UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JACQUELYN N’JAI,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 19-cv-02712 (DLF)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Jacquelyn N’Jai brings this action against the Department of Education, Long Island
University (LIU), New York University (NYU), Immediate Credit Recovery (ICR), and FMS
Investment Corporation (FMS), among others. See Am. Compl., Dkt. 24. Before the Court is
ICR’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 60, Plaintiff’s Motion for Entry of Default, Dkt. 137, and Motion
for Default Judgment, Dkt. 138, and LIU and NYU’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 155. For
the following reasons, the Court will grant LIU and NYU’s motion to dismiss and deny the
plaintiff’s motion for entry of default judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
Jacquelyn N’Jai attended Long Island University from 1986 to 1988, and New York
University from 1988 to 1989. Am. Compl. ¶ 1. Like many students, she took out loans to fund
her education. See id. ¶¶ 1–2. She claims that she paid those loans off. Id. Yet the Department
of Education continues to seek payment on the student-loan debt in her name. Id. ¶¶27–29.
According to N’Jai, the debt stems from identity theft. She claims that the defendants in
this action stole her identity, took out student loans in her name, and then garnished her tax refund and social security checks to collect on those loans. See id. ¶¶ 4, 33, 36. Specifically, she alleges
that “both NYU and LIU signed her name on loan applications” “without her consent []or
knowledge,” id. ¶ 33, and conspired with the Department of Education to steal her identity, id. ¶
36. The Department then enlisted other entities—including Immediate Credit Recovery and FMS
Investment Corporation—to collect the resulting debt from N’Jai by garnishing her tax refund and
social security checks. Id. ¶¶ 4, 49, 55.
B. Procedural background
N’Jai sued several of the parties allegedly involved in this campaign to defraud, including
Long Island University (LIU), New York University (NYU), Immediate Credit Recovery, Inc.
(ICR), and FMS Investment Corporation (FMS). See generally Compl., Dkt. 1. She brought a
variety of statutory claims against those defendants in her 79-page amended complaint, which LIU,
NYU, and ICR separately moved to dismiss. Mem. Op. at 2, Dkt. 102; Mot. to Dismiss by LIU,
NYU, Dkt. 56; Mot. to Dismiss by ICR, Dkt. 60. FMS did not file any motion. See Mem. Op. at
1, Dkt. 142.
In 2021, this Court dismissed N’Jai’s claims against LIU, NYU, and ICR for lack of
personal jurisdiction. See Mem. Op. of Mar. 31, 2021, Dkt. 102 (Mar. 31, 2021). As relevant
here, the only forum contacts on which N’Jai relied were these defendants’ interactions with the
U.S. Department of Education in connection with federal student-loan programs. Id. at 11.
Applying then-governing precedent, the Court held those contacts insufficient to establish specific
personal jurisdiction under the “government contacts” exception, which prevented courts from
exercising personal jurisdiction based on certain contacts between nonresident defendants and the
federal government. Id. at 11–14. Separately, the Court dismissed N’Jai’s claims against FMS
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for the same reasons when N’Jai moved for default judgment against it. See Mem. Op. of Sept. 6,
2021 at 5–6, Dkt. 142.
N’Jai appealed. See Notice of Appeal, Dkt. 143 (Sep. 20, 2022). On appeal, the D.C.
Circuit concluded that the jurisdictional question turned on the scope of the government-contacts
exception under District of Columbia law—specifically, whether the exception is limited to
activity protected by the First Amendment and, if so, whether the defendants’ alleged contacts
with the Department fell within that protection. N’Jai v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 111 F.4th 1288, 1291
(D.C. Cir. 2024). Because District law did not supply a clear answer to the first question, the
Circuit certified two questions to the D.C. Court of Appeals: (1) whether the government-contacts
exception is limited to First Amendment activity between a defendant and a government entity;
and (2) if so, whether the contacts with the Department alleged here fall within that exception. Id.
at 1293.
The D.C. Court of Appeals answered the first question in the affirmative. It held that the
government-contacts exception applies only when “a defendant can establish that relying on the
conduct at issue as a basis for personal jurisdiction would violate the First Amendment.” N’Jai v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 342 A.3d 1217, 1222 (D.C. 2025). It declined to answer the second
question—whether the Universities’ contacts with the Department implicate the First
Amendment—because that question presents an issue of federal constitutional law. Id.
With that answer in hand, the D.C. Circuit vacated this Court’s dismissal and remanded.
The Circuit instructed this Court to “consider any remaining federal constitutional objections to
personal jurisdiction before addressing, if necessary, the merits.” N’Jai v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ.,
No. 22-5243, 2025 WL 2977680, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2025); see also Mandate, Dkt. 148.
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Before the Court is defendant NYU and LIU’s renewed motion to dismiss. See Renewed Mot. to
Dismiss.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), a party may move to dismiss an action
when the court lacks personal jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). “On such a motion, the
plaintiff bears the burden of ‘establishing a factual basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction’
over each defendant.” Triple Up Ltd. v. Youku Tudou Inc., 235 F. Supp. 3d 15, 20 (D.D.C. 2017)
(quoting Crane v. N.Y. Zoological Soc’y, 894 F.2d 454, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). The plaintiff cannot
satisfy that burden through conclusory allegations; she must instead allege specific facts
connecting each defendant to the forum. See Shibeshi v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2–3
(D.D.C. 2013).
In resolving a 12(b)(2) motion, the court “may receive and weigh affidavits and any other
relevant matter to assist it in determining the jurisdictional facts.” Triple Up Ltd., 235 F. Supp. 3d
at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Ultimately, the Court must satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction to hear the suit.” Id. at 20–21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
B. Mandate on Remand
The mandate rule defines this Court’s task on remand. A district court must “scrupulously”
comply with the appellate court’s mandate, neither disregarding matters the mandate resolves nor
extending its reconsideration beyond the scope of the appellate decision. See Nat’l Sec. Couns. v.
DOJ, 305 F. Supp. 3d 176, 180 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). The D.C. Circuit
directed this Court to consider “any remaining federal constitutional objections to personal
jurisdiction before addressing, if necessary, the merits.” N’Jai v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-4
5243, 2025 WL 2977680, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 22, 2025). The question before the Court is
therefore narrow: Has N’Jai alleged facts sufficient to support the exercise of personal jurisdiction
when the defendants’ contacts with the Department are taken into account? The Court addresses
only that question at this stage.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Long Island University and New York University both contend that this Court lacks
personal jurisdiction over them. Renewed Mot. to Dismiss 1. “Federal courts ordinarily follow
state law in determining the bounds of their jurisdiction over persons.” Daimler AG v. Bauman,
571 U.S. 117, 125 (2014). “The District of Columbia’s jurisdictional statute generally allows for
the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant for claims arising from the defendant's transacting of
business in the District.” N’Jai v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 111 F.4th 1288, 1289 (D.C. Cir.
2024), certified question answered, 342 A.3d 1217 (D.C. 2025).
Within those bounds, the exercise of jurisdiction must also comport with due process. See
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 125. The Court “may exercise one of two types of personal jurisdiction: (1)
‘general or all-purpose jurisdiction’ or (2) ‘specific or case-linked jurisdiction.’” Lewis v. Full
Sail, LLC, 266 F. Supp. 3d 320, 323 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
i. General Jurisdiction
The D.C. Circuit’s decision did not disturb this Court’s general jurisdiction analysis. In
any event, as was true in the Court’s previous decision, general jurisdiction is easily dispatched.
A court may ordinarily exercise jurisdiction over a corporation only where its affiliations with the
forum are “so continuous and systematic as to render it essentially at home.” Daimler, 571 U.S.
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at 127 (citation modified). The “paradigm” forums are the corporation’s place of incorporation
and principal place of business. Id. at 137. Both LIU and NYU are chartered in New York and
maintain their principal places of business there. See Fevola Aff. ¶¶ 3-4 (Dkt. 56-1) and Ex. A
attached thereto (Dkt. 56-2); Han Decl. ¶¶ 3-4 (Dkt. 56-5) and Ex. A attached thereto (Dkt. 56-6).
The record suggests that FMS maintains a primary address in Illinois and there is no evidence of
it being incorporated in the District of Columbia. See Mem. Op. 4–5, Dkt. 142. None is therefore
“at home” in the District, and N’Jai identifies no exceptional circumstances that would
nevertheless support general jurisdiction here. See id. The Court thus lacks general jurisdiction
over all defendants.
ii. Specific Jurisdiction
Specific jurisdiction “is confined to adjudication of issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919 (internal
quotation marks omitted). “To establish [specific] personal jurisdiction, [a] plaintiff[] must (1)
plead facts sufficient to show that jurisdiction is appropriate under the District of Columbia’s longarm statute and (2) satisfy the ‘minimum contacts’ demands of constitutional due process.”
Fuentes-Fernandez & Co. v. Caballero & Castellanos, PL, 770 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281 (D.D.C.
2011) (quoting United States v. Ferrara, 54 F.3d 825, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). Because the District’s
long-arm statute reaches to the limits permitted by due process, those requirements generally
“merge into a single inquiry: would exercising personal jurisdiction accord with the demands of
due process?” Thompson Hine, LLP v. Taieb, 734 F.3d 1187, 1189 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Due process requires “‘minimum contacts’ between the defendant and the forum such that
the defendant ‘should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.’” Urquhart-Bradley v.
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Mobley, 964 F.3d 36, 44 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Thompson Hine, 734 F.3d at 1189). Put
differently, there must be “a relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation” in
which “the defendant’s suit-related conduct creates a substantial connection with the forum.’” Id.
(citation modified) (quoting Shatsky v. Palestine Liberation Org., 955 F.3d 1016, 1036 (D.C. Cir.
2020)).
N’Jai locates that connection in the defendants’ participation in the federal student-loan
system. See Mem. Op., Dkt. 102 at 11 (citing Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots., Dkt. 64, at 4-5,
7). She alleges that NYU and LIU dealt repeatedly with the Department of Education in
administering federal student aid, including by obtaining authorization to participate, processing
loan applications, and certifying loans. Id. ICR and FMS, she says, likewise established ongoing
relationships with the Department, both by securing approval to participate in the program and by
contracting to collect delinquent student-loan debt. See Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. at 4–5,
7; see also Am. Compl. at 3–4, 17–34. Because the allegedly fraudulent loans underlying this suit
were administered and later collected through those relationships, N’Jai maintains that her claims
arise from the defendants’ contacts with the District.
This Court previously rejected that theory under the government-contacts exception to the
District’s long-arm statute. See Mem. Op., Dkt. 102. That exception—based on the “unique
character of the District as the seat of national government”—historically limited the jurisdictional
significance of contacts involving the federal government. Id. at 11 (quoting Morgan v. Richmond
Sch. of Health & Tech., Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 104, 108 (D.D.C. 2012)); see Naartex Consulting
Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 786–87 (D.C. Cir. 1983). On appeal, however, the D.C. Court of
Appeals clarified the doctrine’s reach: The government-contacts exception applies “only if a
defendant can establish that relying on the conduct at issue as a basis for personal jurisdiction
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would violate the First Amendment.” N’Jai v. United States Dep’t of Educ., 342 A.3d 1217, 1222
(D.C. 2025).
NYU and LIU attempt to invoke the government-contacts exception again, characterizing
their dealings with the Department as protected petitioning activity. See Renewed Mot. to Dismiss
15–16. They emphasize that their participation in the federal-loan program consisted of
“applications, certifications, reporting, and compliance,” which they contend implicate the First
Amendment right to petition. Id. at 15. The Court is doubtful. Routine participation in a federal
regulatory or benefits program is not obviously petitioning activity, much less activity whose use
as a jurisdictional contact would “pose a threat to free public participation in the government.”
Envtl. Research Int’l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 (D.C. App.
1976). But the Court need not resolve that question. Even counting the defendants’ contacts with
the Department, N’Jai has not established a sufficient connection among the defendants, the
District, and the claims asserted here.
Start with the Universities’ participation in the federal student-aid system. Section 13-423(a) of the District’s long-arm statute permits jurisdiction over a person “as to a claim for relief
arising from the person’s . . . transacting any business in the District of Columbia.” D.C. Code
§ 13-423(a)(1). And the claim must “aris[e] from” those contacts. Lex Tex Ltd., Inc. v. Skillman,
579 A.2d 244, 247 (D.C. 1990). The defendants’ dealings with the Department do not supply that
connection.
To invoke the “transacting any business” provision of the long-arm statute, “the plaintiff
must show that a defendant engaged in commercial or business-related activity directed at District
residents.” Capel v. Capel, 272 F. Supp. 3d 33, 39 (D.D.C. 2017) (emphasis in original)) (quoting
Holder v. Haarmann & Reimer Corp., 779 A.2d 264, 270–71 (D.C. 2001)). Contacts flowing from
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universities’ regulatory participation in federal student-aid programs administered by the
Department of Education do not usually qualify. See Stevens v. Del. State Univ., 70 F. Supp. 3d
562, 565 (D.D.C. 2014) (where “the only contacts alleged are that the University accepts federal
student loan money from a government agency on behalf of its students,” “even if the government
contact exception did not apply, the contacts at issue would be unlikely to form a basis of personal
jurisdiction”).
More fundamentally, N’Jai has not shown that her “claim for relief aris[es] from” those
alleged contacts. See D.C. Code § 13–423(b). Her theory is that NYU and LIU fraudulently
obtained loans in her name while she attended college in New York. Nothing alleged suggests
that the supposed fraud occurred in the District. Indeed, N’Jai previously acknowledged that the
Universities’ relevant “acts and omissions” occurred “outside of DC.” See Mem. Op. at 11, Dkt.
102 (quoting Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. 2, Dkt. 63) Nor does N’Jai allege that she suffered the
resulting injury here. During the relevant period, she lived in Pennsylvania or Maryland. See Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 52–53; Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Defs.’ Mots. 30, Dkt. 157. The Department’s location in
the District does not transform allegedly fraudulent transactions undertaken elsewhere into
District-based conduct. Thus, even assuming NYU and LIU transacted business in the District
through their participation in federal student-aid programs, N’Jai has not shown that her claims
“aris[e] from” that business. D.C. Code § 13–423(b).
The alleged debt-collection relationships fare no better. A contractual relationship with an
entity in the District does not, “by itself”, establish minimum contacts or purposeful availment.
Exponential Biotherapies v Houthoff Buruma, 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing COMSAT
Corp. v. Finshipyards S.A.M., 900 F. Supp. 515, 524 (D.D.C.1995)). Rather, courts examine the
parties’ course of dealing and the circumstances surrounding the agreement, including its
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negotiation and execution, to determine whether the defendant deliberately affiliated itself with
the forum. Id. at 7–8.
Here, the alleged collection activity occurred outside of the District by companies outside
of the District. N’Jai does not allege that the defendants negotiated or executed the relevant
agreements in the District. And the collection activity that allegedly injured her, such as the
garnishment of her tax return, was directed toward where she earns her wages—that is, Maryland.
The mere fact that the Department sits in the District therefore does not establish the sort of
purposeful, suit-related connection with this forum that due process requires. In short, N’Jai
identifies contacts between the defendants and a federal agency headquartered in the District, but
she does not connect those contacts to conduct occurring here or to an injury suffered here. That
is not enough to establish the requires “relationship among the defendant the forum, and the
litigation.” Urquhart-Bradley, 964 F.3d at 44. The Court therefore lacks personal jurisdiction
over the remaining defendants.
Because the Court has neither general nor specific jurisdiction over NYU, LIU, ICR, or
FMS, it will dismiss all claims against these defendants pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2). 1
B. Default Judgment
Having vacated the order to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Dkt. 142, the appellate
court remanded to this Court the motion for default judgment upon which that dismissal was made,
Dkt. 137. “The party seeking default judgment has the burden of establishing both subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim[] and personal jurisdiction over the defendant[].” Friends of Mayanot
Institute, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 313 F.Supp.3d 50, 56 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Thuneibat
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Because personal jurisdiction is lacking, the Court need not reach the defendants’ alternative arguments under Rules 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
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v. Syrian Arab Republic, 167 F.Supp.3d 22, 33 (D.D.C. 2016)). As discussed above, N’Jai has not
sustained the burden of showing that the Court can exercise personal jurisdiction over FMS.
Having found that there is no personal jurisdiction, the court may not assess the merits of the
default judgment. Kaplan v. Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 896 F.3d 501, 510 (D.C.
Cir. 2018). Thus, the motion for a default judgment is denied and FMS is dismissed from the case
without prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant NYU and LIU’s renewed motion to dismiss
for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice, Dkt. 155, deny N’Jai’s motion for entry of
default judgment against FMS, Dkt. 137, and dismiss ICR and FMS from the case for lack of
personal jurisdiction. A separate order consistent with this decision accompanies this
memorandum opinion.
DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH
United States District Judge
September 29, 2026
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