2026 IL App (1st) 242271
No. 1-24-2271
Opinion filed September 30, 2026
Third Division
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT
)
ROBERT BRONSTEIN, Individually and as Independent ) Appeal from the Administrator of the Estate of Nathan Bronstein, a Minor, ) Circuit Court of Deceased, and ROSELLENE BRONSTEIN, Individually ) Cook County.
and as Next Friend of M.B. and S.B., Minors, )
)
Plaintiffs, )
)
v. ) No. 22 L 3763
)
LATIN SCHOOL OF CHICAGO, an Illinois Not-for- )
Profit Corporation, RANDALL DUNN, KRISTINE VON )
OGDEN, BRIDGET HENNESSY, JANE KNOCHE, )
ANNELIESE KRANZ, DAVID KOO, SHELLEY )
GREENWOOD, and THOMAS HAGERMAN, )
)
Defendants )
)
(Robert Bronstein, as Independent Administrator of the )
Estate of Nathan Bronstein, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff- ) Honorable
Appellant, and Latin School of Chicago, an Illinois Not- ) Scott D. McKenna, for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding.
)
JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Presiding Justice Quish and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion. No. 1-24-2271
OPINION
¶1 Plaintiffs Robert Bronstein and Rosellene Bronstein enrolled their son, Nathan, in
defendant Latin School of Chicago (Latin or Latin School) in the fall of 2021 for his 10th grade
school year. Nathan struggled to make friends and felt isolated and ostracized. He eventually
joined the junior varsity basketball team—an experience that ended with him being bullied by his
teammates and other students. Plaintiffs were subsequently able to re-enroll Nathan at his previous
school, Francis W. Parker School (Parker). In the intervening month between the end of his
semester at Latin School and his re-enrollment at Parker for the spring semester, Nathan died by
suicide.
¶2 Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant Latin School and a number of its employees
alleging a variety of claims primarily based on accusations that Latin School did not do enough to
investigate, prevent, and remediate the bullying that Nathan experienced. Most but not all of these
claims were dismissed by the trial court. The trial court entered an order with a finding pursuant
to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), and this appeal followed.
¶3 For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 Plaintiffs’ son, Nathan Bronstein, was 15 years old on January 13, 2022, when he took his
own life approximately 30 days after he voluntarily withdrew from defendant Latin School. In
April 2022, plaintiffs Robert Bronstein, individually and as the administrator of his deceased son’s
estate, and Rosellene Bronstein, individually and as next friend of her two other children, filed suit
1
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
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against Latin School and a number of its current or former employees, as well as five parents of
minor children. Following unsuccessful attempts at mediation, defendants filed motions to dismiss
the complaint and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which added the former chair of the Latin
School’s Board of Trustees and six additional parents of minor children as defendants.
¶6 Plaintiffs eventually dismissed all claims against the parents of the minor students and filed
a second amended complaint that added additional defendants. Defendants moved to strike the
second amended complaint, which the trial court granted.
¶7 Plaintiffs then filed their third amended complaint alleging ten separate counts which
became the operative complaint that led to this appeal. The final list of defendants included Latin
School, Randall Dunn, Latin’s former Head of School, Kristine Von Ogden, the former Upper
School Director, Bridget Hennessy, the 10th Grade Dean of Students, two school counselors, Jane
Knoche and Anneliese Kranz, 2 Andrew Sanchez, a teacher, David Koo, the Chair of Latin’s Board
of Directors, Shelley Greenwood, Latin’s Assistant Head of School, and Thomas Hagerman, the
current Head of School. While it would be impossible to summarize the entirety of plaintiffs’ 166-page third amended complaint and the hundreds of pages of exhibits attached to it, we briefly
summarize the allegations and claims raised therein.
¶8 In March of 2021, Nathan was accepted to Latin School, a private high school with an
annual tuition cost of $40,000, for the 2021-2022 school year. Latin School maintained a handbook
that stated the school “will be an inclusive, welcoming school for all students” and that it would
“strengthen support for new students.” The handbook additionally identified bullying as something
2
Throughout the briefing and the record, we note there are multiple spellings of Hennessey’s last name and Kranz’s first name. For consistency, we have adopted the spellings used in the complaint’s caption.
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which diminished the entire community and compromised the ethical and educational quality of
life at Latin School. The handbook further declared zero tolerance for bullying and cyberbullying,
including when that conduct took place off campus and outside school hours.
¶9 The summer before Nathan’s enrollment was to start, he began expressing anxiety about
the transition to Latin School. Nathan’s mother reached out to Hennessy, the 9th and 10th Grade
Dean of Students. Hennessy stated that she would help Nathan connect with other students.
Nathan’s anxiety did not improve once he began the school year. He complained to his parents
that he felt ostracized by other students, including a neighbor that Nathan believed to be his friend.
Nathan directed his anger and frustration at his parents.
¶ 10 In October 2021, Nathan’s parents reached out to the 10th Grade Parent Chairs to inquire
as to whether social events could be planned so that Nathan and his sister, who was also enrolled
at Latin School, could get to know other children better. The responses she received led her to
understand that Latin School was not willing to fund any social events.
¶ 11 On October 8, 2021, Kranz reached out to Nathan, acknowledging that transitioning to a
new school could be difficult and she wanted to offer him support. Nathan did not respond. Kranz
then contacted Nathan’s mother to inquire as to whether she thought Nathan would meet with her.
Nathan’s mother subsequently learned that Nathan had skipped school. During one email with
Hennessy, Nathan’s mother stated that she felt Nathan was “thrown into school this year without
enough proactive support” from Latin School. She also told Hennessy and Kranz that, although
Nathan was sharing his difficulties at school, he did not want his mother to do anything about it
and that Nathan was upset with her for “meddling.”
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¶ 12 On October 14, 2021, Nathan and his parents met with Kranz to discuss Nathan’s absence
from school. Nathan expressed that he felt isolated and did not want to be at Latin School because
he had no friends there. Several days later, Nathan’s mother emailed Kranz to tell her that Nathan
was angry and uncomfortable about the questions he was getting from other students regarding the
reasons for his departure from his previous school. She asked Kranz to work with Nathan “to come
up with a response to avoid the judgment of his peers.”
¶ 13 On October 19, 2021, Nathan’s mother emailed Kranz and stated, “Things at home are
horrific. Nate has gone crazy. Mr. Bronstein and I think we need to send Nate away, Nate is
terrorizing us and sabotaging his school responsibilities.” Kranz responded that she was sorry
Nathan was struggling and that she would talk to him. The same day, Mrs. Bronstein emailed
Kranz again, stating, “I need a psychiatrist for Nate, Nate needs to be medicated. I’m afraid Nate
is going to hurt himself or hurt me. Can you please refer me to one that is available ASAP?” Kranz
recommended two separate facilities and Mrs. Bronstein followed up with both.
¶ 14 The same day, Kranz met with Nathan and assessed him for suicidal ideation, citing Mrs.
Bronstein’s concerns. Nathan denied any suicidal ideation or safety concerns and called his mother
a liar, claiming that nothing good comes from her involvement. During the assessment, Nathan
was angry and irritable and displayed resentment toward his parents for transferring him to Latin
School. Nathan rejected Kranz’s suggestion that he get more engaged at the school and stated the
only solution was for him to return to his previous school. Nathan’s parents did not learn of this
assessment until 2023, after Nathan’s death.
¶ 15 On October 20, 2021, Kranz emailed Mrs. Bronstein to see if Mrs. Bronstein had located a
therapist for Nathan. Given the nature of Nathan’s struggles, she recommended they look into
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family counseling. She further stated that, “Given Nate’s resistance to any support at Latin (and
his refusal to be open to any alternatives other than returning to Parker), I think this issue needs to
be addressed with professionals outside of school.”
¶ 16 The Bronsteins took Nathan to a mental health evaluation the following day during which
Nathan stated his relationship with his parents was warm but conflictual. He stated he felt socially
isolated at Latin School and identified his stressors as the change in schools and bullying.
¶ 17 Mrs. Bronstein eventually escalated her concerns and met with Von Ogden. During that
meeting, she told Von Ogden that Nathan felt socially isolated and ostracized. She also told Von
Ogden that Nathan felt singled out by his geometry teacher, Andrew Sanchez, and that Sanchez,
in the context of discussing mathematical proofs, told Nathan “you’re going nowhere in life.”
¶ 18 In November 2021, Nathan met with Parker’s principal, and Parker ultimately agreed to a
mid-year transfer, meaning Nathan would begin attending Parker at the start of the next semester
on January 24, 2022.
¶ 19 Nathan continued to attend out-patient counseling sessions and eventually joined Latin
School’s junior varsity basketball team. Although Nathan was injured and could not play, he still
attended practices and games. The team maintained a group chat to communicate about games and
practices. Following a game against Parker, Nathan responded with a “thumbs down” emoji to a
derogatory post about Parker.
¶ 20 On December 10, 2021, Nathan attended a varsity basketball game between Latin School
and Parker. During the game, Nathan’s phone was used to post a photo on social media of the
scoreboard showing Parker in the lead with a “W” superimposed on the photo. Nathan denied
making the post and claimed that someone else had used his phone. Following the game, members
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of the group chat to which Nathan belonged began accusing Nathan of making the post. Multiple
students sent texts such as, “f*** you nate,” “f*** you Bronstein,” and “snake ass n***.” Another
student texted, “Bronstein is silent. He has nothing to say.” Nathan replied, “I’m in shambles.” As
the group continued to text about the incident until midnight, Nathan responded, “I’m still on your
mind in the dead of night.”
¶ 21 One of the Latin School varsity basketball players later heard of the image posted from
Nathan’s phone and posted on the application Snapchat an image of himself holding up his middle
finger with the text “F*** Bronstein.” This image propagated among students and was modified
multiple times, including the words “Bronstein pack” and an emoji blowing smoke. Nathan
understood that addition to mean smoking cigarettes laced with his ashes. Nathan thereafter
reported the incident to Hennessy and communicated that he wanted the bullying to stop.
Sometime between December 10, 2021, and his death, Nathan received a text message from a
Latin School student encouraging him to kill himself. School staff eventually met with students
involved, but did not discipline anyone and eventually labeled the cyberbullying as a “social media
incident.” None of the alleged cyberbullying, whether it was the text messages or the Snapchat
posts, was reported to Nathan’s parents.
¶ 22 On January 13, 2022, Nathan spent time with some friends, attended a math tutoring
session and a counseling session during which he continued to blame his parents for his experience
at Latin School. Later that day, Nathan hung himself from a showerhead and was pronounced dead
at the hospital that evening. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that staff at Latin School knew of the
alleged bullying that Nathan reported and that, at Nathan’s request, they chose not to report it to
Nathan’s parents.
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¶ 23 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged wrongful death (Count I), violation of Illinois’s Bullying
Prevention statute (the Act) (Count II), willful and wanton breach of duty based on a voluntary
undertaking (Count III), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts IV and VI 3), breach of
fiduciary duty (Count V), violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business
Practices Act (Counts VII and VIII), counselor negligence (Count IX), and medical malpractice
(Count X).
¶ 24 Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss which contained a combination of requests to
dismiss counts pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS
5/2-615 and 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2024). The trial court granted these motions in part and
denied them in part. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII were dismissed in their entirety with
prejudice, and Count III was dismissed with respect to defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche.
The trial court’s order left Count III intact as to Hennessy and Kranz and Latin School (by way of
vicarious liability), and Counts IX and X entirely intact.
¶ 25 Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling and sought permission to replead
the dismissed counts. They also raised the possibility of amending their pleading to raise a
negligence count based on the duties enumerated in the Act. The trial court denied the motion to
reconsider and did not allow plaintiffs to file any further amended pleadings.
¶ 26 On October 18, 2024, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court
Rule 304(a), finding that there was no just cause or reason for delay of enforcement or appeal of
3
Count IV alleged a survival action while Count VI involved plaintiffs in their individual capacities.
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its orders related to defendants’ motions to dismiss and plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. Plaintiff
Robert Bronstein filed a notice of appeal on November 18, 2024.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 On appeal, plaintiff Robert Bronstein challenges the trial court’s ruling dismissing with
prejudice Counts I, II, IV, and V brought by Nathan’s Estate against Latin School, and the trial
court’s ruling dismissing Count III brought by Nathan’s Estate asserting direct liability against
Latin School. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling denying him the opportunity to file further
amended pleadings.
¶ 29 A trial court’s dismissal order pursuant to sections 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code of Civil
Procedure is reviewed de novo. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); In re
Estate of Zivin, 2015 IL App (1st) 150606, ¶ 21. We address plaintiff’s contentions in turn.
¶ 30 A. Implied Right of Action under the Bullying Prevention Act—Count II
¶ 31 Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing Count II, which alleged a
violation of the Act, on the basis that the Act did not provide for an implied private right of action.
Whether the Act provides for a private right of action is a matter of first impression.
¶ 32 A private right of action may be implied from a statute when: (1) the plaintiff is a member
of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one the statute
was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of
the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy
for violations of the statute. Pilotto v. Urban Outfitters West, L.L.C., 2017 IL App (1st) 160844,
¶ 22. “The standard that must be met for a court to imply a private right of action in a statute is
quite high. We will take that extraordinary step only when it is clearly needed to advance the
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statutory purpose and when the statute would ‘be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private
right of action were implied.’ ” Channon v. Westward Management, 2022 IL 128040, ¶ 33 (quoting
Abbasi ex rel. Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 395 (1999)).
¶ 33 “Although the courts have demonstrated a willingness to imply private causes of action
where there exists a clear need to effectuate the purpose of an act [citation omitted], the judiciary
by implying causes of action is assuming policy-making authority, a power more properly
exercised by the legislature. The court should exercise such authority with due caution.” Galinski
v. Kessler, 134 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606 (1985).
¶ 34 1. The Text of the Statute
¶ 35 Determining whether a statute contains an implied right of action requires us to perform
statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute our primary objective is to ascertain and give
effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The Act was
amended on June 9, 2023, approximately two and a half months before plaintiffs filed their third
amended complaint, and plaintiffs alleged that this amendment was partly a result of their
advocacy efforts. 4
¶ 36 The Act begins with a statement of its purpose:
“The General Assembly finds that a safe and civil school environment is necessary for
students to learn and achieve and that bullying causes physical, psychological, and
emotional harm to students and interferes with students' ability to learn and participate
4
Effective August 15, 2025, this statute was renumbered to 105 ILCS 5/22-110 but its content did not change. It was further amended July 1, 2026, with changes that do not affect the substance of the arguments before this court. As such, we will confine our discussion to the version of the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed their complaint as that is the statute discussed by the parties.
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in school activities. The General Assembly further finds that bullying has been linked
to other forms of antisocial behavior, such as vandalism, shoplifting, skipping and
dropping out of school, fighting, using drugs and alcohol, sexual harassment, and
sexual violence. Because of the negative outcomes associated with bullying in schools,
the General Assembly finds that school districts, charter schools, and non-public, nonsectarian elementary and secondary schools should educate students, parents, and
school district, charter school, or non-public, non-sectarian elementary or secondary
school personnel about what behaviors constitute prohibited bullying.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(a) (West 2024).
¶ 37 The Act prescribes that each school district, charter school, and non-public, non-sectarian
elementary or secondary school shall create, maintain, and implement a policy on bullying which
must be filed with the State Board of Education. Id. § 27-23.7(d). This policy must be based on a
template provided by the State Board of Education and must include 13 criteria enumerated in
subsection (b). Id. § 27-23.7(b), (d). One of those criteria requires instances of bullying to be
reported to parents or legal guardians. Id. § 27-23.7(b). Bullying policies must also contain a
process to investigate whether a reported act of bullying falls within the scope of the school’s or
district’s jurisdiction. Id. § 27-23.7(d). Every two years, a school must review and revise its policy
and submit it to the State Board of Education. Id. The State Board of Education must then review
the policy to determine if the policy complies with the criteria set out in the statute. Id. If a school
fails to file its policy even after being notified of its failure, the State Board of Education must
publish on its website a notice of the school’s noncompliance. Id.
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¶ 38 The Act further requires schools to submit to the State Board of Education data on verified
allegations of bullying and delegates to the State Board of Education the authority to adopt rules
regarding the notification of schools or districts that fail to comply with the Act’s data submission
requirements. Id. § 27-23.7(f). Schools must also, upon request by parents or guardians of enrolled
children, provide non-identifiable data regarding bullying allegations in a given year, and the State
Board of Education must adopt rules regarding the handling and sharing of that data and
maintaining the privacy of students involved. Id. § 27-23.7(g).
¶ 39 Penultimately, the Act gives the State Superintendent of Education the authority to provide
grants to schools to support their anti-bullying programming. Id. § 27-23.7(j). However, schools
that are not in compliance with subsection (f) are not eligible for grants. Id.
¶ 40 Finally, the Act states that, “This Section shall not be interpreted to prevent a victim from
seeking redress under any other available civil or criminal law.” Id. § 27-23.7(e).
¶ 41 2. Whether the Act Provides for an Implied Private Right of Action
¶ 42 Having outlined the purpose and strictures of the Act, we turn to whether the Act contains
an implied private right of action. At the outset, plaintiff claims that this case is analogous to
Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, but that case is distinguishable because the statutes in
question contained language explicitly permitting a private right of action. There, the plaintiff sued
when a fitness gym failed to use an automated external defibrillator (AED) on her husband, which
resulted in his death. Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 1. The case turned
on whether the Facility Preparedness Act, which mandated that physical fitness facilities have a
functioning AED and staff members trained in its use, and the AED Act gave rise to a private right
of action when facility staff failed to use the AED in an emergency. Id. ¶¶ 25-31. The AED Act
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maintained that, “An AED user is not liable for civil damages as a result of any act or omission
involving the use of an AED in an emergency situation, except for willful or wanton misconduct,
if the requirements of this Act are met.” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting 410 ILCS 4/30(d) (West 2012)). The
supreme court concluded that, “The plain and unambiguous meaning of this phrase is that civil
liability may attach to willful and wanton failures to use an AED. In other words, a right of action
does exist for willful and wanton misconduct in connection with the non-use of an AED.” Id. ¶ 33.
¶ 43 Thus, we do not find Dawkins persuasive. The Act in question contains no explicit
statement about the circumstances in which civil liability may or may not attach and Dawkins does
not assist us in determining whether a private right of action may be implied.
¶ 44 The first element to consider is whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted. Pilotto, 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. Nathan, as a fifteen-yearold high school student who was bullied, is indisputably a member of the class for whose benefit
the Act was enacted. Defendant Latin School concedes this point.
¶ 45 However, assuming without deciding that suicide is one of the injuries the Act is intended
to prevent, the remaining two elements do not support the existence of a private right of action.
First, a private right of action is not consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act. Pilotto,
2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. In evaluating whether a private right of action is consistent with
the underlying purpose of a statute, it is appropriate to consider whether the statute is remedial in
nature. Davis v. Dunne, 189 Ill. App. 3d 739, 743 (1989).
¶ 46 In Davis, the plaintiff sued the president of the Board of Commissioners of Cook County,
alleging that the promotion of another employee ahead of the plaintiff violated the Cook County
Civil Service Commission Rules and a right of action could be implied from the Civil Service Act.
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Id. at 741-42. The court observed that the Civil Service Act applied to the narrow realm of civil
service employment, authorizing the election of commissioners and providing a framework for
appointment, promotion, and removal of civil service employees, and that the statute enumerated
that violations of the statute could be prosecuted by the Attorney General, the State’s Attorney, or
the commission. Id. at 742-43. It further reasoned that simply because the statute served public
policy did not imply a private right of action and it was proper to inquire as to whether the statute
was remedial in nature. Id. at 743. Ultimately, the court held that the statute “prescribes procedures
for appointment, promotion, removal of civil service employees, and prohibits certain
discriminatory and politically based misconduct. The Act does not seek to redress wrongs, and
therefore is not remedial in nature.” Id. It stated, “Although the Act protects, in its observance,
civil service employees such as Davis, it does not, in its breach, provide a civil remedy for those
employees.” Id.
¶ 47 Davis is instructive here. The Act is not remedial, but instead erects a regulatory framework
for schools to follow to establish compliant anti-bullying policies, report data on bullying
allegations, and receive grant money for anti-bullying programming. Similar to Davis, the Act
prescribes policies and requirements for schools, but it is not aimed at righting any wrongs or
providing redress for any grievances—for the government or private parties. While it is clear that
the point of requiring schools to establish anti-bullying policies or permitting them to receive
grants for anti-bullying programming is to protect children and facilitate their ability to learn, it
does not necessarily follow that the Act provides a remedy for private individuals.
¶ 48 Indeed, the Act sets out obligations that schools have with respect to the State Board of
Education, i.e. submitting and maintaining anti-bullying policies that comply with the strictures of
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the Act. But the Act, as written, does not impose obligations on schools or districts with respect to
parents or children. For example, a bullying policy must contain “procedures for promptly
investigating and addressing reports of bullying,” and enumerates 4 areas that these procedures
must address. 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5) (West 2024). But the required procedures are exceptionally
broad.
¶ 49 One such requirement is that a bullying policy must contain procedures “consistent with
federal and State laws and rules governing student privacy rights, [for] providing parents and
guardians of the students who are parties to the investigation information about the investigation
and an opportunity to meet with the principal or school administrator or his or her designee to
discuss the investigation, the findings of the investigation, and the actions taken to address the
reported incident of bullying.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5)(D). Policies must also contain procedures
for “making all reasonable efforts to complete the [bullying] investigation within 10 school days
after the date the report of the incident of bullying was received.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5)(A). The
exact specifics of these policies and procedures, however, are left to schools to formulate and the
State Board of Education to approve. When broad discretion is given to an agency, it negates the
implication that there was legislative intent to create a private right of action. Moore v. Lumpkin,
258 Ill. App. 3d 980, 996 (1994).
¶ 50 Furthermore, the Act concerns itself with incentivizing the creation and promulgation of
anti-bullying policies and the consequences of not having such a policy. It does not, in any way,
concern itself with possible consequences related to how a school enforces or effectuates that
policy. Thus, we agree with the trial court that any conceivable private right of action under the
Act would only permit a lawsuit against a school for failing to have an anti-bullying policy. But
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that is not what Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged; it instead alleged, in line with other
counts, that defendant Latin School violated the Act by failing to properly investigate and failing
to notify the Bronsteins or other parents of students involved. Permitting a lawsuit based on how
a school chose to enforce its policy or respond to a particular instance of bullying would not only
require us to imply a private right of action, it would require us to read into the Act words and
sentences that do not exist. A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that we may not
read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Dew-Becker
v. Wu, 2020 IL 124472, ¶ 14. The fact that the Act is not intended to foreclose individuals from
other civil or criminal remedies further indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to give
private citizens a private right of action. 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(e) (West 2024).
¶ 51 As to the fourth element, we also do not agree that a private right of action is necessary to
provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. Pilotto, 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22.
Plaintiff argues that without a private right of action, the sole consequence for failing to comply
with the statute is placing the school on a list online, and that such a remedy is “toothless” and
does nothing to make a victim whole. The difficulty there is that plaintiff began from the flawed
premise that the Act is remedial in nature and therefore requires teeth or that the Act is concerned
with compensating victims. We must also reiterate that the Act specifically states, “This Section
shall not be interpreted to prevent a victim from seeking redress under any other available civil or
criminal law.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(e) (West 2024). If the legislature wished to give parents or
students a private right of action, it would not have specifically included this subsection. And if
victims of bullying may seek redress for bullying using other available civil or criminal laws, then
a private right of action is not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for bullying victims.
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¶ 52 Given all these considerations, we conclude that the Act as written contains no implied
right of action and the trial court did not err in dismissing this Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint
with prejudice.
¶ 53 B. Repleading a Common Law Negligence Claim Based on the Act
¶ 54 Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to plead a
common law negligence claim based on the requirements of the Act after it concluded that the Act
does not contain a private right of action.
¶ 55 “The law is clear in Illinois that the allowance of an amendment to pleadings rests within
the sound discretion of the trial court.” Tishman Midwest Management Corp. v. Wayne Jarvis,
Ltd., 146 Ill. App. 3d 684, 692 (1986). Before the trial court can be found to have abused its
discretion in denying a party leave to amend, it must be clear from the record that reasons or facts
were presented to the trial judge as a basis for requesting the favorable exercise of the trial court’s
discretion. Id.
¶ 56 However, nothing in the record demonstrates that plaintiffs submitted a proposed amended
complaint or otherwise made a record about what an amended complaint would contain that would
justify being allowed leave to amend. Tishman, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 692.
¶ 57 Ordinarily, when determining whether an amendment to a complaint should be allowed, a
court generally considers four factors: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure a defect
in the pleading; (2) whether the proposed amendment would surprise or prejudice the opposing
party; (3) whether the proposed amendment was timely filed; and (4) whether the moving party
had previous opportunities to amend the complaint. Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1054
(2009). “A plaintiff’s failure to tender a proposed complaint significantly diminishes a court’s
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ability to analyze the appropriate factors for determining whether leave should be granted as the
existence of a proposed amendment is implicit in the first three factors.” Id. at 1054-55. Indeed,
the failure to tender a proposed amendment to the trial court forfeits review of the trial court’s
decision. Id. at 1055. Plaintiff asks us to hold that the trial court abused the discretion that it was
never given an opportunity to consider a proposed amendment. His extensive arguments about the
law supporting a negligence claim based on the Act do not cure this problem—particularly when
plaintiff’s view of the duties imposed by the Act is far broader than our interpretation, as discussed
above.
¶ 58 In asking us to hold that the trial court should have allowed plaintiffs to file an amended
complaint, we are required to speculate as to what that amended pleading would look like and what
factual allegations would have been made to satisfy the various elements, including proximate
cause, of a negligence claim. That, of course, we cannot do.
¶ 59 On this basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow any further
amendments to the complaint.
¶ 60 C. Willful and Wanton Breach of Duty (Voluntary Undertaking)—Count III
¶ 61 Count III alleged that defendants voluntarily agreed to monitor for and address
circumstances that would negatively impact Nathan’s safety, mental health, and well-being.
However, after receiving reports of bullying against Nathan, they failed to exercise reasonable care
and instead acted willfully and wantonly so as to increase the harm to Nathan. The trial court
dismissed this count, with prejudice, as it pertained to defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche,
and left this count intact as to defendants Hennessy and Kranz. The trial court reasoned that the
complaint did not adequately plead that defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, or Knoche undertook any
- 18 -No. 1-24-2271
affirmative duties or steps to prevent Nathan’s bullying and that their interactions with Nathan
were so remote as to render them incapable of voluntarily undertaking any efforts on Nathan’s
behalf.
¶ 62 The trial court later clarified its ruling, stating that Count III remained intact with respect
to defendants Hennessy and Kranz and defendant Latin School by way of vicarious liability.
However, it dismissed this count as it pertained to the direct liability of Latin School. In denying
plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the trial court reasoned that the complaint did not plead any
affirmative undertaking other than the allegations related to Kranz and Hennessy, and that
statements in handbooks, policies, promotional materials, and procedures could not qualify as
affirmative actions that qualify as the undertaking of a duty. On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge
the dismissal of defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche. Instead, they only claim that the trial
court erred in rejecting a claim of direct liability against Latin School.
¶ 63 Ordinarily, to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
owed a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that defendant’s breach was the proximate
cause of injury to the plaintiff. Bell v. Hutsell, 2011 IL 110724, ¶ 11. 5 Under a voluntary
undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be imposed upon a defendant is limited to the
extent of the undertaking. Id. ¶ 12. This theory is narrowly construed. Id.
¶ 64 Plaintiff argues that two different theories for a voluntary undertaking apply here. Under
the first voluntary undertaking theory, one who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to
5
The trial court’s ruling on defendants’ motions to dismiss notes a dispute as to whether this count would need to be proved using an ordinary negligence standard or a willful and wanton standard. This dispute has not carried over to this appeal, nor does it have any bearing on the dispositive issues for this claim.
- 19 -No. 1-24-2271
render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s
person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to
exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if: (1) his failure to exercise such care
increases the risk of harm or (2) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance on the
undertaking. Bell, 2011 IL 110724, ¶ 13 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 323 (1965)).
¶ 65 Alternatively, one who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who is
helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability to the other for any bodily harm
caused to him by: (1) the failure of the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the
other while within the actor’s charge or (2) the actor’s discontinuing his aid or protection, if by
doing so he leaves the other in a worse position than when the actor took charge of him. Wakulich
v. Mraz, 203 Ill. 2d 223, 244 (2003) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 324 (1965)); see
also Rojas Concrete, Inc. v. Flood Testing Laboratories, Inc., 406 Ill. App. 3d 477, 483 (2010) (“If
a person voluntarily agrees to perform a service necessary for the protection of another person or
his or her property, a duty may be imposed on the party undertaking the service under the voluntary
undertaking doctrine”).
¶ 66 Defendant Latin School does not dispute that such an action, in theory, can be pled directly
against the institution of Latin School itself, and thus we concern ourselves only with whether
plaintiffs successfully pled allegations that satisfy either above-referenced standard.
¶ 67 Having reviewed plaintiffs’ complaint, we find it to be lacking with respect to the two
separate standards. Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that defendant Latin School “agreed to voluntarily
undertake to investigate, report, and stop bullying, cyberbullying, and harassment.” We agree with
the trial court that the institution’s act of promulgating rules and policies in a handbook, which is
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the only act alleged that could conceivably have been taken by the institution itself rather than
Kranz and Hennessy, could not be classified as a voluntary agreement with Nathan to perform
particular actions. Additionally, given that we may affirm on any basis, American Service Ins. Co.
v. City of Chicago, 404 Ill. App. 769, 776-77 (2010), this count also suffers from an absence of
allegations establishing causation. As we discuss in detail later in this opinion, cause is not
established where the causal connection is contingent, speculative or merely possible. Mengelson
v. Ingalls Health Ventures, 323 Ill. App. 3d 69, 75 (2001).
¶ 68 The complaint alleges that, “[a]s a direct and proximate result of the Latin Defendants’
willful and wanton failure to undertake an adequate investigation to stop the bullying and
cyberbullying against Nate and the Latin Defendants’ willful or grossly negligent blaming of the
victim and characterizing his suffering as something he deserved, Nate, deceased, sustained
conscious pain and suffering, disability, and disfigurement prior to his death.”
¶ 69 But other than this conclusory allegation, which is insufficient to overcome Illinois’s factpleading requirements, plaintiffs alleged nothing to establish that Latin School’s alleged
undertaking and any alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in that undertaking had any causal
relationship to the harm Nathan suffered. See Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 306 Ill. App.
3d 148, 155 (1999) (a pleading which paraphrases the elements of a cause of action in conclusory
terms is insufficient). No factual allegations establish how Latin School’s actions or failings caused
Nathan’s injuries, left him worse off, or increased the risk of harm to him. On that basis, plaintiffs
cannot state a claim for the breach of a duty that was voluntarily undertaken by Latin School as an
institution. In discussing this issue with causation, we note for clarity that plaintiffs’ allegations in
Count III survive as to Kranz and Hennessy, and Latin School on the basis of vicarious liability.
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The remaining defendants have not cross-appealed to challenge the survival of those counts, and
thus the sufficiency of the complaint with respect to those defendants and claims is not before us.
Therefore, we express no opinion about the sufficiency of those claims.
¶ 70 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing this claim with respect to the direct
liability of Latin School.
¶ 71 D. Breach of Fiduciary Duty—Count V
¶ 72 Count V of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged that defendant Latin School’s policies and school
rules created a confidential relationship with Nathan and that Latin School accepted Nathan’s trust
and undertook a fiduciary duty when school counselors met with Nathan to address his mental
health, well-being, and bullying. The complaint further alleged that Latin School breached that
fiduciary duty when it failed to investigate or remediate the bullying that occurred and failed to
inform Nathan’s parents. The trial court dismissed this count on the basis that plaintiffs failed to
state sufficient facts establishing a duty to investigate and prevent bullying, and because this count
was duplicative with Count III. We agree with the trial court that Count V is duplicative with
Count III.
¶ 73 Generally, to state a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, a plaintiff must allege
(1) a fiduciary duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) an injury; and (4) a
proximate cause between the breach and injury. Alpha School Bus Co., Inc. v. Wagner, 391 Ill.
App. 3d 722, 747 (2009).
¶ 74 Pleading in the alternative is generally permitted. Neade v. Portes, 193 Ill. 2d 433, 445
(2000). However, duplicate claims are not permitted. Id. In Pippen v. Pedersen and Houpt, this
court observed that negligence and breach of fiduciary duty claims are conceptually distinct
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because the relevant standard of care in a negligence claim encompasses a broader range of
conduct than is covered by a fiduciary duty and that a negligence claim is based in tort while a
claim for breach of fiduciary duty is founded on principles of agency, contract, and equity. Pippen
v. Pedersen and Houpt, 2013 IL App (1st) 111371, ¶ 28. Despite those differences, “we look to
the operative facts and injury to determine whether the causes of action are duplicative.” Id.
¶ 75 Neade exemplifies these principles. There, the plaintiff sued his primary care physician for
medical negligence and breach of fiduciary duty and the supreme court was asked to determine if
a breach of fiduciary duty claim could be brought against the doctor. Neade, 193 Ill. 2d at 435,
439. Count I alleged that the plaintiff’s doctor failed to authorize an angiogram which resulted in
the plaintiff’s death. Id. at 437. Count II alleged that the plaintiff’s doctor had a fiduciary duty to
act in good faith and in the best interests of the plaintiff and breached that duty by refusing to
authorize an angiogram, refusing to refer the plaintiff to a specialist, and by failing to disclose that
he contracted with Chicago HMO, which provided funding for outside referrals or tests—a portion
of which the doctor would receive if any funding remained at the end of the year. Id. at 437-38.
¶ 76 The supreme court reasoned that it did not have to decide whether a breach of fiduciary
duty claim could be brought against the doctor because it was duplicative with the medical
negligence claim. Id. at 446. Although the breach of fiduciary duty count contained additional facts
not in the medical negligence counts, namely the facts related to the doctor’s relationship with
Chicago HMO, the court looked to the operative facts of each claim and determined that the
operative fact was the doctor’s failure to order an angiogram for the plaintiff. Id. at 443. The
supreme court reasoned that proving the standard of care for medical negligence was also what the
plaintiff would have had to prove for a breach of fiduciary duty claim and that a breach of fiduciary
- 23 -No. 1-24-2271
duty claim would be nothing but the malpractice standard traditionally applied in actions against
physicians. Id. at 445.
¶ 77 Here, in Count V, plaintiffs alleged the existence of “a confidential relationship between
Latin and Nathan” based on “Latin’s own promulgated rules and policies” and that “Latin
specifically designed the language in the Handbook so that students, including Nate, were aware
of, understood, and would rely upon Latin for its role in safeguarding their emotional and social
well-being, and, to protect them from harassment, thereby ensuring the creation of a confidential
relationship based on trust and confidence.” The complaint further alleged that, “Latin invited its
students, including Nate, to invoke a fiduciary relationship with Latin by offering the help and
counsel of school counselors,” and that, “[b]y agreeing to meet with school counselors, specifically
Kranz, Nate reposed his trust and confidence in Latin.”
¶ 78 According to the complaint, Latin School knowingly accepted that trust and undertook a
fiduciary duty when Kranz and Hennessy met with Nathan to address his well-being and his
complaints of bullying. However, the school breached that duty when it failed to investigate
Nathan’s bullying complaints and failed to prevent additional bullying, and failed to inform
Nathan’s parents. As a result, the complaint alleged that those breaches caused “sustained
conscious pain and suffering, disability, and disfigurement” prior to Nathan’s death.
¶ 79 Meanwhile, Count III alleged a willful and wanton breach of duty based on a voluntary
undertaking. That count alleged that defendants “agreed to voluntarily undertake to monitor for
and address circumstances known to them that would negatively impact Nate’s safety, mental
health and well-being.” This included defendants agreeing to “voluntarily undertake to investigate,
report, and stop bullying, cyberbullying, and harassment.” However, the complaint alleged that
- 24 -No. 1-24-2271
defendants failed to exercise reasonable care in that undertaking by, among other things, failing to
take action to enforce Latin School’s own rules and policies, taking no action to investigate
Nathan’s report of bullying, taking no action to prevent additional bullying, and by giving Nathan
the impression of wanting to assist him by setting up meetings with Nathan while leaving him to
manage the aftermath of the bullying on his own. As a result of defendants’ breach of duty in
Count III, the complaint alleged that Nathan suffered “sustained conscious pain and suffering,
disability, and disfigurement prior to his death.”
¶ 80 Comparing these two claims, we agree with the trial court that these counts are duplicative.
Both claims share the same operative facts. The fiduciary duties that defendants allegedly
undertook and then breached in Count V contain the same essential core of facts that make up
defendants’ duties that they allegedly voluntarily undertook and then breached in Count III—a
failure to investigate, report, and remedy bullying. As additional support, the injuries Nathan
allegedly sustained in these two counts are identical.
¶ 81 Accordingly, we need not determine whether a student or his estate can properly plead a
breach of fiduciary duty claim against a school in this instance. Even if such a claim is proper, it
is duplicative and the trial court did not err in dismissing it. We are mindful of the fact that we
have determined this count to be duplicative of Count III, but we have also affirmed the dismissal
of Count III. Given our conclusion that plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary duty count is essentially the
same claim as Count III, Count V would suffer from the same insufficiencies identified in Count
III, particularly with respect to causation.
- 25 -No. 1-24-2271
¶ 82 E. Wrongful Death—Count I
¶ 83 The trial court dismissed Count I of plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged wrongful death on
the basis that defendants had no duty to prevent Nathan’s suicide, and that Nathan’s act of taking
his own life was, based on the allegations in the pleading, not foreseeable as a matter of law.
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that this conclusion was error.
¶ 84 To state a cause of action under the Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/0.01 et seq. (West
2024), the plaintiff must show that: (1) the defendant owed a duty to the deceased; (2) defendant
breached that duty; (3) the breach of duty was the proximate cause of the deceased’s death; and
(4) monetary damages resulted to persons designated under the Act. Bovan v. American Family
Life Ins. Co., 386 Ill. App. 3d 933, 938 (2008). Here, the foreseeability element as it relates to
proximate cause is dispositive and we need not reach any other issues regarding whether plaintiffs
properly pled a wrongful death claim.
¶ 85 Proximate cause consists of (1) cause in fact and (2) legal cause. Young v. Bryco Arms, 213
Ill. 2d 433, 446 (2004). The second component, legal cause, is established only if the defendant’s
conduct is “so closely tied to the plaintiff’s injury that he should be held legally responsible for
it.” Id. (quoting Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 558 (2002)). The question is one of public
policy—how far should a defendant’s legal responsibility extend for conduct that did, in fact, cause
the harm? Id. The proper inquiry regarding legal cause involves an assessment of foreseeability,
in which we ask whether the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result
of his conduct. Id. Proximate cause is not established where the causal connection is contingent,
speculative or merely possible. Mengelson, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 75.
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¶ 86 Although proximate cause is generally a question of fact, the lack of proximate cause may
be determined by the court as a matter of law where the facts alleged do not sufficiently
demonstrate both cause in fact and legal cause. Id.
¶ 87 Regarding wrongful death and suicide, there is a general rule that the injured party’s
voluntary act of suicide is an independent, intervening act which is unforeseeable as a matter of
law, and which breaks the chain of causation from the tortfeasor’s negligent conduct. Turcios v.
DeBruler Co., 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 20. However, this rule is not absolute. To overcome it, a plaintiff
“must plead facts which, if proven, would overcome application of the general rule that suicide is
deemed unforeseeable as a matter of law. In other words, a plaintiff must plead facts demonstrating
that the suicide was foreseeable, i.e., that it was a likely result of the defendant’s conduct.” Id.
¶ 40.
¶ 88 Turcios is instructive here. In Turcios, the decedent committed suicide inside an apartment
he rented with his wife. Id. ¶ 4. The complaint sought damages for wrongful death and alleged that
the decedent and his wife entered into a written lease and took possession of the apartment on May
1, 2011. Id. ¶ 5. Ten days into the lease, the couple received a letter purporting to be an eviction
notice giving them 30 days to vacate the property and that construction was planned to begin on
June 10, 2011. That letter was followed by several others including a June 7, 2011, letter advising
the couple that demolition work would begin soon. Id. The couple sought assistance from a charity
group and reported to their case manager that they were losing sleep over the matter and that they
were depressed, anxious, and angry over the situation. Id. ¶ 6. Demolition of the building began
on June 10, 2011, despite the fact that the couple and their children were still occupying the
apartment. Id. ¶ 7. The demolition company tore into the outside walls of the building and began
- 27 -No. 1-24-2271
demolishing surrounding units. Id. On June 14, the decedent told his wife that he could not tolerate
the situation any longer, but he did not know what to do. Id. The following day, he committed
suicide, leaving behind a note that said, “Please forgive me my daughters, and you also Carmen.
Sell the land and build the house.” Id. The supreme court observed that:
“[I]ntentional infliction of emotional distress, by its very nature, appears to have a slightly
closer connection to suicide than other intentional torts. The tort requires that the distress
inflicted be so severe ‘that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.’ [Citation
omitted]. Notwithstanding the ostensible connection between severe emotional distress and
suicide, we also recognize that a suicide may result from a complex combination of
psychological, psychiatric, chemical, emotional, and environmental factors. Thus, we
believe it is the rare case in which the decedent’s suicide would not break the chain of
causation and bar a cause of action for wrongful death.” Id. ¶ 41.
¶ 89 The supreme court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations were insufficient to plead a
claim for wrongful death as the decedent’s suicide “was not a reasonably foreseeable result of
defendant’s alleged conduct in breaking the lease and pressuring the couple to vacate the
apartment.” Id. ¶ 42.
¶ 90 Plaintiff Robert Bronstein asserts that Nathan’s suicide was the foreseeable result of
defendants’ failure to notify plaintiffs that Nathan had been bullied and failure to properly
investigate the bullying and mete out discipline. As plaintiff articulates in his brief, “it is not too
much to expect that licensed education professionals and mental health counselors will pick up the
phone or send an e-mail to parents when they become aware of bullying of a minor student.”
However, whether one should expect such actions is separate and distinct from whether a suicide
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is the foreseeable result of not notifying parents of such bullying or not administering punishment
to bullies.
¶ 91 Legal cause is established only if the defendant’s conduct is so closely tied to the plaintiff’s
injury that he should be held legally responsible for it. City of Chicago v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.,
213 Ill. 2d 351, 395 (2004). The conduct in Turcios, attempting to break a lease 10 days into a
tenant’s occupancy, pressuring them to leave, and then beginning demolition of a building while
the decedent and his family were still occupying the unit, conduct that can only be described as
highly egregious and intentional, could not preserve the chain of causation that is normally severed
by suicide. The allegations surrounding Nathan’s suicide similarly do not preserve the chain of
causation. Plaintiffs alleged that Nathan took his own life at home, 28 days after he had withdrawn
from Latin School and re-enrolled at another school. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts that
indicate why Nathan chose to commit suicide, and we would not dream of speculating on that
point. However, plaintiffs’ allegations make it clear that bullying was not the only thing affecting
Nathan’s mental health. Long before Nathan complained of bullying, he repeatedly reported his
unhappiness at being transferred to Latin School—even before starting the school year, his lack of
friends, and his isolation. He carried anger toward his parents, and his mental health struggles were
evident as early as October 2021 when his mother expressed in an email to Kranz concern that
they would have to “send Nathan away” and that she was afraid he was going to hurt himself or
her—long before the bullying incidents that began on December 10, 2021. According to the
complaint, when Kranz discussed the email with Nathan, Nathan denied any suicidal ideation to
school staff, called his mother a liar, and stated that nothing good came from her involvement.
- 29 -No. 1-24-2271
¶ 92 Furthermore, the complaint alleged that Nathan reported the bullying to Hennessy and that
the bullying was not reported to Nathan’s parents at Nathan’s request. Given all these alleged
circumstances, including that Latin School knew that Nathan had denied suicidal ideation and that
not reporting the bullying incidents to Nathan’s parents was consistent with Nathan’s wishes, we
do not agree that the factual allegations overcome the general rule that suicide is unforeseeable as
a matter of law. Turcios, 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 20. In addressing foreseeability, we ask whether the
injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his conduct. Young, 213
Ill. 2d at 446. The allegations in the complaint do not provide sufficient facts to indicate that a
reasonable person would foresee Nathan’s suicide as a likely result of Latin School’s alleged
conduct. There are simply too many gaps in the alleged causal chain to link defendant Latin
School’s conduct with Nathan’s death and overcome the rule that suicide is ordinarily
unforeseeable as a matter of law.
¶ 93 Foreseeability is a question of public policy. Id. As the supreme court said in Turcios,
suicide may result from a complex combination of psychological, psychiatric, chemical,
emotional, and environmental factors. Turcios, 2015 IL 117962, ¶ 41. We agree with the trial court
that holding Nathan’s death to be a foreseeable result of what was largely alleged inaction would
be an impossibly onerous standard. Particularly when Nathan had not been a student at Latin
School for 28 days, during which time he was on vacation and in his parents’ continuous control.
Even assuming suicide could ever be a foreseeable result of defendant Latin School’s alleged
actions or inaction, how deeply intertwined with the personal lives of students and their most
intimate, private struggles would school staff need to be to foresee something that Nathan’s private
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mental health counselor did not when they saw him the same day as his suicide? The fact that a
consequence is merely possible does not suffice for causation. Mengelson, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 75.
¶ 94 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing this count and we need not address
any further arguments regarding the existence of a duty or any immunity on the part of defendant
Latin School.
¶ 95 F. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress—Count IV
¶ 96 Count IV of plaintiffs’ complaint, a survival action directed at all defendants, alleged the
intentional infliction of emotional distress in that defendants perpetrated a number of extreme and
outrageous acts against Nathan, including but not limited to: (1) taking no action to investigate,
address, and prevent the bullying of Nathan; (2) permitting a teacher to berate and bully Nathan in
class; (3) failing to enforce policies in the Latin School’s handbook; (4) failing to inform Nathan’s
parents about the bullying he received; and (5) conveying to Nathan that it was his responsibility
to figure out how to survive at Latin School.
¶ 97 The trial court’s ruling dismissed this count on the basis that plaintiffs’ allegations did not
rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct, nor did they show intent on the part of
defendants to cause Nathan emotional distress.
¶ 98 To properly plead a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
plead facts that establish that: (1) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (2) the
defendant either intended that their conduct should inflict severe emotional distress or knew that
there was a high probability that their conduct would cause severe emotional distress; and (3) the
defendant’s conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress. Kornick v. Goodman, 2023 IL App
(2d) 220197, ¶ 13.
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¶ 99 Intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be based on “mere insults, indignities,
threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.” Duffy v. Orlan Brook Condominium
Owners’ Ass’n, 2021 IL App (1st) 113577, ¶ 36. An objective standard, based on all the facts and
circumstances, determines whether conduct is extreme or outrageous. Id. Extreme and outrageous
behavior requires conduct that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, such that a reasonable
person would hear the facts and be compelled to feelings of resentment and outrage. Id. In
determining whether behavior is extreme and outrageous, courts may consider whether the
defendant abused a position of actual or apparent authority over the plaintiff, or abused the power
to affect the plaintiff’s interests or where the defendant was aware that the plaintiff was particularly
susceptible to emotional distress due to some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. Id.
¶ 100 In this appeal, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint
did not sufficiently allege intent or the existence of extreme and outrageous conduct. While
defendant Latin School responds to these arguments, they further claim that plaintiffs’ complaint
contains no factual allegations regarding causation. Because the issue of causation is dispositive,
we need not address any other arguments regarding the sufficiency of this claim.
¶ 101 Having reviewed plaintiffs’ 166-page complaint, there is a noticeable absence of
allegations which link any of defendant Latin School’s actions or inactions to Nathan’s mental
state or eventual suicide. To be sure, plaintiffs’ complaint makes conclusory allegations that, “The
Latin Defendants’ extreme and outrageous conduct did, in fact, cause Nate severe emotional
harm,” and that “Nate’s emotional harm from Latin Defendants’ conscious disregard to known
and/or foreseeable bullying, cyberbullying, hate speech and/or other harassment of Nate was so
severe that it resulted in Nate taking his own life.” But conclusory allegations are not facts.
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¶ 102 Illinois is a fact pleading jurisdiction. Welsh, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 155. A plaintiff must allege
facts essential to the cause of action under which recovery is sought. Id. A pleading which merely
paraphrases the elements of a cause of action in conclusory terms is not sufficient. Id.
¶ 103 There are any number of allegations in the complaint about defendant Latin School’s
conduct or lack of action. There are also numerous allegations about Nathan’s struggles during his
time as a student at Latin School. But there are no factual allegations linking the two. For example,
Nathan is not alleged to have received any mental health treatment because of defendants’ conduct
or made any statements that would link his mental health or suicide to defendants’ actions. As with
any tort action, plaintiffs must allege actual and proximate causation of the injury by the
defendant’s conduct. Hayes v. Illinois Power Co., 225 Ill. App. 3d 819, 826 (1992). Such causation
cannot be “contingent, speculative, or merely possible.” Mengelson, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 75.
¶ 104 Without factual allegations establishing causation, plaintiffs cannot state a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and we need not reach the remaining arguments
regarding whether plaintiffs sufficiently pled the elements of intent or extreme and outrageous
conduct. Accordingly, the portion of the trial court’s judgment dismissing this count is affirmed.
¶ 105 G. Whether Plaintiffs Should be Allowed to Replead
¶ 106 Finally, plaintiff Robert Bronstein contends on appeal that the trial court abused its
discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice rather than affording plaintiffs an
opportunity to replead. Plaintiff identifies Counts III through V as those which they should have
been permitted to replead.
¶ 107 The trial court’s order denying plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider set out the timeline in this
case. On April 25, 2022, plaintiffs filed an initial complaint. On November 10, 2022, plaintiffs
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filed a first amended complaint which added new parties and dismissed others. On July 24, 2023,
plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The second amended complaint contained 807
paragraphs over 170 pages. On defendants’ motion, the trial court struck a number of paragraphs
from that complaint, but gave plaintiffs leave to file a third amended complaint which also added
two more defendants. Plaintiffs then filed their third amended complaint, which contained 797
paragraphs spanning 166 pages.
¶ 108 The trial court concluded that after 16 months, and four iterations of their voluminous
complaint, plaintiffs “could not, based on the factual scenario presented, ever adequately plead the
causes of actions [sic] which were being dismissed.” It further explained, “Nowhere does the Court
state or suggest in its 5/21/24 Order that there were any ‘gaps’ in the factual allegations to bring
the case within those causes of action, or that the Court believed plaintiffs could ever plead the
case into existence as to those dismissed counts. It was clear to the Court that further pleadings
would not cure the clear legal deficiencies affecting the dismissed counts.”
¶ 109 As a rule, the trial court’s ruling to allow or deny an amendment is a matter of discretion
and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Cook ex rel. Cook v. AAA Life Ins. Co.,
2014 IL App (1st) 123700, ¶ 40. A trial court abuses its discretion when it refuses to allow a
plaintiff to amend his complaint when a cause of action can be stated if the amendment is
permitted. Id. However, a party does not have a right to unlimited amendments. Plocar v. Dunkin’
Donuts of America, Inc., 103 Ill. App. 3d 740, 750 (1981). The trial court may bring the litigation
to an end when it believes that further amendments to pleadings will not further the interests of
justice. Id.
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¶ 110 Here, the trial court’s ruling on plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider makes its motivation for
denying leave to file further amendments clear. After 16 months and multiple iterations of a
massive and voluminous complaint, the trial court did not believe the pleading defects were the
result of factual gaps that could still be filled. Instead, the trial court believed that if plaintiffs had
the allegations to sufficiently state a cause of action for one of the dismissed counts, given the
thoroughness of the complaints, they would have already done so.
¶ 111 We agree. The complaint before us is thorough and comprehensive. It documents in
tremendous detail the numerous interactions plaintiffs had with defendants both before and after
Nathan’s death, defendants’ conduct, Nathan’s struggles, and plaintiffs’ considerable efforts to get
Nathan the help he needed. As an illustrative example, we have discussed the insufficiency of the
complaint as to the element of causation throughout this opinion. Thus far, plaintiffs have not
identified any statements Nathan made to his family or school staff or outside mental health
professionals, or any other fact, that tied his emotional distress or decision to end his own life to
the actions or inactions of defendants. After four versions of their complaint, we can only conclude
that such facts do not exist.
¶ 112 An abuse of discretion occurs only when the trial court’s decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or
unreasonable or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.
Seymour v. Collins, 2015 IL 118432, ¶ 41. This definition does not describe the trial court’s
decision to dismiss the above counts with prejudice. The trial court’s conclusion that, after four
versions of a complaint and multiple years, plaintiffs could not sufficiently state a cause of action
for the dismissed counts was reasonable.
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¶ 113 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims with prejudice and
refusing to allow re-pleading.
¶ 114 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 115 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
¶ 116 Affirmed.
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Bronstein v. Latin School of Chicago, 2026 IL App (1st) 242271
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 22-L-3763;
the Hon. Scott D. McKenna, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Doug Albritton, of Actuate Law LLC, of Chicago, and Danielle for J. Gould and Alexander D. Marks, of Burke, Warren, MacKay Appellant: & Serritella, P.C., of Chicago, for appellant.
Attorneys Michael T. Reagan, of Law Offices of Michael T. Reagan, of for Ottawa, and Michael T. Trucco, Brian E. Martin and Jackie C. Appellee: Condella, of Stamos & Trucco LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.
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