[Cite as State v. Karr, 2026-Ohio-3858.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 31612
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
SHANNON KARR COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. CR-2024-07-2479
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 30, 2026
SUTTON, Judge.
{¶1} Defendant-Appellant Shannon Karr appeals the judgment of the Summit County
Court of Common Pleas. For the reasons that follow, this Court affirms in part and reverses in
part.
I.
Relevant Background Information
{¶2} This appeal arises from Mr. Karr’s conviction for discharging a firearm into his
neighbors’ house.
{¶3} On July 14, 2024, at approximately 6:35 p.m., T.S. was in the kitchen of her home
in Barberton when she heard a “boom.” The “boom” turned out to be a gunshot from Mr. Karr’s
home into T.S.’s home. The shot damaged the window frame in T.S.’s house, ricocheted off the
stove, and hit victims’ kitchen wall. At the time of the incident, T.S., her mother, her mother’s
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boyfriend, her 11-year-old sister, and her infant cousin were in the home. T.S. called 9-1-1 and
police arrived on the scene. A shotgun shell was recovered from the kitchen wall of T.S.’s home.
{¶4} Police were not initially able to make contact with Mr. Karr, who was still inside
of his home. After police were unsuccessful in getting Mr. Karr to come out of the house, they
made the decision to activate their Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) team. The SWAT
team tried unsuccessfully to negotiate with Mr. Karr to surrender via phone and a bullhorn for
several hours, so the SWAT team deployed tear gas which was launched into Mr. Karr’s home.
Mr. Karr then came out of the front door of the home and was arrested without further incident. A
police officer overhead Mr. Karr use a racial slur when referring to the victims.
{¶5} The gun used in the shooting was never recovered from Mr. Karr’s home. Police
did seize a muzzle loaded rifle from Mr. Karr’s home, but it was later determined that it was not
the weapon fired into the victims’ home. Officer David Patron of the Barberton Police Department
testified that Mr. Karr’s house was very messy and there were large holes in the drywall into which
a weapon could have been dropped. There were also holes in the floor of the home. Police were
unable to see all the way into the holes and the lingering gas in the air of the home limited the
amount of time officers could remain in the home to search for the gun. In addition, one of Mr.
Karr’s hands tested positive for gunshot residue, indicating that Mr. Karr had recently “discharged
a firearm, was nearby when a firearm was discharged, or handled an item that had been nearby
when a firearm was discharged.”
{¶6} The Summit County Grand Jury indicted Mr. Karr on one count of improperly
discharging a firearm at or into a habitation, in violation of R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) and (C), a felony
of the second degree, together with a three-year firearm specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A)
and a forfeiture specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.1417(A). The matter proceeded to a bench
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trial. Mr. Karr was found guilty of the charge and specifications and sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of three years to four and one-half years for improperly discharging a firearm at or
into a habitation, to be served subsequent and consecutively to the three-year firearm specification,
for a total sentence of six years to seven and one-half years, and a term of post-release control of
eighteen months to three years.
{¶7} Mr. Karr has appealed, raising four assignments of error for our review.
II.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR I AND II
THE TRIAL COURT WRONGLY DENIED [MR.] KARR’S MOTION FOR
A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THE STATE PRODUCED
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN [MR.] KARR’S
CONVICTION[.]
{¶8} Mr. Karr argues in his first and second assignments of error, which are identical,
that his conviction is based on insufficient evidence that he knowingly fired a gun into the victims’
residence because no one saw him fire the gun and the gun used was never recovered.
{¶9} “Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law that
this Court reviews de novo.” State v. Williams, 2009-Ohio-6955, ¶ 18 (9th Dist.), citing State v.
Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the prosecution has
met its burden of production by presenting sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. Thompkins
at 390 (Cook, J., concurring). For purposes of a sufficiency analysis, this Court must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).
We do not evaluate credibility, and we make all reasonable inferences in favor of the State. State
v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 273 (1991). The evidence is sufficient if it allows the trier of fact to
reasonably conclude that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
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{¶10} R.C. 2923.161(A)(1) provides:
(A) No person, without privilege to do so, shall knowingly do any of the
following:
(1) Discharge a firearm at or into an occupied structure that is a permanent or
temporary habitation of any individual[.]
A person acts “knowingly” when “regardless of purpose . . . [he] is aware that [his] conduct will
probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of
circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge
of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make
inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶11} Mr. Karr argues that there was insufficient evidence that he was the shooter. We
disagree. While the identity of the perpetrator must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable
doubt, the State may prove identity through circumstantial evidence. State v. Taylor, 2015-Ohio403, ¶ 9 (9th Dist.).
{¶12} Mr. Karr lived alone in his house, and no one else was observed at Mr. Karr’s home
prior to the shooting. There was evidence presented that on July14, 2024, at approximately 6:25
p.m., a gun was fired from Mr. Karr’s home into the victims’ kitchen while the victims were in the
home and while T.S. was in the kitchen. The shell entered through the exterior of the victims’
home and lodged in the victims’ interior kitchen wall. Mr. Karr had gunshot residue on one of his
hands. Evidence was presented that there was animosity between the victims and Mr. Karr. Mr.
Karr often yelled at the victims, using racial slurs, which was evidence of a motive to target the
victims. Motive is relevant to the identity of the perpetrator. See State v. Leigh, 2023-Ohio-91, ¶
59 (2d Dist.).
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{¶13} Recovery of the gun is not required to prove the identity of a shooter. See State v.
Carter, 2024-Ohio-5295, ¶ 16-19 (9th Dist.) (there was sufficient evidence that the defendant was
the shooter although the gun used was never recovered where evidence placed the defendant near
the crime scene at the time of the shooting).
{¶14} Mr. Karr was engaged in a standoff with police for more than three hours before he
surrendered. There was testimony presented that there were holes in the drywall and floor of Mr.
Karr’s home that the police could not see into or access, creating an inference that Mr. Karr hid or
otherwise disposed of the gun.
{¶15} As for whether Mr. Karr acted knowingly when he shot into the victims’ home,
evidence was presented that T.S. would have been visible to Mr. Karr through her kitchen window
when the shooting occurred and there was animosity between Mr. Karr and the victims. In
addition, after the shooting, Mr. Karr’s standoff with police for over three hours indicates a
consciousness of guilt. See State v. Nixon, 2025-Ohio-2980, ¶ 33 (9th Dist.), citing State v. Taylor,
78 Ohio St.3d 15, 27 (1997); see, also, State v. Eaton, 19 Ohio St.2d 145, 160 (1969), overruled
in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935 (“It is to-day universally conceded that the fact of an
accused’s flight, escape from custody, resistance to arrest, concealment, assumption of a false
name, and related conduct, are admissible as evidence of consciousness of guilt, and thus of guilt
itself.”)
{¶16} During cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, Mr. Karr’s trial counsel
attempted to elicit alternative explanations for the State’s evidence. For example, counsel posited
that the gunshot residue on Mr. Karr’s hand could have come from the tear gas canisters fired into
the home. However, the State was not required to prove the evidence presented by the State was
irreconcilable with any reasonable theory of innocence in order to support a conviction. State v.
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Warren, 2025-Ohio-3115, ¶ 16 (9th Dist.); State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 at paragraph one of
the syllabus. While there was testimony that only a small amount of gunshot residue was found
on Mr. Karr’s hand, there was testimony that the small amount of gunshot residue did not negate
that Mr. Karr fired the gun. The State presented testimony that gunshot residue falls off naturally
over time. Also, Mr. Karr was engaged in a standoff with police and the SWAT team for several
hours during which time he could have washed or wiped his hands.
{¶17} Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, there was sufficient
evidence that Mr. Karr, without privilege to do so, knowingly discharged a firearm into the victims’
occupied home. Accordingly, Mr. Karr’s first and second assignments of error are overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
ALTERNATIVELY, [MR.] KARR’S CONVICTION IS AGAINST THE
MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶18} Mr. Karr argues in his third assignment of error that his conviction is against the
manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶19} “In determining whether a criminal conviction is against the manifest weight of the
evidence an appellate court must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable
inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in
the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice
that the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339,
340 (9th Dist. 1986). “When a court of appeals reverses a judgment of a trial court on the basis
that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the appellate court sits as a ‘thirteenth juror’
and disagrees with the fact[-]finder’s resolution of the conflicting testimony.” Thompkins, 78 Ohio
St.3d at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42 (1982). An appellate court should exercise
the power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight of the evidence only in exceptional
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cases. Otten at 340. “[W]e are mindful that the [trier of fact] is free to believe all, part, or none of
the testimony of each witness.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) State v. Gannon, 2020-Ohio-3075, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). “This Court will not overturn a conviction on a manifest weight
challenge only because the [trier of fact] found the testimony of certain witnesses to be credible.”
Id.
{¶20} First, Mr. Karr argues there is no evidence Mr. Karr fired or even had the gun used
in the shooting. This argument sounds in sufficiency, not weight. We have already addressed Mr.
Karr’s sufficiency argument and determined the State presented sufficient evidence that Mr. Karr
shot the firearm used in the offense. To the extent that one of the State’s witnesses admitted that
another reason police may not have found the gun in Mr. Karr’s house is because it was not there
may weigh against Mr. Karr’s guilt, but upon review we do not determine it weighs heavily against
Mr. Karr’s conviction.
{¶21} Second, Mr. Karr argues the trial court’s finding concerning which window the shot
originated from was not based on competent, credible evidence. Therefore, Mr. Karr argues, the
trial court lost its way.
{¶22} Here, the trial court found that Mr. Karr knowingly discharged a firearm into the
victims’ home. The State’s theory was that the shot came from a second-floor window of Mr.
Karr’s home. The trial court believed it was more likely the shot came from a first-floor window
of Mr. Karr’s home based on State’s Exhibit F. Exhibit F shows that multiple windows in Mr.
Karr’s house faced the victims’ home. The two homes were approximately 20-25 feet apart. The
State presented evidence that the shot originated in Mr. Karr’s home. Gunshot residue was found
on one of Mr. Karr’s hands. Mr. Karr had a history with the victims which included yelling at
them and using racial slurs against them. Mr. Karr engaged in a standoff with police and the
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SWAT team for over three hours, which shows a consciousness of guilt. See Nixon, 2025-Ohio2980 at ¶ 33.
{¶23} The evidence here does not weigh heavily against Mr. Karr’s conviction for
knowingly discharging a firearm into the victims’ home. Accordingly, Mr. Karr’s third assignment
of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV
IF THE TRIAL COURT ORDERED [MR.] KARR TO FORFEIT HIS GUN,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED.
{¶24} Specification Two to Count One of the indictment (“the forfeiture specification”)
alleged that the gun seized, an Encore 209 Magnum, was used in the commission of the offense
and the trial court found Mr. Karr guilty of the forfeiture specification. R.C. 2941.1417(A)
provides that property seized is not subject to forfeiture unless the property is an instrumentality
or used in the commission or facilitation of the offense. After finding Mr. Karr guilty of the
forfeiture specification, the trial court stated “[u]nfortunately, I guess we don’t have the weapon,
so . . . that one is essentially, moot.”
{¶25} In addition, the trial court stated in its sentencing entry:
As to the SPECIFICATION FOR FORFEITURE OF A WEAPON,
SPECIFICATION 2 TO COUNT 1-R.C. 2941.1417(A)-SPECIFICATION, the
Encore 209 Magnum, Serial Number 19804, seized and being held by the Barberton
Police Department shall be returned to a designated person by the Defendant or
Attorney Jonathan T. Sinn as his legal representative. The seized weapon shall be
maintained in a lawful manner. This firearm was determined not to be operable
and not involved in the commission of the offense of Improperly Discharging a
Firearm at or into a Habitation[.]
The trial court did not order forfeiture of the seized gun because it was not the gun used in the
commission of the offense for which Mr. Karr was indicted and convicted, a requirement of the
forfeiture specification. Nevertheless, the trial court found Mr. Karr guilty beyond a reasonable
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doubt of the forfeiture specification. Therefore, we determine the trial court erred in finding Mr.
Karr guilty of the forfeiture specification and we reverse the trial court’s judgment only on that
portion of Mr. Karr’s conviction.
III.
{¶26} For the forgoing reasons, Mr. Karr’s first, second, and third assignments of error
are overruled. Mr. Karr’s fourth assignment of error is sustained to the extent as discussed above.
Mr. Karr’s conviction on the forfeiture specification alone should be vacated. The trial court’s
judgment is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the trial court to vacate Mr. Karr’s
conviction on the forfeiture specification only, consistent with this decision.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and
cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
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Costs taxed equally to both parties.
BETTY SUTTON
FOR THE COURT
HENSAL, P. J.
MANNING, J.
CONCUR.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH SHELL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and AMANDA R. FILIPPI, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.