UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
CHRISTOPHER MOREE,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-1415 (RDM)
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Christopher Moree, proceeding pro se, brings this action against Defendants
Georgetown University (“Georgetown”) and Dr. John Partridge alleging claims for breach of
contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq., Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act (“Rehabilitation Act”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, and the D.C. Human Rights Act
(“DCHRA”), D.C. Code § 2-140-2.11; and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Dkt. 7 at
39–135 (Compl. ¶¶ 77–291). Pending before this Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Dkt. 25.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. 7, alleges the following facts, which the Court accepts as true
for purposes of the motion to dismiss, see Gordon v. U.S. Capitol Police, 778 F.3d 158, 163–64
(D.C. Cir. 2015).
Plaintiff Christopher Moree, a citizen of the Bahamas, enrolled as a student at the
Georgetown University School of Medicine in the fall of 2022. Dkt. 7 at 9, 11, 13–14 (Compl.
¶¶ 13, 24–25, 30); see Dkt. 9 at 7. During his first year, he performed poorly in multiple classes,
so he was unable to proceed to the second-year curriculum. Dkt. 7 at 15–16 (Compl. ¶ 35).
Georgetown allowed Plaintiff to repeat the first-year curriculum during the following academic
year, but it placed him on academic probation and warned him that another failure would result
in dismissal. Id. at 16, 58–59 (Compl. ¶¶ 36, 119).
In his second attempt, Plaintiff again struggled, narrowly failing to reach the mark for
satisfactory progress in both Histology and Pharmacology. Id. at 20, 22 (Compl. ¶¶ 48, 55).
Plaintiff identifies one particular assignment (the “Toxicology Assignment”) as the tipping point
for his Pharmacology grade: a three-point written response on which Plaintiff’s professor,
Dr. Partridge, awarded Plaintiff 2.8 points. Id. at 17 (Compl. ¶¶ 39–40). If Dr. Partridge had
awarded him full credit, Plaintiff alleges, then he would have made the mark for satisfactory
progress in the Pharmacology course. Id. at 20 (Compl. ¶ 48). Plaintiff acknowledges that he
“did not pursue the formal grade appeal process at the release of the grade.” Id. at 19 (Compl.
¶ 43).
Instead, after failing the first-year curriculum for a second time, Plaintiff faced review
before the Committee on Students, a body with the power to “dismiss students [of the Medical
School] they deem unsatisfactory.” Id. at 20 (Compl. ¶ 49); see id. at 69 (Compl. ¶ 135).
Plaintiff wrote to the Committee on Students to provide context for his performance, explain his
mental health and academic struggles, and identify “new strategies he planned to implement in
the next academic year to ensure his performance improved.” Id. at 22–24 (Compl. ¶¶ 56–57).
The Committee on Students then gave Plaintiff one further opportunity over the summer to
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remediate his failure to progress in Histology and Pharmacology, warning him that “a failed
academic unit . . . would result in dismissal without further consideration.” Id. at 24–25 (Compl.
¶ 57).
Plaintiff received advice from Dr. Partridge while preparing for his remediation exams.
Id. at 25 (Compl. ¶ 58). Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Partridge’s advice misled him about the nature
of the exams. See id. After attempting to follow the advice, Plaintiff failed his remediation
exam in Pharmacology. Id. The Dean of the Medical School then called Plaintiff to inform him
that he “would be dismissed” and to advise him that he could appeal to the Committee on
Student Appeals. Id. at 26 (Compl. ¶ 59).
At this point, Plaintiff sought a mental health evaluation and received an ADHD
diagnosis. Id. at 26–27 (Compl. ¶ 60). Plaintiff also prepared a document arguing that he should
have received full credit (instead of a 0.2-point deduction) on the allegedly pivotal Toxicology
Assignment. Id. at 27 (Compl. ¶ 61). Plaintiff shared that document with Dr. Partridge, who
“expressed regret for the deduction” and “confirmed that he would update the grade if given
permission by ‘the deans.’” Id. at 28 (Compl. ¶ 64). Dr. Partridge later reversed course, stating
that there were “other deficiencies” in Plaintiff’s original submission, which supported the grade
that he received. Id. at 28–29 (Compl. ¶ 66). Dr. Partridge also offered to write a letter to the
Committee on Student Appeals “on . . . Plaintiff’s behalf,” noting Plaintiff’s “good progress” and
near miss in Pharmacology. Id. at 29–30 (Compl. ¶ 67). Ultimately, however, Dr. Partridge’s
letter was equivocal, pointing out areas where Plaintiff had struggled and expressing uncertainty
about whether Plaintiff should be reinstated. Id.
Before the Committee on Student Appeals, Plaintiff focused on three issues: (1) his
Pharmacology grade and, in particular, his grade on the Toxicology assignment, (2) “his recent
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ADHD diagnoses,” and (3) family health circumstances that had impacted his performance. Id.
at 34, 36 (Compl. ¶¶ 73, 76). The Committee upheld Plaintiff’s dismissal. The Committee noted
that Plaintiff did not appeal his Pharmacology grade in accordance with Student Handbook
procedures, “that accommodations cannot be granted for conditions retroactively,” and that his
family circumstances were not “significant enough” to warrant a different decision. Id. at 36
(Compl. ¶ 77). Plaintiff then appealed the Committee’s decision to Dr. Norman Beauchamp, the
Executive Dean of the Medical School and Executive Vice President for Health Sciences, who
upheld the dismissal. Id. (Compl. ¶ 78).
Plaintiff attempted to file the present action on May 9, 2025, Dkt. 1, but did not succeed
in doing so until May 19, 2025, Dkt. 7. He asserts five claims against Georgetown University
and Dr. Partridge: breach of contract (Count I), see Dkt. 7 at 39; breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing (Count II), see id. at 74; violation of Title III of the ADA and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (Count III), see id. at 120; violation of the DCHRA (Count
IV), see id. at 131; and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count V), see id. at 132. On
the same day he filed suit, Plaintiff moved for a temporary restraining order, seeking an order
directing the School of Medicine to readmit him during the pendency of this case and to support
reinstatement of his student visa by confirming his academic eligibility and issuing him a Form
I-20. Dkt. 9. The Court denied that motion. Dkt. 33.
The Court now turns to Defendants’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. 25, which is fully briefed,
Dkt. 30; Dkt. 32.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a defendant may move to dismiss a
complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
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12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570
(2007)). “Facial plausibility exists when ‘the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”
Shanks v. Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftworkers, 134 F.4th 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 2025)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). To determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim, the Court
“assume[s] the truth of all well-pleaded factual allegations and construe[s] reasonable inferences
from those allegations in [the] plaintiff’s favor.” Nurriddin v. Bolden, 818 F.3d 751, 756 (D.C.
Cir. 2016). The Court construes the pleadings of pro se litigants “liberally,” United States v.
Palmer, 296 F.3d 1135, 1143 (D.C. Cir. 2002), and holds them to “less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). But the Court
need not assume the truth of legal conclusions asserted in a complaint, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678,
nor need it “accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such inferences are unsupported by the facts
set out” therein. Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Breach of Contract and Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith & Fair
Dealing Claims (Count I & Count II)
To state a claim for breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, a plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, would plausibly establish
that the parties entered into an enforceable agreement. See Ponder v. Chase Home Fin., LLC,
666 F. Supp. 2d 45, 48 (D.D.C. 2009) (dismissing breach of contract claim under D.C. law where
the plaintiff failed to allege facts that would establish an enforceable contract); Mero v. City
Segway Tours of Wash., DC, LLC, 826 F. Supp. 2d 100, 107 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he absence of a
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contract alone is sufficient to defeat [an] implied covenant claim.”). District of Columbia courts
apply “general principles of contract construction” to determine whether a university policy
document constitutes an enforceable contract. Basch v. George Washington Univ., 370 A.2d
1364, 1367 (D.C. 1977). “For a contract to be enforceable, the parties must (1) express an intent
to be bound, (2) agree to all material terms, and (3) assume mutual obligations.” Dyer v. Bilaal,
983 A.2d 349, 356 (D.C. 2009). The third requirement, mutuality of obligation, demands that
“each party must undertake to do something the party otherwise is under no legal obligation to
do, or to refrain from doing something the party has a legal right to do.” Eastbanc, Inc. v.
Georgetown Park Assocs. II, L.P., 940 A.2d 996, 1003 (D.C. 2008) (alterations and internal
citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff premises his contract claims on two documents: Georgetown University’s
Notice of Non-Discrimination, Dkt. 25-4, and the School of Medicine’s Student Handbook, Dkt.
25-3. See Dkt. 7 at 39 (Compl. ¶ 78). The Court takes judicial notice of both documents, which
are attached as exhibits to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 25, “because they are referred to
in the [C]omplaint and are integral to [Plaintiff’s] [] claim[s],” Kaempe v. Myers, 367 F.3d 958,
965 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Although Plaintiff asserts that both the Notice of Non-Discrimination and
the Student Handbook “are contractual in nature,” Dkt. 7 at 39 (Compl. ¶ 78), both claims fail as
a matter of law.
The Court starts with the Notice of Non-Discrimination. The Notice of NonDiscrimination bears none of the hallmarks of a contractual undertaking. The policy applies
broadly to all “faculty, staff, and students,” and, as relevant here, it merely provides notice that
the University will comply with the laws forbidding discrimination on the basis of disability.
Dkt. 25-4 at 2. Rather than imposing new obligations on Georgetown, the notice acknowledges
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and affirms obligations that already exist as a matter of federal, state, and local law.
“[P]erform[ing] a pre-existing legal obligation does not create mutuality of obligation and cannot
give rise to an enforceable contract.” Di Lella v. Univ. of D.C. David A. Clarke Sch. of L., 570 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2008); see also United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1109–1110,
(D.C. Cir. 1975) (observing that “the performance of a pre-existing duty [is] a typical example of
invalid consideration”).
In addition, the Notice of Non-Discrimination places no reciprocal obligations on
Plaintiff. The Notice of Non-Discrimination states that “Georgetown University is committed to
providing equal educational . . . opportunities,” that “Georgetown University provides
educational opportunities without regard to, and does not discriminate on the basis of . . .
disability,” and that “Georgetown University prohibits retaliation, harassment, or other adverse
action against an individual for making a complaint in good faith, assisting in an investigation,
opposing harassment or otherwise exercising rights protected by law.” See Dkt. 25-4 at 2.
Those commitments apply to the University (and its agents) alone and do not represent the type
of quid pro quo exchange that is necessary to form a contract with a third party. Plaintiff fails to
allege that he offered anything in exchange for the promises of the Notice of NonDiscrimination, nor does he allege that he manifested an intent to be bound by its terms. He does
not allege, for example, that he decided to attend the Medical School and paid tuition based, even
in part, on the Notice of Non-Discrimination.
The Court, accordingly, concludes that the Notice of Non-Discrimination cannot form a
basis for any of Plaintiff’s contract claims.
Next, the Court considers the Student Handbook. Georgetown neither “express[ed] an
intent to be bound” nor “assume[d] mutual obligations” through the Handbook, so the Handbook
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is not an enforceable contract. Dyer, 983 A.2d at 356. For one thing, the Handbook explicitly
states that it “is not a contract.” Dkt. 25-3 at 149 (emphasis added). Express language
disclaiming an intent to be bound indicates that the Handbook is non-contractual. See
Shinabargar v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C., 164 F. Supp. 3d 1, 29 (D.D.C. 2016); Grove v.
Loomis Sayles & Co., L.P., 810 F. Supp. 2d 146, 149 (D.D.C. 2011). That is especially true
when, as here, a handbook “appears to be intended as a means for the university to communicate
its expectations regarding academic conduct to its students,” rather than an intention “to bind
itself to the handbook’s provisions.” Mosby-Nickens v. Howard Univ., 864 F. Supp. 2d 93, 99
(D.D.C. 2012); see Richter v. Cath. Univ. of Am., No. CV 18-00583, 2019 WL 481643, at *3
(D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2019). The Handbook also notes Georgetown’s right to “update its policies,
procedures, . . . course offerings and requirements, . . . and duration graduation or degree
requirements . . . at any time for any reason.” Dkt. 25-3 at 149 (emphasis added). Georgetown’s
unilateral discretion to change the terms of the Handbook bolsters the Court’s conclusion that the
document is non-contractual in nature, see Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d
999, 1001–02 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Shankle v. DRG Fin. Corp., 729 F. Supp. 122, 124 (D.D.C.
1989), since mutual obligations cannot stem from the foundation of an illusory promise, see
Davis v. Joseph J. Magnolia, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 38, 45 (D.D.C. 2009) (“A contract lacks
consideration when one party’s promise is illusory, and a promise is illusory when performance
of that promise is optional.” (citing Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 77 (1981))).
Plaintiff invokes St. Peter v. Georgetown University, 707 F. Supp. 3d 17 (D.D.C. 2023),
as support for his contention that the Student Handbook constitutes an enforceable contract.
Citing St. Peter, Plaintiff argues that if he identifies “explicit contractual term[s]” in the
Handbook, then he has met his pleading burden. Dkt. 30 at 22 (modification in original)
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(quoting St. Peter, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 24). But Plaintiff overreads that case. The Court in St.
Peter suggested that a plaintiff “could have pointed to an explicit contractual term, or he could at
least have pointed to school policies or Student Handbook provisions,” 707 F. Supp. 3d at 24
(emphasis added), to prop up his contract claim. But the Court ultimately determined that, “to
survive a motion to dismiss,” the plaintiff “still ha[d] to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate”
that the handbook was a contract, which “he ha[d] not done.” Id. The same is true here.
Plaintiff cannot imbue the Handbook with the binding force of contract just by identifying
provisions within it that relate to his claims. Plaintiff’s premise—that the Handbook is a
contract—fails because the Handbook does contain language reflecting Georgetown’s intent to
“be bound by its terms,” Mosby-Nickens, 864 F. Supp. 2d at 99, nor “reflect obligations mutually
assumed by [Georgetown] as well as its students,” Richter, 2019 WL 481643, at *3.
Even if Plaintiff could establish that the Handbook creates contractual obligations,
Plaintiff’s claim would fall short because he pleads no facts showing that Georgetown deviated
from its own policies. Plaintiff argues that the Handbook “defines a specific trigger for
dismissal”—namely, “receiving a failing grade on [a] transcript”—and thus, by negative
implication, forbids dismissal in any other circumstance. Dkt. 30 at 23. But the Handbook
elsewhere dispels the negative implication on which Plaintiff relies, making clear that the
Committee on Students “may dismiss a student at any time based on demonstrated academic
deficiency at their discretion.” Dkt. 25-3 at 40 (emphasis added); see Dkt. 7 at 102 (Compl. ¶
214) (“[T]he dismissal policy grants broad discretion to the [Committee on Students] to remove a
student ‘at any time.’”). It may even do so without “allow[ing] a period of remediation,” id.,
which it offered Plaintiff here. And although Plaintiff raised belated doubts about his second
Pharmacology grade based on the Toxicology Assignment, Plaintiff acknowledges that when
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given the opportunity to remediate that class, he failed the exam. Dkt. 7 at 25-26 (Compl. ¶¶ 58–
59). Under those circumstances, Plaintiff cannot establish that Georgetown acted outside the
scope of its asserted dismissal policy. Plaintiff’s contention that any failure of a remediation
exam must result in a repeat of the academic year, Dkt. 30 at 23–24, fails for the same reason.
In sum, Plaintiff has provided the Court with no reason to recognize the Medical School’s
student handbook as an enforceable contract. See Newman v. Howard Univ. Sch. of L., 715 F.
Supp. 3d 86, 103–05 (D.D.C. 2024); St. Peter, 707 F. Supp. 3d at 23–25; Richter, 2019 WL
481643, at *2–*4; Shinabargar, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 28–30; Mosby-Nickens, 864 F. Supp. 2d at
97–100. That “alone is sufficient to defeat [Plaintiff’s] implied covenant claim,” Mero, 826 F.
Supp. 2d at 107, on top of his breach claim.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff alleges a claim against Dr. Partridge for promissory
estoppel, see Dkt. 7 at 82–85 (Compl. ¶¶ 172, 176), that claim also fails. A plaintiff bringing a
promissory estoppel claim “must establish (1) the existence of a promise, (2) that the promise
reasonably induced reliance on it, and (3) that the promisee relied on the promise to his
detriment.” Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d 139, 147 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 552
F.3d 836 (D.C. Cir. 2009). “The promise must be definite, as reliance on an indefinite promise is
not reasonable.” In re U.S. Off. Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d 77, 97 (D.D.C. 2003)
(citing Granfield v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 530 F.2d 1035, 1040) (D.C. Cir. 1976)). And
“[al]though a promise need not be as specific and definite as a contract, it must still be a promise
with definite terms on which the promisor would expect the promisee to rely.” Id. Plaintiff
never identifies a statement by Dr. Partridge sufficient to support a claim of promissory estoppel.
Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Partridge made two false statements. First, “Dr. Partridge
confirmed that he would update the [Toxicology Assignment] grade if given permission by ‘the
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deans,’” yet he never changed the grade. Dkt. 7 at 28–29 (Compl. ¶¶ 64, 66). And second,
“Dr. Partridge offered to write” a letter on Plaintiff’s “behalf to advocate for his dismissal
decision to be reconsidered,” id. at 29 (Compl. ¶ 66), yet Plaintiff alleges his letter was
“objectively negative,” id. at 84 (Compl. ¶ 176).
It is far from clear that either statement constituted a promise by Dr. Partridge or that
Plaintiff relied on that promise to his detriment. But in any event, neither alleged promise was
sufficiently definite to support a promissory estoppel claim. The first statement—in which
Dr. Partridge allegedly “confirmed that he would update” Plaintiff’s grade on the one, disputed
assignment—was expressly contingent; on Plaintiff’s own telling, Dr. Partridge said that he
would update the grade only “if given permission by ‘the deans.’” Dkt. 7 at 28 (Compl. ¶ 64).
Absent a further representation that the “the deans” had, in fact, given Dr. Partridge permission
to change the grade, Plaintiff could not reasonably have relied on Dr. Partridge’s assertion.
“Courts in this district have” ruled for defendants “where the alleged promise at issue in a
promissory estoppel claim was conditioned on some other event” and that event has yet to occur,
because “no injustice [] result[s] from failing to enforce the conditional promise [when] its
condition ha[s] not been met.” Steele v. Fannie Mae, 134 F. Supp. 3d 191, 199 (D.D.C. 2015)
(citations omitted); see also Newman, 715 F. Supp. 3d at 105 (dismissing failure of promissory
estoppel claim as to a merit scholarship because payment of scholarship was contingent on
certain “metrics of academic success” that plaintiff “failed to [meet]”). The Court thus
concludes that Plaintiff fails to state a claim based on the first statement.
The second statement that Plaintiff invokes—Dr. Partridge’s offer to write a letter of
support to the Committee on Student Appeals—fares no better. An offer of “support” is an
indefinite and subjective proposal; without more, it is insufficiently precise to sustain a
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promissory estoppel claim. See In re U.S. Off. Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d at 97
(explaining that “reliance on an indefinite promise is not reasonable”). Indeed, Plaintiff’s
complaint demonstrates the ambiguous nature of “support.” Although Plaintiff characterizes the
letter that Dr. Partridge eventually sent as unhelpful and unduly equivocal on the central question
of whether Plaintiff “should be given [another] chance,” Plaintiff also acknowledges that the
letter pointed to mitigating information, and, in particular, the “extensive [family] health
problems” that may have distracted Plaintiff. Dkt. 7 at 30 (Compl. ¶ 67). Plaintiff’s
dissatisfaction with Dr. Partridge’s letter thus only underscores the Court’s conclusion that
Dr. Partridge’s offer was too indefinite to induce reasonable reliance.
Because the Handbook and the Notice of Non-Discrimination do not “give rise to an
enforceable contract,” Di Lella, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 11, and because Dr. Partridge’s purported
promises were “indefinite” statements, In re U.S. Off. Prods. Co. Sec. Litig., 251 F. Supp. 2d at
97, that could not “reasonably induce[] reliance,” Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 2d at
147, Plaintiff cannot sustain his claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel. The Court will accordingly grant
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts I and II.
B. ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and DCHRA Claims (Count III & Count IV)
Next, Plaintiff asserts a trio of claims under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and DCHRA.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims fail with respect to
Dr. Partridge because neither statute creates a cause of action against an officer or employee of
the plaintiff’s employer. See Di Lella, 570 F. Supp. 2d at 8 n.8; Cooke-Seals v. District of
Columbia, 973 F. Supp. 184, 187 (D.D.C. 1997). And Plaintiff does not appear to allege a
DCHRA claim against Dr. Partridge. Dkt. 7 at 131–32 (Compl. ¶¶ 276–81). The Court will thus
restrict its analysis to Plaintiff’s disability claims against Georgetown.
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Plaintiff’s claims against Georgetown rest on two theories under the ADA, Rehabilitation
Act, and DCHRA: disability discrimination and failure to accommodate his disability. See, e.g.,
Dkt. 7 at 121 (Compl. ¶¶ 252–53). Standards under “[t]he ADA and Rehabilitation Act are
‘virtually identical,’” Wheeler v. Am. Univ., 619 F. Supp. 3d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2022) (quoting
Harrison v. Rubin, 174 F.3d 249, 253 (D.C. Cir. 1999)), and since “claims under the DCHRA are
subject to the same standards as ADA claims, [] the analysis merges,” id. (citation modified). To
plead disability discrimination under these statutes, Plaintiff must allege “(1) that [he] is
qualified under the Acts; (2) that [he was] excluded from participation in or [was] denied the
benefits, services, programs, or other activities for which the defendants are responsible or that
[he] was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) [that] the exclusion, denial, or discrimination
was by reason of [his] disability.” Id. Similarly, a failure to accommodate claim requires
Plaintiff to allege “[1] that [he] was disabled for the purposes of the [Acts], [2] that
[Georgetown] had notice of [his] disability, and [3] that [Georgetown] denied [his] request for a
reasonable accommodation of [his] disability.” Chenari v. George Washington Univ., 847 F.3d
470, 746–47 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
To state a claim on either of his statutory theories, Plaintiff must allege that Georgetown
was aware of his disability at the relevant time; absent that allegation, Plaintiff cannot plausibly
allege that Georgetown either discriminated against him because of his disability or that it denied
a timely request for accommodation. See id. (failure to accommodate claims); Crandall v.
Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 146 F.3d 894, 896–97 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (disability discrimination
claims). But Plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that he cannot satisfy that threshold requirement.
Plaintiff contends that Georgetown failed to accommodate his ADHD disability and that it
dismissed him “partially due” to “conditions set forth by his disability.” See Dkt. 7 at 120, 132
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(Compl. ¶¶ 251, 280). As Plaintiff acknowledges, however, Plaintiff’s ADHD diagnosis came
only after the Committee on Students gave him one last chance to improve his performance, he
failed his remediation examination in Pharmacology, and the Dean of the Medical School called
to tell him that “he would be dismissed due to [that] failure.” Dkt. 7 at 26–27, 121 (Compl.
¶¶ 59–60, 255). Plaintiff does not allege that anyone—including himself—knew he had ADHD
prior to that diagnosis, nor does he allege that he sought an accommodation in a timely manner,
despite numerous opportunities to do so.
Instead, Plaintiff seems to suggest that his academic struggles themselves should have put
Georgetown on notice that he had a disability. Dkt. 7 at 121 (Compl. ¶ 255); see Dkt. 30 at 12,
30. But to incur liability for disability discrimination, Georgetown would have to have “acted
with an awareness of the disability itself, and not merely an awareness of some deficiency in
[Mr. Moree’s] performance that might be a product of an unknown disability.” Crandall, 146
F.3d at 897. Indeed, the D.C. Circuit has affirmed the dismissal of disability discrimination
claims on facts almost identical to those presented here. Ferrell v. Howard Univ., 254 F.3d 315,
315 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (per curiam); see also Ferrell v. Howard Univ., 1999 WL
1581759, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 2, 1999) (dismissing claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act
where plaintiff was dismissed from medical school, later received a diagnosis of ADHD, sought
readmission, and was denied). Here, moreover, the Committee on Students twice reminded
Plaintiff that, if he required an accommodation, he would need to seek and to obtain the
necessary approval before “taking any further examinations,” Dkt. 24-3 at 3; Dkt. 24-4 at 3, yet
he failed to take any action until after he was informed that he had failed his remediation exam
and, accordingly, would be dismissed. Defendants cannot be held accountable for that inaction.
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Plaintiff argues that, “in hindsight,” it is clear that the “behaviors and performance
deficiencies” leading to his dismissal were “driven by an undiagnosed disability.” Dkt. 30 at 30.
But hindsight is not the standard for any of the disability discrimination claims that Plaintiff
raises. He must allege facts showing that Defendants discriminated against him because they
saw him as disabled or that he requested an accommodation in a timely manner and that request
was unlawfully denied. “Although it is unfortunate that [P]laintiff's disability was not
diagnosed” before his dismissal from the School of Medicine, “neither the Rehabilitation Act,
nor the ADA, requires a university to reconsider a decision to dismiss a student” after persistent
academic deficiencies “because the student is later diagnosed with a disability.” Ferrell, 1999
WL 1581759, at *6. Nor does the DCHRA. The Court will accordingly grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss Counts III and IV.
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim (Count V)
Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim for IIED. Under D.C. law, a plaintiff asserting an IIED
claim must allege facts supporting elements: “(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of
the defendant which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional
distress.” Minch v. District of Columbia, 952 A.2d 929, 940 (D.C. 2008). “Liability requires
more than mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.”
Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citation modified). Instead, “[t]he conduct
alleged must be ‘so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized
community.’” Jackson v. District of Columbia, 327 F. Supp. 3d 52, 70 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting
Amobi v. D.C. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 980, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2014)). This is a “demanding
standard.” Asare v. LM-DC Hotel, LLC, 62 F. Supp. 3d 30, 35 (D.D.C. 2014); see also E.M. v.
Shady Grove Reprod. Sci. Ctr. P.C., 496 F. Supp. 3d 338, 406 (D.D.C. 2020) (“The
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outrageousness requirement ‘is not an easy one to meet.’”) (citation omitted); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965) (“It has not been enough that the defendant has acted with
an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress,
or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which
would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.”). The Court concludes that
Plaintiff fails to plead facts sufficient to support an IIED claim.
A plaintiff bringing an IIED claim must allege that he has experienced “severe emotional
distress”—distress “of so acute a nature that harmful physical consequences might be not
unlikely to result.” Daniels v. District of Columbia, 894 F. Supp. 2d 61, 68 (D.D.C. 2012)
(quoting Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C. 1982)). The Court does not
doubt that Plaintiff experienced grave distress due to his dismissal: Plaintiff alleges that his
dismissal took a “profound emotional toll” on him and has “manifest[ed] in both physical and
psychological symptoms,” Dkt. 7 at 37–38 (Compl. ¶¶ 82–83), including “persistent anxiety, low
affect, loss of appetite, disrupted sleep, emotional numbness, and uncharacteristic pessimism,”
id. at 135 (Compl. ¶ 290). At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff’s allegations may be
sufficient to “nudge[] [his] claim[]” as to the harm element of IIED “across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 547. The Court need not resolve the question,
however, because Plaintiff cannot establish the threshold requirement of an IIED claim:
“extreme and outrageous conduct.”
An IIED claim requires a plaintiff to allege conduct “beyond all possible bounds of
decency and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”
Jackson, 327 F. Supp. 3d at 70. Plaintiff’s characterization of his dismissal, even if accepted as
true, does come close to that level. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants expelled him “based on
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flawed and/or biased grading,” provided Plaintiff with “misleading advice” and “purported
support,” failed to give Plaintiff a fair hearing or appeals process, minimized Plaintiff’s disability
and “family medical hardships,” and “misrepresent[ed] and misappl[ied] school policies.” Dkt. 7
at 132–33 (Compl. ¶ 283). Plaintiff’s frustration at the process leading to his dismissal is
understandable. But he does not allege a level of mistreatment by Georgetown or Dr. Partridge
that flouts all bounds of decency. The Court routinely rejects IIED claims predicated on
university dismissals and grade disputes. See, e.g., North v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 310 F. Supp.
3d 89, 94–96 (D.D.C. 2018); Holloway v. Howard Univ., 206 F. Supp. 3d 446, 454 (D.D.C.
2016); Althiabat v. Howard Univ., 76 F. Supp. 3d 194, 197 (D.D.C. 2014); Richards v. Duke
Univ., 480 F. Supp. 2d 222, 228, 241 (D.D.C. 2007). Indeed, outside the university context,
courts routinely reject IIED claims in cases involving markedly more severe uses of force,
falsehoods, and institutional failures. See, e.g., Harris v. District of Columbia, 696 F. Supp. 2d
123, 137–38 (D.D.C. 2010) (concluding that the arrest of an employee at a daycare facility by
twelve officers with guns drawn and in front of children coupled with a sergeant’s falsified
affidavit did not constitute outrageous conduct); Larijani v. Georgetown Univ., 791 A.2d 41
(D.C. 2002) (concluding that a university’s inaction in response to an employee intentionally
causing a co-worker severe physical and mental injuries did not constitute outrageous conduct);
Asare, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 36 (dismissing minority employees’ IIED claim alleging that they were
called trash, that an offensive poster referencing “work[ing] like a slave” was hung in the
workplace, and that they were fired on racial grounds); see also Rogala v. District of Columbia,
161 F.3d 44, 57–58 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding no “extreme and outrageous conduct” when an
officer threatened to arrest a woman repeatedly during a traffic stop, laughed at her hearing
impairment and at her when she cried, and ultimately detained her for multiple hours); Halcomb
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v. Woods, 610 F. Supp. 2d 77, 81–85 (D.D.C. 2009) (denying summary judgment on an IIED
claim alleging that officers confined plaintiff in a cell with a “man dressed as a woman,” made
vulgar sexual remarks to her, and transported her, handcuffed, in the back of a speeding vehicle
that had no seatbelt).
The Court concludes that Plaintiff’s allegations cannot “satisfy [the] very demanding
standard” for pleading an IIED claim under D.C. law. Lewis v. District of Columbia, 768 F.
Supp. 3d 76, 117 (D.D.C. 2025). The Court will accordingly grant Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Count V.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. 25, is hereby
GRANTED.
A separate order will issue.
/s/ Randolph D. Moss
RANDOLPH D. MOSS
United States District Judge
Date: September 30, 2026
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