UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
HAROON I. HAMEED,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 25-cv-04117 (DLF)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Haroon Hameed, proceeding pro se, brings this suit against the U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, and their respective agency
heads (collectively, CMS) alleging violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Fifth
Amendment. See generally Compl. 1, Dkt. 1. Before the Court is CMS’s motion to dismiss, Dkt.
11. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
Hameed is a physician who practices medicine in Maryland. Compl. ¶ 5. On November
5, 2025, CMS notified Hameed that it was revoking Medicare billing privileges, effective
December 5, 2025, because the DEA had revoked Hameed’s registration to prescribe federally
controlled substances.1 Compl. ¶ 23; Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (Defs.’ Mot.), Ex. A, Dkt. 11-1. The
notice invoked 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(13)(i), which allows CMS to revoke a physician’s Medicare
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Hameed separately sought review of the DEA’s revocation decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Compl. ¶ 20, which denied his petition, Hameed v. DEA, No. 25-1192, 2026 WL 2056171, at *1 (D.C. Cir. July 16, 2026). See also Hameed v. Cole, No. 25-cv-1588 (posted September 29, 2026) (dismissing Hameed’s APA unreasonable-delay claim as moot and his due process claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).
enrollment and attendant billing privileges when his DEA registration “is currently suspended or
revoked.” 42 C.F.R. § 424.535(a)(13)(i). Although Hameed was advised that he had 65 days to
seek reconsideration, he submitted his request on November 5, 2025, the same day he received the
notice. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. A at 1–2; Compl. ¶ 26. On November 24, 2025—nineteen days after
requesting reconsideration—Hameed filed this action along with a motion for a temporary
restraining order or preliminary injunction, Dkt. 2, which the Court denied, Mem. Op. of Jan. 8,
2026.
The complaint alleges two claims under the APA: (1) that CMS acted arbitrarily and
capriciously by revoking his Medicare enrollment based on a “nonfinal DEA order” and (2) that
CMS unlawfully withheld and unreasonably delayed administrative action by failing to
acknowledge and process his reconsideration request, in violation of the APA. Compl. ¶¶ 27, 35,
36, 39. It further alleges that CMS violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment both
by refusing “to timely process [Hameed’s] reconsideration” request and for basing its revocation
decision on “unadjudicated allegations contradicted by state regulators.” Id. ¶¶ 37–38.
On December 1, 2025, CMS sent Hameed an email confirming receipt of his
reconsideration request, noting that the agency had 90 days to render a decision, and advising
Hameed that he could continue to “submit additional information / documentation” up until a
decision was issued. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. B, Dkt. 11-2. Relying in part on that confirmation, the Court
denied preliminary relief. Mem. Op. of Jan. 8, 2026, at 5. It found that Hameed was unlikely to
succeed in challenging the revocation because he had not exhausted his administrative remedies
and concluded that his delay claim was likely moot because CMS was already providing the
requested process. Id.
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The administrative proceedings have since progressed. On February 3, 2026, a CMS
hearing officer issued a reconsidered determination upholding the revocation. See Hameed v.
CMS, DAB CR6883, at 3 (HHS Apr. 22, 2026). Hameed then requested review by an HHS
administrative law judge, who affirmed CMS’s revocation decision in a written opinion issued
April 22, 2026. Id. at 1.
CMS has moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1), Dkt. 11. That motion is now fully briefed and ripe for resolution.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to move to
dismiss an action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Federal law
empowers federal district courts to hear only certain kinds of cases, and it is “presumed that a
cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court must “assume the truth of all
material factual allegations in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff
the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged, and upon such facts
determine [the] jurisdictional questions.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, the burden is on the plaintiff to
establish subject-matter jurisdiction. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). And
the court “may undertake an independent investigation” that examines “facts developed in the
record beyond the complaint” to “assure itself of its own subject matter jurisdiction.” Settles v.
U.S. Parole Com’n, 429 F.3d 1098, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). A
court that lacks jurisdiction must dismiss the action. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), 12(h)(3).
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Federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims that are moot. Conservation
Force, Inc. v. Jewell, 733 F.3d 1200, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 2013). “A case is moot when a party has
already obtained all the relief that it has sought.” Schnitzler v. United States, 761 F.3d 33, 37 (D.C.
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, “the mootness doctrine requires a federal
court to refrain from deciding [a case] if events have so transpired that the decision will neither
presently affect the parties’ rights nor have a more-than-speculative chance of affecting them in
the future.” AstraZeneca Pharms. LP v. FDA, 713 F.3d 1134, 1138 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
A. Administrative Procedure Act
Hameed asserts two claims under the APA. The first challenges the substance of CMS’s
decision to revoke his Medicare enrollment; the second challenges CMS’s alleged delay in
processing his reconsideration request. This Court lacks jurisdiction to hear either.
The Medicare Act incorporates the Social Security Act’s judicial-review provisions,
including 42 U.S.C. § 405(h). See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii. Section 405(h) divests federal courts of
“federal question jurisdiction on any claim arising under the Medicare Act,” limiting judicial
review to “final decision[s]” of the Secretary under § 405(g). Porzecanski v. Azar, 943 F.3d 472,
481 (D.C. Cir. 2019); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(b)(1)(A). This framework thus “demands the
‘channeling’ of virtually all [Medicare-related] legal attacks through the agency.” Shalala v. Ill.
Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000); see id. at 12–13 (explaining that
channeling extends “beyond ordinary administrative law principles of ripeness and exhaustion of
administrative remedies” in order to “assure[] the agency greater opportunity to apply, interpret,
or revise policies, regulations, or statutes without possibly premature interference by different
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individual courts”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a physician challenging the
revocation of his Medicare enrollment must first exhaust “the statutorily prescribed administrative
process.” Arriva Med. LLC v. HHS, 239 F. Supp. 3d 266, 278 (D.D.C. 2017); see also Robie v.
Price, No. 17-cv-3089, 2017 WL 3188572, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. July 26, 2017) (“Federal courts are
barred from reviewing . . . the revocation of a physician’s Medicare billing privileges, unless there
has been a final decision by the Secretary.”).
The administrative review process here includes reconsideration by CMS, review by an
HHS administrative law judge, and review by the Departmental Appeals Board. See 42 C.F.R.
§§ 498.22–498.25, 498.40–498.79, 498.80–498.95. When Hameed filed this action on November
24, 2025, he had completed none of those steps. Indeed, Hameed had requested reconsideration
by CMS—the first step in the administrative process—just nineteen days before he filed suit. See
Compl. ¶ 26. Hameed has since obtained reconsideration by CMS and review by an HHS
administrative law judge, but the record does not show that the Departmental Appeals Board has
reviewed his challenge or that he has otherwise completed the administrative process. See
Hameed, DAB CR6883, at 1, 3. Because Hameed failed to exhaust the administrative process
before filing suit, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review CMS’s revocation decision, see
Porzecanski, 943 F.3d at 480–82, which Hameed alleges is “arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to
law,” Compl. ¶ 35 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706).
Hameed’s argument that exhaustion would deprive him of meaningful judicial review is
unpersuasive. Section 405(h) requires plaintiffs to channel claims through the administrative
process unless doing so would result in the “complete preclusion of judicial review.” Ill. Council,
529 U.S. at 23. Mere delay, inconvenience, or cost does not suffice. See id. at 22–23; see also
Porzecanski, 943 F.3d at 481–82 (“A party may not circumvent the channeling requirement by
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showing merely that postponement of judicial review would mean added inconvenience or cost in
an isolated, particular case.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hameed is eligible to pursue
administrative review, and he has done so. Compl. ¶¶ 8, 26, 39. His challenges to CMS’s reliance
on the DEA’s decision, treatment of his Maryland medical license and controlled-substances
registration, and underlying factual findings go to the merits of the revocation decision and may
be raised through the administrative review process. See Hameed, DAB CR6883, at 6–7.
Hameed’s other APA claim, which alleges that CMS unreasonably delayed acknowledging
and processing his reconsideration request, is moot. Compl. ¶¶ 36, 39. The APA permits a court
to “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), but
once the agency performs the action sought, “the issue of regulatory delay will be moot and beyond
[the court’s] effective power to remedy,” Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. ICC, 702 F.2d 1026, 1035
(D.C. Cir. 1983). CMS acknowledged Hameed’s reconsideration request on December 1, 2025,
and subsequently issued a reconsidered determination. An HHS administrative law judge then
reviewed and affirmed that determination. Hameed has therefore received the agency action that
he alleges CMS unlawfully withheld, and identifies no other action that remains unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed. Accordingly, Hameed’s § 706(1) claim is moot.
B. Due Process
Hameed’s due process claims fare no better. He characterizes his principal claim as a
“collateral” constitutional challenge to the procedures CMS used to revoke his Medicare
enrollment. See Pl.’s Opp’n 3, Dkt. 12. But his claim that CMS improperly relied on the DEA’s
revocation decision without adequately considering evidence concerning his medical license and
state registration, see Compl. ¶¶ 21–25, 30; Pl.’s Opp’n 3–4, challenges the factual and legal bases
for the revocation itself, not merely the procedures CMS used to reach it. And although Hameed
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labels his claim procedural, § 405(h)’s channeling requirement turns on whether the claim arises
under the Medicare Act, not whether it is characterized as procedural or substantive. Row 1 Inc.
v. Becerra, 92 F.4th 1138, 1145–46 (D.C. Cir. 2024); Porzecanski, 943 F.3d at 480–82. Here, “at
bottom,” Hameed seeks substantive relief from CMS’s revocation decision: He asks the Court to
prevent CMS from revoking his Medicare enrollment and to require CMS to maintain that
enrollment. See Row 1, 92 F.4th at 1145–46; Compl. at 7.
Hameed appears to allege a separate Fifth Amendment violation based on CMS’s alleged
failure to “timely process” his November 5, 2025 reconsideration request. Compl. ¶¶ 26–30, 37.
But since filing this action, Hameed has received the very process he alleges CMS withheld—
acknowledgment of his request, a reconsideration decision, and review by an HHS ALJ. See
Conservation Force, 733 F.3d at 1204–05. Because the complaint seeks only declaratory and
injunctive relief and the alleged delay has ended, there is no further relief the Court can grant on
this claim. See id. It is therefore moot.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 11, is granted. A separate
order consistent with this decision accompanies this memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
September 29, 2026 United States District Judge
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