For Publication
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
JACQUES CAJUSTE ) §. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007
Appellant/Defendant ) Re Super. Ct. Crim. No. 216/2019
) (STT)
v )
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS )
Appellee/Plaintiff. 5
)
On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Thomas & St. John
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Denise M. Francois
Argued: November 14, 2023
Filed: September 17, 2026
Cite as: 2026 VI 19
BEFORE RHYS S. HODGE, Chief Justice; MARIA M. CABRET, Associate Justice; and
IVE ARLINGTON SWAN, Associate Justice
APPEARANCES
Adam G. Christian, Esq. (Argued)
Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, LLC
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant
Ian Clement, Esq. (Argued)
Assistant Attorney General
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
St. Thomas, U.S.V.1
Michael R. Francisco, Esq
Assistant Attorney General
Virgin Islands Department of Justice
St. Thomas, U.S.V.I
Attorneys for Appellee/Plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE COURT
CABRET, Associate Justice
Cajuste v. People 2026 VI 19
S. Ct. Crim. No. 2023-0007
Opinion of the Court
Page 2 of 58
q 1 Appellant Jacques Cajuste (“Cajuste”) appeals from the January 20, 2023 judgment and
commitment of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands (“Superior Court”) memorializing a jury
verdict finding him guilty of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Egbert “Manno” Stuart
(“Manno”), in violation of title 14, sections 921, 922(a)(1), and 1t(a) of the Virgin Islands Code
For the reasons that follow, we affirm the Superior Court’s June 30, 2022 order denying Cajuste’s
motion to dismiss the murder charges, as well as several of the Superior Court’s evidentiary
rulings. Likewise, we affirm the Superior Court’s January 20, 2023 judgment and affirm Cajuste’s
conviction of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
€2 The evidence and testimony presented at trial established the following facts. On June 22,
2005, Manno’s body was discovered inside the residence he shared with his wife Vivian Stuart
(“Stuart”), and their four-year-old autistic son at Heritage Hill Condominiums on St. Thomas, U.S
Virgin Islands. Manno was found clad only in briefs, covered in blood from multiple stab wounds
to his chest, back, and neck, with a kitchen-type knife approximately one foot in length (an eight
inch blade with a four-inch handle) still lodged in his neck. Stuart, who had just returned home
from her night shift at the Emerald Beach Resort, was the first to discover the body sometime after
7:15 a.m
{3 Several officers from the Virgin Islands Police Department (“VIPD”) responded to the
scene. Upon inspecting the apartment, the officers found no signs of forced entry or burglary, and
determined that the only point of entry was the front door. Stuart later confirmed that she had
locked the door with her keys when she left for work the previous evening, and that only she and
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Manno possessed keys to the home. Manno’s set of keys was found on the countertop when Stuart
returned that morning
44 A walkthrough of the residence revealed that the eastern bedroom, where Manno’s body
was found, showed signs of a violent struggle, with blood stains and droplets on the walls and
floor. In contrast, the western bedroom, used by Stuart, appeared undisturbed
q 5 The next day, June 23, 2005, Dr. Fransico Landron (“Dr. Landron”)! performed Manno’s
autopsy, with VIPD officers Delbert Phipps (“Officer Phipps”)” and Daphne Rouse Carty (“Officer
Carty”)? present. Dr. Landron observed multiple stab wounds, superficial cuts, and defensive
wounds on Manno’s extremities. He noted that Manno sustained seven deep stab wounds, all
consistent with the kitchen-type knife still embedded in his neck at the time of discovery, none of
which exceeded the length of its blade. Dr. Landron concluded that the cause of death was multiple
stab wounds inflicted by this kitchen-type knife
46 In the course of the investigation, VIPD officers collected evidence, photographed the
crime scene and the morgue proceedings, conducted interviews, and coordinated with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) for further forensic testing of DNA evidence. Between 2007 and
2008, the case was transferred from the Major Crimes Team to the Cold Case Squad, where it
remained dormant until 2016. In September 2016, following renewed investigation into Manno’s
murder, the VIPD located Cajuste in Pennsylvania and brought him back to St. Thomas in
connection with the case
' In June 2005, Dr. Landron was the medical examiner for St. Thomas
? In June 2005, Officer Phipps was a detective corporal in the Homicide Division of the Major
Crimes Team
* In June 2005, Officer Carty was an investigator in the Forensic Unit
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B. Procedural Background
q7 On October 5, 2016, the People of the Virgin Islands (“People”) filed a twelve-count
information with the Superior Court against Cajuste (People v. Cajuste, criminal case no. ST-2016
CR-328) and Stuart (People v. Stuart, criminal case no. ST-2016-CR-296), charging them in
connection with Manno’s murder.’ The trial court scheduled both matters to commence for joint
jury selection and trial on September 16, 2019. However, on September 13, 2019, the People filed
a motion to dismiss without prejudice after their motion to continue trial was denied. That same
date, the court granted the People’s motion, and both matters were dismissed without prejudice
48 On September 25, 2019, less than two weeks after the dismissal of the 2016 matters, the
People filed an eighteen-count information against Cajuste (People v. Cajuste, criminal case no
ST-2019-CR-216) and Stuart (People v. Stuart, criminal case no. ST-2019-CR-217), again
charging them in connection with Manno’s murder. Specifically, the charges against Cajuste
included murder, assault, and related weapons offenses—all alleged under an aiding and abetting
theory
“9 On December 30, 2019, Cajuste filed a motion to dismiss Counts Two through Six, and
Eight of the information—the non-murder charges—based on several grounds, including the
expiration of the statute of limitations
£10 On January 10, 2020, Cajuste filed a motion to dismiss Counts One and Seven of the
information—the murder charges—based on “[t]he fourteen-year delay in bringing these charges
“ While Cajuste and Stuart were jointly charged in the same information and subsequently jointly
tried before a jury trial, a detailed rendition of the facts of Stuart’s case is unnecessary to our
disposition of Cajuste’s appeal and accordingly not included herein. Stuart has also appealed her
conviction of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno
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[in] violat[ion] [of his] due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands of 1954, as amended.”
411 On December 30, 2020, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order granting
Cajuste’s December 30, 2019 motion and dismissed with prejudice Counts Two through Six, and
Eight (the non-murder charges) of the information based on statute of limitations grounds
412 On June 17, 2021, the parties appeared before the court for a hearing on pending motions,
including Cajuste’s January 10, 2020 motion to dismiss the murder charges
£13 On June 30, 2022, the court entered a memorandum opinion and order denying Cajuste’s
January 10, 2020 motion (“June 30, 2022 Order”). In the order, the Superior Court applied the test
this Court established in Rivera v. People, 64 V.1. 540 (V.I. 2016), and reiterated in Ventura v.
People, 64 V.1. 589 (V.I. 2016), to determine whether a precharge delay violated a defendant’s
right to due process under the federal Constitution, and found that “Cajuste has not met his burden
to establish that he has suffered substantial prejudice [caused by the delay] in violation of his due
process rights and, thus, the Court need not examine why the government delayed in bringing
charges to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred.”
{14 On July 18, 2022, the People filed a four-count first amended information against Cajuste
and Stuart: Count One (Cajuste)-“FIRST-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in
violation of 14 V.I.C. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 11(a); Count Two (Cajuste)-“SECOND-DEGREE
MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), and 11(a)
Count Three (Stuart)-“FIRST-DEGREE MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation
of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(a)(1), and 11(a); and Count Four (Stuart)-“SECOND-DEGREE
MURDER—AIDING AND ABETTING,” in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921, 922(b), and 11(a)
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415 On August 1, 2022, the Superior Court selected a jury and a jury trial took place from
August 3 through 5, 2022 and August 8 through 11, 2022 where Cajuste and Stuart were jointly
tried
{16 At trial, the People presented testimony from the following VIPD officers: Gregory
Coward, Delbert Phipps (retired), Daphne Rouse Carty (retired), Roselyn Bedminster (retired),
Mario Stout, and Maha Hamdan. The People also presented the following witnesses: Kathryn
Jensen-Delugo, Lemuel Houston, Jr., Lisa Toussaint, Leopold Rodriquez, Ishmael Rodriquez,
Valerie Daley, Lyndane Jackson, Keisha Baynes, Jeremy Fletcher, and Dr. Landron
{17 The Superior Court admitted the following evidence over Cajuste’s objections: (i) the knife
used to kill Manno, marked as People’s Exhibit 18 (“Knife”), along with Ishmael Rodriquez’s
testimony regarding it; (ii) the report prepared by FBI Agent Jeremy Fletcher (“Agent Fletcher”)
containing his DNA testing and analysis of samples collected in connection with Manno’s murder,
marked as People’s Exhibit 48 (‘DNA Report”), along with his testimony regarding the report;
and (iii) a redacted printout of Roy Lester Schneider Hospital’s (“RLSH”) digital medical records
concerning Cajuste’s June 23, 2005 emergency room visit, marked as People’s Exhibit 29 (“RLSH
Digital Record”), along with testimony from RLSH record custodian Keisha Baynes (“Custodian
Baynes”) regarding the redacted record. The Superior Court orally overruled Cajuste’s objections
from the bench and subsequently memorialized in three separate orders entered on August 12,
2022, each of which included the court’s reasoning in greater detail
418 At the close of the People’s case, Cajuste made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Rule 29 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 29”) which the court
orally denied from the bench and subsequently memorialized in an order entered on August 15,
2022 (“Rule 29 Order”). Thereafter, Cajuste offered no evidence in his defense and rested. Stuart,
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after she admitted Defendant Stuart’s Exhibit 8—the 911 call record for June 22, 2005—into
evidence in her defense, also rested. At the close of all the evidence, Cajuste orally renewed his
Rule 29 motion, which the court denied from the bench
£19 The jury found Cajuste guilty of aiding and abetting the first-degree murder of Manno, as
charged in Count One of the first amended information. On January 13, 2023, Cajuste appeared
before the Superior Court for a sentencing hearing. On January 20, 2023, the Superior Court
entered a judgment and commitment (“January 20, 2023 Judgment”) in which the court adjudged
that Cajuste was “convicted of Count [One] of the First Amended Information to wit: First Degree
Murder—Aiding and Abetting in violation of Title 14, § § 921 922(a)(1) and 11(a),” and ordered
inter alia, “that for said conviction [Cajuste] is hereby committed to the custody of the Bureau of
Corrections and imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without parole” and “that Count 2
of the First Amended information...is dismissed.” (Emphasis omitted)
€20 On February 13, 2023, Cajuste filed a timely notice of appeal
Hf. DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction
421 “The Supreme Court [has] jurisdiction over all appeals arising from final judgments, final
decrees or final orders of the Superior Court, or as otherwise provided by law.” 4 V.I.C. § 32(a)
Because the Superior Court's January 20, 2023 Judgment and Commitment was a final judgment,
we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Browne v. People, 56 V.1. 207, 216 (V.I. 2012); see also
Gonsalves v. People, 2019 VI 4, { 34 (“In a criminal case, the written judgment embodying the
adjudication of guilt and sentence imposed based on that adjudication constitutes a Final
[Judgment] for purposes of 4 V.I.C. § 32(a).”) (citing Percival v. People, 62 V.1. 477, 483 (V.I
2015))
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B. Overview of Issues
22 On appeal, Cajuste asserts the following assignments of error for our review: (i) the
Superior Court erred when it denied his January 10, 2020 motion to dismiss Counts One and Seven
of the information—the murder charges—in violation of his due process rights; (ii) the Superior
Court erred when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal when there was insufficient
evidence to sustain Cajuste’s conviction for first-degree murder under an aiding and abetting
theory; and (iii) the Superior Court erred when it admitted the following evidence over his
objections: the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s testimony concerning the
same; Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his testimony concerning the same;
and the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian Baynes’ testimony
concerning the same
C. Standard of Review
923 The standard of review for examining the Superior Court's application of law—including
constitutional questions—is plenary, while factual findings are reviewed for clear error. St
Thomas-St. John Bd. of Elections v. Daniel, 49 V.1. 322, 329 (V.I. 2007); see also Allen v.
HOVENSA, L.L.C., 59 V.1. 430, 436 (V.E. 2013) (citing Daniel, 49 V.I. at, 329)
424 “When [an] appellant[ ] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented at trial ... all
issues of credibility within the province of the jury must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the government. The reviewing court must be particularly deferential when determining whether
a jury verdict rests on insufficient evidence [and] may not usurp the role of the jury by re-weighing
the evidence and re-assessing the credibility of witnesses.” Thomas v. Gov't of the V.I., 2022 VI
22, { (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Powell v. People, 2019 VI 2, 4 52
(Swan, J., concurring in judgment) (“Any concern with the credibility of witnesses and weighing
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of evidence is not for this Court to second guess.”). “The trial court is required to ‘draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the jury's verdict.’” People v. Clarke, 55 V.1. 473, 477 (V.I. 2011)
(quoting United States v. Anderskow, 88 F.3d 245, 251 (3d Cir. 1996)); see Ponce v. People, 2020
VI 2, 1 16 (observing that “this court...also grants the People the benefit of all reasonable
inferences”) (citing Clarke, 55 V.I. at 477))
425 “We must affirm a jury's verdict as long as substantial evidence was presented at trial to
allow a rational trier of fact to convict when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the
People. Therefore, a finding of insufficiency of the evidence should be confined to those cases in
which the prosecution's failure to establish the elements of the crime is clear.” Canton v. People,
61 V.I. 511, 515-16 (V.I. 2014) (citations omitted). Thus, “[a]n appellant who seeks to overturn a
conviction on insufficiency of the evidence grounds bears a very heavy burden.” Thomas v.
People, 69 V.I. 913, 926 (V.I. 2018) (citations omitted); see Powell, 2019 VI 2, § 51 (Swan, J
concurring in judgment) (noting that “when an appellant seeks to have his conviction overturned
for lack of evidence, he bears a heavy burden” and emphasizing that “{t]his standard of review is
highly deferential to the jury's verdict and [is] formidable,” insofar as “defendants challenging
convictions for insufficiency of evidence face an uphill battle’) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)
{26 Finally, we generally review trial court decisions concerning the admission and exclusion
of evidence for abuse of discretion. Castillo v. People, 59 V1. 240, 254 (V.I. 2013) (citing Billu v
People, 57 V.1. 455, 461 (V.I. 2012); see also Davis v. People, 2022 VI 8, 4 31 (Swan, J
concurring in judgment) (“Evidentiary rulings are also reviewed for abuse of discretion.”)
(citations omitted). “An abuse of discretion arises only when the decision rests upon a clearly
erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to fact.”
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Streibich v. Underwood, 2021 V1 3, § 17. However, when a ruling on the admission of evidence
implicates the interpretation of a legal standard, our review is plenary. /d.; see also Corriette v
Morales, 50 V.I. 202, 205 (V.I. 2008)
D. Whether the Superior Court Erred in Denying Cajuste’s
Motion to Dismiss the Murder Charges
427 On appeal, Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss
the murder charges in the following ways. First, the court committed error when it only addressed
his due process argument in the context of the federal Constitution and not in the context of the
Revised Organic Act of 1954 (“ROA”), the Virgin Islands’ de facto constitution. Specifically,
citing to Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I, Inc., 2019 VI 17, for support, Cajuste argues that
because the language in the beginning of clause 3 of ROA § 3—“No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law’—‘“does not appear in either the Fifth or
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, [it] must be given effect and indicates that ROA § 3
provides criminal defendants with greater due process protections than its federal counterparts.”
Cajuste points out that “the trial court did not address this argument on the merits, but, rather,
adopted federal cases addressing pre-charging delay solely under federal law and this Court’s
holdings in Rivera [] and Ventura [}. . which both predate(d] Balboni [and] discussed pre-charging
due process standards solely through the prism of federal law
428 Alternatively, Cajuste argues that even under the test we articulated in Rivera, the court
still erred because “this record also establishes sufficient prejudice and unexplained delay under
the federal due process clause.”
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429 Cajuste also argues that his due process rights were violated because the Superior Court
(1) took almost two years to rule on his fully briefed motion to dismiss° and (2) “failed to conduct
an evidentiary hearing on the motion” despite his request
1. The People’s Precharge Delay
Cajuste’s Due Process Argument Pursuant to Clause 3, Section 3 of the Revised
Organic Act of 1954
430 After reviewing the record, this Court cannot conclude that Cajuste adequately presented
his argument that the precharge delay encountered in this proceeding violated his right to due
process under clause 3 of ROA § 3, which “provides criminal defendants with greater due process
protections than its federal counterparts.”
431 In his January 20, 2020 motion to dismiss, Cajuste failed to explicitly mention clause 3 of
ROA § 3. Instead, he simply stated that “[pJursuant to Section 3 of the ROA and Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Mr. Cajuste is entitled to due process of the law.”
(J.A. 092). In fact, in his motion, Cajuste himself quoted to this Court’s test in Rivera for federal
due process claims to argue that the precharge delay violated his right to due process (J.A. 093);
Cajuste did not mention Balboni
£32 Then, in his two-page reply to the People’s opposition, for the first time, Cajuste pointed
out that ROA § 3 contains language not found in the United States Constitution and referenced
specifically the following sentence in clause 3 of ROA § 3—“No person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process of law.” He argued in his reply that “[t]his language is
* In his brief, Cajuste points out that his motion was filed “on January 10, 2020, and it was fully
ees by April 17, 2020,” and “[y]et, the trial court did not rule on this motion until June 30
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[sic] implicates a more stringent review than federal due process analysis” and the court “must
give effect to this language in ROA.” However, without any explanation or further development
of his argument, Cajuste simply cited Balboni® to support his contention that the due process
guaranty under clause 3 of ROA § 3 provides greater protection than the federal due process
guaranty. (J.A. 184-85)
433 Subsequently at the June 17, 2021 hearing, Cajuste reiterated the ROA argument he raised
for the first time in his reply by, again, arguing it in a superficial manner. Cajuste stated that
“...under Balboni, it is the precedent from our Supreme Court that it extends protection greater
than those of the 5th and 14th Amendments” but he acknowledged that “[t]hat may not be across
the board, but certainly that’s an issue to be noted.” Nevertheless, despite the fact that he correctly
recognized that this Court’s holding in Balboni was limited, Cajuste concluded—without
providing any explanation or further development of his argument—that “under Balboni, the
Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act and the section [he] just quoted [No person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law”], puts a higher burden on the People.”’
® In Balboni, this Court concluded that our equal protection clause under clause 1 of ROA §3
“No law shall be enacted in the Virgin Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law or deny to any person therein equal protection of the laws”
conferred greater rights than the federal equal protection clause, and thus this Court did not reach
the issue of whether the ROA conferred greater rights than the federal due process clause. See
2019 VI 17, 4 60 n.55 (“Because we conclude that section 555 is invalid pursuant to the equal
protection clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, we need not decide whether it also violates
the due process clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, or if it is unconstitutional under the
Fifth, Seventh, or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”)
7 The relevant excerpt from the transcript reads as follows
ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN Clearly, the pre-information delay has prejudiced Mr
Cajuste, and in the absence of an explanation from the People as to what happened—and
there’s none in the record—there’s a violation of section 3 of the Revised Organic Act
which states, “no persons shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process
of law
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434 Inthe June 30, 2022 Order, the court noted that Cajuste, “{rjelying upon Balboni, [] argues
that the Revised Organic Act guarantee of due process that ‘[n]o person shall be held to answer
for a criminal offense without due process prior to being charged’ implicates a more stringent view
than the federal due process analysis,” but pointed out that Cajuste did not “articulate what this
stricter view should be” and concluded that “[s]uch an argument is an insufficient basis for this
Court to depart from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands holding in Ventura....” Tellingly,
the order contained no discussion of Cajuste’s analysis—-because Cajuste provided none—in
support of his argument that ROA § 3 conferred upon criminal defendants greater due process
protections than its federal counterparts based on the language in clause 3 of ROA § 3
935 Cajuste’s vague, perfunctory presentation of this argument deprived the Superior Court of
the opportunity to consider and rule on this issue in any detail. “The rules that require a litigant to
brief and support his arguments before the Superior Court, are not mere formalistic
requirements. They exist to give the Superior Court the opportunity to consider, review, and
address an argument[.}” Simpson v. Golden, 56 V.I. 272, 280 (V.I. 2012). That an issue adverted
to in a cursory manner unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation does not
And that’s a phrase not found in the Federal Constitution. My research indicates
it’s been found in maybe three other states in that precise language, but under Balboni, that
language must mean something. And we submit that under the circumstances of this case,
absent an explanation in the record by the People for this extensive delay in bringing this
matter or charging Mr. Cajuste, that his due process rights under the Revised Organic Act
Section 3 have been violated, as well as under the 14th Amendment to the U.S
Constitution, and that this matter should be dismissed
THE COURT: Doesn’t People versus — Rivera versus People require a showing of
substantial prejudice?
ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN: Well, that is the standard that has been adopted using Sth
Amendment standards. I believe under Balboni, the Section 3 of the Revised Organic Act
and the section I just quoted, puts a higher burden on the People
(J.A. 229-30)
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adequately preserve said issue on appeal is a well-established principle. See Richards v. Pub
Emps. Relations Bd., 2024 VI 37, 4 46 n.31 (“It is not the Court's job to research and construct
legal arguments open to parties ... In order to develop a legal argument effectively, the facts at
issue must be bolstered by relevant legal authority; a perfunctory and undeveloped assertion is
inadequate.”) (quoting V.[. Taxi Ass'n v. West Indian Co., Super. Ct. Civ. No. 551/2016, 2016 V.I
LEXIS 170, at *4 (V.1. Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 2016) (unpublished; citation omitted)). Thus, Cajuste’s
argument as to his due process rights under clause 3 of ROA § 3 is deemed waived.’ See V.I.R
App. P. 4(h) (“Only issues and arguments fairly presented to the Superior Court may be presented
for review on appeal.”); see also, V.I. R. App. P. 22(m) (“Issues that were (1) not raised or objected
to before the Superior Court, (2) raised or objected to but not briefed, or (3) are only adverted to
in a perfunctory manner or unsupported by argument and citation to legal authority, are deemed
waived for purposes of appeal, except that the Supreme Court, at its option, may notice an error
not presented that affects substantial rights.”’)
8 We note that the People did not raise the issue of Cajuste’s waiver on appeal. Cf Simpson v
Golden, 56 V1. 272, 281 n.6 (V.I. 2012) (discussing “waiver of waiver” doctrine). But Rule 4(h)
of the Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure—which provides that an argument must have
been “fairly presented” to the Superior Court in order to be raised on appeal—is among the small
class of claims-processing rules that “implicate[] judicial interest beyond those of the parties” and
that we may invoke sua sponte, Mustafa v. Camacho, 59 V.1. 566, 571 n.2 (V.I. 2013). As
explained above, Cajuste did not present his ROA § 3 argument below
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Cajuste’s Due Process Argument Pursuant to the Federal Constitution’
£36 This Court established the following test to evaluate whether a precharge delay violates a
defendant’s right to due process under the federal Constitution: “once a defendant has proved
substantial prejudice to his defense, the government must justify its delay, and this explanation
will be balanced against the prejudice the defendant suffered due to the delay to determine whether
a violation of justice has occurred.” Rivera, 64 V.I. at 576; see Ventura, 64 VI. at 609 (“[W]e join
the minority of jurisdictions and hold that once a defendant has proved substantial prejudice from
the delay, the burden shifts to the People to explain the delay.”). In Rivera, we explained that “[i]n
so doing, we recognize the Territory's right to investigate and prosecute cases according to its own
agenda and ability, and that it has limited resources and must prioritize the cases it pursues” and
that “[w]e only caution against misuse of its time and agenda to the extent that an unreasonable
delay violates a criminal defendant's Constitutional right to due process.” 64 V.I. at 576
437 “This [burden of proving substantial prejudice] is a heavy burden because it requires not
only that a defendant show actual prejudice, as opposed to mere speculative prejudice, but also
that he show that any actual prejudice was substantial—that he was meaningfully impaired in his
ability to defend against the state's charges to such an extent that the disposition of the criminal
* Cajuste pursued his federal due process claim in the trial court. On appeal, however, he switched
to due process under ROA § 3 and, in a single sentence, asserted that the record “also” establishes
a due process violation “under the federal due process clause.” (Appellant’s Br. 17.) Because
Cajuste’s treatment of the federal claim on appeal was “perfunctory,” we could deem the claim
waived. See V.I.R. App. P. 22(m). And while Cajuste’s reply brief discusses the federal claim more
thoroughly, “mak[ing] no arguments regarding [a claim] until [one’s] reply brief’ constitutes
waiver. Webster v. People, 60 V.I. 666, 679 (V.I. 2014). (See Appellant’s Reply Br. 9-11.)
Nevertheless, we will “exercise [our] discretion to address the merits” of Cajuste’s federal claim,
especially since there is no doubt that he raised this claim below, unlike the ROA § 3 claim. Smith
v. Henley, 67 V.1. 965, 976 n.9 (V.I. 2017); see Bryan v. V.I. WAPA, 2024 VI 30, 4 52 n.48
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proceeding was likely affected.” Ventura, 64 V.I. at 611 (quoting Jones v. Angelone, 94 F.3d 900,
907 (4th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (collecting cases)). “[A]ctual prejudice may be shown
through loss—attributed to the delay—of specific witnesses or documents that would have
provided information unavailable through other sources.”!° Jd., at 611-12 (citing Carty v. People,
56 V.I. 345, 367-68 (V.I. 2012) (finding no actual prejudice where defendant offered no evidence
that a favorable witness actually existed); Francis v. People, 63 V.1. 724, 754 (V.I. 2015); United
States v. Jackson, 446 F.3d 847, 851 (8th Cir. 2006) (finding no actual prejudice where defendant's
claim of deleted computer files did not specify with particularity the exculpatory nature of the
files); Jones, 94 F.3d at 908). “Speculation about possible lost evidence is insufficient to support
a Fifth Amendment due process violation.” See Ventura, 64 V.I. at 612 (collecting cases)
438 In his brief, Cajuste first points to the death of Iris Adina Brady (“Mrs. Brady”)—the
mother of Leopold Rodriquez (“L. Rodriquez”) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s (“I. Rodriquez”)—and
notes: (i) “[a]t trial, [the People] attempted to establish a butcher knife allegedly missing from Mrs
Brady’s home, where [Cajuste] purportedly resided at the time of Manno’s murder, was the murder
weapon”; (ii) “Ishmael Rodriquez testified at trial he only learned this information from his
'© Cajuste—rather than citing cases from this Court—cites to State v. Zimbeck, 961 N.E.2d 1141
(Ohio Ct. App. 2011), an Ohio Court of Appeals case, to support his argument that he sustained
actual prejudice because “key witnesses have died, memories have faded, and evidence has been
lost.” 961 N.E.2d. at 1147. However, Cajuste’s reference to Zimbeck was incomplete. Cajuste fails
to acknowledge that the Zimbeck court, like this Court, similarly requires more than speculative
losses to show actual, substantial prejudice the defendant sustained as result of the delay
To prove actual prejudice, a defendant must show, by concrete proof, the exculpatory value
of any alleged missing evidence. In other words, a defendant must show how lost witnesses,
memories and physical evidence would have proven the defendant's asserted defense. A
showing based on mere speculation will not be found sufficient, and a court may not
presume prejudice where a delay has been lengthy
Id., 961 N.E.2d at 1147-48. As this Court explains below, Cajuste failed to meet his burden of
showing actual prejudice
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mother’; and (iii) he “did not have any opportunity to cross-examine Mrs. Brady, the source of
this information, at trial or even interview her prior to trial.”
439 Cajuste next points to the loss of the handwritten medical records of his June 23, 2005
RLSH emergency room visit (“Written Record”) and notes: (i) the People “attempted to argue
[Cajuste] gave inconsistent accounts about the source of the laceration on his left arm”; and (ii)
the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) introduced at trial “was not a copy of the
actual emergency record, but only a reproduction of the same that was not a true and exact copy
of the original [Written Record, which] was not available for trial because it was destroyed in the
2017 hurricanes.”
40 Here, Cajuste’s argument amounts to a claim that the evidence would have been different
absent the delay, without identifying any specific prejudice he claims to have suffered as a result
of the delay. In other words, Cajuste’s argument hinges on a speculative loss of evidence rather
than demonstrating actual prejudice—let alone substantial prejudice—resulting from the absence
of Mrs. Brady’s testimony and the RLSH Written Record. He fails to identify any concrete
exculpatory information that Mrs. Brady’s testimony or the RLSH Written Record would have
provided or to show that such information could not have been obtained from other sources. In
fact, the information that would have been provided by Mrs. Brady was available through Rodriquez, and the content of the RLSH Written Record was reflected in the redacted RLSH
Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29). See Ventura, 64 V.I. at 611-12
941 According to his brief, Cajuste seems to argue that Mrs. Brady would have testified that a
knife was missing from her kitchen in June 2005, but that her death rendered her unavailable for
cross-examination, thereby prejudicing him. Although Cajuste claims that I. Rodriquez, who lived
with his mother during the relevant period, learned of this information solely from her, I
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Rodriquez’s testimony indicates that he had personal knowledge of a knife missing from her
kitchen in June 2005. At trial, I. Rodriquez testified that he was aware that a homicide occurred at
the end of June 2005. When presented with the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18), he recognized it as
“one of [his] mother’s cutlery” because “[he] just know that it was one of hers among the many
knives that she used to keep for cooking.” When asked whether he had “see[n] that [Knife
(People’s Exhibit 18)] in [his] mother’s home after [he] learned of the homicide,” I. Rodriquez
responded “no.” Cajuste had the opportunity to cross-examine I. Rodriquez and did so
442 On the other hand, Cajuste did not clearly identify what information the RLSH Written
Record would have contained that became unavailable due to its destruction by the 2017
hurricanes. Nor did he explain how this loss prejudiced him. Notably, Cajuste was provided with
a copy of the RLSH Digital Record at trial and had the opportunity to examine and compare it with
the RLSH Written Record.'' Yet he identified no particular information in the RLSH Written
Record, the absence of which prejudiced him. Furthermore, while Cajuste claims that the People
“attempted to argue [Cajuste] gave inconsistent accounts about the source of the laceration on his
left arm,” this claim is unsupported by the record. The portion of the transcript (J.A. 1038)!? and
'! To provide some background: The People realized—at the start of their direct examination of
Custodian Baynes, when they tendered the RLSH Digital Record—that it was a different document
from the RLSH Written Record previously produced during discovery. In fact, the RLSH Digital
Record was never produced to either Cajuste or Stuart. Cajuste raised a plethora of objections to
the admission of the RLSH Digital Record. In response, the court called Custodian Baynes to the
stand, outside the presence of the jury, so that the parties had an opportunity to question her
regarding the RLSH Digital Record and the RLSH Written Record, with both documents presented
to her. After hearing Custodian Baynes’s testimony and the parties’ arguments, the court overruled
Cajuste’s objections and admitted RLSH Digital Record with redactions of all “new”
information—that is, information contained in the RLSH Digital Record but not included in the
RLSH Written Record. Thus, the People’s Exhibit 29 reflects the redacted RLSH Digital Record
'2 Joint Appendix page 1038 contains the following excerpt from the transcript of Custodian
Baynes’ testimony
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the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) (J.A. 1447-51)? referenced by Cajuste
do not show such an attempt by the People; neither Custodian Baynes’ testimony nor the redacted
RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) addresses the source of Cajuste’s arm laceration. It is
worth noting that, with respect to the potential prejudice claimed by Cajuste, the Superior Court
specifically stated in its August 12, 2022 order memorializing its rulings that “[it] believes that
any potential prejudice to Cajuste can and is remedied by: (1) redacting the information not
contained in the handwritten report; (2) providing Cajuste’s counsel a reasonable amount of time
to inspect the roughly two (2) pages of pertinent medical information; and (3) permitting Cajuste’s
counsel to further question the hospital records custodian....”
9443 Insum, Cajuste’s speculation about potentially lost evidence is insufficient to demonstrate
actual prejudice—not to mention the higher standard of substantial prejudice—and therefore fails
to establish a due process violation. See Ventura, 64 V.I. at 612. Because both actual and
substantial prejudice are required to support a due process violation based on precharge delay, and
because Cajuste has not met the heavy burden of showing that he suffered such prejudice as a
[By Attorney Riley}
A. June 23rd, 2005
Q. And now I’m referring to page four of the exhibit. Under Chief Complaint, what does
it list?
A. Laceration left forearm
ATTORNEY RILEY: I have nothing further at this time, Your Honor
The People did not elicit testimony regarding the source of the laceration
'3 Joint Appendix pages 1447-51 reflect People’s Exhibit 29, the redacted RLSH Digital Record
See supra, note 11. As noted above, the court had ordered the redaction of all “new” information
Id. Of relevance, the Superior Court directed that under “Chief Complaint” on page two of the
RLSH Digital Record, the phrase “laceration left forearm, stays in. And then everything after that
on that line is redacted.” People’s Exhibit 29 did not contain information regarding the source of
the laceration
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result of the delay, his claim ultimately fails. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to examine the
People’s justification for the delay. See Rivera, 64 V.1. at 576 (establishing the following test to
evaluate whether a precharge delay violated a defendant’s right to due process under the federal
Constitution: “once a defendant has proved substantial prejudice to his defense, the government
must justify its delay, and this explanation will be balanced against the prejudice the defendant
suffered due to the delay to determine whether a violation of justice has occurred”); see Ventura,
64 V.I. at 609
444 Based on the foregoing, the Superior Court did not err in denying Cajuste’s motion to
dismiss the murder charges
2. The Superior Court’s Delay in Ruling on Cajuste’s Motion to Dismiss and Denial
of an Evidentiary Hearing on the Motion
445 As noted above, Cajuste also argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the murder charges on two additional grounds: (i) that the court’s “extreme delay” in ruling
on the motion violated his due process rights, citing Jn re Elliott, 54 V.1. 423 (V.1. 2010); and (ii)
that the court’s failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion—despite his request
prejudiced him, citing 3RC & Co. v. Boynes Trucking Sys., 63 V.1. 544 (V.1. 2015), and Boynes v
Transp. Servs. of St. John, 60 V.1. 453 (V.1. 2014). However, both arguments are raised in a
perfunctory manner. By merely citing these cases—without explanation, context, or any
substantive analysis—Cajuste has failed to adequately present these arguments as required by the
Virgin Islands Rules of Appellate Procedure and our precedents. See V.I. R. App. P. 22(m)(3)
(“Issues that...are only adverted to in a perfunctory manner or unsupported by argument and
citation to legal authority, are deemed waived for purposes of appeal, except that the Supreme
Court, at its option, may notice an error not presented that affects substantial rights.”); see also,
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V.I. R. App. P. 22(a)(5) (“The argument shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect
to each of the issues presented, and the reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes,
and parts of the record relied on.”); cf Heath v. People, 2024 VI 17, 4 59 (noting that “the
appellant's brief is insufficient” in the presentation aspect because “[a]n argument consisting of a
single sentence, lacking citation to any supporting authority whatsoever, and providing no
references to facts in the record on appeal that are relied upon for support, clearly does not comply
with the obligation imposed by Rule 22(a)(5)” and that “this Court has repeatedly held that such
undeveloped arguments need not be considered on appeal”)
446 This Court declines to undertake such an inquiry or to advance arguments that Cajuste
himself has failed to develop. See Encarnacion v. Testamark, 2023 VI 10, J 13 (“This Court has
repeatedly emphasized that our adversarial system of justice is premised on the parties presenting
facts and legal arguments before a neutral and relatively passive judge, and that it is extraordinarily
disfavored for courts to forsake their roles as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by
the parties before them and instead sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, Joseph v. Joseph, Civ. No. SX-04-CV-188, 2015 V.I
LEXIS 43, *5 (V.I. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015) (“[I]n general, the Court will not make a movant's
arguments for him when he has failed to do so.”). Accordingly, these arguments are deemed
waived. See V.I. R. App. P. 4(h) (“Only issues and arguments fairly presented to the Superior Court
may be presented for review on appeal.”); see also, V.I. R. App. P. 22(m)
E. Whether the Superior Court Erred in its Evidentiary Rulings
4.47 We now turn to Cajuste’s argument that the Superior Court erred in its evidentiary ruling
admitting the following evidence: the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s
testimony regarding it; Agent Fletcher's DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his testimony
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regarding the report; and the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian
Baynes’ testimony regarding the redacted record
1. The Knife (People’s Exhibit 18)
448 First, Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting the knife allegedly used to
kill Manno because “‘no evidence of chain of custody whatsoever was presented” as required by
Rule 901 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence (“Evidence Rule 901”)
£49 In response, the People point out that “{tJhe knife’s chain of custody was testified to by
Forensic Det. Rouse-Carty, who was responsible at the time for collecting and preserving the
eventual storage [sic] all evidence in this case” and that Cajuste “himself acknowledges that the
chain of custody goes to the weight of the evidence and not its admissibility.”
€50 The Superior Court overruled Cajuste’s objection from the bench and did not memorialize
its oral ruling in a written order
€5i Evidence Rule 901 provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or
identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a
finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” V.IL.R. EviD. 901(a). “The following are
examples only -- not a complete list -- of evidence that satisfies the requirement: (1) Testimony of
a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be...(4) Distinctive
Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” V.I.R. EVID
901(b)
452 “Although it is the People's burden to lay the required foundation for authenticity and chain
of custody of its evidence, ‘absent a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof of tampering, the court
operates under a presumption of integrity for the physical evidence.’” James v. People, 60 V.1
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311, 324 (V.I. 2013) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 565 F.3d 1059, 1066 (8th Cir. 2009). “If
the evidence is properly authenticated and if there is reasonable probability that the evidence is
what it is purported to be, ‘[a] possible defect in the chain of custody for a certain piece of evidence
factors into the weight given to the evidence rather than its admissibility.”” Gumbs v. People, 64
V.L 491, 505 (V.I. 2016) (quoting United States v. Scharon, 187 F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1999)); see
also, Browne v. People, 56 V.1. 207, 221 n.12 (V.I. 2012) (citing Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 US. 305, 311 n.1 (2009))
4/53 In this instance, the People authenticated the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) as the weapon
used to kill Manno by having witnesses identify the evidence. Before the Knife (People’s Exhibit
18) was admitted into evidence, VIPD officer Delbert Phipps (“Officer Phipps”) testified that he
was one of the officers who responded to the crime scene and personally observed a knife
specifically, “a large knife, silver knife with a black handle”—lodged in Manno’s neck, with “the
body of [Manno] ... lying face down in that blood.” He also testified that “the body travel[ed] to
the St. Thomas Hospital morgue just in the manner it was ... [and] we place[d] [Manno] in the
body bag as is.” Officer Phipps further stated that he was present at Manno’s autopsy and
personally observed the medical examiner Dr. Landron remove the knife from Manno’s neck. He
explained that, once the knife was removed from the autopsy table, the procedure was to process
it—i.e., photograph, measure, etc.—-and then turn it over to the Forensic Team to secure by proper
storage
$54 When Officer Phipps was presented with the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18), he testified that
he recognized it and described it as “a knife, silver and black, approximately one foot long, 12
inches, eight-inch blade, about a four-inch handle,” and noted that “it also still has what appear to
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be the stain of blood.” When asked “to your recollection, is that the knife that was taken out of
[Manno’]s body?” Officer Phipps responded, “I would say, yes
955 After the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) was admitted, it was further authenticated by VIPD
officer Daphne Rouse Carty (“Officer Carty”) and Dr. Landron. Officer Carty testified that “[she]
was assigned to the case on the date that it occurred” and that “[her] duties and responsibilities [in
2005] were to collect, to photograph, to process, to preserve evidence.” Specifically, she testified
that her involvement in this case included: collecting and securing evidence, taking photographs,
packaging the evidence she collected and mailing them to the FBI for further examination;
receiving confirmation from the FBI that they received her evidence; and receiving the return of
evidence from the FBI. As to the FBI’s return of evidence, Officer Carty testified: “After they are
finish [sic] their examinations they send the box via FedEx sealed. And individual piece again
sealed along with the -- whatever they use for testing, and it’s turned into evidence for safekeeping
until court time or if something else is needed from it.” As to the securing of the returned evidence
from the FBI, Officer Carty testified: “[i]f the property clerk was not available when the items
came back [from the FBI], they were in a sealed box, our area is a secured location, she gets it as
soon as she is available”; that “[they] have two places [they] keep evidence”; that “[they] had
[their] own evidence lockers with a key”; and that “only [she] had access to that evidence [and]
when [she was] finished then it’s turned over to the evidence clerk in the property room.”
456 When the People presented a photograph depicting a knife and ruler (People’s Exhibit 32)
and a photograph depicting Manno’s body with a knife and ruler (People’s Exhibit 38) to Officer
Carty, she recognized—via her handwriting and the case number—that she took the photographs
and that they were a fair and accurate depiction of what she observed at the morgue on June 23
2005. When the People presented a laboratory request form, dated July 6, 2005 (People’s Exhibit
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46), she recognized it as the form she created in this case and testified that “it contains a listing of
all the evidence that [she] sent for examination, and a synopsis of the type of examination [she
was] requesting, and what occurred why [she was] requesting the examination” and “the listing
has where the evidence was obtained, identification marks on the listing, and a description of the
evidence.” Of import here, the laboratory request form (People’s Exhibit 46) included the
following entry: “Number 21, black handled kitchen knife. ID 1-1-1-1 dash 05U from the victim
at the morgue.”
957 Finally, Dr. Landron—qualified as an expert in forensic pathology—testified that during
the autopsy he performed on Manno on June 23, 2005, he observed that a knife was embedded in
Manno’s neck. When Dr. Landron was presented with a photograph depicting a knife and ruler
(People’s Exhibit 32), he recognized that “it’s a kitchen type knife.” When asked “by its markings
is that the knife that was taken out of [Manno’s] neck?” Dr. Landron responded, “yes, it is.”
"58 Based on the foregoing, the People met their burden of authenticating the Knife (People’s
Exhibit 18) as the weapon used to kill Manno. See V.ILR. Evib. 901(b) (“The following are
examples only -- not a complete list -- of evidence that satisfies the requirement: (1) Testimony of
a Witness with Knowledge. Testimony that an item is what it is claimed to be...(4) Distinctive
Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other
distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.”). The chain of
custody requirement for authentication was satisfied through the testimony of Officer Phipps,
Officer Carty, and Dr. Landron. The Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) remained in official custody,
beginning with its transfer—still lodged in Manno’s neck—from the crime scene to the morgue,
continuing through its collection at the morgue, and ultimately to its secure storage in the evidence
room until “court time.” There was no showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof of tampering
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“{W]here items have been in official custody and there is no affirmative evidence of tampering,
there is a presumption that public officers have discharged their duties properly to preserve their
original condition.” James, 60 V.I. at 324 (citing United States. v. Prieto, 549 F.3d 513, 524-25
(7th Cir. 2008)). In any event, under established precedent, a possible defect in the chain of custody
of properly authenticated evidence affects only the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility
See Gumbs, 64 V.I. at 505 (“If the evidence is properly authenticated and if there is reasonable
probability that the evidence is what it is purported to be, ‘[a] possible defect in the chain of
custody for a certain piece of evidence factors into the weight given to the evidence rather than its
admissibility.’”) (citations omitted)
459 Thus, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the Knife (People’s
Exhibit 18) into evidence
2. Ishmael Rodriquez’s Testimony
460 Next, Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in allowing testimony from I. Rodriquez
because: (i) it violated Rule 602 of the Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence (“Evidence Rule 602”)
given that “the only reason Ishmael learned the knife was missing from his mother [Mrs. Brady’s]
kitchen is because his mother told him that”; and (ii) it violated Cajuste’s rights to confront the
witnesses under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and ROA § 3 because the late
Mrs. Brady’s statements to I. Rodriquez were testimonial hearsay” under Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004), since these “statements [] were made under circumstances which would
lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial...”
{61 In response, the People argue that the “elicited information [was] within [Ishmael
Rodriquez’s] personal knowledge”—to wit, “[h]Je simply confirmed that he personally had not
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seen the knife he knew his mother had owned since learning of the homicide for which Cajuste
was a suspect.” Furthermore, the People point out that it was Cajuste, not the People, that “elicited
testimony from Ishmael as to knowledge his mother imputed to him concerning the knife by asking
a question to which Ishmael answered honestly.” The People further point out that “a defendant
cannot complain on appeal of alleged errors invited or induced by himself,”'* and thus, “[b]ecause
the People did not elicit any hearsay testimony or offer the testimony elicited by Cajuste to prove
the truth of any matters into which they inquired, the trial court was correct in overruling Cajuste’s
objections.”
962 Inits August 12, 2022 order denying Cajuste’s motion to strike I. Rodriquez’s testimony
in its entirety, the Superior Court made the following relevant rulings: (i) “Ishmael’s testimony on
direct was based on personal knowledge”; (ii) “On cross-examination, Rodriquez did not give a
hearsay statement ... [but] [rJather, he explained how and when he personally became aware the
knife was missing, when his mother ‘brought it up’”; and (iii) “There being no out of court
statement provided for the truth of the matter asserted, there can clearly be no out of court
testimonial statement provided for the truth of the matter asserted [and] [t]hus, there is no
Confrontation Clause or Crawford issue.”
£63 As to Cajuste’s Evidence Rule 602 argument, there is sufficient evidence to support a
finding that I. Rodriquez has personal knowledge that a knife was missing from his mother’s
kitchen. As noted above, I. Rodriquez testified at trial that he lived with his mother in 2005 and
that he was aware that a homicide occurred at the end of June 2005. When presented with the Knife
(People’s Exhibit 18), he recognized it as “one of [his] mother’s cutlery” because “[he] just know
'4 The People referenced: Latalladi v. People, 51 V.1. 137, 143-44 (V.I. 2009) (citations omitted)
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that it was one of hers among the many knives that she used to keep for cooking.” When asked
whether he had “see[n] that [Knife (People’s Exhibit 18)] in [his] mother’s home after [he] learned
of the homicide?” I. Rodriquez responded, “no.” See V.I.R. EviD. 602 (“A witness may not testify
to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has
personal knowledge of the matter. Evidence to prove personal knowledge may, but need not,
consist of the witness’ own testimony.”). Here, there was no violation of Evidence Rule 602
464 As to Cajuste’s Confrontation Clause argument, the People correctly point out that it was
Cajuste himself who, during cross-examination of I. Rodriquez, elicited testimony indicating that
I. Rodriquez had learned from his mother that a knife was missing from her kitchen. In other words,
this was an invited error as the People correctly assert
465 This Court has held that “when a defendant, through his counsel, induces or encourages
the Superior Court to commit an error, the invited error doctrine precludes that error from forming
the basis for reversal on direct appeal.” Williams v. People, 59 V.1. 1024, 1033 (V.I. 2013); see
also, Powell v. People, 59 V.1. 444, 465 (V.I. 2013) (Generally, trial error which is induced,
encouraged, acquiesced in, or consented to by defense counsel does not form a basis for reversal
on appeal.” (quoting Potter v. People, 56 V.I. 779, 793 (V.1. 2012)); Fontaine v. People, 56 V.1
571, 583 (V.I. 2012) (“[T]he invited error doctrine precludes errors stemming from erroneous jury
instructions proposed by a defendant's counsel from forming the basis for reversal.”); United States
v. Reyes-Alvarado, 963 F.2d 1184, 1187 (9th Cir. 1992) (“We find that a defendant who elicits a
statement that may be violative of Bruton may not later claim error based on the admission of that
statement.”). “{T]he invited error doctrine applies when the appellant induce[s] the specific error
by her affirmative action.” Miller v. People, 67 V.1. 827, 841 (V.I. 2017) (citing Williams, 59 V.I
at 1033)
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66 As the court noted in its August 12, 2022 order memorializing its rulings, “neither the
People during their direct examination nor Cajuste’s codefendant elicited testimonial hearsay
against Cajuste from the witness.” Cajuste therefore induced the specific error at issue
Consequently, regardless of whether Mrs. Brady’s statement was testimonial, the invited error
doctrine precludes Cajuste from arguing on appeal that I. Rodriquez’s truthful testimony—elicited
by Cajuste himself during cross-examination—violated his Confrontation Clause rights or serves
as a basis to exclude that testimony. See Miller, 67 V.I. at 841; see also Williams, 59 V.I. at 1033;
Powell, 59 V.1. at 465; Fontaine, 56 V.I. at 583
467 Additionally, the fact that I. Rodriquez’s mother informed him that a knife was missing
from her kitchen and his own personal knowledge of that fact are not mutually exclusive. I
Rodriquez could have learned from his mother that a knife was missing from her kitchen and also
personally observed that a knife—one resembling the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18)—-was absent
from her kitchen after he learned of the homicide at the end of June 2005, thereby giving him
personal knowledge that a knife was missing from his mother’s kitchen
468 Thus, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting I. Rodriquez’s testimony
3. Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and His Testimony
469 Cajuste also argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting Agent Fletcher’s DNA
Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his testimony regarding the report in violation of Rule 403 of the
Virgin Islands Rules of Evidence (“Evidence Rule 403”), his right to confront the witnesses under
the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and ROA § 3, and the requirement to establish
a proper chain of custody. Cajuste asserts that Evidence Rule 403 was violated because the DNA
evidence presented was minimally probative regarding his involvement in the crime, yet highly
prejudicial, confusing, and misleading to the jury due to the DNA Report’s (People’s Exhibit 48)
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reliance on a prior, unintroduced 2006 report containing work by non-testifying analysts (“2006
Report”) and unexplained references that may have led the jury to speculate.'> In addition, Cajuste
further contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation was violated because Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) relied on the work of non-testifying analysts—i.e
the 2006 Report—whom Cajuste could not cross-examine, and unlike the analyst in Saldana v
People, 2020 V1 21, Agent Fletcher did not independently verify the earlier 2006 Report, making
the admission of Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony
'S In his brief, Cajuste makes the following assertions: (i) “the presence of [Cajuste’s] DNA
evidence in the unit was not very probative on the elements of crimes charges”—to wit, “[t]he
DNA evidence did not indicate whether [Cajuste] was in the unit at the time of the crime, Mr
Fletcher could not conclude the source of the DNA was [Cajuste’s] blood, and he could not opine
on how the DNA got into the unit[, and] [e]ven when a defendant is determined to be on the crime
scene at the time of the crime, and there is no such evidence to that effect as to [Cajuste], that is
not sufficient evidence [of] participation in the crime as a principal or an aider and abettor”; (ii) he
was unduly prejudiced by [the DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48)] and it was misleading and
confusing for the jury” because the DNA Report was “based on a separate analysis by another
person, that was completed in 2006... [and] he was unable to cross-examine the person who
conducted the analysis and wrote the [2006] report”; (iii) “the references to that report, its differing
report number, and different and unexplained reference to ‘QB UU’ may have caused the jury to
speculate as to the contents, author, purpose, and findings of that 2006 report in their decision
making process”; and (iv) “the dependence of [People’s] Exhibit 48 on the 2006 report, without
the introduction of that report into evidence for the jury to see, renders [People’s] Exhibit 48
incomplete and excludable under Evidence Rule 403.”
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constitutionally improper under Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011).' Lastly, Cajuste
also claims that the People “did not introduce any chain of custody by [Agent] Fletcher regarding
the items he tested, the 2006 report, or the items tested in the earlier report.”
470 In response, the People argue that there were no violations by the admission of Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony. First, the People assert that there was
no violation of Evidence Rule 403 because the probative value outweighed the prejudice and Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony were “not misleading or confusing to
the jury.” Second, the People contends there was no violation of the Confrontation Clause because
Agent Fletcher “personally prepared the only report actually offered and received into evidence,”
the report “contains the opinions and interpretations of the issuing examiner [Agent Fletcher] and
is supported by records retained in the FBI files,” and Agent Fletcher “was available for—and
withstood—multiple cross-examinations.” Lastly, the People claim that Cajuste’s chain of custody
argument “is also meritless” because “both [Officer] Carty and [Officer] Hamdan provided
evidence supporting the chain of custody for the items tested by [Agent] Fletcher, and maintain
that “such concerns speak to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.”
'6 Cajuste argues that his right to confrontation was violated by the admission of Agent Fletcher’s
DNA Report and testimony because: (i) under Bullcoming, “[t]he prosecution may not through
one testifying expert, introduce the report on scientific evidence of another non-testifying expert
consistent with a criminal defendant’s right to confront,” 564 U.S. at 652, 659-60 and “...the
analysts who write reports that the prosecution introduces must be made available for confrontation
even if they possess ‘the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa,’”
564 U.S. at 661; and (ii) the People “did not introduce any chain of custody by Mr. Fletcher
regarding the items he tested, the 2006 report, or the items tested in the earlier report”; and (iii)
“[t]he trial court’s reliance on Saldana, was similarly misplaced” because “[i]n Saldana, the
admitted scientific report was the work of the testifying expert [and] [t]he expert testified about
the use of others’ analyses in her report, how that was done, and that she checked them and
independently determined no changes or corrections were needed” while “Mr. Fletcher did not
provide any such testimony.”
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471 Following arguments from the parties, the trial court overruled Cajuste’s objections from
the bench. The court held—after discussion of the facts and the relevant case law——that admission
of Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony did not violate the
Confrontation Clause, and that “the prejudice claimed by [Cajuste in] not being able to cross
examine every person whose report or analyses contributed to [Agent] Fletcher’s report is
outweighed by the probative value.” In its August 12, 2022 order, the trial court memorialized its
ruling only with respect to the Confrontation Clause issue and did not address the Evidence Rule
403 issue
472 While Cajuste raises three grounds on appeal for challenging the admission of Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony, a review of the trial transcript reveals
that he did not raise a chain of custody objection before the trial court. Cajuste’s argument
regarding the chain of custody is thus deemed waived. See V.I. R. App. P. 4(h); see also V.I.R
App. P. 22(m). The transcript further reflects that Cajuste’s Evidence Rule 403 argument focused
primarily on the unfair prejudice resulting from the alleged Confrontation Clause violation, and
briefly asserted that the incomplete nature of the report was misleading and confusing to the jury.!”
'? The relevant excerpt from the transcript reads as follows
ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN And to the extent that Mr. Fletcher's report is entirely
dependent on that other person who IJ cannot cross-examine, I would submit that I am being
deprived of a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine all of this evidence including him
properly in violation of Crawford. And it would also be unduly prejudicial under 403,
because without the opinions and work of the other person, his report is incomplete. And
so it's gonna be misleading and confusing to the jury, and the prejudice will substantially
outweigh its probative value
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Accordingly, we will address the Confrontation Clause issue before turning to the Evidence Rule
403 issue
Confrontation Clause
473 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const
amend. VI; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. We will assume, without deciding, that Agent Fletcher’s
DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) prepared in connection with a criminal investigation is
testimonial in nature and therefore within the compass of the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 53-54 (holding that the Confrontation Clause specifically applies to the “admission of
testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify
and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination”)
74 In Saldana, we addressed a similar issue in the context of a toxicology report. In that case,
the defendant argued, inter alia, that the People's testifying expert witness—Dr. Kacinko, an expert
forensic toxicologist—relied on a non-testifying expert's report which violated his right to
confront witnesses. 2020 VI 21, 4 36. Under the circumstances presented in that case—where (i)
ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN: Well, I just wanted to clarify something on the prejudice. I get
where they are coming from on the probative value, but the prejudice isn't just that it's
against him. The prejudice is that he can't cross-examine the opinions on which Mr
Fletcher relies from a completely independent person, and so the, one, Crawford, which is
a constitutional issue trumps anything in the rules of evidence. And then two, even if you
did a 403 analysis, the lost of the ability to cross-examine is substantial, substantial,
substantial prejudice
ATTORNEY CHRISTIAN: Yes, Your Honor, because this report is incomplete without
the stuff, which we can't cross-examine about. And so it's going to be -- if this is scientific
information, it's really misleading if it's incomplete to lay people, and so I think that's the
other part of the 403 prejudice
(J.A. 968-69, 975-76)
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Dr. Kacinko “personally prepared this (2017] report, based on the analytical work of staff in her
laboratory some years before, which she reviewed and determined did not need any correction”;
(ii) “[her] testimony was that she regularly reviews testing conducted by others in her lab”; (iii)
“she herself prepared the only laboratory report that was actually offered and received into
evidence in this case”; and (iv) “[t]he data she used related to a particular “patient” identified as
Jeanette A. Saldana and [the 2017 report] reports Dr. Kacinko's personal ‘findings’ on the various
chemical test results’—-we concluded that “Dr. Kacinko was not acting in this case as a conduit
for the work of the absent Dr. Isenschmid.” /d. at € 42. We, therefore, held that “the constitutional
imperatives of the Confrontation Clause were more than satisfied,” id., when Dr. Kacinko
“appeared live at trial to present her report, and was subject to detailed questioning by defense
counsel concerning all aspects of the report.” id. at ¢ 41
€75 In this instance, Agent Fletcher, like Dr. Kacinko, was similarly not acting as a conduit for
the work of the non-testifying analysts. Agent Fletcher independently reviewed “[the 2006]
{Report and the underlying information to make sure [he] agreed with all the conclusions made
in the original report,” interpreted the 2006 Report, drew conclusions from the 2006 Report, and
prepared his own report to that effect—the DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48)—-which was the
only report admitted into evidence. In fact, according to the People’s clarification at sidebar, Agent
Fletcher “did the actual DNA testing and... signed the report for the DNA” and that as to the 2006
Report, “it’s only the serology we’re talking about, which — all the serology actually does is to
inform him what to test for DNA.” Furthermore, as the Superior Court pointed out in its order,
Agent Fletcher indicated in the DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48): “The work described in this
report was conducted at the Quantico Laboratory. This report contains the opinions and
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interpretations of the issuing examiner and is supported by records retained in the FBI files.”
(Emphasis added)
€76 Attrial, Agent Fletcher—qualified as an expert in forensic DNA analysis and serology with
no objections from Cajuste or Stuart—was able to explain, in detail, the process used to identify
body fluids such as blood and semen for forensic testing; the process used to identify substances
that could potentially contain DNA for testing; the process used for DNA testing; and the process
used to interpret the DNA testing results, including statistics used to provide significance to the
results. During his testimony, he thoroughly answered questions about the various samples his
laboratory received related to Manno’s murder, the tests performed on such samples, and the test
results. Specifically, when asked, he elaborated on the DNA testing results of the samples he tested
and how he reached his conclusions based on these results
€77 Based on Agent Fletcher’s testimony and the People’s representation, Agent Fletcher relied
on the serology tests and results, i.e., the 2006 Report, to generate his DNA Report (People’s
Exhibit 48) because serology testing was a necessary prior step in completing the DNA testing that
he personally performed—to wit, the serology results identified samples that contained or
potentially contained blood, which helped Agent Fletcher determine which samples to use for
DNA testing. In other words, the DNA Report’s (People’s Exhibit 48) inclusion of the serology
testing and Agent Fletcher’s testimony regarding the same were not intended to prove the truth of
the serology test results—that the samples contained blood—but rather were intended to help
Agent Fletcher explain to the jury why he selected particular samples for DNA testing.'* See Smith
'8 The relevant excerpt from the transcript reads as follows
[By Attorney Scott]
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v. Arizona, 602 U.S. 779, 783-85 (2024) (“This Court has held that the Confrontation Clause’s
requirements apply only when the prosecution uses out-of-court statements for ‘the truth of the
matter asserted.’ ... When a statement is admitted for a reason unrelated to its truth, we have held,
the [Confrontation] Clause’s ‘role in protecting the right of cross-examination’ is not implicated.”)
(citations omitted)
478 To put it another way, the serology testing results were one piece of data relied upon by
Agent Fletcher and included in his report as a step in generating a DNA profile. Ultimately, it was
the DNA testing that Agent Fletcher personally performed and interpreted that provided a DNA
profile which was then used to compare with other established DNA profiles—i.e., Manno,
Q. Okay. Mr. Fletcher, I think we were —I was asking you about whether you had received
items of clothing collected from Viviane Stuart. Did you receive items of clothing from an
individual name[d] Viviane Stuart?
A. Yes, we did
Q. And what items of clothing did you receive?
A. We received a pair of shoes, a pair of socks, a pair of pants, two shirts, and a belt
Q. And what testing was conducted on those items?
A. The first things that were tested was serology to determine if any blood maybe present
on these items. The socks were negative for blood. So no blood was identified on the socks
The shoes, the pants, the shirts, and the belt all tested positive with our presumptive test
for blood, meaning blood may be present on those items. Then the best stain on the belt
was taken on for DNA testing
Q. Now I would like to talk to you about the swabs taken from the scene that were tested
How many swabs did your lab receive?
A. We received seven swabs from various locations at the scene
Q. How many were tested?
A. All seven of those swabs were tested for serology to determine whether or not may be
present. And three of those were taken on for DNA testing
Q. Can you give us the results based on what the swab was in terms of not just the number
for the lab, but actually where it was collected from, and what the results were from the
serology testing?
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Cajuste, and Stuart’s DNA profiles—to determine whether an individual is a contributor of DNA
to the sample tested or to exclude an individual as a contributor, and to conduct a statistical analysis
when necessary.!'? Thus, in this context, Agent Fletcher was the one who bore witness against
'9 The relevant excerpt from the transcript reads as follows
[By Attorney Scott]
Q. And was DNA testing then conducted on the belt?
A. Yes it was
Q. And what did you learn?
A. The DNA testing from the stain on the belt indicated female DNA. That female DNA
was inconclusive, meaning that we could never positively match to an individual, but we
could exclude individuals. That profile was then compared to the DNA reference sample
submitted from [Manno] and Mr. Cajuste, and both of them were excluded as being
possible contributors to the DNA recovered off the belt
Q. Okay. So you said under the victim, a hallway, west bedroom, west bedroom wall, and
then after, under the victim, where else were swabs collected from?
A. Behind the door, a mirror on the headboard, and from outside the building on a stair
Okay. And which of those were taken on for DNA testing?
A Three of those were taken on for DNA testing, the swab from the hallway, the swab from
the west bedroom, and the swab from outside on the stair
Q. Okay. Let’s start with the swab from outside the building on a stair. What did you learn
from the testing of that item?
A. So, DNA testing was conducted on that item, male DNA was obtained from that item,
and that DNA profile was then compared to the DNA profile from [Manno]
Q. And what did you learn from the comparison to the DNA profile of [Manno]?
A. [Manno] is the source of the DNA from the swab from outside on the stair
Q. Now let’s go to the swab from the west bedroom. What did the DNA analysis show or
tell you about that?
A. In this case for the swab from the west bedroom, we got DNA from more than one
individual, and a major contributor could be discerned. So we are able to pull out a major
contributor
Q. And who was the major contributor based on your reference?
A. When comparing to [Manno] and Mr. Cajuste, Mr. Cajuste is the source of the major
contributor to the DNA from this west bedroom
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Cajuste and Stuart, and the Confrontation Clause was satisfied because they both had the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine Agent Fletcher—and did so. See Saldana, 2020 VI 21
§ 42 (“when a lab supervisor such as Dr. Kacinko, independently reviews scientific data, draws
the conclusion from the data and prepares and issues a report to that effect that is admitted at trial,
the Confrontation Clause is not violated if she testifies and is available to the opposing party for
cross-examination”). Cf Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311 n.1 (explicitly refusing to hold that
"anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the
sample, or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case”)
§79 While Cajuste cites Bullcoming to support his argument that the admission of Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony violated his confrontation rights, the
facts here are clearly distinguishable from the facts in Bullcoming.”° In Bullcoming, the United
States Supreme Court—in addressing the question: “Does the Confrontation Clause permit the
A. So when [Manno] was compared to the DNA profile from the west bedroom wall, he
could not be excluded as a possible contributor. Because he could not be excluded statistics
were performed. Those statistics are included in the report. And due to the number of stats
I would have to refer to the report in order to get all of those numbers accurate
Q. Well, can you just tell us what the conclusion was from those statistics?
A. So, in conducting the statistics we performed statistics on seven different population
groups, Caucasian, African American, Southeastern, and Southwestern Hispanic. As well
as Bahamian, Trinidadian, and Jamaican. There is a statistic for all seven of those
population groups. The most common statistics was one in a hundred. The most rare
statistic one in 5700
Q. So, what does that then tell us about whether or not [Manno] was -- DNA was in the
minor contributor in this swab?
A. It just means that he could not be excluded as a possible contributor. And the statistics
provide weight to the significance of that match
20 Tn his brief, Cajuste also cites other cases in support of his argument, but his analysis focuses
mainly on Bullcoming. See supra, note 15
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prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing a testimonial certification, made
in order to prove a fact at a criminal trial, through the in-court testimony of an analyst who did not
sign the certification or personally perform or observe the performance of the test reported in the
certification,” 504 U.S. at 657—+reiterated that, “[a]s a rule, if an out-of-court statement is
testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who
made the statement is unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that
witness,” id., and held that “[b]ecause the New Mexico Supreme Court permitted the testimonial
statement of one witness, i.e., Caylor, to enter into evidence through the in-court testimony of a
second person, i.e., Razatos, we reverse that court's judgment,”! id. at 658. The most glaring
difference between Bullcoming and this case is that here, unlike Razatos who testified to a report
prepared and certified by Caylor, Agent Fletcher testified to his own report that contained his own
opinions and interpretations based on DNA testing he personally performed. The holding in
Bullcoming is therefore inapposite to this case
"80 Thus, the Superior Court was correct in its determination that the admission of Agent
Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony did not run afoul of the Confrontation
Clause
Evidence Rule 403
481 Under Evidence Rule 403, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice;
2! In Bullcoming, SLD scientist Gerasimos Razatos (“Razatos”) replaced the original witness
SLD analyst Curtis Caylor (“Caylor”)—to testify at trial as to the blood alcohol analysis report
prepared and certified by Caylor based on Caylor’s testing of Bullcoming’s blood and his findings
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confusing the issues; misleading the jury; undue delay; wasting time; or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.” V.I.R. EviD. 403. “[WJhen determining whether to exclude evidence under
FRE 403, the trial court is required to engage in a balancing test to weigh the evidence’s probative
value against the danger of unfair prejudice....”*? People v. Todmann, 53 V.1. 431, 442 (V.I. 2010)
(citing Mulley v. People, 51 V.1. 404, 411 (V.I. 2009)). “In reviewing the trial court’s conclusion
that the probative value of the [evidence] is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, this Court is mindful that, ‘[i]f judicial restraint is ever desirable, it is when [an unfair
prejudice] analysis of a trial court is reviewed by an appellate tribunal,’” and “[t]hus we may not
reverse the trial court’s determination under Rule 403...unless we find that the court acted
arbitrarily or irrationally." Jd. (citations omitted)
482 As noted above, the Superior Court did not memorialize its ruling on the Evidence Rule
403 issue in the August 12, 2022 order. However, a review of the court’s oral ruling from the
bench—considered along with the August 12, 2022 order memorializing its ruling as to the
Confrontation Clause issue—demonstrates that the Superior Court fully and carefully considered
the relevant issues and conducted the necessary balancing under Evidence Rule 403. Specifically,
the court explained its Evidence Rule 403 ruling from the bench: “The [c]ourt concludes that it is
not a confrontation clause violation simply because the defendant cannot cross-examine every
report and analysis that an expert utilized in making their final determination ... With respect to
the prejudice argument, I believe that that is mitigated or addressed by the availability of [Agent]
22 Since Todmann, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has adopted the Virgin Islands Rules of
Evidence, which went into effect on March 31, 2017. The local Evidence Rule 403 mirrors its
federal counterpart, and therefore the standard articulated by this Court under the Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 remains applicable
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Fletcher for cross-examination as to the data he relies upon, and I find that the probative value
outweighs the prejudice claimed by the Defendants and not being able to cross-examine every
person whose report or analyses contributed to Mr. Fletcher’s report is outweighed by the probative
value.” (J.A. 990-91)
483 The Superior Court did not err in its assessment. Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s
Exhibit 48) and testimony was relevant and highly probative of Cajuste’s involvement in Manno’s
murder. Specifically, Agent Fletcher testified that Cajuste was the major contributor of the DNA
profile found on swabs taken from the bedroom where Manno’s body was located and the hallway
of the apartment shared by Manno and Stuart and that the DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48)
“contains the opinions and interpretations of the issuing examiner [Agent Fletcher] and is
supported by records retained in the FBI files.” In comparison, any undue prejudice, confusion, or
misleading effect alleged by Cajuste was mitigated by the availability of Agent Fletcher for cross
examination, as the trial court noted. Thus, the balancing required under Evidence Rule 403 tips
in favor of admitting Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and testimony, see V.LR
Evip. 403, and the Superior Court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in making its Rule 403
determination, see Todmann, 53 V.I. at 442
{84 Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Fletcher’s
DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his testimony
4. Redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian Baynes’
Testimony
485 Lastly, Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in admitting the redacted RLSH Digital
Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian Baynes’ testimony regarding the same because the
digital record does not fall under the hearsay exception under Rule 803(6) of the Virgin Islands
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Rules of Evidence (“Evidence Rule 803(6)”) because Custodian Baynes was not a qualified
witness and the RLSH Digital Record is not “a true copy” of the RLSH Written Record (People’s
Exhibit 30) that was destroyed by Hurricanes Irma and Maria in 2017
486 Inresponse, the People argue that “the records were properly introduced and authenticated”
and that they “satisfy V.I.R.E. 803(6)’s exception to the hearsay rule.”
487 Inits August 12, 2022 order overruling Cajuste’s objections as to the RLSH Digital Record
and Custodian Baynes’ testimony, the Superior Court—citing to Custodian Baynes’ testimony
found that the Digital Record “satisfied the hearsay exception in Virgin Islands Rule of Evidence
803(6)” and admitted the records with certain redaction. The court noted that while “Cajuste
challenged the custodian of records, as she did not personally enter the information into the
system [, he] did not show that the source of the information or the methods of preparing the record
lacked trustworthiness.”
*€88 The hearsay exception of Evidence Rule 803(6)—commonly known as the business
records exception—permits admission of “[a] record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or
diagnosis” that meets the following five requirements to be admitted into evidence: “(A) the record
was made at or near the time by -- or from information transmitted by -- someone with knowledge;
(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization,
occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit; (C) making the record was a regular practice of
that activity; (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another
qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute
permitting certification; and (E) the opponent does not show that the source of information or the
method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” V.I. R. EviD. 803(6)
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4.89 Custodian Baynes’ testimony satisfied Rule 803(6)’s requirements. First, her testimony
established that the RLSH Digital Record was made at or near that time by someone with personal
knowledge, that this type of medical digital record was kept in the course of RLSH’s regularly
conducted business, and that making this type of medical digital record was the regular practice of
RLSH. Specifically, Custodian Baynes testified that the information contained in the system that
generates a printout of the digital medical record—such as the RLSH Digital Record—‘comes
from the nurse speaking with the patient or the physician speaking with the patient, and they plug
the information into the system.” Custodian Baynes further testified that the information contained
in the RLSH Digital Record was entered at or near the time of Cajuste’s visit to RLSH and that, in
fact, the information was entered into the system before the information was recorded in the RLSH
Written Record. She also testified that the RLSH Digital Record was kept in the regular course of
RLSH business
490 Next, Custodian Baynes’ testimony established that she was a qualified witness to testify
to the record keeping system of RLSH. She testified that she has been working at RLSH since
1996; that she was a supervisor in the RLSH’s Medical Records Department and oversees the
medical records, i.e., “the release -- the charts coming in, information going out, coding, analyzing,
and signatures”; and that RLSH keeps both paper charts and electronic charts. She also testified
that, while she could not recall her specific duties at RLSH in 2005, she had “knowledge with
when it comes to making copies for the charts, we maintaining the charts, keeping integrity of the
charts, checking for deficiencies of the chart ... coding for billing... [a]nd if we have to appear in
court that’s part of our duties as well.” Notably, RLSH produced Custodian Baynes to testify at
trial in response to the People’s subpoena for RLSH’s record custodian
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£91 Cajuste contends that Custodian Baynes was not qualified to testify since she did not enter
the information into the system that generated the RLSH Digital Record and “her division did not
oversee the inputting of the emergency room information in 2005 or at any time.” We reject that
contention. In Smith v. Henley, we held that “[iJn order for a document to be admitted as
a business record, ‘the person who actually prepared the document need not have testified so long
as other circumstantial evidence and testimony suggest [the record's] trustworthiness.’” 67 V.I
965, 979 (V.I. 2017) (quoting United States v. Parker, 749 F.2d 628, 633 (lith Cir. 1984))
Importantly, Custodian Bayes testified that her department was responsible for giving out medical
records, i.e., processing the request, making copies, and adding a seal to the record. When asked
by the court to explain the five-page RLSH Digital Record, Custodian Baynes explained: “This is
an administrative form that medical records use, due to the fact that with the two storms in 2017
we had some major damage and we lost [the] majority of our records. So once we get a request
and we research and find out the chart is not accessible, all we have is what’s in the system, then
we present a form attached to whatever we have electronically.” Thus, unlike what Cajuste claims,
it was indeed within the scope of Custodian Baynes’s department to create the RLSH Digital
Record
492 Finally, Cajuste argues that the RLSH Digital Record is not a “true copy” of the RLSH
Written Record and thus challenges the trustworthiness of the RLSH Digital Record. This
argument is unpersuasive. As noted above, Custodian Baynes testified that the information in the
system was made by someone with personal knowledge at or near that time and that, upon the
request of a patient whose physical file was damaged, the RLSH Digital Record was generated
from the system. There is no evidence that the source of information or the methods used to
generate the RLSH Digital Record were untrustworthy
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493 Furthermore, to the extent that Cajuste’s argument that the RLSH Digital Record should
be excluded because it was not a “true copy” in the sense that it was only a portion of the complete
medical records for Cajuste’s June 23, 2005 emergency room visit, this goes to the weight given
to the evidence rather than admissibility. “[A]}s long as its proponent lays a sufficient foundation,
the incompleteness of a document alone does not preclude its admission under the business records
exception; rather, the incompleteness of a document goes towards its evidentiary weight or
value.” Smith, 67 V.I. at 979 (citing United States v. Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 178 n.27 (Sth Cir
1998) (rejecting the argument that their incompleteness rendered certain business records
inadmissible, reasoning that “[t]he district court could properly conclude that the incompleteness
of any of the records went to their evidentiary weight rather than their admissibility”))
494 Here, the admission of the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) was
supported by adequate foundation and falls within the scope of Rule 803(6)’s well-established
business records exception to hearsay. Accordingly, the Superior Court did not abuse its discretion
in admitting the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29) and Custodian Baynes’
testimony
F. Whether the Superior Court Erred in its Denying
Cajuste’s Motions for Judgment of Acquittal
€95 Cajuste argues that the Superior Court erred in denying his motion for a judgment of
acquittal because “[e]ven in the light most favorable to [the People], [the evidence identified by
the court in its order] does not reasonably support a conclusion that [Cajuste] unlawfully killed
Manno with malice aforethought or, as to Court One, did so with willful and deliberate
premeditation” and “[t]hese facts also do not reasonably support any conclusion that [Cajuste]
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knew Manno was being murdered or that he took any action to facilitate, with the requisite specific
intent, the murder.”
{96 In response, the People argues that they “presented sufficient evidence on which a
rational jury could have found Cajuste guilty of First-Degree Murder-Aiding and Abetting.’
197 In the Rule 29 Order, the Superior Court—finding that the evidence presented,?? when
viewed in a light most favorable to the People, “[t]aken in its entirety is sufficient legal
evidence for a jury to make a reasonable and good-faith finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
[for the charged offenses]”—tejected Cajuste’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence
{98 As astarting point, in considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, “the only appropriate
justification for granting [the motion] is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the
conviction.” Corraspe v. People, 2024 VI 21, 56 (citation omitted). This standard of review, as
noted above, is “formidable, and defendants challenging convictions for insufficiency of evidence
face an uphill battle on appeal.” Ubiles v. People, 66 V.1. 572, 582 (V.I. 2017) (citation omitted)
Accordingly, “[t]his Court must affirm a jury's verdict as long as substantial evidence was
3 In the Rule 29 Order, the Superior Court stated
The evidence shows that: (1) a murder of a human being was committed; (2) that it was not
an accident or suicide; (3) there was no sign of forced entry and nothing was stolen or
missing; (4) that there was motive; (5) consciousness of guilt shown by flight; (6) the
Defendant or Defendants had access to the crime scene; (7) there was access to the murder
weapon by a Defendant, as well as his presence at the crime scene; (8) there are
unexplained and contradictory statements by both Defendants with respect to their actions
on the night of the murder; (9) the evidence shows the Defendants knew each other; (10)
communication between the Defendants; (11) that the victim fought back or otherwise
defended himself; (12) that a Defendant suffered a wound on the same date as the victim’s
murder that was the same nature as the wounds on the victim; (13) Cajuste’s DNA was on
the wall of the bedroom where the victim was found murdered; (14) the Defendants both
worked at Ranger American as security guards; and (15) their relationship was such that
Cajuste would visit and call Viviane while she was on duty at the hotel
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presented at trial to allow a rational trier of fact to convict, under the standard of beyond a
reasonable doubt, when the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution.”
Corraspe, 2024 VI 21, € 56. “[W]e examine the entire record to determine if any evidence was
introduced at trial sufficient to sustain the conviction.” Flores v. People, 2019 VI 12, § 20 (citing
Cascen v. People, 60 V.I. 392, 409 (V.I. 2014) (“[W]hen an appellate court reviews the sufficiency
of the evidence, it must consider all the evidence the jury had before it, including any evidence
that is later determined to be inadmissible.”))
£99 “In order for the evidence to rationally support a verdict, there must be a logical and
convincing nexus between the evidence both direct and circumstantial and the guilty
verdict[;] [a] trier of fact acts rationally if, in light of reason and everyday experience, the evidence,
properly presented, rationally and logically supports the existence of the facts establishing the
elements of the crime.” Corraspe, 2024 VI 21, § 57. “A verdict is irrational if there is a lack of
connection between the facts offered in evidence and the essential elements of the crime
charged.” /d = (citing Jackson vy Virginia, 443 US 307 317. = (1979)
(“The Winship doctrine, see 397 U.S. 358 (1970), requires more than simply a trial ritual. A
doctrine establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must also require that
the factfinder will rationally apply that standard to the facts in evidence.”). In other words, “a jury's
verdict cannot be founded upon suspicion, speculation, conjecture, or any overly attenuated piling
of inferences upon inferences.” Gonsalves v. People, 2019 VI 4, { 36 (citing Ventura v. People,
64 V.I. 589, 601 (V.I. 2016))
4,100 However, “the fact that the testimony is contradictory does not mean the evidence is
insufficient, only that the finder of fact must make credibility determinations.” Marcelle v. People,
55 V.I. 536, 547 (V.I. 2011). “So long as circumstantial evidence allows for a logical and
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rational inference based on common sense and every day experience, it will support a finding of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to the relevant element of the crime.” Corraspe, 2024 VI 21, 4
58 (quoting Gonsalves, 2019 VI 4, 4 36)
{101 We now turn to the question of whether there was sufficient evidence—viewed in the
light most favorable to the People and with the benefit of all reasonable inferences—from which
the jury could reasonably conclude that Cajuste acted in concert with Stuart and committed every
element of first-degree murder against Manno
1. First-Degree Murder
4102 The jury convicted Cajuste of first-degree murder under an aiding-and-abetting theory, as
charged in Count One of the first amended information: “On or about June 21, 2005—June 22,
2005, in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, Jacques Cajuste willfully, deliberately, and with
premeditation unlawfully killed a human being with malice aforethought, to wit: he participated
in causing the death of [Manno] by multiple stab wounds, in violation of 14 V.LC. §§ 921
922(a)(1); 14 V.I.C. § 11 (a)
4103 Section 921 provides that “[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice
aforethought.” 14 V.ILC. § 921. Section 922(a)(1) provides that “[ajll murder which ... is
perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture, detonation of a bomb or by any other kind
of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing ... is murder in the first degree.” 14 V.I.C. §
922(a)(1). Therefore, the prosecution was required to prove each of the following elements beyond
a reasonable doubt to obtain a conviction for first-degree murder: (i) there was an unlawful killing
of a human being; (ii) the killing was done with malice aforethought; and (iii) the killing was
willful, deliberate, and premeditated. Jd. Section 11(a) provides that “[w]hoever commits a crime
or offense or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
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as a principal.” 14 V.LC. § 11(a). “In ascertaining the plain meaning of the words in the statute,
we apply any specific definitions that are statutorily prescribed. When no statutory definition is
provided, the words that have an accumulated legal meaning will be given that meaning, and other
words will be given their common, ‘dictionary,’ meaning.” Ubiles, 66 V.I. at 590 (citing, inter
alia, 1 V.1.C. § 42; United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997))
There was an unlawful killing of a human being
4/104 The term “unlawful” is not defined in the statute. Black’s Law Dictionary defines
“unlawful,” inter alia, as “[nJot authorized by law; illegal” and “[c]riminally punishable.”
Unlawful, BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 1856 (12th ed. 2024). Here, there was uncontested evidence
that there was an illegal killing of a human being—Manno
The killing was done with malice aforethought
4105 The term “malice aforethought” is also not defined in the statute. In Nicholas v. People,
we reiterated that, in the Virgin Islands,
malice aforethought does not mean simply hatred or particular ill will, but extends to and
embraces generally the state of mind with which one commits a wrongful act. It may be
inferred from circumstances which show a wanton and depraved spirit, a mind bent on evil
mischief without regard to its consequences. And “where the killing is proved to have been
accomplished with a deadly weapon, malice can be inferred from that fact alone.’
56 V.I. 718, 731-32 (V.I. 2012) (quoting Gov't of the V.I. v. Sampson, 42 V.I. 247, 253 (D.V.1
App. Div. 2000); see also Gov't of the VI. v. Lake, 362 F.2d 770, 775 (3d Cir. 1966) (“It is well
settled that where the killing is proved to have been accomplished with a deadly weapon malice
may be inferred from that fact alone. It is inferred when the killing is effected by the use of a
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weapon or other instrument in such a manner as may be expected naturally and probably to cause
death.”) (collecting cases).”4
{106 While Virgin Islands statutory law does not define “deadly weapon,” we have previously
stated that “when an object can be used in a manner calculated to inflict death or serious bodily
injury, that object can be classified as a deadly weapon[, and thus concluded that] if an individual
can use aknifeto kill or to inflict serious injury upon another person, the knife is a deadly
weapon when used in such a manner.” Prince v. People, 57 V.1. 399, 408 (V.I. 2012) (citation
omitted); see Lake, 362 F.2d at 775 (“Whether a weapon is to be regarded as deadly often depends
more on the manner in which it has been used than on its intrinsic character.”). Cf 14 V.LC. §
4 At trial, the Superior Court’s jury instructions on malice aforethought included, inter alia,
language permitting the jury to infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon
Malice aforethought means that the Defendant had a wanton and depraved spirit at the time
of the killing. It may be inferred from circumstances which show a mind bent on evil
mischief without regard to its consequences. And where the killing is proved to have
been accomplished with a deadly weapon, malice can be inferred from that fact alone
To say the Defendant -- to say that the Defendant acted with malice aforethought means
that the Defendant either intended to kill Egbert Stuart, or intentionally committed an act,
the natural consequences of which were dangerous to human life, and at the time he or she
acted he or she knew his or her act was dangerous to human life, and he or she deliberately
acted with conscious disregard for human life
(J.A. 1392-93) (emphasis added)
Although Cajuste did not object to the jury instructions at trial or on appeal, we nevertheless
believe it is worth pointing out that the instruction given by the trial court created a permissive
inference, not a mandatory presumption. See Williams v. People, 2024 V1 27, € 40 n.11 (Aug. 16,
2024) (“We caution the judges of the Superior Court that it is inadvisable to state
in jury instructions that malice is inferred by the use of a deadly weapon. We unequivocally
recommend the conditional form of the instruction as delineated in Nicholas v. People, 56 V.1
718, 732 (V.I. 2012)—‘[W]here the killing is proved to have been accomplished with a deadly
weapon, malice can [or may] be inferred from that fact alone.’”)
Accordingly, the Superior Court’s instruction permitting the jury to infer malice—without
requiring such an inference—was constitutional, as it did not relieve the People of their burden to
prove malice as an element of first-degree murder
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2251(a)(2) (““Whoever...with intent to use the same unlawfully against another, has, possesses,
bears, transports, carries or has under his proximate control, a dagger, dirk, dangerous knife, razor,
stiletto, or any other dangerous or deadly weapon shall...” )
£107 Dr. Landron, the medical examiner who performed Manno’s autopsy, testified that
Manno died from multiple stab wounds to the chest, back, and neck. The wounds were inflicted
with a kitchen-type knife approximately one foot in length—-comprising an eight-inch blade and a
four-inch handle. Notably, the knife was still embedded in Manno’s neck when his body was
brought to the morgue. Dr. Landron’s testimony was corroborated by Officer Phipps, Officer
Carty, and the photographs Officer Carty took of Manno’s body
£108 Based on the size of the knife, the manner in which it was used, and the number and location
of the stab wounds—particularly the stab wound to Manno’s neck—that caused Manno’s death
these circumstances support the conclusion that the assailant acted with malice. A reasonable jury
could therefore find that the knife used to kill Manno constituted a deadly weapon and rationally
infer that the killing of Manno was committed with malice aforethought, as referenced in the
statute
The killing was willful, deliberate, and premeditated
4109 The terms in this element of the offense are similarly not defined in the statute. Black’s
Law Dictionary defines “willful,” inter alia, as “[d]one wittingly or on purpose, as opposed to
accidentally or casually.” Willful, BLACK’s LAW DICTIONARY 1922 (12th ed. 2024). As to
“deliberate” and “premeditated,” we previously explained in Simmonds v. People
[T]o premeditate a killing is to conceive the design or plan to kill. A deliberate killing is
one which has been planned and reflected upon by the accused and is committed in a cool
state of the blood, not in sudden passion engendered by just cause of provocation. It is not
required, however, that the accused shall have brooded over his plan to kill or entertained
it for any considerable period of time. Although the mental processes involved must take
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place prior to the killing, a brief moment of thought may be sufficient to form a fixed,
deliberate design to kill
59 V.I. 480, 487 (V.I. 2013) (quoting Brown v. People, 54 V.I. 496, 507 (V.I. 2010)). To put it
another way, in addition to proof that there was an unlawful killing of a human being and that the
killing was done with malice aforethought, first-degree murder also requires “proof that the
defendant deliberated and reflected upon his decision to kill andcarried it out in cold
blood.” Woodrup v. People, 63 V.1. 696, 707-08 (V.1. 2015) (quoting Nicholas, 56 V.I. at 735)
4110 “[P]remeditation can be demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, suggested by any
number of factors,” such as “the nature of the weapon used, lack of provocation, the defendant's
conduct before and after the killing, ... evidence that the killing was done in a brutal manner, the
nature and number of the victim's wounds, [and] the use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed
victim.” Jd. at 708; see Gov't of the V.L v. Sampson, 94 F. Supp. 2d 639, 644 (D.V.1. App. Div
2000) (“As a practical matter, premeditation can generally be proved only by circumstantial
evidence.”’)
Since [the defendant's mental processes] are wholly subjective it is seldom possible to
prove them directly. If premeditation is found it must ordinarily be inferred from the
objective facts. Every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable
consequences flowing from his deliberate acts. . . Accordingly, if one voluntarily does an
act, the direct and natural tendency of which is to destroy another's life, it may fairly be
inferred, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the destruction of that other's life
was intended
Gov't of the VI. v, Charles, 72 F.3d 401, 410 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Gov’t of the V.I. v. Roldan
612 F.2d 775, 781 (3d Cir. 1979))
{111 Before turning to the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” element—the perpetrator’s
mental state—we must first examine the sufficiency of the evidence establishing that Cajuste was
the perpetrator of Manno’s first-degree murder
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112 The People presented substantial evidence placing Cajuste at the crime scene and directly
linking him to Manno’s murder. Agent Fletcher, the forensic analyst who conducted the DNA
testing, testified that Cajuste was the major contributor to mixed DNA profiles—each containing
DNA from more than one individual—found on two swabs: one from the bedroom where Manno’s
body was discovered and another from the hallway of the apartment shared by Manno and Stuart
Notably, Manno could not be excluded as a possible minor contributor to those same profiles. The
detection of Cajuste’s DNA in the bedroom and hallway—both areas directly associated with the
killing—unequivocally placed him at the crime scene. Moreover, the mixed nature of the swabs,
containing DNA from multiple individuals, supported the inference that Cajuste and Manno were
in close physical contact around the time of Manno’s death
£113 In addition to the DNA evidence, the People presented surrounding circumstances and
witness testimony further supporting the inference that Cajuste was the perpetrator. I. Rodriguez,
who recognized the kitchen knife used to kill Manno as “one of [his] mother’s cutlery” previously
kept at his mother’s house where Cajuste lived, testified that he never saw the knife again after
learning about the homicide. Kathryn Jensen-Delugo, the downstairs neighbor, testified that she
heard a male and female voice arguing around the time of the killing, with the female voice saying,
“Oh God” or “Oh my God,” though she could not make out what the male voice said. Her live-in
son also testified that he was awakened by the sounds of a struggle in the early morning of June
22, 2005
4,114 Cajuste’s conduct before and after the killing further connected him to Manno’s murder
Prior to the incident, Cajuste and Stuart were coworkers, employed by Ranger American as
security guards at the Emerald Beach Resort. Lisa Toussaint, the resort’s night auditor, testified
that she observed Cajuste visiting Stuart at the resort even when he was not scheduled to work,
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and that during Stuart’s June 21-22 shift, Stuart received one or two calls from Cajuste, whose
distinctive voice and accent she readily recognized. These actions—Cajuste’s unplanned visits and
calls during Stuart’s work shifts—reflect a relationship that went beyond a casual acquaintance
and that they maintained contact around the time of Manno’s death. Following the killing, Cajuste
appeared for a July 2005 interview with Officer Phipps harboring a fresh cut on his left arm
consistent with a knife wound. His explanation for when he sustained the injury and sought medical
treatment conflicted with hospital records. During the interview, Cajuste was nervous, exhibiting
frequent body movements and trembling hands. Shortly thereafter, Cajuste departed St. Thomas
and never returned until his arrest
4115 Taken together, the DNA evidence and surrounding circumstances provided sufficient
evidence for a rational juror to conclude that Cajuste was the perpetrator. We now turn to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting that Cajuste committed willful, deliberate, and premeditated
first-degree murder against Manno
4116 On June 22, 2005, Manno’s body was discovered in his bedroom of the apartment he shared
with Stuart at Heritage Hill Condominiums, covered in blood and bearing multiple stab wounds to
vital areas—the chest, back, and neck—a total of seven wounds that Dr. Landron described as
being deeper than their surface length. These injuries were consistent with a kitchen-type knife
approximately one foot in length, which remained lodged in Manno’s neck. The number, nature,
and intensity of the stab wounds Cajuste inflicted show that he had ample time to consider his
actions (deliberate and premeditated) and made a conscious (willful) decision to murder Manno
4/117 Moreover, the fact that the apartment door was locked when Stuart left for work the evening
preceding the murder, that there were no signs of forced entry, and that both sets of keys belonging
to Stuart and Manno were accounted for, further supports that the act of killing Manno was
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committed knowingly and with specific intent (willful), rather than as an impulsive or
opportunistic act. Cajuste would have had to plan ahead to gain access without using force,
demonstrating conscious orchestration of events to facilitate the crime (deliberate and
premeditated)
4.118 Additionally, Cajuste’s conduct before the killing provides further evidence of willfulness,
deliberation, and premeditation. Witnesses I. Rodriquez and L. Rodriquez testified that the
kitchen-type knife used to kill Manno closely resembled one previously seen at their mother’s
house, where Cajuste was living at the time. L. Rodriquez specifically recalled seeing the knife in
Cajuste’s room shortly before the murder, indicating that Cajuste had acquired the weapon in
advance and planned its use. These facts show that Cajuste intentionally armed himself in
preparation for the attack (willful) and that he procured and retained the weapon in advance with
the conscious objective of using it to kill Manno (deliberate and premeditated)
4/119 When considered together—the manner of killing, the absence of forced entry, and
Cajuste’s prior possession of the murder weapon—a rational trier of fact could certainly find that
the killing of Manno was not spontaneous or provoked, but rather the result of a calculated and
intentional plan formed after reflection—and thus conclude that the killing of Manno was willful,
deliberate, and premeditated murder. See Woodrup, 63 V.I. at 708 (noting that the fact that the
People offered no direct evidence that the defendant acted with premeditation “is not fatal to [the
People's] case, ... for it is often true that there is no direct evidence of a person's intent”); see also
Nicholas,’> 56 V.I. at 732 (explaining that, “[a]s we described in Brown, premeditation is the
5 In Nicholas, we reaffirmed our language and holding in Brown regarding the mental state of
premeditation and deliberation required for first-degree murder
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deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life, and involves the mental
process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing, or reasoning for a period of
time, however short; that premeditation “may be established by circumstantial evidence, including
the nature of the weapon used, lack of provocation, the defendant's conduct before and after the
killing, threats and declarations of the defendant before and during the occurrence, or the dealing
of lethal blows after the deceased was felled and rendered helpless”; that other relevant factors
include “ill will or previous difficulties between the parties, evidence that the killing was done in
a brutal manner, the nature and number of the victim's wounds, the use of a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed victim, the particular cruelty of the killing, declarations by the defendant of an intent
to kill, evidence of procurement of a weapon, preparations before the killing for concealment of
the crime, and calmness immediately after the killing”; and that the “premeditation required for a
first-degree murder conviction is not inferred from the use of a deadly weapon alone ...”) (quoting
Brown, 54 V.I. at 506-07 (emphasis omitted, alterations in original)); Ostalaza v. People, 58 V.1
531, 548 n.16 (V.I. 2013) (“[T]he use of a deadly weapon against unarmed persons in the absence
of any provocation is a fact that can weigh towards a finding of premeditation.”)
4.120 Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People, Thomas
2022 VI 22, { 9, and granting them the benefit of all reasonable inferences, Ponce, 2020 VI 2,
16 (citing Clarke, 55 V.I. at 477), we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
find that Cajuste committed the crime of first-degree murder against Manno
2. Aiding and Abetting
4121 Here, the People charged—and the jury convicted—Cajuste as a principal under Section
11(a), the aider and abettor statute, for “participat[ing] in causing the death of [Manno] by multiple
stab wounds” in concert with Stuart, rather than as the primary actor. “Under an aiding and abetting
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theory, a finding of guilt may still be upheld although there is insufficient proof that the defendant
personally did every act constituting the offense alleged.” Ventura, 64 V.I. at 601 (internal
quotation marks omitted); see Boston v. People, 56 V.1. 634, 644 n.10 (V.I. 2012) (affirming
conviction even though there was no evidence that defendant, as opposed to his friends, actually
assaulted the victim)
4,122 “Based on the language of the statute, a person is responsible for a crime, if that person
‘commits [the] crime ... or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission.’”
James v. People, 59 V.I. 866, 875 (V.I. 2013); see 14 V.LC. § 11(a) (“Whoever commits a crime
or offense or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable
as a principal.”). “Consequently, the People were only required to present evidence that [the
defendant] engaged in any of the above mentioned acts that are listed in the statute[, and] [w]hether
[the defendant] was aided and abetted by another person has no bearing on his personal
responsibility for the crimes.” James, 59 V.I. at 875
4/123 Put simply, the People needed to present evidence only that Cajuste committed the
offense charged—first-degree murder—or aided, abetted, counseled, commended, induced, or
procured its commission. Based on our conclusion above, there was sufficient evidence for the
jury to find that Cajuste committed the crime of first-degree murder against Manno and thus
convict him under an aiding-and-abetting theory. See James, 59 V.I. at 875 (holding, in a first
degree murder case where the defendant was charged as a principal under the aider and abettor
statute, that the People needed to prove only the elements of murder, rejecting the defendant’s
claim that “aided and abetted by another” was a necessary element of the charge as meritless)
4124 Accordingly, the Superior Court did not err in denying Cajuste’s motions for judgment of
acquittal
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IH. CONCLUSION
4125 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Superior Court’s June 30, 2022 Order denying
Cajuste’s January 10, 2020 motion to dismiss the murder charges. We also affirm the Superior
Court’s evidentiary rulings regarding: (i) the Knife (People’s Exhibit 18) and Ishmael Rodriquez’s
testimony concerning the same, (ii) Agent Fletcher’s DNA Report (People’s Exhibit 48) and his
testimony concerning the same; and (iii) the redacted RLSH Digital Record (People’s Exhibit 29)
and Custodian Baynes’ testimony concerning the same. Lastly, we also affirm the Superior Court’s
January 20, 2023 Judgment and affirm Cajuste’s conviction of aiding and abetting the first-degree
murder of Manno
Dated this “7 Tay of fesieh 2026
BY THE COURT
c “ : a Sil ~
i a
ATTEST
DALILA E. PATTON, ESQ
Zf,
Clerk of the Court. ,
By: _“ Z,
Deputy Clerk II
Dated Q\ a & WO