UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HAROON I. HAMEED,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 25-cv-01588 (DLF)
TERRANCE C. COLE, Administrator,
Drug Enforcement Administration,
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Haroon I. Hameed is a physician who brought this action against the Administrator
of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), alleging that the agency unreasonably delayed
issuing a final decision concerning his DEA registration, in violation of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Fifth Amendment. Compl., Dkt. 1. Before the Court is the DEA’s motion
to dismiss, Dkt. 9, and Hameed’s motions for leave to supplement his pleadings, Dkts. 12, 16. For
the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the DEA’s motion to dismiss and deny Hameed’s
motions for leave to supplement.
I. BACKGROUND
Hameed is a physician who resides in Washington, D.C. and practices in Maryland.
Compl. ¶ 11, Dkt. 1. On November 5, 2020, the Maryland State Board of Physicians summarily
suspended Hameed’s medical license based on concerns that he had practiced medicine while
under the influence of controlled substances and alcohol. Compl., Ex. B at 2, Dkt. 1-2. The Board
later adjudicated those concerns and found Hameed guilty of unprofessional conduct, including habitual abuse of controlled dangerous substances and providing professional services while using
a narcotic. Id. It later lifted the suspension after Hameed completed a rehabilitation program. Id.
In November 2021, Hameed applied to renew his registration with the DEA as a
practitioner authorized to prescribe drugs under Schedules II through V. Id. at 1. The DEA
determined that Hameed’s application contained materially false statements concerning his
Maryland suspension and issued an order to show cause why his application should not be denied.
Id. at 1, 3–4. The order informed Hameed that he could request a hearing or submit a written
response. Id. at 4. Hameed waived his right to a hearing and instead provided a written response
on April 28, 2022. Compl., Ex. C at 1. In May 2025—more than three years after submitting that
response—Hameed filed this action, alleging that: (1) the DEA withheld or unreasonably delayed
a decision on his application in violation of § 555(b) and § 706(1) of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA); (2) the delay deprived him of property and liberty without due process in violation of
the Fifth Amendment; and (3) he was entitled to declaratory and injunctive relief. Compl. ¶¶ 26–
33.
After Hameed filed suit, in September 2025, the DEA issued a final Decision and Order
revoking Hameed’s registration and denying his pending applications for registration renewal in
Maryland. Final Decision & Order, Dkt. 9-3. Hameed petitioned for review in the D.C. Circuit
under 21 U.S.C. § 877, which the court denied. Hameed v. DEA, No. 25-1192, 2026 WL 2056171,
at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2026).
While that action was pending, Hameed moved for leave to supplement his complaint after
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) revoked his Medicare enrollment based on
the DEA’s revocation. Dkt. 12. He later notified the Court that, on March 16, 2026, the DEA
2
issued him another show cause order proposing to deny a separate 2023 application for DEA
registration in Washington, D.C. Notice, Dkt. 16.
The DEA has moved to dismiss this action under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), Dkt. 9.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal law
empowers federal district courts to hear only certain kinds of cases, and it is “presumed that a
cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must “assume the truth of all
material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff
the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged, and upon such facts
determine [the] jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). And
the court “may undertake an independent investigation” that examines “facts developed in the
record beyond the complaint” to “assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction.” Settles v.
U.S. Parole Com’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
court that lacks jurisdiction must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims that are moot. Conservation
Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “A case is moot when a party has
already obtained all the relief that it has sought.” Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 37 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “the mootness doctrine requires a federal
court to refrain from deciding [a case] if events have so transpired that the decision will neither
3
presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in
the future.” AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. FDA, 713 F.3d 1134, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
As Hameed concedes, “his APA claim for unreasonable delay . . . is moot in light of the
DEA’s September 2025 final order.” Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dismiss (Pl.’s Opp’n) 4, Dkt. 10. This
Court also lacks jurisdiction to consider his due process claims. The Court will thus grant the
DEA’s motion to dismiss and deny Hameed’s motions for leave to supplement.
A. APA Claim
The APA requires agencies to decide matters presented to them “within a reasonable time,”
5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and allows parties to file an action to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). “[O]nce the [agency] has rendered a final
decision, the issue of regulatory delay will be moot and beyond [the court’s] effective power to
remedy.” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. I.C.C., 702 F.2d 1026, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Because the
DEA has issued a final order revoking Hameed’s DEA registration and denying his pending
Maryland renewal applications, the agency has taken the action that Hameed sought to compel.
His APA claim is therefore moot. See Pl.’s Opp’n 4; Conservation Force, 733 F.3d at 1204
(dismissing as moot APA claims alleging unreasonable delay after agency issued requested finding
during appeal). Count I will therefore be dismissed.
B. Due Process Claim
The Court lacks jurisdiction over Hameed’s remaining due process claim. “Within
constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to
consider.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Trump, 929 F.3d 748, 754 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
4
(quoting Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 212 (2007)). Although federal district courts generally
have jurisdiction over questions of federal law, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, Congress may circumscribe
that jurisdiction “by establishing an alternative statutory scheme for administrative and judicial
review.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., 929 F.3d at 754. “If a special statutory review scheme
exists, . . . it is ordinarily supposed that Congress intended that procedure to be the exclusive
means of obtaining judicial review in those cases to which it applies.” Jarkesy v. SEC, 803 F.3d
9, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation modified). A litigant may not circumvent an exclusive statutory
review scheme through “creative pleading.” Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654,
660 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
Section 877 of the Controlled Substances Act provides that “any person aggrieved by a
final decision of the Attorney General” under the Act may obtain review “in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia or for the circuit in which his principal place of
business is located.” 21 U.S.C. § 877. The D.C. Circuit has held that § 877 vests courts of appeals
with exclusive jurisdiction to review final DEA decisions. Hemp Indus. Ass’n v. DEA, 36 F.4th
278, 286–87 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (“[C]laims falling within the ambit of section 877—those
challenging a final decision of the DEA under the [Controlled Substances Act]—are considered
by the courts of appeals, not the district courts.”).
Hameed’s due process claims fall within that exclusive review scheme. Section 877
applies to challenges to the procedures by which the DEA reaches its decisions. See John Doe,
Inc. v. DEA, 484 F.3d 561, 569 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that § 877’s applicability
depends on “the DEA’s compliance with its procedural requirements” and explaining that the court
of appeals alone may review procedural defects in a DEA decision). And, “more important,” the
scheme did not deprive Hameed of judicial review or “prevent effective consideration of any legal
5
issue.” Id. at 569, 570. The D.C. Circuit has already considered and rejected Hameed’s due process
arguments, including his claim that “DEA’s [three-year] delay . . . constituted a deprivation of due
process.” Pl.’s Opp’n 4; Hameed, 2026 WL 2056171, at *1 (rejecting Hameed’s delay challenge
because “delay alone is not enough to justify . . . setting aside agency action” and he had not
identified harms attributable specifically to the delay). The D.C. Circuit also held that the DEA’s
order to show cause “provided [Hameed] adequate notice of the allegations against him and his
opportunities to present any objections;” that the DEA adequately considered Hameed’s written
submission; and that Hameed had “not identified any other process he was constitutionally due.”
Hameed, 2026 WL 2056171, at *1.
Hameed’s reliance on Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), is misplaced.
Pl.’s Opp’n 5–6. Free Enterprise Fund concerned a challenge that was “wholly collateral” to the
statute’s review provisions and for which the prescribed review process would not provide
“meaningful judicial review.” Free Enterprise Fund, 561 U.S. at 489. In contrast, Hameed’s
claim concerns the procedures that led to the DEA’s final decision and, critically, was subject to
meaningful review: the D.C. Circuit considered, and rejected, his due process claims under § 877.
Hameed, 2026 WL 2056171, at *1. Hameed cannot evade § 877 by recasting the same claim as a
separate challenge. See Vietnam Veterans, 599 F.3d at 660 (rejecting an attempt to circumvent an
exclusive statutory review scheme through “creative pleading”); Prescript Pharms. Inc. v. DOJ,
No. 24-2729, 2025 WL 1423656, at *5 (D.D.C. May 16, 2025) (holding that plaintiffs could not
obtain district-court review of Fifth Amendment claims concerning a DEA decision after
challenging the agency’s actions in the proper forum).
Accordingly, Count II will be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
C. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
6
Count III does not assert an independent cause of action but seeks declaratory and
injunctive relief tied to Counts I and II. See Bridges v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 935 F.
Supp. 37, 45 (D.D.C. 1996) (declaratory relief “not cognizable as a separate cause of action, but
is more properly included in the[] prayer for relief”). A declaratory-relief claim may be dismissed
when it “duplicates or is wholly subsumed by another claim that is dismissed.” Walpin v. Corp.
for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., 718 F. Supp. 2d 18, 24 (D.D.C. 2010). Because Count III necessarily
relies on Counts I and II, which will be dismissed, Count III will be dismissed as well.
D. Leave to Supplement
Rule 15(d) permits a court, “on just terms,” to allow a party to supplement a pleading with
events occurring after the pleading was filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d). Leave should generally be
granted unless there is a good reason to deny it, including futility. Wildearth Guardians v.
Kempthorne, 592 F. Supp. 2d 18, 23 (D.D.C. 2008). A proposed supplement is futile if it would
not survive a motion to dismiss. Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, 5 F. Supp. 3d 7, 12–13
(D.D.C. 2013).
Hameed seeks to supplement his complaint in two ways. First, he attempts to add
allegations about a separate revocation imposed by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS). See Mot. to Supp. Pleading, Dkt. 12. But CMS is not a defendant here, and Hameed has
already challenged that agency action in a separate lawsuit before this Court. See Hameed v. HHS,
No. 25-4117. Second, Hameed seeks to add allegations concerning a March 2026 Order to Show
Cause that relates to a separate DEA registration application.1 Pl.’s Not. of Subsequent
Development, Dkt. 16. That DEA proceeding will not reopen the applications that the DEA
1
Although styled as a “Notice of Subsequent Development,” Hameed asks the Court to add the filing and attached exhibit to the record and consider them in resolving this case. Dkt. 16. The Court therefore construes the notice as a second motion to supplement under Rule 15(d).
7
adjudicated in the order at issue here. Further, any future challenge to a final decision concerning
that application would also be subject to § 877’s exclusive review scheme. Because neither of
Hameed’s proposed supplements would cure the defects with his existing claims, supplementation
would be futile. The Court will therefore deny Hameed’s motions for leave to supplement.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 9, is granted and the
plaintiff’s motions for leave to supplement, Dkts. 12, 16, are denied. A separate order consistent
with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
September 29, 2026 United States District Judge
8