. The court agreed and rescheduled the hearing.
[6] At the November 10 hearing, T.M. provided the juvenile court with an article
about Coates’ farm and workbooks he had completed. T.M. requested the
court reschedule the matter so he could continue making progress with Coates.
The court reset the hearing again. When the parties reconvened on December
10, the juvenile court proceeded with placement determination and reviewed
the Predispositional Report (PDR), noting T.M. had a high risk of reoffending.
T.M. advised the court he continued to volunteer with Coates at the Evansville
Rescue Mission, was actively seeking employment, and completed his makeup
schoolwork. Despite this, the State noted that Kilps was unable to find a
residential treatment facility for T.M. “because his medications and his needs
are so high that some of the facilities did not even want to take him” and
recommended placement in the DOC. Id. at 77. In response, the court
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 4 of 9
narrowed down T.M.’s placement options to the DOC or probation with
intensive outpatient treatment. T.M., Coates, and T.M.’s mother (Mother)
favored the latter. Ultimately, the court continued the matter once more to
allow T.M. additional time to make progress with Coates.
[7] On February 11, the parties first met with the judge in chambers and discussed
establishing a guardianship for T.M. to effectuate disposition in both cases.
T.M. requested an additional continuance to explore guardianship and noted
that since the last hearing, he had completed group therapy at Deaconess
Outpatient Youth. The State objected. The court denied the continuance and
asked for the opinions of everyone involved, including Mother, Coates, and
6
Kilps.
[8] Mother believed T.M. should be placed in the DOC because the level of help he
required was beyond her capabilities. Coates recommended continuing
placement with her or placing him on probation and “get[ting] him in some
kind of educational center” to address his untreated learning disability. Id. at
100. At that point, the juvenile court asked Mother if she would agree to
Coates having guardianship of T.M., to which she said no. Kilps
recommended the DOC and again noted she had tried to find residential
6
The opinions given here and all updates and recommendations given in the prior dispositional hearings—
except for Kilps’ testimony on October 24—were all unsworn statements.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 5 of 9
placement for T.M. but his “mental health was so severely compromised that
they wouldn’t take him[.]” Id. at 102.
[9] In closing, the State acknowledged Coates’ efforts to help T.M. but argued
placing him with Coates would put him in “legal limbo” since she wasn’t his
guardian or a party to the proceedings. Id. at 105. Ultimately, the State
recommended placement in the DOC. In response, T.M. requested placement
with Coates, whom he believed provided enough structure to meet his needs.
The juvenile court reasoned that Coates did not have legal standing—
guardianship or custody of T.M.—and the court did not have jurisdiction over
Coates. The court concluded Coates was not a “legal, viable option” and
placed T.M. in DOC custody. Id. at 110. T.M. now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[10] T.M. argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it made him a ward of
the DOC instead of placing him with Coates. A juvenile court has broad
discretion when determining the disposition of a juvenile delinquency
adjudication. A.F. v. State, 247 N.E.3d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). This
discretion is “subject to the statutory considerations of the child’s welfare,
community safety, and the policy favoring the least harsh disposition.” Id.
(quoting Q.H. v. State, 216 N.E.3d 1197, 1200 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)). We will
reverse the court’s judgment only if it abused its discretion “by misinterpreting
the law or ‘if its decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and
circumstances before it.’” G.W. v. State, 231 N.E.3d 184, 188 (Ind. 2024)
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 6 of 9
(quoting T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023)). In our review, we
neither judge witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence. A.F., 247 N.E.3d at
843.
[11] Here, we find that the juvenile court abused its discretion by misinterpreting the
disposition options available to it under Indiana Code section 31-37-19-6.
Under that statue, a dispositional decree may, among other things:
(D) Remove the child from the child’s home and place the child
in another home . . . [; and]
(E) Award wardship to a:
(i) person, other than the department . . . .
7
Ind. Code § 31-37-19-6(b)(2)(D), (b)(2)(E)(i) (2023). When presented with the
option of placing T.M. with Coates, the court determined it could not do so
because she did not have guardianship or custody of T.M. and the court did not
have jurisdiction over her as a non-party. But section 31-37-19-6 plainly
authorizes the court to place T.M. in Coates’ home and grant wardship to her,
provided that placement was “consistent with the safety of the community and
8
the best interest of the child.” J.T. v. State, 111 N.E.3d 1019, 1026 (Ind. Ct.
7
T.M. points to this same language in Indiana Code section 31-37-19-1 (2023). But that section applies to
adjudications under 31-37-2. T.M. was adjudicated delinquent under 31-37-1.
8
Placement with Coates would also be subject to other statutory prerequisites, such as criminal background
check requirements under Indiana Code section 31-37-19-6.5. We express no opinion on whether Coates
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 7 of 9
App. 2018) (quoting D.S. v. State, 829 N.E.2d 1081, 1085 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)),
trans. denied; see also Ind. Code 31-37-18-6 (1997). Coates is a person, and her
home constitutes “another home.” I.C. § 31-37-19-6(b)(2)(D). Not only does
the State offer no legal authority indicating that placing T.M. with Coates
would run afoul of the statute, but it offers no argument whatsoever on this
subject.
[12] As a result of its incorrect interpretation of the juvenile code, the court did not
explore placing T.M. with Coates and instead concluded the only viable
disposition was placement in the DOC. We are not confident, however, that
the court would have made the same decision had it correctly interpreted
section 31-37-19-6. Indeed, T.M. lived with Coates from at least October 24,
2025, until February 11, 2026. At each of the four dispositional hearings, T.M.
provided the court with positive updates, all stemming from his stay with
Coates, including volunteering at the Evansville Rescue Mission and
completion of skills workbooks, makeup schoolwork, and group therapy at
Deaconess Outpatient Youth. In addition, T.M. was actively volunteering with
Coates and seeking employment. Due in part to this progress and hoping to
9
prolong it, the court continued the dispositional hearing three times.
satisfies these requirements, as that is beyond the scope of the issues presented on appeal and should be
addressed by the court on remand.
9
We acknowledge the continuances also stemmed in part from Kilps’ determination to secure T.M.’s
placement in a residential treatment facility, which ultimately did not come to fruition.
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 8 of 9 [13] In sum, the juvenile court’s decision was significantly impacted by its
misunderstanding of the law, which constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Conclusion
[14] For these reasons, we reverse the juvenile court’s commitment of T.M. to the
DOC and remand to consider whether placement with Coates is consistent with
the safety of the community and in T.M.’s best interest.
[15] Reversed and remanded.
Foley, J., and Felix, J., concur.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Riley L. Parr
Lebanon, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Indiana Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
John R. Oosterhoff
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana Opinion 26A-JV-645 September 29, 2026 Page 9 of 9