[Cite as Daubenmire v. Craig, 2026-Ohio-3856.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )
MICHAEL T. DAUBENMIRE C.A. No. 2025CA0058-M
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
CHRISTINE M. CRAIG COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 19DR0305
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 30, 2026
STEVENSON, Judge.
{¶1} Appellant, Christine M. Craig fka Daubenmire (“Mother”), appeals the judgment
of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, granting a motion
to modify child support. We affirm.
I.
{¶2} Mother and Appellee, Michael T. Daubenmire (“Father”), jointly petitioned the
trial court for a dissolution of marriage and a decree of dissolution was issued in September 2019.
Mother and Father share two minor children, M.D. and G.D., and the matter proceeded after the
dissolution with the court addressing various motions over the years. Relevant to this appeal is
Father’s motion to modify child support filed in May 2024.
{¶3} A trial court magistrate held an oral hearing to address numerous pending motions,
including Father’s motion to modify child support, on March 10, 2025. Mother and Father were
present at the hearing with counsel. The parties informed the magistrate that nine motions had been
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resolved by a revised shared parenting plan or were being withdrawn and that only Father’s motion
to modify child support remained.
{¶4} The magistrate did not take evidence at the oral hearing, with counsel for Mother
agreeing that the “simple statements of counsel [would] suffice[.]” The parties stipulated that
Father’s yearly income was $134,000 and that Mother’s yearly income was $75,884. They agreed
that Mother provides private health insurance, which includes medical, dental, and vision, for the
minor children at an annual cost of $2,963.28. Mother and Father agreed to maintain the division
of costs as set forth in an October 21, 2022 judgment entry, with Mother paying for all of M.D.’s
expenses and Father paying for all G.D.’s expenses. They further agreed that Mother would
continue claiming M.D. for tax purposes and Father would continue claiming G.D. for tax
purposes.
{¶5} In support of his motion to modify child support, counsel for Father argued at the
oral hearing that Father had purchased a vehicle at a cost of $10,000 for M.D. and that Father was
paying car insurance for M.D. at a cost of $200 a month. Counsel argued that “if there should be
any [child] support that is put in place, then that [$200] a month . . . should be offset within that
support.” Counsel maintained that Father was also paying all G.D.’s “expenses as per the court
order” and that he was “unclear as to what additional support would actually be needed, as all of
those expenses [were] being paid for out-of-pocket already.” Father asked the magistrate to set
child support “at zero or be modified to include the contributions that Father is making towards
[M.D.].”
{¶6} Counsel for Mother argued that child support is needed “to be able to sustain the
basic needs of both of the children[.]” He contended that “the extras of . . . car insurance and
buying of cars” was not “contemplated or part of the shared-parenting plan or even a split of costs
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even from the prior order, and a choice that [Father] made.” Counsel represented that Mother was
“not opposed to . . . the Court’s consideration for a downward deviation” but argued that “zeroedout support . . . is not appropriate under the circumstances[.]”
{¶7} The magistrate issued a decision on March 28, 2025, granting Father’s motion to
modify child support and finding that “[a] 100% downward deviation is appropriate and in the best
interest of the children herein.” Mother filed a pro se objection and supplemental objection to this
decision. Father did not respond in opposition.
{¶8} On August 7, 2025, the trial court issued a decision overruling Mother’s objections
and adopting the magistrate’s downward deviation. Mother appeals, asserting five assignments of
error for this Court’s review.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND ERRED AS A
MATTER OF LAW BY GRANTING A 100% DEVIATION TO $0
WITHOUT MAKING THE WRITTEN FINDINGS REQUIRED BY R.C.
3119.22 THROUGH 3119.24 OR CONDUCTING AN INDEPENDENT
REVIEW UNDER CIV.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECONCILE THE
DEVIATION WITH THE ACTUAL PARENTING ARRANGEMENT FOR
[G.D.].
{¶9} Mother argues in her first assignment of error that the trial court abused its
discretion and erred as a matter of law by granting a 100% downward deviation of child support
without making the required statutory findings or conducting an independent review pursuant to
Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b). She similarly argues in her fourth assignment of error that the trial court erred
“[b]y eliminating her guideline support without statutory findings[.]” We disagree.
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Standard of Review
{¶10} The trial court overruled Mother’s objections and adopted the magistrate’s
decision. “Generally, the decision to adopt, reject, or modify a magistrate’s decision lies within
the discretion of the trial court and should not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”
Barlow v. Barlow, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). “In so doing, we consider the trial court’s
action with reference to the nature of the underlying matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio3139, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.). A decision to modify a child support order is also subject to an abuse of
discretion standard. Salmons v. Eubanks, 2017-Ohio-8985, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.). An abuse of discretion
means more than an error of law or judgment; it implies that the trial court’s attitude was
unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219
(1983). An abuse of discretion demonstrates “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or
moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993). When applying
the abuse of discretion standard, a reviewing court is precluded from simply substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court. Id.
{¶11} The trial court will necessarily make findings of fact when deciding whether to
modify a support order. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, “‘an appellate court
should not reverse the factual findings of the trial court, where there is ‘some competent and
credible evidence’ in support of the trial court’s findings.” Keller v. Keller, 2005-Ohio-3302, ¶ 7
(9th Dist.), quoting Huff v. Huff, 2003-Ohio-1304, ¶ 22 (9th Dist.).
Deviation of Child Support
{¶12} “R.C. 3119.03 establishes a rebuttable presumption that the child support obligation
calculated pursuant to the basic child support schedule and applicable worksheet is the correct
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amount of child support due.” Seegert v. Seegert, 2018-Ohio-5119, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.). We recognized
in Irish v. Irish, 2010-Ohio-403, ¶ 12 (9th Dist.), that a court may deviate
from the amount as calculated in the worksheet and schedule if [it]: (1) finds that
the amount calculated is unjust or inappropriate; (2) finds that the amount
calculated does not conform to the [children’s] best interest, and; (3) states findings
of fact supporting the deviation from the amount calculated.
{¶13} Mother, argues in her first and fourth assignments of error that the trial court judge,
in ruling on her objections, was required to make specific factual findings. She argues that the trial
court erred because its denial of objections sustaining the downward deviation “includes no
individualized analysis, no citation to the statutory deviation factors, and no findings that guideline
support would be unjust or that a $0 order serves either child’s best interest.” She further argues
that the trial court erred as it failed to conduct an independent review of the magistrate’s decision
as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) and R.C. 3109.05(E). Mother argues in her fourth assignment
of error that the trial court erred by granting a downward deviation “without statutory findings[.]”
{¶14} The parties stipulated that Father’s annual income is $134,000 and that Mother’s
annual income is $75,884. They agreed that, pursuant to an October 2022 agreed judgment entry,
Mother provides private health insurance for the children, Father is financially responsible for
100% of G.D.’s expenses, and Mother is 100% responsible for M.D.’s expenses. There is no
dispute that Mother claims M.D. for tax purposes and Father claims G.D. for tax purposes. There
is also no dispute that the parties’ revised shared-parenting plan, incorporating a prior agreed
judgment entry and standard visitation schedule, was presented to the magistrate at the hearing and
that this plan set forth the parenting arrangement for both children.
{¶15} The magistrate stated in her decision that she had considered
the parenting time schedule, health care coverage costs, division of out of pocket
costs, extracurricular expenses, costs that either parent has voluntarily undertaken
for the benefit of the children, tax dependency exemptions, relative incomes of the
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parties, the prior practice of the parties, and the history of this case in how the
current plan was determined.
The magistrate further “considered the age and needs of the children and the parents[’] intent
evidenced in the revised shared parenting plan.” After considering the aforementioned factors,
“along with consideration of factors unnamed herein but listed in [the] statute for child support
calculation and for deviations,” the magistrate found that “[t]he guideline support worksheet
amount is unjust and inappropriate” and that “[a] 100% downward deviation is appropriate and in
the best interests of the children[.]” Mother argued in her objections to magistrate’s decision that
there was insufficient justification for a 100% downward deviation.
{¶16} The trial court stated in its judgment entry that it had “engaged in an independent
review of the Magistrate’s Decision, the transcript of proceedings, the court record, and the filings
of the parties.” The trial court noted the magistrate’s findings, including its best interest findings,
and it found “that the Magistrate considered all relevant information, made relevant findings, and
applied the law appropriately.” See Spencer v. Spencer, 2005-Ohio-5495, ¶ 10-12 (5th Dist.) (trial
court evidenced that it had conducted an independent review, even though it did not issue separate
findings, when it stated that it had reviewed the matter and found that the magistrate’s decision
was “supported by the facts in evidence and is legally correct”). It further evidenced its
independent review of the record by summarizing the facts regarding Father’s provision of a car
for M.D. and the benefits it would provide the family for transportation. It again stated that, “[u]pon
an independent review of the record[,]” it agreed “with the Magistrate’s decision to deviate and
the amount of that deviation.” We cannot say the trial court failed to undertake an independent
review of the Magistrate’s decision in this case.
{¶17} Mother also argues that the trial court failed to make statutory findings, including
a finding that the downward deviation was in the children’s best interest, when it ruled on her
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objections to the magistrate’s decision. The record shows, however, that the magistrate made the
required findings and that the trial court undertook an independent review of the matter, that it
addressed Mother’s objections, and that it considered the relevant statutory factors when it
overruled Mother’s objections. See Linam v. Linam, 2003-Ohio-7001, ¶ 23 (7th Dist.).
{¶18} Like Mother, the appellant in Linam argued that the trial court erred when it
overruled objections and adopted a magistrate’s child support decision that deviated downward
from child support guidelines. Id. at ¶ 9-10. The appellant in Linam argued that the trial court erred
as its judgment entry did not include the following three statutorily required items: (1) the
presumed amount of child support, (2) the court’s determination that the amount would be unjust
or inappropriate and not in the children’s best interest, and (3) findings of fact to support the court’s
determination. Id. at ¶ 18-19. The Seventh District Court of Appeals noted that the trial court
adopted the magistrate’s decision, that the magistrate was the original trier of fact, and that the
magistrate had included these statutorily required items in its decision. Id. at ¶ 20-23. It concluded
that “[t]he decision of the trial court adopting the magistrate’s decision need not restate the three
statutorily required items” and that “it is not error that the trial court failed to set forth the three
items in its own journal.” Id. at ¶ 23. We agree with the reasoning and analysis of the Seventh
District in Linam. As in Linam, the trial court in this case overruled Mother’s objections and
adopted the magistrate’s decision, the magistrate was the original trier of fact, and the magistrate
had included the required statutory items in her decision. In the decision overruling the objections,
the trial court in this case undertook an independent review of the magistrate’s decision and found
that the magistrate made “relevant findings[.]” In considering Mother’s objections, the trial court
reviewed Father’s purchasing of a car and insurance for M.D. facts the Magistrate specifically
found to be relevant. The magistrate’s “relevant findings” included the required best interest
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finding and that the guideline support was not appropriate. Mother objected to the Magistrate’s
decision in part on the issue of the children’s best interests so that issue was clearly considered as
part of the denial of her objections.
{¶19} In considering the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Husband’s motion to modify child support and granting a
downward deviation. Mother’s first and fourth assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RELYING ON [FATHER’S]
VOLUNTARY PROVISION OF A CAR AND INSURANCE FOR ONE
CHILD AS THE BASIS TO ELIMINATE ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT
OBLIGATIONS.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE TRIAL COURT’S ADOPTION OF A 100% DOWNWARD
DEVIATION LACKED EVIDENTIARY FOUNDATION AND VIOLATED
CIV.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv).
{¶20} Mother argues in her second assignment of error that the trial court erred when it
relied on Father’s voluntary action of providing a car and paying car insurance for M.D. as a basis
to eliminate child support obligations. She argues in her third assignment of error that the trial
court erred as it failed to take “sworn testimony or documentary evidence demonstrating a material
change in circumstances” to support the downward deviation.
{¶21} Mother did not object to the magistrate’s reliance on Father’s voluntary provision
of a car and insurance for M.D. with the trial court. Further, Mother did not raise any objections
to the magistrate’s failure to take evidence and testimony at the oral hearing. Mother has thus
forfeited these issues on appeal.
{¶22} Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iv) states as follows:
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Except for a claim of plain error, a party shall not assign as error on appeal the court's
adoption of any factual finding or legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated
as a finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party has
objected to that finding or conclusion as required by Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
{¶23} Civ.R. 53(D)(b)(ii) requires that “[a]n objection to a magistrate’s decision shall be
specific and state with particularity all grounds for objection.” “‘Where a party fails to raise an
issue in its objections to a magistrate’s decision, that issue is forfeited on appeal.’” Niederst v.
Niederst, 2018-Ohio-5320, ¶ 34 (9th Dist.), quoting Bass-Fineberg Leasing, Inc. v. Modern Auto
Sales, Inc., 2015-Ohio-46, ¶ 24 (9th Dist.); see also Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b).
{¶24} The magistrate recognized Father’s voluntary contribution of a vehicle and car
insurance for M.D., stating in her decision that she had considered the costs “voluntarily
undertaken for the benefit of the children.” Mother raised no objections to the magistrate’s
consideration of Father’s voluntary contribution in the trial court.
{¶25} Further, Mother raised no objections concerning the taking or admission of
testimony and evidence at the oral hearing before the magistrate. Counsel for Mother, rather, stated
at the oral hearing “that [the] simple statements of counsel [would] suffice[.]”
{¶26} Mother argued in her objections that 1) there was insufficient justification for a
100% deviation, specifically that the magistrate failed to make detailed findings, 2) the magistrate
ignored unequal parenting time, 3) the parties’ shared parenting agreement did not justify the
deviation, 4) the magistrate failed to consider the best interests of the children, and 4) the
magistrate’s CSEA enforcement language preempts future review and may negatively impact the
children’s financial support without due process. Mother did not object to any “voluntarily
undertaken” costs as found by the magistrate nor did she raise any objections concerning the
magistrate’s failure to take testimony and evidence at the oral hearing. Mother has not argued plain
error on appeal. Because Mother has forfeited these arguments and has not argued plain error on
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appeal, we will not address their merits. Lucas v. Noel, 2020-Ohio-1546, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); State v.
Perkins, 2018-Ohio-2240, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.).
{¶27} Accordingly, Mother’s second and third assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V
THE TRIAL COURT UNLAWFULLY DIRECTED CSEA TO MAINTAIN
THE $0 DEVIATION IN ALL FUTURE ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEWS.
{¶28} Mother argues in her fifth assignment of error that the trial court unlawfully directed
CSEA to maintain the $0 deviation in all future administrative reviews. She contends that the trial
court erred as a matter of law as its ruling directly conflicts with statutory mandates. We disagree.
{¶29} “It is well settled that this [C]ourt’s standard of review concerning questions of
law is de novo.” DeJesus v. DeJesus, 2007-Ohio-678, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.), citing Nationwide Mut. Fire
Ins. Co. v. Guman Bros. Farm, 73 Ohio St.3d 107, 108 (1995); Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Pub.
Util. Comm., 76 Ohio St.3d 521, 523 (1996). “‘[I]t is appropriate for an appellate court to substitute
its judgment for that of the trial court where matters of law are involved.’ Indeed, where an
appellate court determines that the trial court erred as a matter of law, it may reverse and render
judgment.” (Citation omitted.) Petro v. N. Coast Villas Ltd., 136 Ohio App.3d 93, 96 (9th Dist.
2000), quoting State v. Today's Bookstore, Inc., 86 Ohio App.3d 810, 823 (2d Dist. 1993).
{¶30} Mother argues that the trial court’s order “restricts CSEA’s statutory oversight
authority and contravenes both the plain text of R.C. 3119.60 through 3119.79 and established
Ninth District precedent holding that trial courts may not ‘tie the agency’s hands’ in advance.” The
purported Ninth District precedent on which she relies is Murray v. Murray, 128 Ohio App.3d 662
(12th Dist.). Murray is a case from the Twelfth District Court of Appeals and is clearly
distinguishable from the present case. Murray involved the issue of “whether unexercised stock
options should be considered when determining the obligor’s income for purposes of child
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support” and the proper way to calculate unexercised stock options for child support purposes. Id.
at 666, 673.
{¶31} Mother also cites Marker v. Grimm, 65 Ohio St.3d 139 (1992) in her fifth
assignment of error. Marker is also distinguishable because, unlike the trial court in that case, the
trial court in this case included the child support computation worksheet in her judgment entry
and, as set forth above when addressing the first and fourth assignments of error, the magistrate
issued required statutory findings. See contra Id. at 142-143 (trial court failed to complete a child
support computation worksheet and make the worksheet part of the record; trial court also failed
to issue findings to support its deviation from the child support schedule and worksheet).
{¶32} Mother’s entire argument in her fifth assignment of error is that the trial court
unlawfully directed CSEA to maintain the $0 deviation. She has not explained nor cited a single
case in support of the proposition that it is an error of law for the trial court to direct the CSEA to
apply the deviation to administrative adjustments. “This Court will not develop an argument for
an appellant who fails to develop one for herself.” Owca v. Owca, 2008-Ohio-6939, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.),
citing App.R. 16(A)(7).
{¶33} As previously set forth, the record shows that the trial court considered R.C.
3119.23 statutory factors when it addressed Mother’s objections to the magistrate’s decision. R.C.
3119.63(B) states that “[i]f the child support order under review contains a deviation granted under
section . . . 3119.23 . . .” the CSEA “shall” “apply the deviation from the existing order to the
revised amount of child support[.]” The trial court’s order that the CSEA maintain the deviation
complies with R.C. 3119.63(B). Further, it does not prohibit either party from requesting
modifications from the court in the future, which will then be implemented by CSEA. Mother has
not established how the trial court’s order conflicts with statutory mandates.
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{¶34} Mother’s fifth assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶35} Mother’s assignments of error are overruled and the judgment of the Medina
County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
SCOT STEVENSON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
CHRISTINE M. CRAIG, pro se, Appellant.
WHITNEY K. MILLER, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.