UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OLUBUKUNOLA ALAO,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 24-784 (TJK)
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
In March 2024, Olubukunola Alao, proceeding pro se, sued several components of the
District of Columbia government, including her former employer, the Department of Health. She
asserted claims of discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA. The District of Columbia moved to dismiss in
part, and the Court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. A few months later, the Court
granted Alao’s leave to amend her complaint. That amendment recycled some of her dismissed
claims, brought new ADA ones, challenged the results of her administrative proceeding before the
D.C. Office of Human Rights, and—for whatever reason—abandoned claims the Court had held
survived the District’s motion to dismiss. The District of Columbia—now the only named Defendant—again moves to dismiss in part. The result is the same: the Court will grant the motion
in part and deny it in part.
I. Background
Alao sued in March 2024, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). See ECF Nos. 1, 8. Her original complaint
alleged that her former supervisor, Dr. Sharon Lewis, and other employees at the District of Columbia Department of Health (“DOH”), “‘denied [her] reasonable accommodation’ for her disability; that she endured changes to the ‘terms and conditions’ of her employment because of
her ‘race, disability, national origin, and retaliation’; that she was ‘demoted’ because of ‘disability’
and ‘retaliation’; and that she suffered ‘wrongful termination.’” ECF No. 18 at 2 (quoting ECF
No. 8 at 6). In May 2024, the District of Columbia filed its partial motion to dismiss, which the
Court granted in part and denied in part. See ECF No. 9; ECF No. 18. The District then answered,
and the parties proceeded to discovery. See ECF Nos. 21, 24.
But five months later, Alao sought leave to further amend her complaint to, as she said,
“narrow [the] issues” to those contained in her 2023 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) right-to-sue letter. ECF No. 28. The Court granted her request and in December 2025,
Alao filed what is now her operative complaint. Minute Order of Oct. 22, 2025; see ECF No. 30
(“Compl.”).
Alao’s operative complaint, like many of her filings, is “hard to follow and often provide[s]
too little information for the Court to assess how specific allegations fit with her claims.” ECF
No. 18 at 2. But as best the Court can tell, she abandons several surviving claims from her prior
complaint, recycles others which the Court dismissed as unexhausted, and asserts fresh claims for
failure-to-accommodate and a hostile work environment based, in part, on new allegations.1 See
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Alao’s operative complaint and briefing omit reference to—and therefore appear to abandon—her claims for retaliation under Title VII and for retaliation and discrimination under the ADA, both of which the Court held survived the District’s prior motion to dismiss. See ECF No. 18 at 18–21. “If a plaintiff amends her complaint, the new pleading supersedes the old one” and “the original pleading no longer performs any function in the case.” Royal Canin U.S.A., Inc. v. Wullschleger, 604 U.S. 22, 35 (2025) (citation omitted). Thus, any claims not reasserted in an amended complaint are deemed “superseded and abandoned.” Rocha v. Brown & Gould, LLP, 101 F. Supp. 3d 52, 80 n.23 (D.D.C. 2015), aff’d, No. 15-7053, 2016 WL 11761481 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 30, 2016). True, courts often construe a pro se plaintiff’s “pleadings broadly, and presume[] that” amendments do not “abandon claims raised in the original complaint,” absent clear “inten[tion] that the latter document replace[s] the former.” Bradley v. Smith, 235 F.R.D. 125, 127 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting Logan v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 404 F. Supp. 2d 72, 74 n.1 (D.D.C.
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generally Compl. Specifically, Alao alleges that the DOH failed to accommodate her disability
under the ADA by denying her requests for an ergonomic chair and footstool, alternate work
schedule (“AWS”), and part-time work with a gradual increase in hours. Compl. at 1, 12, 20. She
also alleges that DOH unlawfully terminated her in retaliation for her accommodation requests, id.
at 29–39, and—maybe—that it created a hostile work environment, id. at 18; ECF No. 42 at 11.
Alao also devotes nearly half of the operative complaint to an attack on the way the D.C.
Office of Human Rights (“OHR”) handled her administrative case.2 See Compl. at 1–19. She
kicked off those proceedings in August 2014, when she cross-filed a discrimination charge against
the DOH with OHR and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging,
among other things, that the DOH failed to accommodate her disability by denying her request for
an ergonomic chair and footstool. See ECF No. 28-2 at 10, 24. OHR sustained that claim and,
after conciliation efforts failed, referred the case to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for an
evidentiary hearing. Id. at 25.
The ALJ concluded that Alao had demonstrated “that DOH failed to accommodate her
spinal stenosis . . . when [it] denied [her] requests for an ergonomic chair and footstool,” and
awarded her damages of $145.24 plus interest as reimbursement for purchasing those items herself.
Id. OHR then adopted the ALJ’s finding but remanded to a different ALJ for a supplemental
evidentiary hearing on damages. Id. at 45–49. After that hearing, the ALJ recommended an additional $1,331 award as reimbursement for Alao’s disability insurance premium payments plus
2005)). But here, Alao represents that her amended complaint “supersedes/nullifies any prior filed Complaint.” ECF No. 42 at 13.
2
Alao references several exhibits attached to her motion for leave to file it. See ECF Nos. 28-1, 28-2. Those exhibits include, among other things, a partial record of her OHR proceedings. See id.
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compounded interest. Id. at 13. OHR’s final order adopted the ALJ’s findings but granted a
slightly reduced damages award. Id. at 19.
Alao petitioned for review of OHR’s final order in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia asserting, among other things, that she was entitled to additional damages. See Alao v.
D.C. Dep’t of Health, 2023-CAB-5861, at 5 (D.C. Sup. Ct. Mar. 2, 2026).3 That court denied the
petition, holding that OHR did not err in adopting the ALJ’s findings, which were supported by
substantial evidence. See id. at 6–10. Alao now asks this Court to “review and overturn” OHR’s
final order, grant her a new hearing, and award her additional damages. Compl. at 2, 6. She asserts
that the second ALJ committed “deliberate[,] [e]gregious [p]rocedural [e]rror” in the supplemental
damages hearing, id. at 6, thereby depriving her of due process, ECF No. 42 at 5.
The District moves to dismiss all but one of Alao’s claims, on several grounds. See ECF
No. 37.4 The operative complaint, as noted above, is far from a model of pleading clarity, but the
Court has done its best to determine the claims Alao purports to assert and what allegations relate
to each claim. In the end, most of the claims the District challenges must be dismissed. The Court
will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.
II. Legal Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint
must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff states a facially plausible claim when she pleads “factual content that
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The Court may “take[] judicial notice of the [D.C.] Superior Court docket and its publicly available filings.” Wall v. Wingo, No. 25-cv-4537, 2026 WL 1763970, at *1 n.1 (D.D.C. June 18, 2026).
The District does not seek dismissal of Alao’s claim that the DOH failed to reasonably
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accommodate her by timely providing an ergonomic chair and footstool. Id. at 6 n.1.
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allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true “all well-pleaded
factual allegations” and “construes reasonable inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff’s
favor.” Sissel v. HHS, 760 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2014). But “mere conclusory statements” are not
enough to establish a plausible claim, and courts “are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Because Alao proceeds pro se, the Court construes her filings liberally. See Bowman v. Iddon, 848
F.3d 1034, 1039 (D.C. Cir. 2017). That means, among other things, considering factual allegations
from all her filings,5 not just her complaint. Brown v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 789 F.3d 146,
151–52 (D.C. Cir. 2015). But none of that absolves her of the need to plead facts that state a claim
for relief. See Bickford v. United States, 808 F. Supp. 2d 175, 179 (D.D.C. 2011).
III. Analysis
A. Alao’s Claims Challenging Her OHR Administrative Proceeding Must Be Dismissed as Either Claim Precluded or for Failure to State a Claim
As described above, most of Alao’s operative complaint consists of allegations about her
OHR administrative proceeding and the ALJ who presided over her supplemental damages hearing. See Compl. at 1–19. She asserts, among other things, that the ALJ did not award her enough
damages after a hearing laden with “unsubstantiated . . . disinformation” and “[e]gregious [p]rocedural [e]rror.” Id. at 6. She asks the Court to overturn the agency’s final order, grant her a new
hearing, and award her additional damages. Id.
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In addition to her opposition, Alao has also filed a surreply without the Court’s permission. See ECF No. 44. While a party generally cannot file a surreply without the Court’s leave, see Robinson v. Detroit News, Inc., 211 F. Supp. 2d 101, 113 (D.D.C. 2002), because the District has not moved to strike it, and in light of her pro se status, the Court considers the surreply to the extent that it clarifies the claims raised in the operative complaint. See Martinez v. Constellis/Triple Canopy, No. 20-cv-153, 2020 WL 5253851, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 3, 2020).
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The problem, as the District argues, is that Alao has already “petitioned for review of the
[ALJ’s] determination in D.C. Superior Court.” ECF No. 37 at 9 (citing Alao, 2023-CAB-5861).6
That court affirmed OHR’s final order and denied Alao’s petition. Alao, 2023-CAB-5861, at 10.
For that reason, Alao’s claims challenging that order are barred by “the doctrine of res judicata, or
claim preclusion.” Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Under that doctrine, a party is precluded from asserting a claim “if there has been prior litigation (1) involving
the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their privies, and (3) there has
been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent jurisdiction.” Id.; accord
Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C. 1989).
Alao’s claims asking the Court to “review and overturn” OHR’s final order and set aside
the ALJ’s findings satisfy all three elements. Compl. at 2. Alao petitioned for review in D.C.
Superior Court appealing OHR’s decision before she filed her operative complaint here.7 And, as
here, she asserted “that she is entitled to additional damages” and “ask[ed] the [c]ourt to dismiss
[the ALJ’s] decisions and order . . . [and] grant[] . . . a hearing” for additional damages. Alao,
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The District also argues that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over what is effectively “an appeal of [OHR’s] administrative proceedings.” ECF No. 37 at 8. Though the District cites no case law in support, it seemingly argues that District of Columbia regulations routing review of OHR decisions to the D.C. Superior Court divest this Court of jurisdiction. See ECF No. 37 at 8; D.C. Mun. Regs. Tit. 4, § 121. But federal district courts may “exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for on-the-record review of administrative decisions,” provided they are, as here, “so related to [the plaintiff’s] [federal] claims . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 165, 172 (1997) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)).
7
Alao named OHR and DOH—components of the District of Columbia that are not individually amenable to suit—as defendants in her Superior Court petition. See ECF No. 18 at 6 n.2 (“Unless a statute provides otherwise, ‘bodies within the District of Columbia government are not suable as separate entities’—in other words, they are ‘non sui juris.’”) (quoting Hunter v. D.C. Child & Fam. Servs. Agency, 710 F. Supp. 2d 152, 157 (D.D.C. 2010)). So claim preclusion’s second element is satisfied.
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2023-CAB-5861, at 5. The Superior Court denied Alao’s petition, “conclud[ing] that [OHR’s]
decision [was] supported by substantial evidence, . . . otherwise in accordance with law, and . . .
not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence in the record as a whole.” Id. at 10. That
is a final judgment on the merits. See Bagenstose v. Dist. of Columbia, 503 F. Supp. 2d 247, 261
(D.D.C. 2007), aff’d sub nom., No. 07-5293, 2008 WL 2396183 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2008) (“[A]
state administrative decision in the employment-discrimination context is entitled to preclusive
effect in a subsequent Title VII suit where that decision has been reviewed and affirmed by the
state courts.”). Thus, “[h]aving been affirmed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the OHR’s
determination[s] [are] entitled to preclusive effect.”8 Id.
Alao also alleges that the ALJ “denied [her] Due Process” by holding a hearing marred by
“procedural error.” ECF No. 42 at 5.9 But she does not allege with any specificity what “procedural error” the ALJ committed. Rather, she says the ALJ denied her “the opportunity to . . .
8
The District does not assert claim preclusion as a basis to dismiss Alao’s OHR-based claim. That is no wonder—the D.C. Superior Court decision denying Alao’s petition came after the District filed its latest motion to dismiss. But where, as here, “a court is on notice that it,” or another court, “has previously decided the issue presented, the court may dismiss the action sua sponte, even though the defense has not been raised. This result is fully consistent with the policies underlying res judicata: it is not based solely on the defendant’s interest in avoiding the burdens of twice defending a suit, but is also based on the avoidance of unnecessary judicial waste.” Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412 (2000) (citation omitted); see also Steele v. United States, 144 F.4th 316, 326 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (“[A] complaint that discloses all necessary elements of preclusion is ripe for dismissal.”).
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The District argues that Alao’s due process claim, raised for the first time in her opposition, is not properly before the Court. See ECF No. 43 at 2. But the Court “is mindful of its obligation to construe this pro se Plaintiff’s submissions liberally,” Brown v. Hill, No. 14-cv-0140, 2018 WL 3238696, at *1 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018), and to consider her filings holistically, see Whole Foods, 789 F.3d at 151–52. Of course, that does not mean Alao can “interject new claims through briefing—rather than the proper process for amending pleadings under Rule 15.” ECF No. 18 at 20 n.12. But since Alao alleges in her complaint that the ALJ committed “[p]rocedural [e]rror,” Compl. at 5, the Court liberally construes that allegation—clarified in her opposition—as asserting a due process violation.
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present her case” “first”—i.e., before DOH—and adds that he prevented her from “present[ing]
the burden of proof.” Compl. at 6, 11. These vague and at times incomprehensible accusations
do not state a procedural due process claim.
“To prevail on [such a] claim, plaintiffs must show (1) that they ‘were deprived of a protected interest, and’ (2) that they did not receive ‘the process they were due.’” Gordon Coll. v.
SBA, No. 23-cv-614, 2025 WL 1517208, at *17 (D.D.C. May 28, 2025) (quoting Statewide Bonding, Inc. v. DHS, 980 F.3d 109, 118 (D.C. Cir. 2020)). Alao’s allegations falter at the second prong
for two reasons. First, she “fail[s] to identify any procedural protection that [s]he was denied.”
Bagenstose, 503 F. Supp. 2d at 259 n.5. Indeed, she does not allege that she was deprived of “an
opportunity to be heard with respect to the applicable evidence.” Gordon Coll., 2025 WL
1517208, at *18. That Alao “may have desired a greater opportunity to present [her] case than the
limited nature of the . . . hearing provided” does not mean that she was denied due process. La.
Ass’n of Indep. Producers & Royalty Owners v. FERC, 958 F.2d 1101, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
Second, Alao “does not allege or identify ‘what plausible alternative safeguards would [have been]
constitutionally adequate,’ which is a necessary element to support a due process violation.” Gordon Coll., 2025 WL 1517208, at *18 (quoting Statewide Bonding, 980 F.3d at 118). And Alao’s
due process claim fails for a third, independent reason—she does not say that she was prejudiced
by any purported due process violation. In other words, she not plausibly alleged that any “procedural defects affected the outcome of” her OHR proceeding. Id. at *17.
For these reasons, the Court will grant the District’s motion to dismiss Alao’s claims related
to her OHR administrative proceeding as either precluded or for failure to state a claim. See
Compl. at 1–19.
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B. Alao’s Wrongful Termination Claim Must Be Dismissed for Lack of Administrative Exhaustion, as the Court Already Determined
Alao again alleges in the operative complaint—in scattershot fashion—that DOH fired her
in 2016 in retaliation for her accommodation requests. See Compl. at 29–39. But the Court already
dismissed that claim because she failed to administratively exhaust it by obtaining a right-to-sue
letter. See ECF. No 18 at 11–12. Alao’s operative complaint suffers from the same deficiency—
she again fails to “allege or argue that she ever received a right-to-sue letter for her 2016” “termination-based claims.” Id. at 5, 11 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court again concludes that Alao’s
discrimination and retaliation claims arising from her 2016 termination “cannot support liability
under Title VII or the ADA.” Id.; Wye Oak Tech., Inc. v. Republic of Iraq, 24 F.4th 686, 697 (D.C.
Cir. 2022) (“[T]he same issue presented a second time in the same case in the same court should
lead to the same result.”) (quoting Kimberlin v. Quinlan, 199 F.3d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
C. To the Extent Alao Asserts a Hostile Work Environment Claim, It Will be
Dismissed for Failure to State a Claim
In part of her operative complaint and opposition, Alao appears to allege that DOH officials
subjected her to a “hostile work environment” by denying or failing to respond to her requested
accommodations. Compl. at 20; ECF No. 42 at 11 (referencing her “[h]ostile [w]ork [e]nvironment [c]laim”). Yet, in her surreply, Alao backtracks—casting her “reasonable accommodation,”
“hostile work environment,” and “harassment” claims as “previously adjudicated claims.” ECF
No. 44 at 4 (emphasis added). Indeed, she calls the District’s arguments directed at those claims
“digressions, intended to distract from the core issue: [the] ALJ[’s] . . . failure to adhere to the
proper scope of the order for Supplemental Hearing for Damages mandate and failure to allow
Plaintiff to present her case.” Id. Thus, Alao seems to disclaim asserting any hostile work environment claim, and the Court considers it abandoned. That said, any such claim would fail.
“To state a hostile work environment claim” under the ADA or Title VII, “a plaintiff must
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plausibly allege facts that, if true, would support a reasonable inference that misconduct occurred
that was so severe that it changed []a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of employment.” Hunter v.
Rubio, No. 24-cv-480 (TJK), 2026 WL 496871, at *6 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2026) (quoting Meritor
Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)); Ham v. Ayers, No. 15-cv-1390, 2019 WL
1202453, at *5 (D.D.C. Mar. 14, 2019). “This is a high bar designed to filter out complaints
attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace and prevent federal civil rights statutes from
imposing a general civility code.” Davis v. Vilsack, No. 17-cv-245 (TJK), 2023 WL 6065012, at
*10 (D.D.C. Sept. 18, 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The District argues that Alao’s allegations underpinning her failure-to-accommodate
claim, standing alone, do not amount to a hostile work environment claim, ECF No. 43 at 3–5, and
they are right. “[T]he mere denial of a requested accommodation, with nothing more, will not rise
to the level of a hostile work environment.” Floyd v. Lee, 85 F. Supp. 3d 482, 517–18 n.54 (D.D.C.
2015). “That is, a failure-to-accommodate claim cannot fully merge with a hostile work environment claim because ‘a plaintiff may not combine discrete acts to form a hostile work environment
claim without meeting the required hostile work environment standard.” Id. (quoting Baird v.
Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
True, “[t]he prolonged denial of a reasonable accommodation can underlie a hostile work
environment claim” when accompanied by “other evidence of verbal harassment.” Floyd, 85 F.
Supp. 3d at 517–518 (emphasis added). But none of the conduct Alao alleges in her operative
complaint amounts to the kind of “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, [or] insult” that creates a
hostile work environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (citation omitted).
Indeed, Alao rehashes many of the same allegations the Court already held do not demonstrate a
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hostile work environment. See ECF No. 18 at 20 n.12.10
D. Alao States an ADA Failure-to-Accommodate Claim
The Court sides with Alao on one aspect of the District’s motion. Alao asserts that DOH
violated the ADA by denying her accommodation requests—including those for an ergonomic
chair and foot stool, alternate work schedule (AWS) with “flexible hours,” and “part-time” work
with a gradual increase in hours. Compl. at 12, 18–29. The District does not move to dismiss this
claim to the extent that it is based on its purported failure to provide an ergonomic chair and foot
stool. ECF No. 37 at 6 n.1. On the other hand, the District argues, Alao’s allegations that DOH
denied her an AWS or gradual increase in hours do not state a claim under the ADA. Id. at 6–10.
The problem for the District is that “[a] motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) doesn’t
permit piecemeal dismissals of parts of claims; the question at this stage is simply whether the
complaint includes factual allegations that state a plausible claim for relief.” BBL, Inc. v. City of
Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 325 (7th Cir. 2015). Only later, “[a]t the summary-judgment stage, [can]
the court . . . properly narrow the individual factual issues for trial by identifying the material
disputes of fact that continue to exist.” Id. Since, as the District concedes, Alao has stated a
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Alao also lobs a few (seemingly) new allegations at the District in the operative complaint—including that DOH refused her an assigned office chair and “benched” her “alone in the office” without work assignments at times. Compl. at 21, 28, 29, 33, 34. She does not tether these allegations to any particular claim, and—notwithstanding her pro se status—it is not the Court’s job “to decide what claims [she] may or may not want to assert.” Kaufman v. IRS, 787 F. Supp. 2d 27, 33 (D.D.C. 2011). Moreover, as explained above, Alao appears to have disclaimed any hostile work environment claim the operative complaint could be construed to assert. Moreover, for the same reasons described above, these allegations do not make out a hostile work environment claim. Brooks v. Grundmann, 748 F.3d 1273, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 2014). To the contrary, for example, a dispute over an assigned chair is the type of ordinary “workplace disagreement[] . . . into which the court cannot wade.” Hogan v. Hayden, 406 F. Supp. 3d 32, 54 (D.D.C. 2019) (citation omitted); cf. Gleave-Perez v. Neurobehavioral Ctr. for Growth, No. 21-cv-765, 2023 WL 4238895, at *3 (D. Utah June 28, 2023) (holding that plaintiff’s complaint “that she did not have her own office” did not “suggest a . . . hostile work environment”).
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failure-to-accommodate claim, the Court declines at this stage to parse whether her allegations that
DOH denied her an AWS or gradual increase in hours get over the hump.
IV. Conclusion and Order
For all the above reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the
Amended Complaint, ECF No. 37, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. The Motion is GRANTED to the extent that it seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims (1) challenging her
OHR administrative proceeding and final order from that proceeding; (2) for wrongful termination
in 2016 based on discrimination or retaliation; and (3) alleging a hostile work environment. It is
further ORDERED that the motion is DENIED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Timothy J. Kelly
TIMOTHY J. KELLY
United States District Judge
Date: September 29, 2026
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