UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SCOTTS VALLEY BAND OF POMO
INDIANS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 1:26-cv-02814 (TNM)
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
This case is about an Indian tribe’s quest to build a casino. A decade ago, the Scotts
Valley Band of Pomo Indians asked the Department of the Interior to allow it to conduct gaming
on a parcel in Vallejo, California. After several rounds of litigation, Interior recently issued a
final determination that the Band’s Vallejo parcel is ineligible for gaming. Foiled in its casino
plans, Scotts Valley now moves for a preliminary injunction that would vacate Interior’s latest
opinion and restore the agency’s previous decision in the Band’s favor.
The Band’s bid for preliminary relief fails on all four factors. Scotts Valley has not
shown likelihood of success on any of its claims. It has not established that Interior’s decision
on gaming eligibility defied the remand order from another judge in this district. Nor is the Band
likely to prevail on its claims that Interior’s reconsideration process was arbitrary and capricious,
that the agency disregarded its reliance interests, or that Interior violated its due-process rights.
Scotts Valley also does not clear the high bar for irreparable harm, whether for its economic
losses or sovereign harm. Finally, the equities and public interest weigh against preliminary
relief.
I.
The facts are familiar to followers of this case by now. See Scotts Valley Band of Pomo
Indians v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 633 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.D.C. 2022) (“Scotts Valley I”);
Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Burgum, 2025 WL 1639901 (D.D.C. June 10, 2025)
(“Scotts Valley II”); Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians v. Burgum, 808 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C.
2025) (“Scotts Valley III”). The Court retells and updates them here.
Scotts Valley is a federally recognized Indian tribe from the Clear Lake region in
Northern California that became landless in the mid-20th century after Congress ended its
reservation. Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. For ten years, the Band has sought to build
a casino in Vallejo, roughly 80 miles from Clear Lake. Id.; see also Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp.
3d at 158.
In 2016, Scotts Valley asked Interior to take a Vallejo parcel into trust on its behalf and to
declare it eligible for gaming under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”). Scotts Valley
III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. The Band invoked IGRA’s “restored lands” provision, id., which
allows gaming on “lands . . . taken into trust as part of . . . the restoration of lands for an Indian
tribe that is restored to Federal recognition,” 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(B)(iii). Under Interior
regulations, a tribe seeking gaming eligibility via that provision “must demonstrate a significant
historical connection to the land.” 25 C.F.R. § 292.12(b). Interior denied Scotts Valley’s
application, finding that the Band had not established “a significant historical connection” to the
parcel. Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 139 (cleaned up).
The Band sued, and another judge in this district vacated and remanded Interior’s
decision. Id. at 165. The court rejected all but one of Scotts Valley’s claims. See id. at 141–71.
It held that Interior “did not act outside of its statutory authority under the Indian Gaming
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Regulatory Act or the Indian Reorganization Act when it promulgated . . . a regulation requiring
tribes to demonstrate a ‘significant historical connection’ for purposes of the restored lands
exception.” Id. at 171. But the court “conclude[d] that the agency’s application of its regulation
to the Band under the particular factual circumstances of this case was inconsistent with the
canon of Indian construction and clear policy behind the IGRA and the restored lands
exception.” Id. In particular, the court faulted Interior for disregarding “the government’s role
in weakening the historical connection between the Band and its land” and “the fundamental
remedial nature of the restored lands exception.” Id. at 165–68. Given those shortcomings, the
court reasoned, Interior’s gaming eligibility decision could not “withstand arbitrary and
capricious review.” Id. at 171.
On remand, Interior reversed itself in Scotts Valley’s favor. In the Biden
Administration’s final month, the agency issued an Indian Lands Opinion (“ILO”) “conclud[ing]
that the Parcel qualifies as restored lands.” 2025 ILO, ECF No. 2-2, at 2. That finding flowed
from Interior’s “ha[ving] given additional consideration to (1) the historical circumstances
underlying the Band’s landless status; and (2) the policy underlying IGRA and the restored lands
exception.” Id. At the same time, Interior’s 2025 ILO did not “consider[] any additional
evidentiary materials from outside parties,” including “those opposed to the Band’s request.” Id.
at 3–4; see also Mot. Hr’g Tr., ECF No. 48, at 24:2–3 (“[T]he Department made th[e] 2025
decision based on the record that it had in 2019 . . . .”). Based on its revised determination,
Interior took the Vallejo parcel into trust on Scotts Valley’s behalf and declared it eligible for
gaming. Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10.
This state did not last long. Frustrated with Interior’s refusal to consider their postremand submissions challenging the Band’s historical ties to the Vallejo parcel, four neighboring
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tribes sued the agency after the Trump Administration took over. See id. at 10–12. Those
lawsuits remain pending. See Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation et al. v. Dep’t of Interior et al., No.
25-cv-867 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2025); United Auburn Indian Cmty. v. Dep’t of Interior et al.,
No. 25-cv-873 (D.D.C. filed Mar. 24, 2025); Lytton Rancheria of Cal. v. Dep’t of Interior et al.,
No. 25-cv-1088 (D.D.C. filed Apr. 10, 2025).
Days after those lawsuits hit the docket, Interior reversed course again. In a March 2025
letter to the Band, the agency announced that it was “temporarily rescinding the Gaming
Eligibility Determination for reconsideration,” though the Vallejo parcel “remain[ed] in trust.”
March 2025 Letter, ECF No. 10-8, at 1 (footnote omitted). Interior explained that it was
“concerned that [it] [ha]d not consider[ed] additional evidence submitted after the 2022
Remand.” Id. “To aid in [its] reconsideration,” Interior “invite[d] the [Band] and other
interested parties to submit evidence and/or legal analysis regarding whether the Vallejo Site
qualifies as restored lands.” Id. The agency also instructed that “any documents submitted to the
Department after the 2022 Remand should be resubmitted.” Id. Finally, Interior advised that
“[d]uring the pendency of this reconsideration, neither the [Band] nor any other entity or person
should rely on the Gaming Eligibility Determination.” Id.
Shortly after receiving Interior’s letter, Scotts Valley sued once more, “assert[ing] that
Interior’s rescission and reconsideration of its gaming eligibility violated § 706 of the
Administrative Procedure Act and infringed its Fifth Amendment right to due process.” Scotts
Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 12 (footnote omitted). The Band moved for a preliminary
injunction to vacate Interior’s rescission and “to immediately stop” the reconsideration. Scotts
Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *1.
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This Court denied that motion. Id. at *9. As the Court held, the Band had not carried its
“heavy burden to show that any harms it could experience during this litigation w[ould] be
irreparable.” Id. at *1. Neither the economic nor sovereign injury met the mark. Id. On the
economic side, the Court reasoned that “[e]ven if all $2 million in anticipated contract payments
were due before the likely end of this litigation—and the tribe ha[d] made no such showing—the
Band ha[d] not shown that this expenditure would ‘threaten[] the very existence of the movant’s
business’ or similarly compromise tribal services and programs.” Id. at *4 (quoting Wis. Gas
Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (per curiam)). As to sovereign harm, the Court
concluded that the Band had forfeited its argument. Id. at *1. And even if properly argued, “any
sovereignty change” in the Band’s ability to conduct and regulate gaming “ha[d] not produced
the type of actual, tangible harm that the D.C. Circuit requires.” Id. at *6 (cleaned up). Because
of the Band’s failure to establish irreparable harm, the Court denied its bid for preliminary relief.
Id. at *1.
Then came summary judgment, where Scotts Valley secured a narrow win. The Court
rejected the Band’s challenge to the ongoing reconsideration because that process was “non-final
and thus not subject to APA review.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 10. The rescission, by
contrast, “amounted to final agency action.” Id. at 16. The Court ruled against Scotts Valley’s
three APA claims targeting the rescission: that it exceeded Interior’s reconsideration authority,
that it resulted from undue political influence, and that it disregarded the Band’s reliance
interests. Id. at 16–23.
But the Court held in Scotts Valley’s favor on one claim: due process. Id. at 23. As the
Court concluded, “the Band’s gaming eligibility was a protected property interest,” and “Interior
provided too little process to rescind it.” Id. Because Interior’s rescission “infringed the Band’s
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due-process right,” the Court vacated it. Id. at 28. As the Court emphasized, though, that
“remedy d[id] not bar Interior from continuing its reconsideration, nor d[id] it stop the
Department from revoking the Band’s gaming eligibility at the end of that process.” Id. “For
that reason,” the Court cautioned Scotts Valley that it “would be ill-served by placing undue
reliance on [the] decision.” Id.
After this summary-judgment ruling, Interior adapted its reconsideration process. In
December 2025, Interior shared with the Band all the “evidence and legal analysis” that other
tribes and stakeholders had submitted to the agency by June of that year. 2026 ILO, ECF No. 2-1, at 3 (cleaned up). After twice “discuss[ing] a time frame for reconsideration with the Band,”
Interior “gave the Band until May 1, 2026, to review and respond to the June 2025
Submissions.” Id. (footnotes omitted). Interior officials also met with the Band in person in
mid-April, where the Band delivered its response. Id. at 3–4. Upon receiving Scotts Valley’s
response, Interior “accepted no further submissions.” Id. at 4.
While Interior was reconsidering, the Band forged ahead with its gaming plans. After
this Court vacated the rescission in Scotts Valley III, “the Band proceeded with development of
the Vallejo Site in reliance on the 2025 [ILO] and the rights it conferred.” Davis Decl., ECF No.
10-2, ¶ 20. Scotts Valley “undertook substantial expenditures and financial commitments”—to
the apparent tune of $10 million—“to develop gaming operations at the Vallejo Site, including
the development of a temporary Class II gaming facility known as the ‘Preview Casino.’” Id.
¶¶ 23, 56. To set up the “Preview Casino,” the Band “convert[ed] two modular buildings.” Id.
¶ 26. The casino opened “on a limited basis” on July 24, 2026. Id. ¶ 37. During its operation,
the Preview Casino offered 17 class II gaming devices (bingo and the like) maintained by nine
Band members. See id. ¶ 33; Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 11:3–8.
6
A week later, Interior issued its reconsidered ILO. As the agency concluded, “the Vallejo
Parcel does not qualify as restored lands within the meaning of applicable law, and the Band may
not conduct gaming on the Parcel pursuant to IGRA’s restored lands exception.” 2026 ILO at
39. In its 39-page analysis, Interior examined the original 2019 ILO, the 2025 ILO, the other
tribes’ and stakeholders’ June 2025 submissions, and the Band’s response. Id. at 12–31. The
agency recounted the “additional historical context” of the Band’s displacement and
dispossession throughout the 19th century. Id. at 14–16. Interior also considered “the
fundamental remedial nature of the restored lands exception and the Indian canon of
construction,” including by “adopt[ing] broad understandings of the terms ‘occupancy’ and
‘vicinity’ within Part 292’s definition of ‘significant historical connection.’” Id. at 18 (cleaned
up). Ultimately, though, the newly submitted evidence led Interior to “revisit several factual
questions that [had] inform[ed]” the 2025 ILO. See id. at 31–39. Viewed as a whole, the record
now counseled that “the Band ha[d] not demonstrated the requisite significant historical
connection.” Id. at 39.
One week after Interior’s reconsidered ILO, Scotts Valley came back to this Court. Like
its predecessor, the Band’s newest lawsuit brings three APA claims and one due-process claim.
Compl., ECF No. 2, ¶¶ 125–83. On the heels of its Complaint, the Band also filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction, which asks the Court to “(1) enjoin[] the Department from implementing
and otherwise giving legal effect to the July 30, 2026, [ILO] during the pendency of the Band’s
action for judicial review of the Decision; and (2) [to] reinstat[e] and preserv[e] the legal force
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and effect of the January 2025 [ILO] during the pendency of this action.” Mot. Prelim. Inj., ECF
No. 10, at 1. That motion is fully briefed, 1 and the Court held a motion hearing.
II.
“[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be
granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v.
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (per curiam) (cleaned up). “A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555
U.S. 7, 20 (2008). “[T]he degree of proof required for irreparable harm is high,” and “a failure
to surmount it provides grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary injunction, even if the other
three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Olu-Cole v. E.L. Haynes Pub. Charter
Sch., 930 F.3d 519, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (cleaned up). Meanwhile, the equities and public
interest “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435
(2009).
III.
Like every movant, Scotts Valley faces an uphill battle to win preliminary relief. The
Band falters on every front. The likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, and the
merged equities and public interest all counsel against a preliminary injunction. The Court
addresses each factor in turn.
1
The Court acknowledges the helpful amicus briefs in this case. See Governor Newsom Amicus Br., ECF No. 38; Lytton Rancheria Amicus Br., ECF No. 39; United Auburn Amicus Br., ECF No. 40; Patwin Tribes Amicus Br., ECF No. 41; Cal. Gaming Ass’n Amicus Br., ECF No. 42.
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A.
Scotts Valley advances four claims. First, the Band asserts that the 2026 ILO violated the
remand order in Scotts Valley I. Compl. ¶¶ 125–42; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 17–31. Second, it
contends that Interior did not adequately justify its decision to reconsider the 2025 ILO. Compl.
¶¶ 150–68; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 31–37. Third, the Band argues that the agency again ignored its
reliance interests. Compl. ¶¶ 143–49; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 39–45. And finally, Scotts Valley
maintains once more that Interior infringed its due-process rights. Compl. ¶¶ 169–83; Mot.
Prelim. Inj. at 37–39. The Band is unlikely to succeed on any of these theories.
1.
Start with Scotts Valley I’s remand order. According to the Band, the 2026 ILO
“unlawfully abandon[ed] the analytical framework adopted in the January 2025 [ILO] and
required by Scotts Valley I.” Compl. ¶ 133. A proper application of that “analytical framework,”
the Band contends, would have compelled a favorable finding on the Vallejo parcel’s gaming
eligibility. See id. ¶¶ 134–39; Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 20–22. The Band claims the 2026 ILO’s
departure from Scotts Valley I makes it arbitrary and capricious. Compl. ¶ 141.
Recall that in Scotts Valley I, Judge Jackson held that the 2019 ILO “was inconsistent
with the canon of Indian construction and clear policy behind the IGRA and the restored lands
exception.” 633 F. Supp. 3d at 171. In the court’s view, “Interior’s parsimonious interpretation”
of the “significant historical connection” requirement defied the Indian canon’s instruction to
“constru[e] the law liberally and interpret[] any ambiguous provision to the tribe’s benefit.” See
id. at 168. In particular, the court took issue with Interior’s failure to consider “the government’s
role in weakening the historical connection between the Band and its land” and “the fundamental
remedial nature of the restored lands exception.” Id. at 165–68. Considering those failures, the
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court vacated the 2019 ILO as arbitrary and capricious and remanded it to Interior “for further
proceedings consistent with th[e] opinion.” Id. at 171.
The Band is unlikely to succeed on its fact-intensive claim that the 2026 ILO infringed
Scotts Valley I.
a.
“Under settled principles of administrative law, when a court reviewing agency action
determines that an agency made an error of law, the court’s inquiry is at an end: the case must be
remanded to the agency for further action consistent with the corrected legal standards.” PPG
Indus., Inc. v. United States, 52 F.3d 363, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1995). While the remanding court may
set forth the governing law, it “may not . . . ‘dictate to the agency the methods, procedures, and
time dimension of the needed inquiry and order the results to be reported to the court without
opportunity for further consideration on the basis of the new evidence by the agency.’” See Am.
Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Orgs. v. Dep’t of Lab., 836 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154 (D.D.C. 2026)
(quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 544–45
(1978)).
Against that backdrop, consider first where the parties agree: the Indian canon’s proper
role on remand. Both the 2025 and 2026 ILOs emphasized that “although the Indian canon
requires that ambiguous laws be interpreted in favor of the Indians, the canon ‘has no
applicability to the weighing of evidence, for example, regarding occupancy or use of a given
plot of land.’” 2026 ILO at 31 (quoting 2025 ILO at 10). At the motion hearing, both Interior
and Scotts Valley concurred that the Indian canon does not apply to an agency’s factfinding—
i.e., that Scotts Valley I did not compel Interior to weigh ambiguous facts in the Band’s favor.
See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 17:15–24, 49:6–11.
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Rightly so. Like other substantive canons, the Indian canon is a “rule[] of construction
that advance[s] values external to a statute.” See Biden v. Nebraska, 600 U.S. 477, 508 (2023)
(Barrett, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). It instructs “that statutes dealing with the Indians
must be construed in their favor.” Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful Agency,
90 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 151 (2010). The canon emerged in the 19th century, with courts deploying
it when interpreting treaties between Indians and the United States. Id.; see, e.g., Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 582 (1832) (M’Lean, J., concurring) (“The language used in treaties with
the Indians should never be construed to their prejudice. . . . How the words of the treaty were
understood by this unlettered people, rather than their critical meaning, should form the rule of
construction.”). In other words, the canon began “as essentially a rule of contract interpretation.”
Barrett, supra, at 152. Then, in the early 20th century, the canon “jumped without discussion
from the interpretation of treaties to the interpretation of statutes.” Id.; cf. Arizona v. Navajo
Nation, 599 U.S. 555, 572 (2023) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“To this day, it remains unclear how
the ‘trust relationship’ [between Indians and the federal government] could justify freestanding
pro-Indian canons that authorize courts to depart from the ordinary rules of statutory
interpretation.”).
Whatever the Indian canon’s pedigree in the context of treaties and statutes, its role ends
there. In Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Bernhardt, 466 F. Supp. 3d 199 (D.D.C. 2020), the
court rebuffed an effort to extend it to agency factfinding. There, “[t]he Mashpee Tribe
invoke[d] the Indian canon of construction in order to suggest that the [agency’s] application of ”
a two-part factual test “should be favorable to the Tribe.” Id. at 216. But that “argument
misunderst[ood] the canon.” Id. “The Indian canon of construction says that ambiguous statutes
should be construed liberally in favor of Indians.” Id. After statutory ambiguity is “resolved,
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however, the canon’s role is complete.” Id. at 217; see also Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah &
Ouray Indian Rsrv. v. United States, 185 F.4th 244, 252 (D.C. Cir. 2026) (stating that the Indian
canon “ha[s] no application where the relevant law is unambiguous”). Extending the canon to
agency factfinding would “place courts, not democratically accountable executive officials, in
the policymaking role the Framers (and the drafters of the APA) reserved for the political
branches.” Cal. Gaming Ass’n Amicus Br., ECF No. 42, at 8. And that expansion would be
particularly inappropriate here, where applying the canon in Scotts Valley’s favor would harm
the interests of several neighboring tribes. Accord Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of
Oregon v. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 3d 387, 396 (D.D.C. 2014) (“[T]he Indian canon of construction
does not apply for the benefit of one tribe if its application would adversely affect the interests of
another tribe.”), aff’d, 830 F.3d 552 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
Rather than falling under the Indian canon’s purview, agency factfinding is “subject to
arbitrary and capricious review under the APA.” Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe, 466 F. Supp. 3d
at 217 (cleaned up). “[W]hen an agency exercises discretion granted by a statute, judicial review
is typically conducted under the [APA]’s deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard.” Seven
Cnty. Infrastructure Coal. v. Eagle Cnty., 605 U.S. 168, 179–80 (2025). “Under that standard, a
court asks not whether it agrees with the agency decision, but rather only whether the agency
action was reasonable and reasonably explained.” Id. at 180.
An agency decision is “arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which
Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of
agency expertise.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
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463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). “The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Id.; see also Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 392 (2024) (emphasizing that APA “Section 706 does
mandate that judicial review of agency policymaking and factfinding be deferential”).
b.
The Band is unlikely to establish that the 2026 ILO fell short of the APA’s or Scotts
Valley I’s demands. Interior’s 39-page analysis reviewed the entire record—including the 2019
ILO, the 2025 ILO (which was based on the same evidence as the 2019 one), the June 2025
submissions from third parties, and the Band’s response. 2026 ILO at 12–31. Consistent with its
2025 predecessor and in keeping with Scotts Valley I, the 2026 ILO laid out the “additional
historical context” on the Band’s displacement at the hands of Mexican settlers and the U.S.
government. See id. at 14–16; see also 2025 ILO at 15–18; Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at
165–68. On that same note, the 2026 ILO also considered “the fundamental remedial nature of
the restored lands exception and the Indian canon of construction,” including by adhering to the
2025 ILO’s “broad understandings of the terms ‘occupancy’ and ‘vicinity’ within Part 292’s
definition of ‘significant historical connection.’” See 2026 ILO at 18 (cleaned up); see also 2025
ILO at 19–20.
Through that lens, the 2026 ILO drew certain inferences in Scotts Valley’s favor. One of
them concerned a Band ancestor: “an individual named Augustine, a ‘chief of the Hoolanapo
Indians’ who lived and worked in the North Bay region during the mid-1800s.” 2026 ILO at 11
(footnote omitted). The 2026 ILO stood by the 2025 ILO’s finding that “Augustine and other
Band ancestors worked on ranchos in the North Bay Region.” Id. at 32. As Interior explained,
the history showed “that the livestock operations on the ranchos were labor-intensive, involving
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hundreds of Indian laborers, and that the Vallejos and other settlers raided Pomo communities,
including at Clear Lake, to work on the ranchos.” Id. (footnote omitted). The 2026 ILO also
“confirm[ed] that Augustine’s residency in Napa in the 1870s constituted occupancy, as defined
in the 2025 ILO,” and it “le[ft] in place the determination that that occupancy is attributable to
the Band as a whole, for the reasons stated in the 2025 ILO.” Id. at 33 (footnote omitted); see
also Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 168 (faulting the 2019 ILO for “declin[ing] to attribute
Augustine’s connections to the land to the Band as a whole”).
Ultimately, though, the updated record made Interior conclude that “the Band ha[d] not
demonstrated the requisite significant historical connection.” 2026 ILO at 39. The newly
submitted evidence led the agency to “revisit several factual questions.” Id. at 31. Three merit
closer examination.
First, the 2025 ILO had noted “Augustine’s possible baptism at Mission San Francisco
Solano in the late 1830s,” which it deemed “consistent with a broader, documented practice of
the removal of Indian children from their villages and their placement in the missions.” 2025
ILO at 17. The 2025 ILO “credit[ed] th[is] experience[] of Augustine to the Band as a whole for
the purposes of demonstrating a significant historical connection to the Parcel.” Id. at 17–18.
The 2026 ILO, meanwhile, found this assumption untenable in light of new evidence. 2026 ILO
at 31. As Interior now observed, “the names of the parents of the Agustin listed in the relevant
baptismal register, as well as the name of his village, are different from those associated with the
Band’s ancestor Augustine.” Id. (footnote omitted). In the agency’s view, two other tribes
“persuasively argue[d] that ‘the names of the 1837 Baptismal Cohort, the names of the parents of
the 1837 Baptismal Cohort, and the village of origin of the 1837 Baptismal Cohort are all
distinctively Southern Pomo,’ not Eastern Pomo like the Band’s ancestors.” Id. at 32 (cleaned
14
up). Based on those and other submissions, Interior reversed its previous assumption that
Augustine (and, by extension, the Band) had possibly been baptized near the Vallejo parcel. Id.
Second, Interior reassessed its finding on the Band’s presence at Rancho Suscol, the large
Mexican ranch that embraced what now is the Vallejo parcel. See id. at 12. On that evidentiary
issue, the 2025 ILO had reasoned that “[a]lthough no documentation link[ed] the Band’s
ancestors specifically to Rancho Suscol . . . , it [wa]s reasonable to assume that the Band’s
ancestors worked there after Vallejo acquired it in 1843 and used or occupied the Parcel in the
process.” 2025 ILO at 23 (footnote omitted). By contrast, the 2026 ILO highlighted the thirdparty submissions contesting Scotts Valley’s ties to Rancho Suscol. 2026 ILO at 24–25. The
Yocha Dehe Tribe, for example, “explain[ed] that by 1870 the Project Site [on Rancho Suscol]
was a small family farm owned and worked by non-Indian labor and that, before that, Rancho
Suscol had been set aside as a Rancho Nacional, . . . for military use, and therefore distinct from
the other ranchos controlled by the Vallejos.” Id. at 25 (cleaned up). “Contrary to leading to a
natural inference of use or occupancy,” the 2026 ILO reasoned, “the evidence (or the lack of it)
suggests that Rancho Suscol was indeed different from other ranchos in the region, as the
opposing parties contend[ed].” Id. at 37 (footnote omitted).
Finally, Interior reconsidered “whether the Parcel is located in territory ceded by the
Band’s predecessors.” Id. at 31. In 1851, “the Band’s predecessors-in-interest were tribal
signatories to an unratified treaty with the United States,” in which they agreed to cede certain
California lands. Id. at 9. “In exchange, the United States designated a tract of land to be set
apart as a reservation on the western shore of Clear Lake . . . .” Id. Some decades later,
“cartographer Charles Royce compiled maps purporting to depict Indian land cessions in the
United States, including the land that would have been ceded under the 1851 Treaty, as well as
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tracts set apart for reservations, including the reservation at Clear Lake.” Id. (footnote omitted).
The Court reproduces an excerpt from the map below.
Id. at 10. “The area numbered ‘296’ . . . purports to show the ceded territory, while the area
numbered ‘295’ . . . shows the Clear Lake reservation.” Id. at 9. The Vallejo parcel “is located
in the southwestern portion of Area 296, south of Napa.” Id. at 10. According to the 2025 ILO,
“Royce’s inclusion of Vallejo in Area 296 . . . reinforce[d] the reasonableness of granting a
favorable inference to the Band,” “notwithstanding the fact that the 1851 Treaty did not
specifically describe the land that its tribal signatories used, occupied, or purposed to cede.”
2025 ILO at 23 (cleaned up).
The 2026 ILO rethought that conclusion. In the June 2025 submissions, several third
parties “challenge[d] the reasonableness of the inference linking the Band with the Parcel based
on the Parcel’s location within Area 296.” 2026 ILO at 25. One of the other tribes’ historians,
16
for example, “explain[ed] that the 1851 Treaty ‘failed to describe the ceded lands,’ only the
reservation to be set aside at Clear Lake.” Id. (footnote omitted). In his assessment, “Royce’s
description of the ceded lands in his map amounted to a ‘guess.’” Id. (footnote omitted). He
also “point[ed] out that none of the tribes residing along the north side of San Francisco and San
Pablo bays entered into [the 1851] treaty negotiations with the United States.” Id.
Faced with these new submissions, the 2026 ILO withdrew its inference in favor of the
Band’s occupancy. Id. at 33. As Interior now reasoned, “[e]ven if . . . Area 296 depicts what the
federal agents who negotiated the 1851 Treaty understood to be the boundaries of the ceded
territory, no one seems to argue that the Band, its predecessors, or the other tribal signatories had
the authority to cede the land around Vallejo at the time of the treaty.” Id. And “nothing in the
extensive record before the Department suggest[ed] that they had that authority.” Id. Because of
the Royce map’s historical deficiencies, the 2026 ILO concluded that “[f]avorable treatment of
Royce’s map in this analysis would not only be ahistorical but also unfair to any successors-ininterest of the original inhabitants of those territories, who did not participate in the negotiation
of the 1851 Treaty.” Id. (footnote omitted).
These were some of the key evidentiary issues on which Interior revised its findings in
light of new evidence. Zooming out, the 2026 ILO also noted “the shortcomings in the Band’s
evidence, more generally.” Id. at 37. Especially “striking,” according to Interior, “[wa]s the
discrepancy between the evidence of a Band presence elsewhere during the time period in
question, in places where the Band might attain a different result, and the lack of evidence
indicating a Band presence on Rancho Suscol, much less the Parcel.” Id. (cleaned up).
Ultimately, even considering Scotts Valley’s historical displacement and IGRA’s remedial
17
purpose, “the Band ha[d] not demonstrated the requisite significant historical connection.” See
id. at 39.
* * *
As the above recounting shows, “[t]he Vallejo parcel’s gaming eligibility is an avowedly
complex question.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 18. It raises issues of the accuracy of
historical documents and assumptions based on tantalizing clues. Some of these issues could
arguably go either way. But whether the Band demonstrated a “significant historical connection”
to the parcel involves fact-intensive judgments that fall within Interior’s realm of expertise. In
this setting, “[t]he Court recognizes that it is not its role to scour through the ILO and substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.” Scotts Valley I, 633 F. Supp. 3d at 168. Instead, this is
where the APA’s “deferential arbitrary-and-capricious standard” applies, and it requires only that
the agency decision be “reasonable and reasonably explained.” Seven Cnty. Infrastructure Coal.,
605 U.S. at 179–80.
Against this backdrop, the Court holds that Scotts Valley is unlikely to succeed on its
claim that the 2026 ILO defied Scotts Valley I or was otherwise arbitrary and capricious. The
Band has not made “a clear showing” that Interior’s reconsidered analysis was inconsistent with
Scotts Valley I’s demands or the 2025 ILO’s overall method. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972
(cleaned up). Rather, at this preliminary stage, the record suggests that the 2026 ILO reversed
Interior’s previous finding based on an updated set of facts. That is no APA violation.
2.
Scotts Valley also asserts that Interior “had no lawful basis to reopen the 2025 [ILO].”
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 32–34. The Band faults Interior for “fail[ing] to articulate a coherent and
18
reasoned explanation” for revisiting the 2025 ILO. Compl. ¶ 165. This Court rejected the bulk
of that claim in Scotts Valley III, and it remains unlikely to succeed now.
In this case’s previous iteration, Scotts Valley contended that Interior’s decision to
rescind the parcel’s gaming eligibility “exceeded [its] authority to revisit its prior decision.”
Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 16–17 (cleaned up). The Court disagreed, emphasizing the
D.C. Circuit’s longstanding “rul[ing] that ‘administrative agencies . . . possess at least some
inherent authority to revisit their prior decisions.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Ivy Sports Med., LLC v.
Burwell, 767 F.3d 81, 86 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Kavanaugh, J.)). In the Court’s eyes, the rescission
fell within Interior’s inherent authority to reconsider. Id. at 19. For one part, the Court saw “no
statutory limit on Interior’s reconsideration authority.” Id. at 17–18. For another, the agency’s
decision to revisit the 2025 ILO less than eleven weeks after its issuance met the doctrinal
guideposts for timeliness. Id. at 18–19. That conclusion holds true today, and it foils Scotts
Valley’s renewed challenge to the “lawful basis [of] reopen[ing] the 2025 [ILO].” See Mot.
Prelim. Inj. at 32–34.
Nor is the Band likely to succeed on its theory that Interior “failed to articulate a coherent
and reasoned explanation” for exercising its inherent authority to reconsider the 2025 ILO.
Compl. ¶ 165. In the March 2025 letter that launched the reconsideration process, Interior stated
that it “[wa]s concerned that the Department did not consider additional evidence submitted after
the 2022 Remand.” March 2025 Letter at 1. In announcing its intent to continue reconsideration
post-Scotts Valley III, the agency reaffirmed its “concern[] that not taking those submissions into
consideration in this particular case could be deemed legal error.” December 2025 Letter, ECF
No. 10-9, at 1. Interior also explained that its misgivings revolved around “whether the Vallejo
Site qualifies as restored lands under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(B)(iii) and 25 C.F.R. Part 292.”
19
March 2025 Letter at 1. On that issue, the agency “invite[d] the [Band] and other interested
parties to submit evidence and/or legal analysis.” Id. “To ensure that [it] ha[d] all the relevant
materials,” Interior also advised that “any documents submitted to the Department after the 2022
Remand should be resubmitted.” Id.
Interior’s unease about legal error stemmed from arguably unkept promises to other tribes
following the Scotts Valley I remand. Consider the Yocha Dehe Tribe for instance. Yocha Dehe
moved to intervene in Scotts Valley’s lawsuit challenging the 2019 ILO. See Scotts Valley Band
of Pomo Indians v. Dep’t of the Interior, 337 F.R.D. 19, 21 (D.D.C. 2020). The tribe “argue[d]
that the land at issue was the exclusive territory of its ancestors, the Patwin people, and that if
Scotts Valley [wa]s permitted to develop the parcel, including by establishing a casino there,
Yocha Dehe’s existing nearby gaming facility w[ould] suffer severe injury, thereby harming the
important tribal programs and cultural resources that depend upon casino revenue.” Id. (cleaned
up).
Judge Jackson denied Yocha Dehe’s motion to intervene. Id. at 27. As the court
reasoned, “Yocha Dehe submitted a considerable volume of material about its historical
connection to the land when the question about Scotts Valley’s association with the parcel was
pending before the agency the first time, and it c[ould] do so again.” Id. at 26. In defending that
ruling on appeal, Interior argued that “Yocha Dehe w[ould] have additional opportunities to
submit relevant information or views” after any potential remand to the agency. Federal
Appellees’ Final Response Brief at 17, Yocha Dehe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 3 F.4th 427
(D.C. Cir. 2021) (No. 21-5009). Scotts Valley similarly told the D.C. Circuit that Interior would
produce “a new analysis of the parcel’s eligibility for gaming under [IGRA], addressing the same
statutory and Part 292 criteria covered in the [2019 ILO] and responding to comments from
20
interested parties and the public.” Final Brief of Appellee Scotts Valley Band of Pomo Indians
at 35–36, Yocha Dehe v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 3 F.4th 427 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (No. 21-5009).
The D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of Yocha Dehe’s motion to intervene. Yocha Dehe v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Interior, 3 F.4th 427, 428 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
Yet after the Scotts Valley I remand, Interior did not consider Yocha Dehe’s—or any
other tribe’s—submissions before handing down the 2025 ILO. The 2025 ILO admitted as
much. 2025 ILO at 3–4 (stating that Interior did not “consider[] any additional evidentiary
materials from outside parties”). In Yocha Dehe’s view, Interior’s refusal to review its postremand evidence not only departed from the agency’s representation to the D.C. Circuit but also
defied its post-remand assurances to the tribe. See Yocha Dehe June 2025 Letter, ECF No. 41-9,
at 4 (“On November 27, 2024, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary-Indian Affairs Wizipan
Garriott . . . explicitly confirmed receipt of Yocha Dehe’s submission and promised it would be
carefully reviewed and considered as part of decision-making on Scotts Valley’s restored lands
request.”). After the 2025 ILO’s issuance, Yocha Dehe and three other tribes sued Interior—
claiming, among other things, that Interior’s “refusal to consider relevant evidence timely placed
before [it] by Yocha Dehe, Kletsel Dehe, and other tribes and concerned parties violated the
APA in multiple respects.” See Yocha Dehe Wintun Nation, No. 25-cv-867, Compl., ECF No. 1,
¶ 145; cf. Butte County v. Hogen, 613 F.3d 190, 193–95 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that Interior’s
restored lands determination was arbitrary and capricious where the agency declined to consider
local county’s submission disputing tribe’s historical connection to the parcel).
Given this context, Scotts Valley has not shown that Interior failed to “cogently explain
why it ha[d] exercised its discretion” to reconsider the 2025 ILO. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 48. “Agency explanations need not be elaborate or verbose . . . .” Chiesi
21
USA, Inc. v. Kennedy, 2025 WL 2466045, at *6 (D.D.C. Aug. 27, 2025). “Indeed, nothing more
than a ‘brief statement’ is necessary,” if “the agency explains ‘why it chose to do what it did.’”
Coe v. McHugh, 968 F. Supp. 2d 237, 240 (D.D.C. 2013) (quoting Tourus Recs., Inc. v. DEA,
259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). Interior sufficiently explained its basis for reconsideration
by voicing its concerns over ignored third-party submissions and potential legal error—concerns
of which Scotts Valley was well aware. Indeed, the Band had itself assured the Circuit that those
third-party submissions would be considered. Nor has the Band demonstrated that Interior later
“chang[ed] the stated scope of reconsideration” by asking third parties to resubmit their postremand materials. See Compl. ¶ 165. There too, the agency likely acted within its discretion
“[t]o ensure that [it] ha[d] all the relevant materials.” See March 2025 Letter at 1. All told,
Scotts Valley is unlikely to prevail on its claim that Interior’s reconsideration was arbitrary and
capricious.
3.
Scotts Valley’s next claim also looks familiar. It asserts that the 2026 ILO “disregard[ed]
the Band’s serious reliance interests.” Compl. ¶ 148; see also Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 39–45. For
similar reasons as last time, the Band is unlikely to succeed on its reliance theory. See Scotts
Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 20–23.
When an agency reverses course, it must “display awareness that it is changing position
and show that there are good reasons for the new policy.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro,
579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016) (cleaned up). “In explaining its changed position, an agency must also
be cognizant that longstanding policies may have engendered serious reliance interests that must
be taken into account.” Id. at 221–22 (cleaned up). “It would be arbitrary and capricious to
ignore such matters.” DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1, 30 (2020) (cleaned up).
22
As the Court highlighted in Scotts Valley III, “[t]his strand of arbitrary-and-capricious
doctrine does not set a high bar,” “[n]or is that bar uniformly set across all contexts.” 808 F.
Supp. 3d at 22 (cleaned up). While “a cursory explanation” may be “inadequate” when dealing
with “decades of industry reliance,” Kiewit Power Constructors Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 959 F.3d
381, 399 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (cleaned up), “[a] summary discussion may suffice in other
circumstances,” Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 222.
Against that backdrop, consider Scotts Valley’s asserted reliance interests. According to
the Band, the 2025 ILO “created substantial governmental, economic, regulatory, contractual,
and property-based reliance interests.” Compl. ¶ 145. “Among other things, the Band:
(a) obtained acceptance of the Vallejo Site into trust for the primary purpose of conducting
gaming; (b) obtained [National Indian Gaming Commission] approval of its gaming ordinance;
(c) established a Tribal Gaming Commission and regulatory infrastructure; (d) entered into
agreements with the City of Vallejo; (e) developed and licensed a Class II gaming facility;
(f) hired and trained Tribal employees and gaming regulators; (g) entered into leases and other
contractual obligations; (h) invested more than $10 million in the facility and related
infrastructure; and (i) commenced gaming operations in reliance on the January 2025 [ILO].” Id.
Those reliance interests do not make Scotts Valley likely to succeed on its APA claim.
At the outset, some of the interests duplicate those in Scotts Valley III. At that juncture, the Band
had already “authorized the payment of millions of dollars in project related expenses, signed an
agreement to reimburse the City of Vallejo’s costs to evaluate and analyze potential impacts of
the Tribe’s development, and amended its gaming ordinance and obtained NIGC approval.”
Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 22 (cleaned up). Then as now, those actions are not enough
to sustain the Band’s reliance claim.
23
More, the Band’s post-Scotts Valley III reliance interests are “tempered by substantial
concerns for legal or political jeopardy.” See Mozilla Corp. v. FCC, 940 F.3d 1, 64 (D.C. Cir.
2019) (per curiam). To count toward an APA claim, reliance interests must be “reasonably
incurred.” Solenex LLC v. Bernhardt, 962 F.3d 520, 529 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Reliance is
unreasonable when an issue has long “been disputed,” thus shrouding the plaintiff’s actions in
“considerable [legal] uncertainty.” See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 79 F.3d 1195, 1207 (D.C. Cir.
1996); see also Voyageur Outward Bound Sch. v. United States, 444 F. Supp. 3d 182, 196
(D.D.C. 2020) (holding that “[p]laintiffs unreasonably relied on a decision actively being
challenged by [a third party] in court”), opinion vacated, appeal dismissed, 2022 WL 829754
(D.C. Cir. Mar. 17, 2022). By that same token, reliance interests count less when the relied-upon
agency decision “might soon be reversed.” See Mozilla Corp., 940 F.3d at 64.
Those principles lessen Scotts Valley’s reasonable reliance interests. After the Court
vacated the 2025 ILO’s rescission in Scotts Valley III, the 2025 ILO—though temporarily
restored—still faced legal peril. As the Court spelled out, its decision “d[id] not bar Interior
from continuing its reconsideration, nor d[id] it stop the Department from revoking the Band’s
gaming eligibility at the end of that process.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 28.
Recognizing the reconsideration process’s likely result, the Court cautioned that “Scotts Valley
would be ill-served by placing undue reliance on [the Court’s] decision.” Id. Roughly one
month after Scotts Valley III, Interior, too, advised the Band that it would continue its
reconsideration, echoing the Court’s warning about “undue reliance.” December 2025 Letter at
1 (cleaned up). And aside from undergoing active reconsideration, the 2025 ILO was also still
overshadowed by the neighboring tribes’ three lawsuits. See supra Part I.
24
Although the Court does not hold that Scotts Valley’s reliance on the legally effective
2025 ILO was wholly unreasonable, the “considerable uncertainty” about the 2025 ILO’s future
warranted caution. See Bell Atl. Tel. Cos., 79 F.3d at 1207. And even setting aside the legal
peril they faced, the Band’s interests do not amount to the “society- and industry-wide reliance
on longstanding policies” that would require a lengthy explanation. See Scotts Valley III, 808 F.
Supp. 3d at 22–23; see also Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 43 (“The Band does not contend that seven
months of post-[Scotts Valley III] reliance is equivalent in duration to the decades of industry
reliance present in Encino Motorcars.”).
Given the reliance interests at stake, Scotts Valley has not shown that Interior addressed
them inadequately. Instead, the agency showed that it was “cognizant” of the Band’s reliance.
See Encino Motorcars, 579 U.S. at 221–22 (cleaned up). Interior repeatedly warned Scotts
Valley not to rely on the 2025 ILO while reconsideration was ongoing. See March 2025 Letter at
1; December 2025 Letter at 1; cf. MediNatura, Inc. v. FDA, 998 F.3d 931, 942 (D.C. Cir. 2021)
(considering agency’s response to reliance interests “during the development” of the agency
action (cleaned up)). In the 2026 ILO, Interior repeated Scotts Valley III’s warning about “undue
reliance.” 2026 ILO at 3 (cleaned up). As summarized above, the 39-page document then
explained why the new evidence justified reversing the 2025 ILO despite any reliance. See id. at
4–39. Under these circumstances, the APA likely demanded nothing more. See MediNatura,
998 F.3d at 942–43 (upholding FDA’s withdrawal of 30-year enforcement guidance on
homeopathic drugs where the agency gave a one-paragraph explanation). Like last time, “Scotts
Valley’s theory would break new ground, and the caselaw does not warrant that move.” See
Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 23. Especially in this preliminary posture.
25
4.
For its final claim, Scotts Valley returns to the well of due process. Compl. ¶¶ 169–83;
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 37–39. On the last go-around, this Court ruled “that the Band’s gaming
eligibility was a protected property interest and that Interior provided too little process to rescind
it.” Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 23. The Band is unlikely to recreate that success here.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that “[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “The first inquiry in every due
process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in ‘property’
or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). “Only after finding
the deprivation of a protected interest do [courts] look to see if the government’s procedures
comport[ed] with due process.” Gen. Elec. Co. v. Jackson, 610 F.3d 110, 117 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(cleaned up).
If the plaintiff shows a deprivation of a protected interest, due process requires “notice
and [an] opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (cleaned up). Constitutionally adequate notice
must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Reeve
Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 982 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (cleaned up). “[D]ue
process requires, at the least, that an affected party be informed of the official action, be given
access to the . . . evidence on which the official actor relied and be afforded an opportunity to
rebut that evidence.” Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in U.S., 758 F.3d 296, 319 (D.C.
Cir. 2014).
26
Scotts Valley’s latest due-process claim targets the reconsideration process. The Band
contends that Interior “failed to provide the Band adequate notice of the specific basis for its
decision to reopen the 2025 [ILO], and failed to give the Band a meaningful opportunity to
present its objections to that course of action.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 38. Scotts Valley also sees a
due-process violation in the agency’s decision to “alter[] its reconsideration procedure by
excluding all pre-January 10, 2025, submissions unless they were resubmitted,” which
supposedly “augured a new and different reason for reconsidering the matter.” Id. According to
the Band, Interior “again failed to provide adequate notice of the specific reasons for this new
rationale or a meaningful opportunity to respond to such rationale.” Id.
Scotts Valley is unlikely to succeed on this claim for two reasons.
The first flaw lies in the Band’s focus on the reconsideration process. Remember that
“[t]he first inquiry in every due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
protected interest in ‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co., 526 U.S. at 59. In Scotts
Valley III, the Court held that the Band’s rescinded gaming eligibility was a protected dueprocess interest. 808 F. Supp. 3d at 23. By contrast, Interior’s bare decision to reconsider did
not take away Scotts Valley’s gaming eligibility, which means that the Band’s present challenge
does not involve “the deprivation of a protected interest.” See Gen. Elec. Co., 610 F.3d at 117
(cleaned up). To be sure, the 2026 ILO’s restored lands decision amounts to a deprivation, but
the Band does not contend that it lacked opportunity to argue its case for gaming eligibility. See
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 37–39. As framed here, Scotts Valley’s due-process claim takes issue with
the reconsideration process itself without identifying a protected interest that the process
deprived. That claim runs headlong into the longstanding maxim that plaintiffs “do[] not have a
constitutionally protected interest in having [an agency] adhere to its procedural requirements.”
27
See Brandon v. D.C. Bd. of Parole, 823 F.2d 644, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Antidote Health
Plan of Ariz., Inc. v. Becerra, 754 F. Supp. 3d 219, 230 (D.D.C. 2024) (rejecting plaintiff’s effort
to “claim[] a[] [due-process] entitlement to the [agency’s] reconsideration process” because that
“would equate the process due with the substantive interest at stake” (cleaned up)). Scotts
Valley’s refashioned due-process claim is unlikely to work.
Even if the Band possessed a protected interest in not undergoing reconsideration itself,
Interior still satisfied due process’s demands. Interior timely informed the Band of its decision to
reconsider the 2025 ILO less than 11 weeks after its issuance. See Scotts Valley III, 808 F. Supp.
3d at 18. At the start of the reconsideration process, Interior communicated its “concern[] that
the Department did not consider additional evidence submitted after the 2022 Remand.” March
2025 Letter at 1. The agency later reiterated “that not taking those submissions into
consideration in this particular case could be deemed legal error.” December 2025 Letter at 1.
Interior also told the Band what those submissions were about: “whether the Vallejo Site
qualifies as restored lands under 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(l)(B)(iii) and 25 C.F.R. Part 292.” March
2025 Letter at 1. And Scotts Valley knew that other tribes like Yocha Dehe had submitted those
materials and were suing Interior over its refusal to consider them. See supra Part III.A.2.
Interior’s notice to the Band thus was “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise [it] of the pendency of the [reconsideration].” See Reeve Aleutian Airways, 982 F.2d at
599 (cleaned up).
After this Court’s due-process ruling in Scotts Valley III, the Band also had ample
“opportunity to present [its] objections.” See id. (cleaned up). Interior gave Scotts Valley all the
“evidence and legal analysis” that other tribes and stakeholders had resubmitted. 2026 ILO at 3
(cleaned up). The agency then twice “discussed a time frame for reconsideration with the Band,”
28
allowing Scotts Valley to respond almost five months after it received the submissions. Id.
Interior then met in person with the Band, “at which meeting the Band presented its response to
the June 2025 Submissions.” Id. at 3–4 (footnote omitted). Scotts Valley’s final response
consisted of five new expert reports, a 66-page memorandum of law, hundreds of pages of new
exhibits, and an eight-minute video. See Adams Decl., ECF No. 41-1, ¶ 14. The Band’s
memorandum devoted two sections to challenging the necessity of reconsideration. See Scotts
Valley Mem., ECF No. 43-6, at 14–17. After receiving Scotts Valley’s response, Interior
“accepted no further submissions.” 2026 ILO at 4.
The Band has not shown that this process was insufficient. Instead, the record suggests
that Scotts Valley was “informed of the official action,” “given access to the . . . evidence on
which [Interior] relied,” and was “afforded an opportunity to rebut that evidence.” See Ralls
Corp., 758 F.3d at 319. Nor is there likely merit to the Band’s assertion that Interior unlawfully
“altered its reconsideration procedure by excluding all pre-January 10, 2025, submissions unless
they were resubmitted.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 38. As Interior clarified to Scotts Valley in giving it
the five-month response period, the agency asked for resubmission “to gather all the evidence
that may not have been considered in reaching the 2025 Gaming Eligibility Determination.”
January 2026 Letter, ECF No. 10-10, at 1. And the resubmission “allow[ed] [the Band] to
narrow the focus of [its] response.” Id. Scotts Valley had plenty of time to deliver its lengthy
response, and it had the last word. That last word included a high-level, in-person meeting,
numerous reports and exhibits, and a short film. The Band is unlikely to show a due-process
violation.
29
* * *
Scotts Valley falters on all four counts. The Band has not demonstrated likely success on
its claim that the 2026 ILO defied Scotts Valley I, that Interior inadequately justified its decision
to reconsider the 2025 ILO, that the agency disregarded its reliance interests, or that Interior
violated due process. Scotts Valley’s “failure to show a likelihood of success on the merits alone
is sufficient to defeat [its] preliminary-injunction motion.” See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 205 F. Supp. 3d 4, 26 (D.D.C. 2016) (citing Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n,
Inc. v. USDA, 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The other factors only underline that defeat.
The Court turns to them now.
B.
When Scotts Valley last moved for injunctive relief, the Court denied its motion solely
because of the lack of irreparable harm. Scotts Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *1. Although the
Band has since pressed on with its casino plans, it comes up short on irreparable harm yet again.
Binding precedent sets “a high standard for irreparable injury.” Chaplaincy of Full
Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006). To amount to irreparable
harm, “[t]he injury must be both certain and great; it must be actual and not theoretical and of
such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at
529 (cleaned up). The injury must also “be beyond remediation.” League of Women Voters of
U.S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (cleaned up).
30
As in its previous motion for preliminary relief, the Band puts forward two kinds of
harm: economic and sovereign. 2 See Scotts Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *3; Mot. Prelim. Inj.
at 45–50. Neither cuts the mustard.
1.
Start with economic harm, where the uphill slope is even steeper than elsewhere. “Where
the injuries alleged are purely financial or economic, the barrier to proving irreparable injury is
higher still, for it is well settled that economic loss does not, in and of itself, constitute
irreparable harm.” Mexichem Specialty Resins, Inc. v. EPA, 787 F.3d 544, 555 (D.C. Cir. 2015)
(cleaned up). “Financial injury is only irreparable where no adequate compensatory or other
corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation.” Id. To
count as irreparable, then, the loss must “threaten[] the very existence of the movant’s business.”
Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.
Scotts Valley’s claimed economic harm flows from the forced “[c]losure of the Preview
Casino,” which “immediately eliminated the gaming revenue that the Band intended to use to
support the facility.” Davis Decl. ¶ 54. The Band asserts that its “total investment in the
Preview Casino exceeds $10 million.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 48; see also Davis Decl. Ex. A, ECF
No. 10-3 (table providing claimed expenses). According to the Band, “[t]his figure represents
unrecoverable sunk costs for the use of class II gaming devices, the placement, structural
improvement, and outfitting of buildings for the Preview Casino, construction and improvement
of the facility’s landscaping, driveway and parking area, and the hiring and training of casino
2
The Band also claims irreparable harm from Interior’s alleged due-process violation. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 46. Because the Band is unsuccessful in its due-process claim, supra Part III.A.4, it suffers no constitutional irreparable harm. See Mills v. District of Columbia, 571 F.3d 1304, 1312 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
31
employees and the members and staff of the Tribal Gaming Commission.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at
49. Scotts Valley states that “[a]ll of these costs were incurred while the January 2025 restored
lands decision was in effect,” and “[t]he facility’s premature closure prevents the Band from
recouping the[m].” Id.
“Even while the Preview Casino remains closed,” the Band maintains, “approximately
$235,247 in expenses and obligations are incurred each month to preserve the facility and the
governmental and operational infrastructure necessary to resume gaming.” Davis Decl. ¶ 54.
“Those continuing monthly expenses include approximately $59,081 for employees; $40,500 for
security; $50,167 attributable to obligations under the Band’s agreement with the City of Vallejo;
$68,000 for trailer and generator rental and fuel; and $17,500 for the Tribal Gaming
Commission, including its Executive Director and Commissioners.” Id. ¶ 55. And “[c]ontinued
closure will also deprive the Band of gaming revenues needed to support Tribal governmental
operations, delay the development of the planned Class III gaming facility, and result in the loss
of community goodwill, operational momentum, and valuable regulatory and operational
experience that cannot readily be recreated.” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 49.
Though greater than last year, the Band’s economic harm still is not irreparable. Similar
to Scotts Valley II, at least some of the Band’s costs are deductible or insufficiently corroborated.
See Scotts Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *3–4. Scotts Valley’s cost table labels more than $2
million in expenses simply as “Admin Office,” without offering further detail. See Davis Decl.
Ex. A at 1. Worse, the table lists more than $1.5 million of those “Admin Office” costs as
occurring the month before or on October 30, 2025—the day the Court issued Scotts Valley III.
That sum thus was not “incurred while the January 2025 restored lands decision was in effect.”
See Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 49. The rest of Scotts Valley’s cost summary is only slightly more
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detailed. Under the banner of “Other Purchases as of 7.31,” for example, it claims more than $4
million, providing curt descriptions like “Klas Robinson” ($48,789), “Habitat Credits”
($168,000), and “MOU Commitment” ($1,506,000). Davis Decl. Ex. A at 3–4. This showing
does not meet the high “degree of proof required for irreparable harm.” See Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d
at 529 (cleaned up).
Even if taken at face value, Scotts Valley’s economic harm would still not justify a
preliminary injunction. That is for one main reason: The Band has not established that any of its
monetary losses “threaten[] the very existence of [its] business.” See Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at
674. Without that showing, Scotts Valley cannot surmount the even higher “barrier to proving
irreparable injury” through economic harm. See Mexichem Specialty Resins, 787 F.3d at 555.
Not being able to immediately recover the $10 million investment into the Preview
Casino does not threaten to destroy the Band’s business. In fact, by Scotts Valley’s own
admission, the $10 million sum is “sunk cost[].” Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 49. For that expense, the
Band thus fails to show that “no adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be
available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation.” See Mexichem Specialty Resins,
787 F.3d at 555 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 979 F. Supp. 2d 104,
112 (D.D.C. 2013) (ruling that “any previous harm . . . is not properly remedied by prospective
injunctive relief absent a showing that the harm is likely to recur”), aff’d, 785 F.3d 684 (D.C.
Cir. 2015). Without more, the $10 million figure looks like ordinary economic loss, which “does
not, in and of itself, constitute irreparable harm.” See Mexichem Specialty Resins, 787 F.3d at
555 (cleaned up).
Nor does Scotts Valley meet the mark with the claimed $235,247 per month to maintain
its casino and “the governmental and operational infrastructure necessary to resume gaming.”
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See Davis Decl. ¶ 54. Once again, the threat to the movant’s business must be “of such
imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” See Olu-Cole, 930 F.3d at
529 (cleaned up). The Band does not make that showing—even if the Court accepts Scotts
Valley’s questionable claim that it takes $235,247 per month to maintain two modular buildings
with 17 class II gaming machines. See Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 11:3–12. At the motion hearing, Scotts
Valley’s counsel predicted that “[a]t some point, the preservation costs are going to outweigh the
costs of dismantling the facility.” Id. at 5:25–6:1. But he admitted that “we don’t have a date for
that yet,” asserting instead that “th[is] day may come.” Id. at 6:1–3. That is not enough to prove
imminent irreparable harm. See Nat’l Min. Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34, 51–52 (D.D.C.
2011) (finding no irreparable harm even where company claimed that it lost $6.7 million in
revenue, that it “laid off five of its twenty-eight employees,” that it would “likely need to lay off
more employees and sell equipment to lower its costs and loan debt in the very near future,” and
that it “would be forced out of business in eighteen months” (cleaned up)).
The final flaw in Scotts Valley’s claim of economic harm is that it was largely avoidable.
“It is well-settled that a preliminary injunction movant does not satisfy the irreparable harm
criterion when the alleged harm is self-inflicted.” Safari Club Int’l v. Salazar, 852 F. Supp. 2d
102, 123 (D.D.C. 2012) (cleaned up); accord Int’l Ass’n of Sheet Metal, Air, Rail & Transp.
Workers v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 502 F. Supp. 3d 180, 193 (D.D.C. 2020) (same). In its push to
set up and open the Preview Casino one week before Interior’s announced deadline for the 2026
ILO, the Band knew that its gaming eligibility was on shaky ground—not least because this
Court warned Scotts Valley against unduly relying on its decision. See Scotts Valley III, 808 F.
Supp. 3d at 28. Scotts Valley rolled the dice and invested anyway, which makes its economic
harm self-inflicted. To be sure, one decision in this district has ruled that harm is self-inflicted
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only if “curable by the moving party without an injunction.” See District of Columbia v. Dep’t
of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2020). But even under that standard, the Band could
have avoided sinking $10 million into a casino project that it knew was in serious legal jeopardy.
Ultimately, Scotts Valley has “suffered the most from [its] own actions.” See Barton v. District
of Columbia, 131 F. Supp. 2d 236, 247 (D.D.C. 2001). That reality cements the Band’s failure to
justify a preliminary injunction via economic harm.
2.
Next to economic loss, Scotts Valley also asserts sovereign harm. Mot. Prelim. Inj. at
46–48. “Until the 2026 [ILO], the Band possessed the sovereign authority to regulate class II
gaming on the Vallejo Site.” Id. at 46. The Band exercised that authority when operating the
Preview Casino. See id. at 47–48. By revoking the parcel’s gaming eligibility, Scotts Valley
contends, Interior “immediately terminate[d] the Band’s governmental power over class II
gaming.” Id. at 46. On top of that inability to regulate, Scotts Valley also points to three other
“interrelated governmental activities that were harmed by” the 2026 ILO: the Band’s “use of the
land” for gaming, the Band’s employment of its members in the casino, and its
“intergovernmental relationships with the City of Vallejo.” Mot. Hr’g Tr. at 9:2–10:14; see also
Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 46–48.
Once again, the Court recognizes that the Band has made headway since Scotts Valley II.
Though briefly and on a small scale, the Band ran a class II gaming operation on the parcel. The
Court also assumes that the Band’s loss of regulatory authority is not self-inflicted because that
outcome is unavoidable “without an injunction.” See Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d at 35.
35
And yet, the Band’s claimed sovereign harm is not enough. Even today, it remains true
that “any sovereignty change has not produced the type of actual, tangible harm that the D.C.
Circuit requires.” See Scotts Valley II, 2025 WL 1639901, at *6 (cleaned up).
The Circuit has emphasized that not all incursions on an Indian tribe’s sovereignty are
equally grave. As it explained in San Manuel Indian Bingo & Casino v. NLRB, 475 F.3d 1306
(D.C. Cir. 2007), “[a]n examination of Supreme Court cases shows tribal sovereignty to be at its
strongest when explicitly established by a treaty . . . or when a tribal government acts within the
borders of its reservation, in a matter of concern only to members of the tribe.” Id. at 1312
(citations omitted). “Examples of such intramural matters include regulating the status of tribe
members in relation to one another . . . and determining tribe membership.” Id. (citations
omitted). By contrast, the D.C. Circuit ruled that “when a tribal government goes beyond
matters of internal self-governance and enters into off-reservation business transaction[s] with
non-Indians, its claim of sovereignty is at its weakest.” Id. at 1312–13. As the court also
recognized, “[m]any activities of a tribal government fall somewhere between a purely
intramural act of reservation governance and an off-reservation commercial enterprise.” Id. at
1313. In those cases, the incursion on tribal sovereignty equals the degree to which the
challenged action “will constrain the tribe with respect to its governmental functions.” Id.
The Circuit applied those principles to a tribe’s casino operations. Id. at 1314. As the
court acknowledged, “in establishing and operating the Casino, San Manuel ha[d] not acted
solely in a commercial capacity.” Id. After all, the tribe’s “enactment of a tribal labor ordinance
to govern relations with its employees was a governmental act, as was its act of negotiating and
executing a gaming compact with the State of California.” Id. “Nevertheless,” the Circuit
concluded, “impairment of tribal sovereignty [wa]s negligible in this context, as the Tribe’s
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activity was primarily commercial and its enactment of labor legislation and its execution of a
gaming compact were ancillary to that commercial activity.” Id. at 1315. In the San Manuel
court’s eyes, the sovereign harm ultimately “amount[ed] to some unpredictable, but probably
modest, effect on tribal revenue and the displacement of legislative and executive authority that
is secondary to a commercial undertaking.” Id. To the Circuit, that “limited” harm did not
warrant “a restrictive construction of the [National Labor Relations Act].” Id.
This distinction shows why Scotts Valley’s claimed sovereign harm is not enough. As in
San Manuel, the Band’s injuries fall outside the core of sovereignty and are instead “ancillary to
th[e] commercial activity” of running a casino. See id. That fact once again distinguishes
Mashpee Wampanoag Tribe v. Bernhardt, 2020 WL 3034854 (D.D.C. June 5, 2020), which
remains Scotts Valley’s best case in this setting. See Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 48. In that case, the
federal government took the tribe’s land out of trust, wholly extinguishing “its sovereignty over
the land,” and thereby also taking away the tribe’s “right to self-governance” and “its eligibility
for a variety of federal programs and funding including COVID relief.” Mashpee Wampanoag
Tribe, 2020 WL 3034854, at *3. As before, “[t]his context is readily distinguishable from the
current situation,” mainly because the Band’s land remains in trust. See Scotts Valley II, 2025
WL 1639901, at *8. Instead, this case resembles Cow Creek Band of Umpqua Tribe of Indians
v. Department of the Interior, 2025 WL 548316 (D.D.C. Feb. 19, 2025), where the plaintiff
tribes similarly failed to “describe[] in any detail how potential near-term revenue losses [from
gaming] would concretely affect any program or service.” See id. at *4. Irreparable harm
demands more.
37
* * *
Neither the Band’s economic loss nor its sovereign harm satisfies the Circuit’s “high
standard for irreparable injury.” See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297. That
failure is fatal.
C.
If that were still not enough, Scotts Valley must also show “that the balance of equities
tips in [its] favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. “These
factors merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. That is
because “the government’s interest is the public interest.” Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. FEC,
831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016). And “[i]n assessing these factors, courts consider the
impacts of the injunction on nonparties as well.” TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 490 F. Supp. 3d 73, 84
(D.D.C. 2020). Here, the equities and public interest weigh decisively against preliminary relief.
Scotts Valley addresses these factors briskly. See Mot. Prelim. Inj. at 50–51. The Band
contends that they weigh in its favor because it “faces immediate and concrete harms to its due
process rights, gaming rights, sovereign authority, economic development efforts, and
government-to-government relationships.” Id. at 50. Despite the Band’s curt briefing, the Court
recognizes its interest in a favorable ILO, especially after its ten-year quest to obtain it. As
before, the Court credits Scotts Valley’s claim that “gaming on the Vallejo parcel would
rejuvenate the long landless tribe’s governmental operations and economic development.” Scotts
Valley III, 808 F. Supp. 3d at 25 (cleaned up).
The problem for the Band is that several other sovereigns have genuine concerns
counseling against a preliminary injunction. The first (of course) is the federal government, or
Interior, which continues to “ha[ve] an interest in reaching the right gaming decision because a
38
Vallejo casino would have substantial social and economic effects, especially on the neighboring
tribes.” See id. at 26; see also Dun & Bradstreet Corp. Found. v. USPS, 946 F.2d 189, 194 (2d
Cir. 1991) (recognizing “the general public interest in attaining the correct result in
administrative cases”). Reinstating the 2025 ILO despite Interior’s deliberate—and thoroughly
reasoned—decision to revoke it would impair the federal government’s interest.
Scotts Valley’s home state also advocates against preliminary relief. In his amicus brief,
Governor Gavin Newsom contends that “[t]he proposed preliminary injunction threatens to harm
California and its Governor, and the public interests that they represent.” Governor Newsom
Amicus Br., ECF No. 38, at 4. “In particular,” the Governor explains, “a preliminary injunction
threatens to coerce California and its Governor into compact negotiations; expose them to new
litigation risk; and undermine their bargaining position, given . . . the unprecedented uncertainty
surrounding the gaming eligibility of the Vallejo site.” Id. The Governor also reiterates his
general “oppos[ition] [to] the U.S. Department of the Interior’s invocation of IGRA’s ‘restored
lands’ exception to render the Vallejo site gaming-eligible.” Id. at 5 n.1. Consistent with that
opposition, the Governor emphasizes that “despite the Scotts Valley Band’s contrary implication,
the two sides are not near consensus in [class III] compact negotiations.” Id. at 6.
Finally, there are the four neighboring tribes, all of whom vehemently oppose Scotts
Valley’s casino plans and its bid for preliminary relief. See Lytton Rancheria Amicus Br., ECF
No. 39, at 5–6; United Auburn Amicus Br., ECF No. 40, at 6; Patwin Tribes Amicus Br., ECF
No. 41, at 6. According to the United Auburn Indian Community, for example, “[t]he record
already demonstrates that Scotts Valley’s proposed off-reservation project would compete
directly with [the tribe’s] existing on-reservation tribal gaming operations.” United Auburn
Amicus Br. at 21. Meanwhile, the two Patwin tribes (Yocha Dehe and Kletsel Dehe) also assert
39
cultural harm. They maintain “that the Vallejo Property lies within Patwin ancestral lands,”
which “are not just an important part of Patwin history, but also an integral and continuing part
of Patwin cultural identity.” Patwin Tribes Amicus Br. at 27. “This is a matter of critical
importance to Yocha Dehe and Kletsel Dehe, whose ancestors and culture were almost
completely erased by government policies during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.” Id. According to the Patwin tribes, restoring the 2025 ILO would “renew that
process of erasure, causing a deep cultural injury that transcends the harm associated with a nontribal land dispute.” Id.
* * *
Several sovereigns explain why a preliminary injunction would harm the constituencies
they represent. Restoring the 2025 ILO (even temporarily) would displace the federal
government’s thoroughly reasoned decision on gaming eligibility, push California into
negotiating a casino expansion that it opposes, and injure both the economic and cultural
interests of multiple neighboring tribes. Although the Band has an interest in realizing its
gaming plans, that interest does not tilt the balance in favor of the extraordinary relief that it
seeks. Indeed, this final factor weighs especially strongly against an injunction given the
concerns raised by amici.
IV.
In sum, the Court holds that Scotts Valley has not carried its heavy burden to obtain a
preliminary injunction. The Band fails to show likelihood of success on any of its four claims:
that Interior infringed Scotts Valley I’s remand order, that it improperly justified its
reconsideration, that the agency ignored the Band’s reliance interests, and that Interior violated
the Band’s due-process rights. Nor has Scotts Valley established irreparable harm with either its
40
economic or sovereign injuries. Finally, the equities and public interest oppose a preliminary
injunction for the Band. “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic
remedy . . . .” Mazurek, 520 U.S. at 972 (cleaned up). None is warranted here.
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Scotts Valley’s [10] Motion for Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.
2026.09.30
14:25:00 -04'00'
Dated: September 30, 2026 TREVOR N. McFADDEN
United States District Judge
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